| CEDEAO, Cour de justice de la communauté des etats de l'afrique de l'ouest, 27 février 2019, ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/19

COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE,
ECOWAS
COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA COMMUNATE,
CEDEAO
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICA DA COMMUNIDADE,
CEDEAO
IN THE COMMUNITY No. 10 DAR ES SALAAM
D CRESCENT OFF AMINU KANO
CRESCENT, WUSE II, ABUJA-
5j À NIGERIA. PMB 567 GARKI, ABUJA TEL: 234-9-78 22 801
Website: www.courtecowas.org
COURT OF JUSTICE OF ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)
HOLDEN IN ABUJA NIGERIA ON THEBI7"" OF BC, 2019 SUIT NO: ECW/CCI/APP/06/18
JUDGMENT NO. ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/19
BETWEEN:
JUSTICE JOSEPH WOWO PLAINTIFF
AND
THE REPUBLIC OF THE AL DEFENDANT
COMPOSITION OF THE COURT:
HON. JUSTICE EDWARD AMOAKO ASANTE - PRESIDING
HON. JUSTICE GBERI-BE QUATTARA - MEMBER
HON. JUSTICE KEIKURA BANGURA - MEMBER
ASSISTED BY:
MR. TONY ANENE-MAIDOH - BM REGISTRAR JUDGMENT
PARTIES
The Plaintiff is a Ak and a former BM Justice of the Republic of The AL.
Although the Plaintiff initially designated two Defendants in this suit; namely the
Republic of The AL and its Ministry of Justice, the Court, in line with its
jurisprudence struck out the name of the latter as it is bereft of a legal personality
distinct from that of the State, being just a constituent part and the legal arm of the
Defendant. See the case of HOPE DEMOCRATIC PARTY & ANOR. V. THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AND 5 ORS. Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/04/15 where the Court
held that “2°” through 6‘ Defendants not being competent parties/Defendants
before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, the case against these
defendants is ruled inadmissible (...) and they are dropped as improper parties
before the Court, and the case accordingly dismissed severally and jointly”.
In effect the only defendant in the instant suit is the Republic of the AL a
Member State of the ECOWAS, and a signatory to the At Bg establishing
the ECOWAS.
THE PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY OF FACTS
The application is premised on an alleged violation by the Defendant of the
Plaintiffs legitimate rights as enshrined in Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 & 19 of the Ah
BB, Articles 6 & 7 of the BF BQ BI AR A and section 24
of the 1997 Constitution of The AL.
The Plaintiff avers that he served as BM Justice of the Republic of The AL in
2013, under the administration of President Yahaya Jammeh.
Plaintiff claims that owing to his nationality, he suffered discrimination by most of
the members of The AL Bar to the extent that the then Bar President, Ms
Aw Bl and the Minister of Justice, Ms. Al Ae, sometime in the year 2013,
made frivolous allegations of corruption against him which led to the Plaintiff’s
removal from office without prior investigation. The Plaintiff states that he
contested his removal through the security authority who initiated an investigation
into the matter. At the completion of the investigation, the Plaintiff anticipated the
announcement of the outcome by the office of the then President Yahaya Jammeh
which until date has not been announced. The Plaintiff contends that the refusal to
announce the outcome of the investigation is hinged on the realization of the falsity
of the allegations made against him.
According to the Plaintiff, in view of this development, he called for a press
conference to publicly state that the allegations of corruption made against him
were false and that the President erred in removing him from office without
compliance with the proper procedure. The then President, according to the
Plaintiff perceived his action as an affront to his authority so publicly declared that
he must be put in jail.
The Plaintiff avers that the then Minister of Justice, under the instructions of the
then President, filed a frivolous case against him on allegations of abuse of office
and false information under sections 90, 112, 102 and 106 (i) (d) of the Criminal
Code, vol iii Revised Laws of The AL.
The Plaintiff states that while he was in office, he was reliably informed by some
staff of the BP of compilation of documents that was done in the BP
without recourse to the proper procedure. Plaintiff went on to say that upon hearing this, and in his capacity as the acting BM Justice, he wrote a letter to the
National Av Ay AKBh) to investigate the issue.
It is the case of the Plaintiff that upon investigations, a report dated the 18" of
December, 2012, was produced which clearly commended the Plaintiff and
indicted two others. The plaintiff claims that to his utter surprise, he who has been
commended was charged and convicted for false information whereas the two
persons indicted by the report were not charged with any offence.
He further states that prior to his trial, he was presiding over a case of corruption
as the BM Justice, involving one Justice Az Bo. He says upon his
removal from office, his successor assigned his own trial to the said judge who was
standing trial before him. Another perplexing concern of the Plaintiff is that the
prosecution of his case was remitted to one Ba Ag, a state Counsel who is
a nephew to the trial Judge and at that time, was living in the same house with the
trial judge.
Plaintiff claims that during the trial, his Counsel filed a motion urging the trial Judge
to recuse himself from proceeding with the matter based on the above grounds but
the trial judge failed to do so. He further avers that, sometime in 2014, the matter
was adjourned for adoption of brief but when the case was called, the trial Judge
deliberately ignored all the documents and testimonies of witnesses, convicted
and sentenced the Plaintiff to two (2) years imprisonment.
The Plaintiff maintains that the whole trial was a charade and a well-acted drama
to achieve a pre-conceived intent of putting him in jail at all cost and without
hearing. The Plaintiff asserts that he was sent to Mile 2 prison without access to
the outside world, including his lawyers.
The plaintiff states further that upon enquiry, it was discovered that the trial Judge
in his case, Justice Az Bo did not attend the Sierra-Leone law school as
he claimed, neither did he attend any other law school.
The Plaintiff further asserts that he was granted a presidential pardon in August,
2015 as a result of pressure from the governments of Ak and BE Ar of
America.
The Plaintiff maintains that his fundamental human rights were violated by the
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court where in the latter Court, the prosecution
clearly stated that there was no case against the Plaintiff and therefore they were
not filing any brief. To this end, and without relying on any law, the Court dismissed
the case against the Plaintiff.
In Conclusion, the Plaintiff restates that he has been seriously injured by the
conduct of the Defendant by denying him the benefits of a fair, independent and
impartial trial, and therefore urged the Court to restore his rights.
On the 20% of Be 2018, the Plaintiff applied for a judgment to be entered in
default in view of the Defendant’s failure to lodge a defence within time. Before
the Court could pronounce on the Plaintiff's application for default judgment, the
Defendant on the 24” of May 2018, filed an application for extension of time within
which to file its defence, stating reasons why it was unable to file the defence within
the prescribed time. The Defendant filed its defence to the Plaintiffs application
together with its own application for extension of time.
The originating Application of the Plaintiff was initially endorsed with three reliefs
which said reliefs were amended upon application to the Court dated 14th June,
2018. The Plaintiff added an additional relief upon the grant of the amendment.
ORDERS BEING SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF
On the basis of the foregoing, the Plaintiff is seeking the following amended reliefs
from the Court:
1. A DECLARATION that the trial of the Plaintiff by the trial judge who was
undergoing some corruption allegation proceedings before him is a
violation of his human rights.
2. A DECLARATION that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff the sum of Twenty
Million US Dollars ($S20,000.000) plus six percent (6%) interest per annum
for violation of his human rights.
3. A DECLARATION that Defendant pays successful AI'’s fees.
4. A DECLARATION that the Plaintiff’s trial is a violation of his human rights.
DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY OF FACTS
In its defence filed on 24” May, 2018, the Defendant denied each and every
material allegation of fact contained in the Plaintiff’s application and contends that
the Plaintiff had a good working relationship with the AL Bar Association
during his tenure of office which commenced sometime in 2000, till his arrest and
trial for abuse of office and other offences in the year 2013.
On the alleged petition, the Defendant maintained that the said petition by the
AL Bar Association was addressed to the Judicial Service Commission alleging
serious malpractices by the Plaintiff based on certain revelations contained in an
audio recording published by the press. The Defendant stated further that the
Plaintiff was removed from office by the President in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission after investigations and due deliberations pursuant to the
petition.
The Defendant vehemently opposed the Plaintiff's assertion that the President
receives and announces outcomes of police investigations and further stated that,
on the contrary criminal investigation reports are forwarded to the office of the
Director, Public Prosecution at the AI Bd’s Chamber for legal advice and
further actions as may be necessary. The Defendant therefore maintained that the
Plaintiff was properly charged based on the outcome of the investigation report
submitted to the AI Bd An BA the police, the legal opinions and
surrounding facts.
According to the Defendant, the said investigations, only offered a limited reprieve
for the Plaintiffs actions in referring the matter to the AL National
Av Ay, and did not commend or clear the Plaintiff of any wrong doing.
The Defendant again stated that the investigation reports are not conclusive in the
sense that final decision to bring charges or not rests with the Director of Public
Prosecution.
The Defendant denied that the trial judge in his case had any corruption case before
or during the trial of the Plaintiff and that primarily informed the refusal of his
application requesting the trial judge to recuse himself from the trial since the facts
deposed to in the affidavit disclosed no grounds to warrant granting the
application. The Defendant further submitted that it did not file an affidavit in
opposition to the appeal at the Supreme Court because the allegations were
targeted at the trial Judge.
The Defendant maintained that the prosecution was led by a special litigation
counsel and assisted by a state counsel Ba Ag, who to all intents and
purposes was a state counsel at the AI Bd’s Chamber. The Defendant
claims that the Plaintiff was accorded a free and fair treatment during the trial and
the whole proceedings were witnessed by the press officials of both the American
and Ak Am without protest. In the estimation of the Defendant, the
Plaintiff was accorded all his rights as a litigant and that even his appeals were given
speedy and fair attention devoid of any deprivation of access to his Counsel while
in prison.
On the Plaintiff’s allegation about the trial judge not possessing the requisite
qualifications, the Defendant maintained that the trial judge was employed upon
meeting the requirements for employment.
The Defendant stated that the Plaintiff's case at the Supreme Court succeeded in
part to which they annexed copies of the said judgment. Furthermore, the
Defendant affirmed that the Plaintiff was granted remission of sentence as part of
a general exercise of the Presidential powers of prerogative of mercy to over three
AM (300) prisoners as published in the Ac Ap Bs AW. 21,
vol 132.
In conclusion, the Defendant reiterates that the Plaintiff's rights were never denied
at any point during the trial nor after his conviction and thus he is not entitled to
any restoration of rights as none have been violated in the first place.
THE PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO THE DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF DEFENCE
On the 31* of May 2018, the Plaintiff filed its response to the Defendant’s defence.
In his reply, the Plaintiff reiterated categorically that most of the members of the
AL Bar were not happy with his appointment due to his nationality. He also
stated that contrary to the Defendant'’s assertion, the petition from The AL
Bar dated 2"9 July, 2013, against the Plaintiff was addressed to the AI Bd
and Minister of Justice, and not to the Judicial Service Commission. The Plaintiff
further contends that the AI Bd is not a member of the Judicial Service
Commission and would at the hearing of this suit rely on the provisions of sections
145, 146, 147 and 148 of the AL Constitution 1997 as amended.
In advancing his position, the Plaintiff maintained that as the BM Justice at that
time, he was the chairman of the Judicial Council and there was no deliberations or
consultation with the President before his removal, neither was there any
investigations in that regard. Again, the fact that he was in the office performing
his duties until the close of the day on Friday, 19 July 2013, while the letter
terminating his employment which emanated from the AI Bd and
Minister of Justice, on the directives of Security operatives was received on
Bp, the 20" of July, 2013.
The Plaintiff replied to the Defendant’s statement of defence that the
investigations conducted (on abuse of office) were after the termination of his
appointment and the said investigations clearly exonerated him and that was the
reason why the prosecution refused to produce the report in Court. Plaintiff again
replied that the prosecution only produced the report on false information which equally exonerated the Plaintiff. The said report has been annexed to his
application as “ANNEXURE -5”
The Plaintiff also maintained in his reply that the matter before the Court of Appeal
was not in compliance with the Court of Appeal Rules as parties were not called to
settle the records.
The Plaintiff acknowledged that the ECOWAS Court is not a Court of Appeal to re-
open and re-litigate the matter decided at the National Courts. The Plaintiff
however maintained that the Defendant was given ample opportunity to deny the
allegations against the trial judge during the trial of the Plaintiff but they refused to
do so because the allegations were true. He further contends that one of the
prosecuting Counsel withdrew from the case in the face of the injustice to which
the records of proceedings, the ruling and judgment of the High Court clearly shows
that Mr. Ba Ag was prosecuting alone. That the Defendant is only trying to
mislead the Court in this regard.
The Plaintiff insists that he was not accorded free and fair treatment during the
trial. To this effect, letters of protest were sent by the American and the Ak
Am BN the AL Ap. He also maintained that he was not
allowed access to his Counsel while in Mile 2 prison. He also replied that the trial
judge fled the AL as a result of the discovery of not having the requisite
qualification and the alleged corruption charges and has since been declared
wanted by the Government of the AL.
The Plaintiff denied being among those that were granted mass pardon, but was
granted pardon on the pressure from both the Ak and BE Ar’
Governments.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff asserts that his right to fair trial was violated by the
Courts. That even at the Supreme Court, the prosecution informed the Court that
they will not file any brief because they believed that the Plaintiff had not
committed any offence, but the Court did not allow the appeal. The record of
proceedings have up till the time of filing this suit not been released despite the
Plaintiffs application.
On the 5" of July 2018, the Defendant filed a rejoinder to the Plaintiff’s reply stating
inter alia that the said petition was sent to the Judicial Service Commission and that
it was on the strength of the petition from the AL Bar Association that an
investigation was conducted. The Defendant reiterated its position that it was
based on the report of the said investigation that the Plaintiffs appointment was
rescinded by the then President.
The Defendant denied that the prosecution counsel opted out of the case on the
grounds canvassed by the Plaintiff and further states that the Counsel stopped
appearing in Court when his contract with the ministry of Justice expired as state
Counsel. The Defendant again denied receiving any letters of protest neither from
the Ah Am nor the Ak Am on the conduct of the case and
puts the Plaintiff to the strictest proof.
The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's assertions are mere speculations meant
to draw the sympathy of the Court as he was accorded all the rights he deserved
without hindrance during the course of his trial and that he was on bail throughout
his trial.
On the Plaintiffs assertion of being granted a presidential pardon, the Defendant
contends that if such pardon exists, then the Plaintiff should not complain of being
unable to secure a new job.
That the decision of the Defendant’s counsel in not filing a brief at the Supreme
Court was based on technical grounds and not that he was pessimistic in the
Appeal.
The Defendant concluded that the Plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs being
sought.
PROCEDURE
The Plaintiff on the 31° May, 2018, filed a motion seeking leave of the Court to lead
evidence for the purpose of establishing facts already asserted in his initiating
application.
On the 22" November, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiff request to lead oral
evidence after all pending interim applications have been dealt with in the
presence of respective counsel of the parties. He gave oral evidence after which
the parties were given opportunity to file written addresses if they so wished to do.
ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
At the completion of the trial, one cardinal issue stands out for resolution as could
be gleaned from both the written and oral procedures as follows:
WHETHER IT CAN BE DEDUCED FROM THE TOTALITY OF FACTS AND EVIDENCE
PRESENTED THAT THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF
THE PLAINTIFF’S RIGHTS AS ALLEGED.
The Court shall now proceed to determine the issue as set out.
The stance espoused by the Plaintiff is that the Defendant denied him a fair trial
through the unlawful termination of his employment with no regard to the proper
procedures. Advancing this position, the Plaintiff posits that his trial by a Judge
whose case he was handling prior to his trial, having publicly raised his reservations,
falls short of the guarantees of the right to be heard by an impartial and
independent tribunal. The Plaintiff further alleged that there was complete failure
to comply with the requirements of fair trial during his trial and he has suffered
discrimination by the Defendant.
The position of the Defendant is that the powers it exercised relative to the Plaintiff
were in line with its Constitution and that the Plaintiff was properly charged on the
outcome of the investigation report submitted to the AI Bd’s Chambers
by the police, as well as the legal opinions and surrounding facts.
As amply stated in the decision of the Bn Bi BI AR A [ECHR] in
the case of:
O’HALLORAN AND FRANCIS V. AU BE AS [GC], NOS. 15809/02 AND
25624/02, $ 53, ECHR 2007-II1);
“What constitutes a fair trial cannot be the subject of a single unvarying rule but
must depend on the circumstances of the particular case” The right of an accused to be tried before an impartial tribunal, as provided for both
in the BF BQ BI AR A and the Ah BB on Human
and Peoples Rights (hereinafter referred to as UDHR and ACHPR respectively) is not
only an integral component of the right to fair trial but also an unqualified right.
ARTICLE 10 OF THE BF BQ BI AR A reads:
“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of
any criminal charge against him”
ARTICLE 7 (1) OF Ah BB ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHTS also
reads:
Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises:
a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws,
regulations and customs in force;
b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or
tribunal:
c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice;
d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.
The Court’s primary concern under the above mentioned instruments is to evaluate
the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings. The contemporary approach to the
determination of whether or not a trial has met the requirements of fair trial must
be devoid of piecemeal approach but rather every aspect of the trial ought to be
meticulously examined.
In the instant case, to enable the Court resolve the sole issue as set out (supra), the
evaluation of the overall fairness of the proceedings warrants the determination of
the following sub-issues:
> Whether or not the Plaintiffs nationality accounted for his dislike by
members of the AL Bar which resulted in the alleged discrimination
against him;
> Whether or notthe trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself from the trial of the
Plaintiff amounted to a breach of fair trial rules in the circumstance of this
case.
> Whether or not the trial of the Plaintiff in its entirety followed due process.
The above issues will now be addressed in seriatim.
For the avoidance of doubt, and before the determination of the issues, it is
imperative to point out that this court does not constitute itself as an appellate
chamber to interfere with the findings of the national Courts. However, once
human rights violation are alleged, it invokes its jurisdiction to examine whether or
not there has been a violation. The Court will therefore concern itself only in cases
of apparent non-compliance with the relevant laws which the member states have
ratified, to ascertain whether or not there has been a violation by the member
state.
The above caveat has been reiterated in a number of cases by this Court including
MUSA LEO KEITA V. MALI (2004-2009) pg. 65, where the court declared that it had
no jurisdiction to adjudicate on a judgment delivered by the court of a member
state.
Also in BH Bc AO Au BD BI BL (2004-2009) CCJELR,
pg. 232 para. 60, the court held that it does not have the mandate to examine the
laws of member states of the community in abstracto but rather, to ensure the
protection of rights of individuals whenever such individuals are victims of the
violation of those rights which are recognized as theirs, and the court does so by
examining concrete cases brought before it.
The Court shall now proceed to consider the issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF’S NATIONALITY ACCOUNTED FOR HIS DISLIKE
BY MEMBERS OF THE AL BAR WHICH RESULTED IN THE ALLEGED
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HIM.
The Plaintiff maintained that his nationality prompted dislike and discord by
members of the AL Bar. The Defendant in debunking his claim argued that
the Plaintiff had a good working relationship with the Bar Association since he
stepped into office sometime in 2000, till his arrest and trial for abuse of office and
other offences.
The Plaintiff reiterated emphatically that most of the members of the AL Bar
were not happy with his appointment due to his nationality.
It is important that the context in this case relative to this issue be put to its rightful
perspective. In doing so, the Court will reproduce verbatim the claims of the
Plaintiff in respect of his allegation of discrimination as contained in paragraphs 5
and 6 of his Initiating Application filed at the Registry of the Court on 22"* Ax,
2018 as follows:
5. The Plaintiff further states that because he is not a AL
citizen, most of the members of the AL Bar were not happy
with his appointment.
6. That sometime in 2013 some members of the AL Bar
Association including the then President Ms. Aw Bl and the
Minister of Justice Ms. Al Ae went to the then President Alhaÿi
Yahaya Jammeh and made frivolous allegation of corruption
against the Plaintiff and without any investigation, the Plaintiff
was removed from office.
Comparative information available to the Court gleaned from the pleadings of the
parties clearly established that the Plaintiff was appointed by the Defendant as a
judge, was assigned a role as the acting BM Justice at a point in time and was
eventually appointed as the BM Justice. Throughout these stages of the Plaintiff's
engagement with the Defendant, the Defendant was aware of the nationality of
the Plaintiff and yet entrusted into his hands the highest office of the third arm of
governance in the Defendant state.
The allegations of human rights violation in this suit is against the Defendant and
not the AL Bar Association as a body. The Court notes that the fact that the
decision to remove from office and to prosecute him emanated from the petition
by the AL Bar Association — does not prove the allegation of discrimination
by the AL Bar Association. The mere allegation of discrimination without
more is itself sufficient to prove an issue of discrimination against the Defendant.
What was important was the fact that the Plaintiff's guilt or innocence was
determined by established legal framework in accordance with the evidence presented and that the process leading to the Plaintiff’s indictment and subsequent
trial were neither hostile nor in breach of the established guaranteed procedural
rights of an accused to such an extent that the fairness of his trial was prejudiced.
Indeed, whether the Plaintiff’s removal from office by the then President of the
Defendant pursuant to the said petition by the AL Bar Association was
without investigation or not, is an issue in itself to be interrogated by Court in this
trial, and that fact does not impute discrimination on the part of the AL Bar
Association.
Imputing to the Defendant an alleged hatred by the AL Bar Association on
the ground of the Plaintiff’s nationality, in the face of comparative information
available to the Court including his appointment to the highest judicial functions, is
far-fetched an attribution this Court considers unsustainable. In any case, the
Plaintiff has not been able to discharged the burden of proof required of him as
stated in the case of Aq BR, WAIDI MOUSTAPHA v. THE REPUBLIC OF
BENIN & 2 ORS (2012) CCJELR 1., where this Court held that:
“as always, the onus of proof is on a party who asserts a fact and who will fail if
that fact fails to attain that standard of proof that will persuade the Court to
believe the statement of the claim”.
Discrimination in this context, even if presumable against the AL Bar
Association, which has not been proven, cannot be attributed to the Defendant
herein. The Court, therefore finds that the issue of discrimination based on
nationality alleged by the Plaintiff has not been sufficiently proven and same is
hereby dismissed.
The Court will now consider the next issue which the Plaintiff has placed much
reliance on in establishing that his trial was bereft of the needed fairness as
required by the various instruments underpinning his case:
WHETHER OR NOT AU Y BO’S REFUSAL TO RECUSE HIMSELF FROM THE
TRIAL OF THE PLAINTIFF AMOUNTED TO A BREACH OF FAIR TRIAL RULES IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
It is trite that a charge or allegation of bias against a sitting judge must be
satisfactorily proved on the balance of probabilities by the person alleging same
and any flimsiest pretext should fail else accused persons would be choosing their
own judges whenever a criminal case is instituted against them.
The evidence before the Court brings to light the Plaintiff's aspersions to the effect
that the trial Judge before whom his matter was heard, had a likelihood of bias
against him. The relevant portions of the Plaintiff’s pleadings on the issue are as
contained in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Plaintiff’s Initiating Application cited
above reads as follows:
25. “The Plaintiff states that Justice Bm Bb who replaced him
and Ms Al Ae who was the Minister of Justice at the time of
the plaintiffs supposed trial were aware that the trial judge,
Justice Az Bo was having some pending corruption
allegation matter before the plaintiff as the BM Justice and
everybody knows the zero tolerance policy of the plaintiff, still
Justice Bm Bb AY the trial judge to try the plaintiff
which was a gross violation of the plaintiffs human right.
26. The Plaintiff further states that his counsel filed à motion for the
trail judge to recuse himself due to the above reason and the
prosecution, knowing it was a fact did not file any affidavit in
opposition to dispute the fact, still the trial judge refused to recuse
himself which is à clear gross violation of the plaintiff human
rights. The plaintiff will rely on the said motion and ruling at the
trial of this case”.
In effect, the gravamen of the Plaintiff’s allegation is that while he was in office,
there was a pending case before him on corruption to which the trial Judge was
involved and that the BM Justice who replaced him assigned his own trial to the
said judge. Another perplexing concern is that the Plaintiff's case had been assigned
to one Ba Ag, a state Counsel who is a nephew to the trial Judge and at
that time, was living in the same house with the trial judge.
In response to this assertion, the Defendant denied the existence of any pending
case and maintained that the prosecution was led by a special litigation counsel,
one Mr. Agiah and assisted by a state counsel Ba Ag, who for all intents
and purposes was a state counsel at the AI Bd’s Chamber.
One fundamental point which needs to be clarified by the Court is whether or not
the trial judge was indeed a subject of corruption proceedings before the Plaintiff
when the former was assigned as the trial judge over the Plaintiff's trial. The
Plaintiff who bears the burden of proof, in his pleading averred as reproduced
above. When same was denied by the Defendant, the Plaintiff in his oral evidence
before the Court on the 22"Ÿ November, 2018, at page seven (7) of the verbatim,
stated as follows:
“Yes, the judge, Justice Az Bo was undergoing a corruption
proceedings before me. And when the matter came up in the AL, my
lawyers filed a motion that the judge recuse himself based on two (2) major
grounds. That the judge was undergoing a corruption proceeding under me, and
that the nephew of the judge, Legunju was the one prosecuting. And because |
was not in the (...) at the time of my trial; ! finished work on Friday, and the next
day Bp was when | received a letter from the Security Agents that | have
been relieved of my duties. So when the case commenced, | was not having
access to all the files”.
The Defendant’s counsel who was given opportunity to cross examine the Plaintiff
did not dispute this piece of evidence of the Plaintiff.
Again, the Plaintiff attached to his initiating application the said motion filed against
the trial judge to recuse himself and the ruling by the Court as ANNEXURE “1” &
“2”. At page four (4) of the ruling by the trial judge (Annexure “2”), the judge
commenting on the allegation that he was undergoing corruption proceeding
before the Plaintiff which has generated hostility and animosity stated as follows:
“It must be noted that the allegation of hostility and animosity are issues which
allegedly occurred long before the 1st accused/applicant was charged to court,
talk less of being made to appear before me. And suffice | tot state that the 1°
accused/applicant has appeared before me three times at the pre-trial phase of
this matter.”
From the above pieces of evidence adduced by the Plaintiff, and contrary to the
denial by the defendant, the Court finds as a fact duly proven, that the trial judge
was undergoing corruption proceedings before the Plaintiff when he was the BM Justice. The allegation made that one Ag Ba was also a nephew of
the trial judge, the Court finds relevant to the issue of controversy.
In determining whether there is a legitimate reason to fear that the Judge lacked
independence or impartiality, it is important to ascertain the standpoint of the
accused and whether his doubts can be held to be objectively justified.
In GABRIEL INYANG & ANOR V. AP (2018), the court stated that:
“For the applicants to succeed in an application for a violation of their right to
fair trial, (...) it must be shown that the trial was in breach of international
standard”.
The Plaintiff maintained that he objected to the determination of his fate by the
trial Judge vide an application which he annexed as evidence before the Court. The
trial Judge however failed to recuse himself and stated that the Plaintiff has not
disclosed any reasonable ground to warrant a recusal.
The Defendant on the other hand argued that the Plaintiff did not disclose any fact
that will warrant the trial Judge to be seen to have breached any Section of the
BO Aa Code of Conduct Act Cap 7:09 of the laws of The AL
particularly Section 5 which basically provides the duty of a judge to be impartial
and fair in the exercise of his judicial duties by according every person a right to be
heard. The Defendant concluded that the allegations made by the Plaintiff are mere
speculations.
The right to be heard guaranteed under Article 7 of the Ah BB provides as
follows:
“Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises:
a) The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations
and customs in force;
b) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or
tribunal;
c) The right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice;
d )The right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal
In AMOUZOU HENRI & ORS V. REPUBLIC OF COTE D’IVOIRE (2009) CCJELR pg. 297
para 57-58, the Court stressed that the right to fair hearing is guaranteed by
Articles 10 of the UDHR, Article 7 of the ACHPR, and Article 14 of the ICCPR (Cited
above). That the UDHR and the ACHPR are legal instruments that all ECOWAS
Member States, including the Defendant are signatories. At the community level,
their eminent importance has been underlined, notably by the affirmation from
member states which vowed to expressly respect them.
It is imperative to point out the provisions of Section 10 (4) of the BO
Aa Code Act Cap 7:09 of The AL which provides:
“a judge must disqualify himself or herself from sitting in a case where there is
actual conflict of interest or where the circumstances are such that a
reasonable-fair minded and informed person would reasonably apprehend a
perceived conflict”
In ANNEXTURE “1”, the Plaintiff inter-alia expressed his fears observing the
occurrences especially the attitude and utterances of the Judge in the matter,
which extended to the Plaintiff's Counsel and made him uncomfortable to which
he threatened to withdraw from his case. The Plaintiff also reiterated that the trial
Judge had served under him both as acting BM justice and BM justice and on the
two occasions, the Plaintiff had issued instructions to him to which the Judge was
hostile and questioned such instructions. The Plaintiff further made mention of the
petition against the trial Judge to which the Plaintiff expressed certain views not
favorable to the trial Judge.
In the said affidavit, the Plaintiff stated that he raised and argued a preliminary
objection against the state to which the Judge overruled and granted the
application without hearing on the merit. Furthermore, the Plaintiff stated that at
times during the trial, the Judge tried to reshape the prosecution’s questions for
witnesses to his detriment especially when the case was handled by the Judge’s
nephew who to the best of the Plaintiff’s knowledge lives with him.
An allegation of bias in any adjudication process is a matter that courts take very
seriously. The assertions made on oath must be viewed from an objective and
reasonable standpoint. It is often impossible to determine with any measure of
precision the state of mind of an adjudicator who has rendered a verdict.
Accordingly, the courts take the position that an appearance of impartiality is in
itself an essential component of procedural fairness.
The test applicable to determine whether a judicial officer is disqualified from
hearing a case by reason of a reasonable apprehension of bias was enunciated in
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHERS V C Ah
AN AQ UNION AND OTHERS. 1 [1999] ZACC 9; 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC)
para 48. In that case the Constitutional Court said:
‘It follows from the foregoing that the correct approach to this application for the
recusal of members of this court is objective and the onus of establishing it rests
upon the applicant. The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed
person would on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the judge has not or
will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case that is a
mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel.(...). It must
be assumed that they can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or
predispositions. They must take into account the fact that they have a duty to sit in
any case in which they are not obliged to recuse themselves. At the same time, it
must never be forgotten that an impartial judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a
fair trial and a judicial officer should not hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there
are reasonable grounds on the part of a litigant for apprehending that the judicial
officer, for whatever reasons, was not or will not be impartial.
The Bn Bi BI AR A Z AT AH Au AZ (2016) ECHR,
reiterated that impartiality, within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention,
(which is in pari materia with the provisions in ACHPR) normally denotes the
absence of prejudice or bias. There are two tests for assessing whether a tribunal
is impartial: the first consists in seeking to determine a particular judge’s personal
conviction or interest in a given case (subjective test); and the second in
ascertaining whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any
legitimate doubt in this respect (objective test). In the first test, the impartiality of
a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary. The second test
determines whether there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to the
impartiality of a body sitting as a bench. In this respect, even appearances may be
of some importance, but what is decisive is whether the fear can be held to be objectively justified. See also PANYIK V. B, (2011) APP NO 12748/06 ECHR
Strasbourg. Again in MORICE v. FRANCE (2015) APP NO. 29369/10, ECHR, it was
stated that an Applicant who had argued nevertheless that the very presence of a
judge on the bench presiding over his case had created a situation which justified
his fears of lack of impartiality, the court thus examined the case from the
perspective of the objective impartiality test, addressing the question whether the
Applicant’s doubts could be regarded as objectively justified in the circumstances.
The Court held in the affirmative that due to the previous judicial proceedings
between the judge and the Applicant, the Applicant’s fears were objectively
justified. Thus any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a
lack of impartiality must withdraw.
The Court is convinced that the grounds disclosed by the Plaintiff were sufficient to
ground his fears of bias and impartiality and the judge ought to have withdrawn
from the case. The mere stating that the Plaintiff has not disclosed reasonable
grounds does not portray objectivity on the part of the Judge.
The Court is of the considered view that the powers exercised by the trial judge
were done arbitrarily eschewing improper influences. The Court therefore finds
that there were no sufficient guarantees provided to exclude legitimate doubt as
to the trial Judge’s impartiality towards the Plaintiff. Consequently, it is the finding
of the Court that the act of the Defendant in maintaining the said judge to try the
Applicant’s case, violates the provisions of Article 7 of the Ah BB on
Human and Peoples Rights.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL OF THE PLAINTIFF IN ITS ENTIRETY FOLLOWED DUE
PROCESS IN LAW.
The Plaintiff's argument in support of this issue was categorized into three; that
his appointment was terminated without regards to due process and he was
convicted without proper investigation; that he was denied access to the records
of proceedings to enable him pursue his appeal; and that there was no access to
his counsel while in Mile 2 prison.
The Defendant submitted that the trial of the Plaintiff started with an investigation
by the investigating body which formed the basis of the Plaintiff's arrest and trial
and that the trial was in accordance with due process.
As regards the pre-trial stage (inquiry, investigation), the Court considers criminal
proceedings as a whole, including the pre-trial stage of the proceedings since the
fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply
with the necessary pre-trial procedural rights of the accused.
In the case of VERA BJ Au AJ, APP. NO. 108114, the ECHR
reiterated this point when it delivered itself as follows:
“Although investigating officers do not determine a “criminal charge”, the steps
taken by them have a direct influence on the conduct and fairness of the
subsequent proceedings, including the actual trial. Accordingly, Article 6 (1) may
be held to be applicable to the investigation procedure conducted by an
investigating officer, although some of the procedural safeguards envisaged by
Article 6 (1) might not apply”.
Due process of law is interpreted here as rules that are administered through courts
of justice or tribunals in accordance with established and sanctioned legal
principles and procedures; with safeguards for the protection of individual rights.
It has not been disputed that the Plaintiff was at some point the acting BM Justice
and BM Justice of The AL. The defendant has a statutory legal framework
dealing with persons who occupy such judicial positions and the said legal
framework has its own prescribed set of rules and procedures as well as sanctions.
Thus, it can be rightly said that where there is an allegation against a Judge of a
superior Court, a procedure is in place for the investigation, discipline and
appropriate sanctions where the circumstance of the case so demand.
To this end, Section 141 (2) (c) of the 1997 Constitution of The AL as amended
provides that:
“Subject to the provisions of this section, a Judge of a Superior Court may have his
or her appointment terminated by the President in consultation with the Judicial
Service Commission”.
Section 141 (4) of the said Constitution provides that:
“The BM Justice, a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the
High court and members of the Ad Bq Bi may only be removed from
office for inability to perform the functions of his or her judicial office, whether
arising from infirmity of body or mind, or for misconduct”.
By virtue of Section 141 (5) of the AL Constitution, a Judge may be removed
from his or her office if notice in writing is given to the Speaker, signed by not less
than one-half of all the voting members of the National Bt, of a motion that
the judge is unable to exercise the functions of his or her office on any of the
grounds stated in subsection (4) and proposing that the matter should be
investigated under this section.
Even though the Defendant contended that there was investigation into the
allegations against the Plaintiff, this Court observes that the Defendant did not
annex any report in proof that there was an investigation stricto sensu. The only
document relevant to this issue from the Defendant’s pleadings is the Charge Sheet
from the national Courts. In the said Charge Sheet, the Court observes that charges
contained in counts 6, 7, 8 & 9 on false information are those connected with the
investigation report annexed to the Plaintiff’s application as ANNEXURE “5”.
There is neither a Caution Statement nor investigation report on the allegations of
abuse of office, criminal fraud and breach of trust, conspiracy to defeat justice,
offences relating to judicial proceedings and false assumption of authority as
contained in the said Charge Sheet particularly Counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. There is also
no evidence of the Plaintiff being subjected to the Judicial Service Commission or a
judicial tribunal as the case may be in his capacity as a former BM Justice.
Lord Phillips in a hearing on the Report of the BM Justice of Gibraltar [2009] UKPC
43 stated at paragraph 1 stated that:
“The independence of the BP requires that a judge should never be
removed without good cause and that the question of removal be determined
by an appropriate independent and impartial tribunal. The principle applies with
particular force where the judge in question is a BM Ao”
The Defendant maintained that the petition was addressed to the Judicial Service
Commission alleging serious malpractices by the Plaintiff based on certain
revelations contained in an audio recording published by the press. That the Plaintiffs removal was effected after investigations and due deliberations in
consultation with the Judicial Service Commission.
The Plaintiff on the other hand argued that the petition from the AL Bar
dated 2"9 July, 2013, against him was addressed to the AI Bd and
Minister of Justice, and not to the Judicial Service Commission. The Plaintiff further
contends that the AI Bd is not a member of the Judicial Service
Commission and placed reliance on the provisions of sections 145, 146, 147 and
148 of the 1997 AL Constitution as amended.
In buttressing his position, the Plaintiff maintained that as the BM Justice at that
material time, he was the chairman of the Judicial Service Commission and there
was no deliberation or consultation with the President before his removal, neither
was there any investigation in that regard. More to this is the fact that he was in
the office performing his duties until the close of work on Friday, 19 July 2013,
and the letter terminating his employment which emanated from the AI
Bd and Minister of Justice, on the directives of Security operatives was
received on Bp, the 20" of July, 2013.
Pursuant to Section 141 (7) of the Defendants Constitution, the National Bt
shall by a resolution appoint a tribunal consisting of three persons, at least one of
whom shall hold or shall have held high judicial office, who shall be the chairman
of the tribunal, who shall investigate the matter and shall report to the National
Bt through the Speaker whether or not it finds the allegations specified in
the motion to have been substantiated.
Where the Tribunal finds any such allegation substantiated and reports to the
National Bt, the National Bt shall consider the report at the first convenient sitting and if, on a motion supported by the votes of not less than two-
thirds of all the members, the National Bt resolves that the judge be
removed from office, the judge shall immediately cease to hold office.
In RE: JUDGE PAMELA J. WHITE Court of Appeals of Maryland in Misc. No. 5
February 22, 2017, it was stated that an accused Judge is entitled to these elements
of procedural due process: notice, an opportunity to respond, a fair hearing —
regardless of the outcome — i.e., whether the Commission ultimately decides to
dismiss the charges, reprimand the judge, or recommend that we censure,
discipline, or remove the judge. The Court further stated that an accused judge is
entitled to a fair proceeding, but not necessarily a perfect proceeding.
From the facts and evidence adduced by both parties, there is nothing to show or
prove that the relevant provisions as cited above were complied with by the
Defendant relative to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff states that there was no
investigation, neither was there any consultation with the Chairman of Council with
regards to his removal. The Defendant on the other hand merely stated that due
process was complied with without adducing evidence in proof. No copies of the
investigation report, and other relevant documents in compliance with the
provisions of section 141 of the constitution above.
On the issue of the investigation, the Defendant has not sufficiently discharged the
requirement of proof upon it as stated in the case of Aq BR, WAIDI
MOUSTAPHA v. THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN & 2 ORS (cited supra).
In ASSIMA KOKOU INNOCENT & ORS v. REPUBLIC OF TOGO (2013)
CCJELR 187 pg. 201 & 202 para 59, this Court insisted that “before it concludes
on the issue of occurrence of human rights violation, the concrete proof of the fact
upon which the Applicants’ based their claims must be established with high
degree of certainty, or at least there must be a high possibility of the claims
appearing to be true upon scrutiny. In this regard, mere allegations do not suffice
to elicit the conviction of the Court”.
The Court recalls its earlier affirmation that it considers the pre-trial stage
(investigation) as an essential component of a criminal proceedings since the quality
or otherwise of investigation is likely to affect the overall fairmess of the trial. To
this end, the Court holds that the Plaintiff was removed from office as BM Justice
of The AL and subsequently tried and convicted without proper investigation
which compromised the due process required in the case of the Plaintiff.
In the decided case of Ab Au AX, NO. 9300/81, COMMISSION’S REPORT OF
12 JULY 1984, & 48, SERIES A NO. 96), the ECHR had this to say;
“Compliance with the requirements of a fair trial must be examined in each case
having regard to the development of the proceedings as a whole and not on the
basis of an isolated consideration of one particular aspect or one particular
incident, although it cannot be excluded that a specific factor may be so decisive
as to enable the fairness of the trial to be assessed at an earlier stage in the
This Court is not unaware of the fact that the Plaintiff has equally raised other aspects
of his trial that compromised the required due process and fairness provided for
under the international instruments he has cited in support of his case. Among others,
the Plaintiff has raised issues of the impartiality and independence of the judges who
presided over his proceedings both at the trial Court and the Appellate courts,
improper evaluation of legal points raised in the proceedings, refusal and/or failure
to make the records of proceedings accessible to him and finally his inability to
consult freely his lawyer while at the Mile 2 Prisons.
Indeed, the defendant merely denied the plaintiff’s assertion that he applied for the
trial records to enable him appeal, but the defendant/its agents made it extremely
difficult for him to obtain them. The issue of not permitting the plaintiffs lawyers
to visit him in prison was also rebuffed by the defendants. However, this court deems
them very serious allegations against the due process of trial of accused persons.
Though the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to lead further evidence in proof of
these denied pleadings, the court also resorts to the credibility of the plaintiffs
evidence on the other issues as well as the mere incredible denials of the allegations
by the defendant and comes to the conclusion that it believes the plaintiff’s evidence
in its entirety, and therefore concludes that the plaintiff has established credibly that
the defendant failed to allow his access to his lawyers whilst in prison, and also that
the defendant frustrated the appeal process.
There is nothing before the Court to suggest that the trial Court acted under the
recommendation of the National Bt, the Tribunal or the Judicial Service
Commission as the case may be. There is also no evidence of a fair trial or
proceeding before a duly constituted tribunal in line with Section 141 of the
Defendant’s Constitution. In light of the above, whereas the 1997 Constitution of
AL provides the methods of initiating proceedings for the removal of a
Bk Bi BO, and whereas the provision requires the tribunal to conduct
independent investigations before making a conclusion, and whereas the Defendant has not complied with this requirements, the Court in considering the
texts creating the Judicature and in line with the principles of fair trial, holds that
the acts of the Defendant was unconstitutional, biased, lacking in independence,
amounts to non-compliance with due process and in breach of natural justice and
thereby constitute a gross violation of the Applicant’s right to fair trial.
COMPENSATION
The Plaintiff per his reliefs, prayed this Honourable Court to order the Defendant
to pay to him the sum of Twenty Million US Dollars (US$20,000.000) plus six percent
(6%) interest per annum for violation of his human rights. He further prayed for
payment by the Defendant of successful AI’s fees.
In the case of BM EBRIMAH MANNEH v. THE REPUBLIC OF THE AL (2004-
2009) CCJELR 181 pg. 194 para. 32, this Court held that:
“Having concluded that the Plaintiff’s right to his personal liberty has
been abused, the Plaintiff is entitled to some damages for the wrongs that he
has suffered. The amount of damages, however, is dependent on the facts of
this application and the relevant rules governing the award of damages”
The Court in the above case reviewed cases of the Bn Bi BI AR A
which are of persuasive effect and can help in determining the basis and quantum
of damages to be awarded. In Aj X v. STATE OF FRANCE (2005) CHR
237 and AV AG v. REPUBLIC OF CROATIA (2005) CHR 429 the ECHR
awarded damages to the successful Plaintiffs whose human rights were violated.
However, the Court, in awarding the damages; was emphatic that in awarding general damages, the circumstances of each case must be thoroughly examined
since the object of such an award is only to ensure “just satisfaction” and no more.
In this application, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated any special pecuniary
damages he suffered as a result of the violation of his rights. The closest he came
to in that direction was when he alleged that he has not been able to secure
employment as a result of his conviction by the Defendant. He was granted a
remission of sentence by the Defendant after serving part of his sentence.
In consonance with the object of human rights instruments, in cases where the
abuse has already taken place, restoration of the rights in question is paramount.
In this case, the Court is mindful of the fact the claims of the Plaintiff’s inability to
secure employment will be substantially ironed out by the findings of this Court in
this judgement. The Court considers that as enough “just satisfaction” to the
Plaintiff. The time spent by the plaintiff in prison when he was wrongfully tried and
sentenced [though he has been cleared of any stigma and cannot now be described
as an ex-convict] is the major concern of this court for which he must be
compensated. The court will exercise its discretion to award him nominal damages,
having regard to the circumstances of this case. The plaintiff is awarded
compensatory damages of One AM and Ai Br BE Ar Af
[USS150 000.00] or its equivalent in Dalasi, The AL currency.
The prayer for payment of successful AI’s fees will equally receive a
favorable consideration by the Court since the Plaintiff has been unemployed after
his removal from office and may be financially constrained in footing the bills of his
AI and the costs of this litigation. Under this head, the plaintiff is also awarded the sum of Ai Br BE Ar Af [US$50 000.00] or its
equivalent in Bf
BK OF THE COURT
1. The Court has found that the Plaintiff’s trial by the trial judge who was
undergoing some corruption allegation proceedings before him was a
violation of his human rights to fair trial.
2. Whereas the 1997 Constitution of AL provides the methods of initiating
proceedings for the removal of a Bk Bi BO, and whereas the
provision requires the tribunal to conduct independent investigations before
making a conclusion, and whereas the Defendant has not complied with this
requirements, the Court in considering the texts creating the AL
As Bi of Judicature and in line with the principles of fair trial
enshrined in International Instruments particularly UDHR and ACHPR, has
found that the acts of the Defendant relative to the Plaintiff's removal from
office, trial and conviction were biased, lacking in independence, amounts to
non-compliance with due process and in breach of natural justice and
thereby constitute a gross violation of the Plaintiff’s right to fair trial.
3. The Court awards the plaintiff nominal damages for violation of his rights to
fair hearing and for his incarceration as prayed for considering the fact that
the findings of the court are restorative enough to give just satisfaction to
the Plaintiff and clear any impediment in his efforts to secure employment.
4. The Court finds that there is justification for payment of Plaintiff's Attorney's
fees as a successful AI since the Plaintiff has not been working after
his removal from office and may be constrained in meeting the financial
obligations of his AI.
COSTS
The Plaintiff is adjudged to be entitled to costs of this application to be borne by
the Defendant, as will be assessed, under and by virtue of Article 66 of the Court’s
Rules of Procedure.
REASONS
For the reasons canvassed above, the Community Court of Justice, sitting in public
after hearing the parties, and their submissions duly considered in the light of
Article 7 and Article 10 of ACHPR and UDHR respectively, and also the
Aa Bj of the Court and the Court’s Rules of Procedure, declares
this application to be admissible in human rights and the Court enters judgment for
the Plaintiff against the Defendant, who is liable for the violation of the plaintiff's
rights.
ORDERS
Consequently, the Court orders:
i. That the Republic of The AL pays damages to the Plaintiff as well as
his AI's legal fees as assessed by this court.
ii. That the Defendant pays the costs of this action to be assessed.
THIS DECISION IS MADE, ADJUDGED AND PRONOUNCED PUBLICLY BY THIS
COURT, COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE, ECOWAS; SITTING AT ABUJA, NIGERIA
ON THE DAY 27TH FEBRUARY, 2019.
HON. JUSTICE EDWARD AMOAKO ASANTE - PRESIDING
HON. JUSTICE GBERI-BE QUATTARA - MEMBER
HON. JUSTICE KEIKURA BANGURA - MEMBER
MR. TONY ANENF-MAIDOH - BM REGISTRAR