AGEE c. ROYAUME-UNI

APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° TP29/7 6 Philip Burnett Franklin AGEE v/the UNITED KINGDOM Philip Burnett Franklin AGEE c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 17 December 1976 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 17 dÃ©cembre 1976 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 3 of the Convention : a) The fact that a Member of the Government gave brief details in Parliament of the considerations which led to the decision to deport a person, cannot be said to have involved degrading treatment . b) In normal circumstances, deportation of an alien on grounds of State security cannot be looked on as a penalty, in particular as a penalty contrery to Article 3 . Article 5 of the Convention : In order to safeguard the individual's right to "Security of person", every decision taken within the sphere of Article 5, must be in conformity with the procedural and substantive requirements laid down by an afreedy existing law. Article 6, parograph I of the Convention : a) In a State which recognises parfianrentary immunity, which is an attribute of a democratic society, there is no "civil right" to protection of reputation against statements by a parfiamentarian . b) Article 6, para. (1) does not appty to the decision to deport an alien, since it does not relate to the determination of civil rights and obligations or of a criminaf charge . Article 6 paregreph 1 of the Convention : The deportation of an individuaf does not interfere with his family life when the spouse has the possibility to follow him . Article 10, paragraph I of the Convention : In case of deportation of a journafist or a writer : Article 10 does not protect the right to reside on the territory of a State of which he is not a national. Article 11, paragraph I of the Convention : This provision does not forbid a State from deporting an alien on the ground that he has been in contact with foreign intelligence officers. Article 14 of the Convention, in conjunction with Artfcfes 5, 6 B, 10 and 11 of the Convention : The status of an afien would, in itseff, provide objective and reasonable justification for a treatment different from that applied to nationals . Article 26 of the Convention : The possibifity of requesting an authority to reconsider a decision taken by it or the possibility of making representations to a body of an advisory character, cannot be considered as effective remedies.
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Article 3 de ie Convention : a) tl n'y a pas de traitement dÃ©gradant dans le fait qu'un membre du Gouvernement a indiquA briÃ©vement devant le Parlement sur quels motifs se fondait la dÃ©cision d'expulser une personne . b) Dans des circonstances normales, l'expulsion d'un Ã©tranger pour des motifs touchant Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale ne saurait Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©e comme une peine, notamment comme une peine contraire Ã l'article 3. Article 5 de la Convention : Pour garantir la Â« sOretÃ© u de la personne, toute dAcision prise dans la sphÃ©re d'application de l'article 5 doit Ãªtre conforme aux exigences procÃ©durales et de fond d'une loi prÃ©existante. Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : e) Dans un Etat qui connait le principe de l'immunitÃ© partementaire, qui est un attribut de la rr sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique n, il n'existe pas un Â« droit de caractÃ©re civii u Ã la protection de la rÃ©putation contre les dÃ©clarations d'un partementaire . b) L Ã©rticte 6, par. 1, ne s'applique pas Ã© la dÃ©cision d'expulser un Ã©tranger, celle-ci ne portent ni sur des droits et obligations de caractÃ©re civil ni sur le bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©naie. Article 8, paregraphe 1, de la Convention : L'exputsion d'une personne ne porte pas atteinte Ã se vie familiale lorsque son conjoint a la possibilitÃ© de la suivre. Article 10, paragrephe 1, de fe Convention : Dans le cas de l'expulsion d'un journaliste ou auteur : l'article 10 ne protÃ©ge pas le droit de sÃ©journer sur le territoire d'un Etat dont on n'est pas ressortissant. Article 11, peragrephe 1, de I. Convention : Cette disposition n'interdit pas Ã un Etat d'expulser un Ã©tranger au motif qu'il a eu des contacts avec des agents de renseignement Ã©trangers .
Article 14 de la Convention, combinÃ© avec les articles 5, 6, 8, 10 et 11 de la Convention : Le statut d'Ã©tranger peut, en lui-mÃ©me, fournir la justification objective et raisonnable d'un traitement diffÃ©rent de celui appliquÃ© aux nationaux . Article 26 de la Convention : Ne constituent un recours efficace ni la possibititÃ© de demander Ã© l'autoritÃ© de reconsidÃ©rer fe dÃ©cision rendue par elle, ni la possibilitÃ© de faire des reprÃ©sentations Ã¨ un organe de ceractÃ©re consultatif .
I franpais : voir p. 176)
THE FACTS
The facts of the case as submitted on behalf of the applicant may be summarised as follows : The applicant was born in 1935 and is a citizen of the United States of America . He has been resident in the United Kingdom since October 1972 and is currently resident in Cambridge . The applicant lives with his common-law wife who is a Brazilian national who ha s lived in the United Kingdom since 1973 . The renewal of her residence permit has been under review by the Home Office since June 1976 . It is alleged that she is unable to return to Brazil for fear of persecution for political reasons, having previously been shot at, tortured under interrogation and detained for two years by the present regime in Brazil . It is believed that she is entitled to refugee status under the UN Conventio n
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on the Status of Refugees of 1951, as amended by the 1967 Protocol thereto . The applicant's two sons, who are United States citizens, also live with him . The applicant was employed for twelve years as an agent of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) . He resigned in 1969 as a result of growing disillusionment with its practices and, it is stated, he has not since been employed by it or any other intelligence agency . He has allegedly been disenchanted with aspects of the nature and modus operandi of the CIA (in particular "covert operations" techniques of infiltration and destruction of institutions) and has come to believe them to be "detrimental to the true interests of the United States and dangerously subversive of Western democratic principles" .
According to the applicant he was at no time engaged in activities involving United States-United Kingdom intelligence collaboration and did not at any time gain knowledge of United Kingdom intelligence services . To his knowledge he has no information which could plausibly jeopardise the security of the United Kingdom in any manner . In about January 1975 a book by the applicant entitled "Inside the Company CIA Diary" was published . A copy has been submitted to the Commission . The applicant described therein his work for the CIA in South America . The applicant believes that its publication caused political embarrassment to the CIA, and that this and similar publications, some written by him, provoked critical debate in the United States legislature and elsewhere about certain CIA activities, and widespread censure of the CIA for such parts of its activities . The applicant states that he has subsequently started to research and write a second book on covert CIA activity in such countries as Guatemala, the Congo, Indonesia, Brazil, Chile and in connection with the 1967 coup in Greece and subsequent events there, some of which had formed an important element in the Commission's enquiries in the "Greek case" . The applicant has allegedly been widely consulted by reputable journalists, researchers, academics and other commentators of many nationalities concerning the methods of the CIA . He insists, however, that he has never divulged information bearing upon any activities of the CIA or other Western intelligence services relating to the security of the United Kingdom or other Western European democracies . Nor is he conscious of knowing of any such activities . Since 1975 the applicant has, he states, made periodical visits abroad for the purposes of research, interviews and publishing arrangements . At times during these visits and in the United Kingdom he has been conscious of coming under surveillance . It is stated moreover that this might have been expected and that the applicant has been prudent as to the kinds of contact he has made . At no time in the past eight years, it is said, has he knowingly had contact with any member of "Soviet or allied intelligence services" . On arrival in the United Kingdom the applicant was granted leave to enter for a three-month period . He subsequently received a number of extensions of stay . A further extension was refused by letter from the Home Office dated 15 November 1976 . The letter stated inter alia that the Secretary of State had decided that the applicant's departure from the United Kingdom "would be conducive to the public good as being in the interests of national security" . The Secretary of State had accordingly decided to refuse the application for a further extension of stay and for the same reason t o
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make a deportation order against the applicant by virtue of S . 3 (5) (b) Immigration Act 1971 .
of the
The grounds for this decision are indicated in a note annexed to the letter which stated that the Secretary of State had considered information that the applicant : "'la) has maintained regular contacts harmful to the security of the United Kingdom with foreign intelligence officers , (b) has been and continues to be involved in disseminating information harmful to the security of the United Kingdom ; and Icl has aided and counselled others in obtaining information for publication which could be harmful to the security of the United Kingdom . " The letter also informed the applicant that he was not entitled to appeal against the refusal of an extension of stay or against the decision to make a deportation order . He could, however, make representations against the decision to deport him to an advisory panel . He could appear before the panel but could not be represented . To such extent as the advisers might sanction he might be assisted by a friend or arrange for third parties to testify on his behalf . He could also make representations to the Home Secretary .
The letter also pointed out that, if a deportation order were made, the applicant would have a right of appeal against removal to the country specified in the removal directions on the ground that he ought to be removed to a different country specified by him . On 29 November 1976 the applicant gave notice to the Home Secretary that he denied the allegations made against him and that he wished to appear before the advisory panel . On 30 November 1976 in a further letter he expressed concern about the value of the hearing and the apparent lack of elementary safeguards of justice . He stated that if he were to be in a position to defend himself against the allegations, he must be given further details and asked for certain specific details of the allegations and of the procedure at the hearing .
The hearing was fixed for 11 January 1977 . By letter of 2 December 1976, the Home Office stated that the Secretary of State was not prepared to add to thE statement of grounds already given . It was also said that it was implicit in the nature of the procedure, which was not adversarial, that the applicant could neither be crossexamined on behalf of the Secretary of State nor be able to conduct a crossexamination . The Advisers' advice would be communicated to the Secretary of State and would not be communicated to third parties . The allegations against the applicant were repeated in Parliament by the Home Secretary on 18 November 1976 . The case has also attracted considerable publicity in the press, and a number of press-cuttings have been submitted . It is stated that the applicant vigorously denies the allegations against him, which are said to be highly damaging to him in his professional capacity by reason of their imprecise yet defamatory nature . The applicant believes that, if deported, he would not only have to bear the stigma of deportation but would also be identified as a person who had been involved in pro-Soviet (as opposed to anti-CIA) activities . Referring to a press cutting from "The Guardian" it is suggested that he might also be identified as a person associated with the IRA or other unlawful Irish organisations . A plethors of unfounded and damaging rumour of a similar kind had been engendered by the Home Secretary's statement .
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The applicant has been advised that no action for defamation could have any chance of success because the Minister's publication of the allegations was covered by absolute privilege . The applicant alleges that deportation may prove damaging to him especially as it is not clear whether there may be an intention to prosecute him because of his writing if he were returned to the United States . He has no other nationality by virtue of which he would have a legal right to enter a third country . It is further alleged that it may prove damaging to his family life as his wife may have difficulty in entering the United States . It was not clear whether, as an alien associated with the applicant, and as one who might be deemed actively hostile to the Government of Brazil, she would be granted an entry visa with him .
Complaints The applicant submits that the treatment to which he has been subjected and which he was undergoing at the time of introduction of his application was in breach ot Arts . 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Convention whether considered in isolation or in conjunction with Art . 14 . Article 3 He submits that to subject an individual to public defamation in a manner which seriously jeopardises his career and livelihood, without possibility of domestic legal redress, constitutes degrading treatment within the meaning of Art . 3 as interpreted by the Commission in the "Greek Case" (Yearbook Xll, p . 186) . Moreover, an act of deportation might, in aggravated circumstances such as those in question, in itself be degrading treatment contrary to Art . 3 in that it amounted to an arbitrary, unjustified or disproportionate penalty (Fawcett, Application of the European Convention, p . 38) . (b) Artic% 5 Deportation also constituted so grave and arbitrary an interference with liberty and security of person, that in particular circumstances it might constitute a breach of Art . 5 . Such circumstances might include those in which a long-resident alien was subjected to removal or threat of removal by discretionary administrative decision without benefit of judicial hearing or other form of due process . The possibility of such sudden removal would, if not contained by the concept of liberty and security of person, largely if not entirely undermine the protection afforded by Art . 5 . Any other interpretation would enable governments to circumvent the rather precise protection of Art . 5 by making the very kind of order now served upon the applicant . (a)
So to interpret away the protection of this entrenched and fundamental right, afforded to alien and national alike, would, in the applicant's submission, not only provide carte blanche to a Government determined to use administrative discretion to avoid the perils of having to employ due process of law but would fly in the face of the principle of equality before the law . This principle was not only expressed in Art . 14 of the Convention . It was also one of the "general principles of law recognised by civilised nations" alluded to in Art . 38 (1) Ic) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, by reference to which all treaties bearing upon human rights should be interpreted . The applicant refers in this context to the Opinion of Judge Tanaka, in S . W. African Cases, Second Phase, lCJ Reports 196 6, p. 248 et seq.
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Icl
Article 6
The applicant further submits that the case raises grave issues for the rule of law and concept of due process in relation to Art . 6 of the Convention, such as have had to be confronted by the courts of most countries pretending to democratic standards . The applicant has in this context referred to and quoted from judgments given in the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Jay v. Boyd (351 U.S . 345) ( 1955), Greene v. McElroy (360 U.S. 474) 119591 and Kwong Hei Chew v. Colding 1344 U.S . 590) (1952) as showing the approach of that tribunal to such issues . A report of the judgment in the latter case where the Supreme Court held that a resident alien could not be refused entry to the country by the executive . onâ¢"public interest" grounds without due process of law, has been submitted . The question in the present case is, the applicant submits, whether the nature of the deportation proceedinps attracts the protection of "due process" as set out in Art . 6 of the Convention . They could not be described as the hearing of a "criminal charge" in strict terms of English law but this was clearly not conclusive . It was for the Convention organs to determine the character of the proceedings . It was clearly penal, the protection of Art . 6 was engaged and the proceedings were in breach of the Convention . The applicant referred in this respect to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Engel and others v. the Netherlands . The applicant submits that, whilst he has not been criminally charged, the three allegations made against him provide the basis for criminal charges under the Official Secrets Acts or otherwise. He refers in this connection to Archbold, Criminal Pleading etc ., 39rh Ed. paras. 3209-3222. However, a hearing before the Advisory Panel, without detail of the allegations, without legalrepresentation, without the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and without binding character for its determination of the issues, clearly breached the most fundamental canons of natural justice . Moreover deportation might, and in the present case would be, penal being a consequence of and in the nature of a punishment for, committing the three series of acts summarised by the allegations of the Home Secretary .
The deportation process must thus attract the protection of Art . 6 of the Convention, although no charge had been brought under municipal law . The applicant would indeed prefer that such a charge were brought, thereby enabling him to defend and clear himself . The applicant also refers to paras . 80-82 of the Judgment of the Court in the Engel case, and in particular the following passage : "However, supervision by the Court does not stop there . Such supervision would generally prove to be illusory if it did not also take into consideration the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked incurring . In a society subscribing to the rule of law, there belong to the "criminal" sphere deprivations of liberty liable to be imposed as a punishment, except those which by their nature, duration or manner of execution cannot be appreciably detrimental . The seriousness of what is at stake, the traditions of the Contracting States and the importance attached by the Convention to respect for the physical liberty of the person all require that this should be so . " The applicant submits that the submissions advanced by him are necessitated by the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation, since otherwise, as the Court had noted in para . 81 of the Engel judgment "the operation of the fundamental clauses o f
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Articles 6 and 7 would be subordinated to the (Contracting States') sovereign will" . By choosing an administrative circumvention, rather than the due process of criminal law laid down by statute, a State might set these fundamental protections at naught . It is also submitted that the applicant has been defamed by official statements and that his right to defend his reputation is a "civil right" within the meaning of Art . 6 . However, no hearing of any kind would be available because of the defence of absolute privilege . (d)
Article 8
With reference to Art . 8 of the Convention the applicant firstly refers to Art . 17 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides inter alia that no one shall be subjected to "unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation" . He also observes that Velu, in Privacy and Human Rights (ed . Robertson, Manchester 1973) has persuasively suggested that the Convention also protects against attacks on honour and reputation and similar torts . It is submitted that the applicant's honour and reputation have been severely attacked without his having an effective remedy and that such attacks are in breach of Art . 8 (1) of the Convention . Secondly the applicant submits that his deportation would in the circumstances outlined by him adversely affect his family life within the meaning of Art . 8 111 .
(e)
Article 10
The applicant further submits that the action of the United Kingdom authorities is in breach of Art . 10 of . the Convention since it is in the nature of the Home Secretary's allegations against him that the deportation order is to be made because of his professional activities in receiving and imparting information . Deportation would constitute an "interference" with the applicant's freedom of expression since it could hardly be maintained that the threat of deportation as a penalty would not severely inhibit an individual's exercise of the protected right .
(f)
Article 1 1
The authorities' action was also in breach of Art . 11 in that the allegation that he had "maintained regular contacts harmful to the security of the United Kingdom with foreign intelligence officers" constituted, in association with the penalty of deportation, a restriction unjustified by the Convention . The applicant maintains that his activities have in no way related to the security of the United Kingdom but have been concerned with aspects of the workings of the CIA and the publication and re-publications of his writings . He denies that the second paragraphs of Arts . 8, 10 and 11 apply to him . He had done nothing which would threaten national security, no action of his could be said to necessitate the particular restriction imposed on his Art . 10 freedom, namely deportation, or to necessitate the arbitrary form of restriction imposed . It is submitted that the application raises the issue of the nature and effectiveness of the Convention control over a Governmental proclivity to raise the issue of "State security" to override human rights . A Government could not evade its duties under Arts. 8, 10 and 11 by the exercise of executive discretion without possibility of judicial control or review . This would make a mockery of Convention protection .
(g)
Article 1 4
Finally the applicant submits that the authorities' action also breaches Art . 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Arts . 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and (apparently) 11 . The basis
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of this complaint is that the authorities have acted against him with discrimination on the grounds of political opinion or national origin . (h)
Article 16 It is submitted that A rt . 16 is not applicable since it contemplates the possibility of general and prospective limitations and does not permit limitations imposed selectively or ex post facto . Any other interpretation would, it is submitted, infringe the conceptions of A rt s . 7 and 14 of the Convention . (i) Artic%26 The applicant submits that the Home Office letter of 15 November 1976 is a "final decision" and that neither the Advisory Panel nor the right to make representations to the Home Secreta ry constitutes a"domestic remedÃ¿' within the meaning of Art . 26 . Alternatively he submits that they are not sufficient remedies . No remedy thus lay between the notice of intention to depo rt and the making of a depo rt ation order . The notice of intention to depo rt might thus be deemed to be the order itself and thus the "final decision" . The applicant requests that, in view of the urgency of the matter the Commission should give the application such expedited treatment as may be appropriate under its Rules of Procedure .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant has made a number of complaints connected with the decision of the United Kingdom authorities to deport him . He alleges the violation of Arts . 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Convention both in isolation and in conjunction with Art . 14 . In particular he complains that defamatory allegations have been made against him without possibility of legal redress, contrary to Arts . 3 and 8 . He complains that his deportation as such would in the circumstances involve the violation of Arts . 3 and 5. He maintains that the authorities' action in deporting him has or would involve the violation of Arts . 8, 10 and 11 of the Convention . He also complains that Art . 6 has been violated in that he has no possibility of obtaining legal redress in respect of the allegedly defamatory statements and in that the decision to deport him in essence involved the determination of criminal charges against him in respect of which he will not receive a hearing in accordance with Art . 6 .
2 . The Commission observes that the decision of the United Kingdom authorities to deport the applicant was communicated to him on 15 November 1976 . The Commisssion does not consider that the right to make representations to the advisory panel (a body with no power to decide the matter) or to the Home Secretary (the authority responsible for the decision) can be seen as effective and sufficient remedies which the applicant is required to exhaust under Art . 26 of the Convention . It has accordingly dealt with the case on the basis that the decision communicated to the applicant was the "final decision" in relation to his deportation and that the requirements of Art . 26 have been complied with . 3 . The Commission will deal in turn with each aspect of the applicant's complaints, namely his allegations that he has been defamed or slandered, his complaints as to his impending deportation itself and its consequences, and his complaint that he has been denied a fair hearing in connection with these matters .
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(a) The complaint that the applicant has been subjected to public defamation 4. The applicant alleges that he has been subjected to public defamation severely jeopardising his career and livelihood without possibility of legal redress and that this amounts to degrading treatment contrary to Art . 3 . He also submits that such an attack on his honour and reputation violates Art . 8 . 5 . The commission observes that the purported ground for the decision to deport the applicant is that the Home Secretary considers his departure from the United Kingdom would be in the interests of national security . A brief statement of the nature of certain information which apparently led the Home Secretary to this conclusion was given to the applicant and repeated in Parliament, on 18 November 1976, by the Home Secretary in response to a Parliamentary question . The authorities appear to have given no other material publicity to the grounds for deportation, ahhough the case has attracted considerable attention in the press .
6 . The Commission does not consider that the statements made by the Home Secretary in Parliament, in which he gave brief details in an objective and neutral manner of the considerations which led to his decision, can be said to have involved degrading treatment of the applicant within the meaning of Art . 3, or to have violated his right to respect for his private life as guaranteed by Art . 8 . Accordingly, insofar as the applicant complains of the allegedly defamatory statements as such, his complaints are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art . 27 (2) of the Convention . (b) The complaints as to the decision to deport the applicant and its consequences 7 . The applicant has submitted that the act of deportation might in itself amount to degrading treatment contrary to Art . 3, as being an arbitrary, unjustified or disproportionate punishment . He has also submitted that in particular circumstances such as those present in his case it might involve the violation of his right to liberty and securiry of person under Art . 5 . He also alleges that it would in the circumstances involve interference with his family life, contrary to Art . 8 of the Convention . He submits that it is implicit that the deportation order is being made because of his professional activities in receiving and imparting information and that would involve a violation of his rights under Art . 10 . He also submits that his freedom of association with others, as guaranteed by Art . 11, is violated in that the allegation that he had "maintained regular contacts with foreign intelligence officers" constituted, in association with the penalty of deportation, a restriction unjustified by the Convention . (i) The complaints under Arts . 3 and 5 8. The applicant submits that his deportation would be contrary to the Convention in that it would violate Arts . 3 and 5 . 9 . The Commission observes firstty that it has constantly held that the right of an alien to reside in the territory of a High Contracting Party is not as such guaranteed by the Convention . Furthermore it is clearly implied by Art . 5 (1) (f) of the Convention and Arts. 3 and 4 of Procotol No . 4 thereto that the High Contracting Parties intended to reserve to themselves the power to deport aliens from their territory . On the other hand the Commission has held that deportation may in exceptional circumstances involve violation of the Convention, for example where there is serious fear of treatment contrary to Art . 3 in the receiving State . The High Contracting Parties thus have a discretionary power to decide whether to expel an alien present in their territory bu t
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this power must be exercised in such a way as not to infringe the rights under the Convention of the person concerned . 10 . No question appears to arise in the present case of the applicant being in danger of suffering treatment in violation of Art . 3 in the country of destination if, for instance, he is deported to the United Slates, although he may face prosecution there . Nevertheless the applicant has suggested that in the particular circumstances of this case the deportation would be contrary to Art . 3 as being an arbitrary, unjustified or disproportionate punishment . However, deportation of an alien on grounds of state security cannot, in normal circumstances at least, be looked on as a penalty, and it has not been shown in the present case that the authorities' intention was to punish the applicant, as he has suggested, rather than to protect national security . Such deportation cannot be considered as contrary to Art . 3 in itself . There is therefore no indication of a violation of Art . 3 . 11 . With reference to the complaints under Art . 5, the Commission observes firstly that the applicant has not been deprived of his liberty at least as yet . The question is therefore only whether the decision to deport the applicant nevertheless involves any . other infringement of his right to "liberty and security of person" under Art . 5(1) . 12 . The Commission considers that the protection of "security" of person guaranteed by Art . 5 is concerned with arbitrary interference by a public authority with an individual's personal "liberty" . Accordingly any decision taken within the sphere of Art . 5 must, in order to safeguard the individual's right to "security of person" conform to the procedural and substantive requirements laid down by an already existing law .
In the present case the decision to deport the applicant has been taken under certain provisions of the Immigration Act 1971 and there is no indication that the requirements of this Act have not been met . S . 3 (5) of the 1971 Act provides for deportation on grounds that it is conducive to the public good, and S . 15 (4) clearly implies that this may include grounds of national security . The Home Office statement indicates the reasons why it was considered that national security required the applicant's departure . FurthermorÃ©, there is no evidence that the applicant is being prevented from departing from the United Kingdom and travelling to the country of his choice . 13 . The Commission therefore finds no indication of a violation of Art . 5 of the Convention either and concludes that insofar as the applicant complains that his deportation would as such violate the Convention, the application is manifestly illfounded . liil
The complaint of inten'erence with the applicant's famify life contrary to Art. 8
14 . The applicant alleges that his deportation would also involve an interference with his family life contrary to Art . 8 of the Convention . 15 . The applicant and his common-law wife, who have apparently been living together in England since 1973, are both aliens and are of different nationality . They have been resident in the United Kingdom on a temporary basis and it has not been shown that they will be unable to make reasonable arrangements to live together outside the United Kingdom, even if they would prefer to remain . 16 . Where in such circumstances the wife has the possibility of following her husband out of the country, this does not in the Commission's opinion constitute a n
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inte rference with family life contra ry to A rt . 8 ( 1) (see e .g . Application No. 5269/71, X . and Y . v . the United Kingdom, Yearbook XV, p . 564, Collection of Decisions 39, p . 104) . 17 . Accordingly, whilst some disturbance in the applicant's family life will inevitably result from his depo rtation, the Commission considers that it has not been shown that it would in the circumstances involve a violation of his right to respect therefo re within the meaning of A rt . 8 . This complaint is also, therefore, manifestly ill-founded . (iii) The complaint of interference with the applicant's freedam of expression contrary to A rt. 10 18 . The applicant submits that it is in the nature of the allegations made by the Home Secreta ry ( and in pa rticular the allegations that he has been involved in disseminating information harmful to the security of the United Kingdom and that he had aided and counselled othe rs in obtaining such information for publication), that the deport ation order is to be made because of his professional activities in receiving and impa rting information . He submits that this involves the violation of A rt . 10 . 19 . A rt . 10 (1) of the Convention provides inter elie that eve ry one has the right to freedom of expression and that this right includes freedom "to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority . . . . . . . ." . However, A rt . 10 does not in itself grant a right of asylum or a right for an alien to stay in a given count ry . Depo rtation on security grounds does not therefore as such constitute an inte rfe re nce with the rights guaranteed by A rt . 10 . It follows that an alien's rights under A rt . 10 are independent of his right to stay in the count ry and do not protect this latter right . In the present case the applicant has not, whilst in the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, been subjected to any restrictions on his rights to receive and impa rt imformation . Nor has it been shown that the depo rtation decision in reality cons ti tuted a penalty imposed on the applicant for having exercised his rights under A rt . 10 of the Convention, rather than a proper exercise on security grounds of the discretiona ry power of deportation reserved to States . 20 . The Commission finds accordingly that there is no indication of any inte rf erence with the applicant's right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by A rt . 10 (1) and this complaint is therefore also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of A rt . 27 (2) . (iv) The complaint of interfe rence with the epp/icent's right to freedom of association under A rt. 1 1 21 . The applicant submits that the action of the authorities has been in violation of A rt . 11 in that the allegation that he had "maintained regular contacts harmful to the securiry of the United Kingdom with foreign intelligence officers " constituted, in association with the penalty of deport ation, a restriction on his freedom of association with others unjustified by the Convention . 22 . However the Commission does not consider that A rt . 11 can be interpreted as forbidding a State from depo rt ing an alien on the ground that he has been in contact with foreign intelligence officers even if, under A rt . 11, he were entitled to have contact with such persons whilst in the jurisdiction of the State concerned . There is no indication that the applicant's freedom to associate with others has been inte rf ered with whilst he has been in the United Kingdom . The Commission therefore considers this complaint also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of A rt. 27 (2) . (v) The complaints that the applicant has been denied a fair hearing
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23 . The applicant has alleged that Art . 6 of the Convention has been violated in respect that he has been denied a fair hearing in connection firstly with the allegedly defamatory statements made in Parliament and secondly with the decision to deport him . 24 . Art . 6 111 provides inter alia that : "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing . . . . . . . . . by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 . The Commission has first considered the complaint in relation to the statements made in Parliament . The applicant has submitted that he has no redress in respect of these allegedly defamatory statements . He submits that the right to defend his reputation is a"civil right" within the meaning of Art . 6 but that no hearing will be available to him because of the defence of absolute privilege . 26 . However, the Commission has already held in Application No . 3374/67, X . v . Austria (Yearbook XII, p . 246, Collection of Decisions 29, p . 29) that Art . 6 ( 1) must be interpreted with due regard to parliamentary immunity as traditionally recognised in the States parties to the Convention . The principle of immunity in respect of such statements is generally recognised as a consequence of an "effective political democracy" within the meaning of the Preamble to the Convention . In the present case the applicant cannot complain in the United Kingdom courts of the statements made in Parliament in view of the doctrine of Parliamentary privilege, which forms part of United Kingdom law . This affords absolute protection to persons making such statements . Although a person's rights under domestic law to protection of his reputation generally constitute "civil rights" within the meaning of An . 6(1 ) , the applicant does not have any right in United Kingdom law to protection of his reputation insofar as it may be affected by the statements complained of . Art . 6 111 does not therefore guarantee the right to take proceedings in respect of these statements, since the applicant has no "civil right" to protection of his reputation against them . It follows that the Commission has no competence to examine this complaint and must reject it as incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae under Art . 27 121 of the Convention .
27 . The Commission has next considered the applicant's complaint that he has been denied a fair hearing in respect of the decision to deport him . The applicant has submitted that the decision in essence involved the determination of criminal charge since the allegations made against him "provide the basis for criminal charges" under the Official Secrets Act or otherwise . The Commission has also considered ex officio whether the decision involved a determination of his civil rights or obligations . 28 . However, the Commis .sion observes that the right of an alien to reside in a particular country is a matter governed by public law . It considers that where the public authorities of a State decide to deport an alien on grounds of security, this constitutes an act of state falling within the public sphere and that it does not constitute a determination of his civil rights or obligations within the meaning of Art . 6 . Accordingly, even though the decision to deport the applicant may have consequences in relation to his civil rights, in particular his reputation, the State is not required in such cases to grant a hearing conforming to the requirements of Art . 6 111 . 29 . The question remains, however, whether in the present case the decision involved the determination of a criminal charge against the applicant . Whilst no specifi c
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allegations of criminal conduct have been made against him, it is implied at least that the Home Secreta ry 's decision is based on information that he has been guilty of criminal conduct. However this does not, in the Commission's opinion, bring the decision within the penal sphere, since depo rtation constitutes a procedure completely separate from criminal prosecution or conviction . It cannot, as the Commission has already observed, normally be looked on as a penalty . The Commission the rf ore conside rs the applicant's complaints that he has bee n .30 denied a fair hearing in respect of the depo rt ation decision, contrary to Art . 6, to be incompatible with the Convention retione materiee on the ground that the decision to depo rt him did not involve the determination of his civil rights or obligations or of any criminal charge against him . (c) The complaint under Art . 1 4 The applicant has alleged that, in addition to being a victim of a violation of Arts . 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 in themselves, he has also been the victim of a violation of Art . 14 in conjunction with these A rt icles . However, the Commission finds no indication that he has been discriminated against in his enjoyment of any of the rights in question contra ry to Art . 14 . His status as an alien would in itself provide objective and reasonable justification for his being subject to di ff erent treatment in the field of immigration law to persons holding United Kingdom citizenship . The Commission therefore considers this complaint man'rfestly ill-founded . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .
(TRADUCTION ) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant est nÃ© en 1935 et il est ressortissant des Etats-Unis d'AmÃ©rique . II rÃ©side au Royaume-Uni depuis octobre 1972 et il vit actuellement Ã Cambridge . Le requÃ©rant vit avec sa femme', une ressortissante brÃ©silienne qui rÃ©side au Royaume-Uni depuis 1973 . Une demande de renouvellement du permis de sÃ©jour de sa femme est en instance au MinistÃ©re de l'IntÃ©rieur depuis juin 1976 . II lui serait impossible de retourner au BrÃ©sil de peur d'Ãªtre persÃ©cutÃ©e pour des motifs politiques, Ã©tant donnÃ© que, dans le passÃ©, elle a essuyÃ© des coups de feu, qu'elle a Ã©tÃ© torturÃ©e au cours d'interrogatoires et emprisonnÃ©e pendant deux ans par le rÃ©gime actuel du BrÃ©sil . Le requÃ©rant estime qu'elle a droit au statut de rÃ©fugiÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã la Convention des Nations Unies de 1951 sur le statut des rÃ©fugiÃ©s, amendÃ©e par le Protocole de 1967 . Les deux fils du requÃ©rant, qui sont des ressortissants des Etats-Unis, vivent Ã©galement avec lui . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© employÃ© pendant douze ans en qualitÃ© d'agent de la Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) des Etats-Unis . II a donnÃ© sa dÃ©mission en 1969, de plus en plus dÃ©Ã§u par les mÃ©thodes utilisÃ©es et, depuis lors, il n'a plus, selon ses dires, Ã©tÃ© employÃ© par cette Agence ni par aucun autre service de renseignements . II dÃ©clare ' Common law wife, i .e . femme avec lequelle il n'eat oes mariÃ© selon la loi .
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avoir Ã©tÃ© dÃ©Ã§u par certains aspects de la nature et des procÃ©dÃ©s de la CIA (en particulier par les techniques secrÃ¨tes d'infiltration et de destruction d'institution) et il en est venu Ã penser que ces mÃ©thodes Â« portent prÃ©judice aux intÃ©rÃªts vÃ©ritables des Etats-Unis et qu'elles risquent d'Ã©branler les principes dÃ©mocratiques occidentauxÂ» . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend qu'il n'a jamais exercÃ© d'activitÃ©s impliquant une collaboration entre les services de renseignements des Etats-Unis et ceux du Royaume-Uni et qu'il n'a Ã© aucun moment disposÃ© d'informations sur les services de renseignements du Royaume-Uni . Il ne possÃ¨de Ã sa connaissance aucune information qui serait de nature Ã compromettre d'une maniÃ¨re quelconque la sÃ©curitÃ© du Royaume-Uni . En janvier 1975 environ, un livre du requÃ©rant intitulÃ© Â« Inside the Compagny CIA Diary Â» a Ã©tÃ© publiÃ© . Un exemplaire de ce livre a Ã©tÃ© soumis Ã la Commission . Le requÃ©rant y dÃ©crit le travail qu'il a accompli pour la CIA en AmÃ©rique du Sud . Il pense que la publication de ce livre a mis la CIA dans l'embarras sur le plan politique et que cette publication et d'autres publications similaires, dont certaines Ã©taient Ã©crites par lui, ont suscitÃ©, au Parlement des Etats-Unis et ailleurs, une controverse au sujet de certaines activitÃ©s de la CIA et de nombreuses critiques sur ces aspects de ses activitÃ©s . Le requÃ©rant indique qu'il a ensuite entrepris de faire des recherches et d'Ã©crire un second livre sur l'activitÃ© secrÃ©te de la CIA dans des pays tels que le GuatÃ©mela, le Congo, l'IndonÃ©sie, le BrÃ©sil, le Chili et sur le coup d'Etat de 1967 en GrÃ©ce et les Ã©vÃ©nements ultÃ©rieurs dans ce pays ; certaines parties de ce livre ont constituÃ© un Ã©lÃ©ment important lors de l'enquÃªte de la Commission dans l'Affaire grecque . Le requÃ©rant dÃ©clare qu'il a Ã©tÃ© beaucoup consultÃ© par d'Ã©minents journalistes, chercheurs, un'rversitaires et autres commentateurs de nombreuses nationalitÃ©s au sujet des mÃ©thodes de la CIA . 11 affirme cependant qu'il n'a jamais divulguÃ© d'informations portant sur des activitÃ©s de la CIA ou sur d'autres services de renseignements occidentaux ayant trait Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© du Royaume-Uni ou d'autres dÃ©mocraties de l'Europe occidentale . Il ne pense pas non plus Ãªtre au courent d'activitÃ©s de ce genre .
Depuis 1975, le requÃ©rant dit avoir effectuÃ© pÃ©riodiquement des sÃ©jours Ã© l'Ã©tranger Ã des fins de recherches, d'interviews et de publications . Au cours de ces sÃ©jours, ainsi qu'au Royaume-Uni, il a parfois eu l'impression de faire l'objet d'une surveillance . Il reconnait d'ailleurs que l'on pouvait s'y attendre et qu'il a Ã©tÃ© prudent en ce qui concerne la nature des contacts qu'il a Ã©tablis . II indique qu'Ã aucun moment au cours des huit derniÃ¨res annÃ©es il n'a eu sciemment des contacts avec un membre des Â« Services de renseignements soviÃ©tiques ou apparentÃ©s Â» . A son arrivÃ©e au Royaume-Uni, le requÃ©rant s'est vu accorder un permis de sÃ©jour valable pour trois mois . Il a obtenu par la suite un certain nombre de prolongations de sÃ©jour . Une nouvelle prolongation lui a Ã©tÃ© refusÃ©e par lettre du Home Office datÃ©e du 15 novembre 1976 . II est dit, notamment dans cette lettre, que le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat a dÃ©cidÃ© que le dÃ©part du requÃ©rant du Royaume-Uni Â« contribuerait au bien public puisqu'il serait dans l'intÃ©rÃªt de la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale Â» . Le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat a dÃ©cidÃ© par consÃ©quent de rejeter la nouvelle demande de prolongation de sÃ©jour et, pour le mÃªme motif, de prendre une ordonnance d'expulsion contre le requÃ©rant en vertu de l'article 3 (5) (b) de la loi relative Ã l'immigration de 1971 . Les motifs de cette dÃ©cision sont indiquÃ©s dans une note annexÃ©e Ã la lettre, qui indique que le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat a pris en considÃ©ration des informations selon lesquelles le requÃ©rant :
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Â« a . a entretenu des contacts rÃ©guliers prÃ©judiciables Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© du Royaume-Uni avec des agents de renseignements Ã©trangers , b . s'est occupÃ© et continue Ã s'occuper de diffuser des informations prÃ©judiciables Ã© la sÃ©curitÃ© du Royaume-Uni ; et c . a aidÃ© et conseillÃ© des tiers Ã obtenir des informations en vue de publications qui pourraient Ãªtre prÃ©judiciables Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© du Royaume-Uni . Â» Cette lettre informait aussi le requÃ©rant qu'il n'avait pas la facultÃ© de recourir contre le refus de prolongation de sÃ©jour ou contre la dÃ©cision de prendre une ordonnance d'expulsion . Il pouvait cependant adresser Ã© une commission consultative des reprÃ©sentations au sujet de la dÃ©cision relative Ã son expulsion . Il pouvait comparaitre devant la commission mais non y Ã©tre reprÃ©sentÃ© . Dans la mesure oii les commissaires y consentiraient, il pouvait Ã©tre assistÃ© par un ami ou faire en sorte que des tiers viennent tÃ©moigner en sa faveur. Il pouvait aussi adresser des reprÃ©sentations au Home Secretary . La lettre faisait aussi observer que, si une ordonnance d'expulsion Ã©tait prise, le requÃ©rant aurait le droh de recourir contre son transfert dans le pays indiquÃ© dans l'ordonnance et de demander Ã Ã©tre transfÃ©rÃ© dans un autre pays spÃ©cifiÃ© par lui . Le 29 novembre 1976, le requÃ©rant a informÃ© le Home Secretary qu'il niait les allÃ©gations forrnulÃ©es contre lui et qu'il souhaitait comparaitre devant la commission consultative . Le 3D novembre 1976, dans une nouvelle lettre, il exprimait sa prÃ©occupation au sujet de la valeur de l'audience et de l'absence manifeste des garanties Ã©lÃ©mentaires de justice . Il indiquait que, s'il devant Ãªtre en mesure de se dÃ©fendre contre les allÃ©gations, il fallait que d'autres dÃ©tails lui soient communiquÃ©s et il demandait Ã Ãªtre informÃ© de certains dÃ©tails spÃ©cifiques concernant les allÃ©gations et de la procÃ©dure lors de l'audience . L'audience a Ã©tÃ© fixÃ©e au 11 janvier 1977 . Par lettre du 2 dÃ©cembre 1976, le Home Office a indiquÃ© que le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat n'Ã©tait pas disposÃ© Ã ajouter d'autres prÃ©cisions Ã© l'Ã©noncÃ© des mot'rfs dÃ©jÃ© communiquÃ© . Il a indiquÃ© aussi que la nature de la procÃ©dure, qui n'Ã©tait pas contradictoire, impliquait que le requÃ©rant ne pouvait ni subir de contre-interrogatoire au nom du SecrÃ©taire d'Etat ni procÃ©der Ã un contreinterrogatoire . L'avis des membres de la commission serait communiquÃ© au SecrÃ©taire d'Etat mais non Ã des tiers . Les allÃ©gations formulÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant ont Ã©tÃ© rÃ©itÃ©rÃ©es au Parlement par le Home Secretary le 18 novembre 1976 . L'affaire a d'autre part Ã©tÃ© largement commentÃ©e dans la presse et un certain nombre de coupures de presse ont Ã©tÃ© produites par le requÃ©rant . Le requÃ©rant nie Ã©nergiquement les allÃ©gations formulÃ©es contre lui, qui lui sont, dit-il, extrÃ©mement prÃ©judiciables dans sa profession en raison de leur caractÃ©re imprÃ©cis et cependant diffamatoire . Le requÃ©rant estime que, s'il est expulsÃ©, non seulement il sera marquÃ© des stigmates de l'expulsion mais, de plus, il sera identifiÃ© comme une personne qui a Ã©tÃ© impliquÃ©e dans des activitÃ©s pro-soviÃ©tiques (par opposition Ã des activitÃ©s anti-CIA) . Se rÃ©fÃ©rant Ã une coupure de presse du Â« Guardian Â», il suggÃ¨re qu'il pourrait aussi Ãªtre assimilÃ© Ã une personne associÃ©e avec l'IRA ou avec d'autres organisations irlandaises illÃ©gales . Une foule de rumeurs infondÃ©es et prÃ©judiciables du mÃªme genre ont Ã©tÃ© suscitÃ©es par la dÃ©claration du Home Secretary .
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Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© informÃ© qu'aucune action en diffamation n'avait la moindre chance d'aboutir, parce que la rÃ©vÃ©lation des allÃ©gations par le Ministre Ã©tait couverte par une immunitÃ© absolue . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que l'expulsion peut lui porter tort, notamment parce qu'il se peut que des poursuites soient engagÃ©es contre lui en raison de ses Ã©crits s'il retourne aux Etats-Unis . Il n'a pas d'autre nationalitÃ© en vertu de laquelle il aurait un droit lÃ©gal Ã pAnÃ©trer sur le territoire d'un pays tiers . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue en outre que l'expulsion peut porter prÃ©judice Ã sa vi e familiale Ã©tant donnÃ© que sa femme pourrait avoir des difficuhÃ©s Ã pÃ©nÃ©trer sur le territoire des Etats-Unis . Il n'est pas certain qu'en tant qu'Ã©trangÃ©re ayant des liens avec le requÃ©rant et en tant que personne pouvant Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme activement hostile au Gouvernement du BrÃ©sil, elle se verrait accorder un visa d'entrÃ©e avec lui.
Griefs Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend que le traitement auquel il a Ã©tÃ© soumis et Ã©tait soumis Ã l'Ã©poque de l'introduction de sa requÃªte port e a tteinte aux a rticles 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 et 11 de la Convention, qu'ils soient considÃ©rÃ©s isolÃ©ment ou en liaison avec l'a rticle 14.
a . Article 3 Il allÃ¨gue que le fait de diffamer publiquement un individu d'une maniÃ©re qui compromet gravement sa carriÃ¨re et ses moyens d'existence, sans qu'il y ait possibilitÃ© de recours juridique interne, constitue un traitement dÃ©gradant au sens de l'erticle 3, tel qu'il est interprÃ©tÃ© par la Commission dans Â« l'Affaire grecque Â» (Annuaire XII, page 186) . En outre, dans les circonstances aggravantes telles que celles dont il est question, une mesure d'expulsion pourrait constituer en elle-mÃªme un traitement dÃ©gradant po rtant a tteinte Ã l'a rt icle 3, dans la mesure oÃ¹ elle Ã©quivaut Ã une peine arbitraire, injustifiÃ©e ou dispropo rt ionnÃ©e (Fawcett , Application of the European Convention, pagÃ© 38) .
b . Article 5 L'expulsion constitue aussi une ingArence si grave et si arbitroire dans la libe rtÃ© et la sÃ©curitÃ© d'une personne que, dans des circonstances pa rt iculiÃ©res, elle pourraitâ¢ constituer une violation de l'article 5 . Des circonstances de ce genre pourraient inclu re celles oÃ¹ un Ã©tranger qui rÃ©side depuis longtemps dans le pays est expulsÃ© ou menacÃ© d'Ãªtre expulsÃ© par une dÃ©cision administrative arbitreire, sans bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'une audience judiciaire ou d'une qutre forme de procÃ©du re rÃ©guliÃ©re . Si elle n'est pas contrÃ´lÃ©e par le concept de la libe rtÃ© et de la sÃ©curitÃ© de la personne, la possibilitÃ© de procÃ©der Ã une expulsion soudaine de ce genre aurait pour effet de saper dans une large mesure sinon complÃ©tement la protection offe rte par l'a rticle 5 . Toute autre interprÃ©tation permettrait aux gouvernements de ne pas appliquer la protection assez prÃ©cise de l'a rt icle 5 en prenant prÃ©cisÃ©ment le type d'ordonnance qui est Ã prÃ©sent signifiÃ©e au requÃ©rant . Selon le re quÃ©rant, en interprÃ©tant ainsi restrictivement la protection que ce droit essentiel et fondamental garantit aux Ã©trange rs comme aux nationaux, on laisserait ca rt e blanche Ã un gouvernement dÃ©terminÃ© Ã avoir recou rs Ã l'arbitraire administratif pour Ã©viter les risques inhÃ©rents Ã l'obligation d'employer une procÃ©dure lÃ©gal e
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rÃ©guliÃ©re, mais aussi on violerait le principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© devant la loi . Ce principe n'est pas seulement exprimÃ© dans l'a rticle 14 de la Convention, il est aussi l'un des Â« principes gÃ©nÃ©raux de droit reconnus par les nations civilisÃ©es Â» dont il est question Ã l'a rt icle 38 (1) ( c ) du Statut de la Cour internationale de justice, par rÃ©fÃ©rence auquel tous les trahÃ©s concernant les droits de l'homme devraient Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ©s . Le requÃ©rant se rÃ©fÃ©re dans ce contexte Ã l'avis du juge Tenaka, in Alfaire du Sud-Ouest Africain, deuxiÃ©me partie, Rapports de la CIJ, 1966, page 248 et suivantes. c . Article 6 Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue en outre que l'affaire soulÃ¨ve de greves problÃ©mes concernant la prÃ©Ã©minence du droit et le concept de procÃ©dure rÃ©guliÃ¨re sous l'angle de l'a rt icle 6 de la Convention, problÃ©mes du genre de ceux auxquels se sont heu rtÃ©s les tribunaux de la plupa rt des pays qui prÃ©tendent avoir des normes dÃ©mocratiques . Dans ce contexte, le requÃ©rant mentionne et che des arrÃªts rendus par la Cour suprÃªme des Etats-Unis dans les affaires Jey c/Boyd 1351 U.S . 3451 119551, Greene c/McElroy (360 U .S. 474) 119591 et Kwong Hai Chew c/Colding (344 U.S. 5901 (1952), qui montrent de quelle maniÃ¨re ce tte juridiction aborde les problÃ¨mes de ce genre . Le requÃ©rant a produit un extrait du jugement prononcÃ© dans la derniÃ©re a ff aire, oÃ¹ la Cour suprÃªme soutient qu'un rÃ©sident Ã©tranger ne peut se voir refuser par l'exÃ©cutif, pour des motifs Â« d'intÃ©rÃªt public Â» l'entrÃ©e sur le territoire du pays sans procÃ©dure lÃ©gale rÃ©guliÃ©re . Le requÃ©rant soutient que, en l'espÃ©ce, la question est de savoir si la nature de la procÃ©dure d'expulsion entratne la garantie du droit Ã© une procÃ©du re rÃ©guliÃ¨re dont il est question Ã© l'a rt icle 6 de la Convention . Cette procÃ©dure d'expulsion ne saurait Ãªtre qualifiÃ©e comme po rtant sur Â« une accusation en metiÃ©re pÃ©nale Â» selon les termes stricts du droit anglais, mais cela n'est manifestement pas concluant . Il appa rt ient aux organes de la Convention de dÃ©terminer le caractÃ©re de la procÃ©dure . Il s'agit manifestement d'une procÃ©durepÃ©nale, la protection de l'article 6 est requise et la procÃ©dure po rte att einte Ã la Convention . Le requÃ©rant se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã cet Ã©gard Ã l'arrÃªt de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire Enge1 et autres contre les Pa ys-Bas. Le requÃ©rant fait valoir que, elors qu'aucune accusation pÃ©nale n'a Ã©tÃ© po rt Ã©e contre lui, les trois allÃ©gations formulÃ©es Ã son Ã©gard fournissent la base d'accusations pÃ©nales se fondant notamment sur les Â« Official Secret Acts Â»(Lois sur les secrets officiels) . Il se rÃ©fÃ¨re Ã ce propos Ã Archbold, Crimina/ P/eeding etc. . . 39Ã©me Ã©dition Â§Â§ 3209-3222 . Cependant, le fait que, Ã© l'audience de la commission consultative, les griefs ne sont pas exposÃ©s en dÃ©tail, que le requÃ©rant n'a pas de reprÃ©sentation juridique, qu'il n'a pas la possibifrtÃ© de procÃ©der au contre-interrogatoire des tÃ©moins et que l'avis rendu n'a pas de caractÃ¨re obligatoire pour la dÃ©termination des problÃ©mes soulevÃ©s po rte manifestement att einte aux normes les plus fondamentales de la justice naturelle . En outre, l'expulsion pourrait constituer une sanction pÃ©nale et, en l'espÃ¨ce, ce serait le cas, puisqu'elle rÃ©sulterait du fait que le requÃ©rant a commis les trois genres d'actes rÃ©sumÃ©s par les motifs du Home Secreta ry et qu'elle aurait le caractÃ¨re d'une sanction . Le processus de l'expulsion requie rt la protection de l'a rt icle 6 de la Convention, bien qu'aucune accusation pÃ©nale n'ait Ã©tÃ© formulÃ©e en droit national . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©fÃ©rerait en fait qu'une telle accusation fÃ¹t formulÃ©e, ce qui lui perme tt rait de se dÃ©fendre et de se disculper .
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Le requÃ©rant se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã©galement aux 44 80-82 de l'arrBt de la Cour dans l'aNaire Engel et en pa rticulier au passage suivan t Â« LÃ ne s'arrÃªte pas le contrÃ´le de la Cour . Il se rÃ©vÃ©lerait en gÃ©nÃ©ral illusoire s'il ne prenait pas Ã©galement en considÃ©ration le degrÃ© de sÃ©vÃ©ritÃ© de la sanction que risque de subir l'intÃ©ressÃ© . Dans une sociÃ©tÃ© attachÃ©e Ã la prÃ©Ã©minence du droit, ressortissent Ã la Â« matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale Â» les privations de libertÃ© susceptibles d'Ãªtre infligÃ©es Ã titre rÃ©pressif, hormis celles qui par leur nature, leur durÃ©e ou leurs modalitÃ©s d'exÃ©cution, ne sauraient causer un prÃ©judice important . Ainsi le veulent la gravitÃ© et l'enjeu, les traditions des Etats contractants et la valeur que la Convention attribue au respect de la libertÃ© physique de la personne . Â» Le requÃ©rant fait valoir que les thÃ¨ses qu'il a Ã©noncÃ©es dÃ©coulent du principe de l'efficacitÃ© dans l'interprÃ©tation d'un traitÃ© car, sinon, comme l'a notÃ© la Cour au Â§ 81 de l'arrÃªt Engel, cr le jeu des clauses fondamentales des a rt icles 6 et 7 se trouverait subordonnÃ© Ã la volontÃ© souveraine (des Etats contractants) Â» . En choisissant une procÃ©dure administrative dÃ©tournÃ©e plutÃ´t que le dÃ©roulement rÃ©gulier d'un procÃ¨s pÃ©nal rÃ©glÃ© par la loi, un Etat pourrait rÃ©duire Ã nÃ©ant cette protection fondamentale . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue aussi qu'il a Ã©tÃ© diffamÃ© par des dÃ©clarations officielles et que son droit Ã dÃ©fendre sa rÃ©putation est un a droit de caractÃ¨re civil Â», au sens de l'article 6 . Or, aucune espÃ¨ce de recours judiciaire ne lui est accessible en raison de l'argument de l'immunitÃ© absolue . d . A rtic% 8 En ce qui concerne l'article 8 de la Convention, le requÃ©rant se rÃ©fÃ©re tout d'abord Ã l'article 17 du Pacte des Nations Unies sur les droits de caractÃ¨re civil et politique, qui stipule notamment que nul ne sera l'objet x d'a tt eintes illÃ©gales Ã son honneur et Ã sa rÃ©putation n . Il fait aussi observer que Velu, dans Privacy and Human Rights (Ã©dition Robertson, Manchester 1973) suggÃ¨re de faÃ§on convaincante que la Convention protÃ©ge aussi contre les a tteintes Ã l'honneur et Ã la rÃ©putation et les prÃ©judices similaires . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue que son honneur et sa rÃ©putation ont subi un grave prÃ©judice sans qu'il dispose d'un recours effectif et que les atteintes de ce genre contreviennent Ã l'article 8 de la Convention . En second lieu, le requÃ©rant fait valoir que, dans les circonstances qu'il a dÃ©crites, son expulsion serait de nature A compromettre sa vie familiale au sens de l'article 8 (1) . e . Article 10 Le requÃ©rent allÃ©gue en outre que la mesure prise par les autoritÃ©s du RoyaumeUni viole l'article 10 de la Convention parce qu'il est dans la nature des allÃ©gations portÃ©es contre lui par le Home Secretary que l'ordonnance d'expulsion doit Ãªtre rendue en raison des activitÃ©s professionnelles qu'il a exercÃ©es en recevant et en communiquant des informations . L'expulsion constituerait une Â« ingÃ©rence Â» dans la libertÃ© d'expression du requÃ©rant, Ã©tant donnÃ© que l'on peut difficilement soutenir que la menace d'expulsion en tant que sanction n'entraverait pas gravement l'exercice par l'individu du droit protÃ©gÃ© . f . Article 1 1 La mesure prise par les autoritÃ©s po rt e aussi atteinte Ã l'a rt icle 11, dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'allÃ©gation selon laquelle il a entretenu des contacts rÃ©guliers prÃ©judiciables Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© du Royaume-Uni avec des agents de renseignements Ã©trange rs Â» constitue, e n
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association avec la sanction de l'expulsion, une restriction qui n'est pas justifiÃ©e par la Convention . Le requÃ©rant soutient que ses activitÃ©s n'avaient aucun rapport avec la sÃ©curitÃ© du Royaume-Uni, mais qu'elles avaient trait Ã certains aspects du travail de la CIA et Ã la publication et la rÃ©Ã©dition de ses Ã©crits . Il nie que les seconds paragraphes des paragraphes 8 . 10 et 11 lui soient applicables . II n'a rien fait qui soit de nature Ã menacer la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale, on ne peut dire d'aucun de ses actes qu'il entraPne la nÃ©cessitÃ© de soumettre la libertÃ© qui lui est garantie par l'article 10 8 une restriction particuliÃ©re, Ã savoir l'expulsion, ou qu'il requiert la fortne arbitraire de restriction Ã laquelle il est soumis .
Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que la requÃªte soulÃ©ve la question de la nature et de l'efficacitÃ© du contrÃ´le de la Convention sur une propension gouvernementale Ã invoquer l'argument de la Â« sÃ©curitÃ© de l'Etat Â» pour fouler aux pieds les droits de l'homme . Un gouvernement ne peut se soustraire par l'exercice d'un pouvoir exÃ©cut'rf arbitraire aux obligations qui lui incombent au titre des articles 8, 10 et 11, sans qu'il y ait possibilitÃ© de contrÃ´le ou de rÃ©vision par le pouvoir judiciaire . Dans le cas contraire, la protection de la Convention ne serait qu'une dÃ©rision . g . Article 14 Enfin, le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que la mesure prise par les autoritÃ©s viole aussi l'article 14 de la Convention en liaison avec les articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 et (semble-t-il) 11 . Son grief se fonde sur le fait que les autoritÃ©s ont agi contre lui de maniÃ©re discriminatoire en raison de ses opinions politiques ou de son origine nationale . h . Article 1 6 Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que l'article 16 n'est pas applicable puisqu'il envisage la possibilitÃ© de restrictions gÃ©nÃ©rales et futures mais n'autorise pas des restrictions imposÃ©es de faÃ§on sÃ©lective ou ex post facto . Toute autre interprÃ©tation porterait atteinte aux principes contenus dans les articles 7 et 14 de la Convention . i . Article 26 Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que la lettre du Home Office du 15 novembre 1976 est une Â« dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive e et que ni la possibilitÃ© de comparaÃ®tre devant la commission consultative ni le droit d'adresser des reprÃ©sentations au Home Secretary ne constituent une a voie de recours interne Â» au sens de l'article 26 . Subsidiairement, il soutient que ce ne sont pas des voies de recours suffisantes . Ainsi, il n'existe aucun recours entre la notification de l'intention de procÃ©der Ã l'expulsion et la prise d'ordonnance d'expulsion . La notification de l'intention de procÃ©der Ã l'expulsion pourrait donc btre considÃ©rÃ©e comme Ã©tant l'arrÃªtÃ© lui-mÃªme et, par consÃ©quent, la Â« dÃ©cision dÃ©finh'rve a . Le requÃ©rant demande qu'Ã©tant donnÃ© l'urgence de la question, la Commission fasse bÃ©nÃ©ficier la requÃªte du trehement repide qu'elle jugera appropriÃ©, aux termes de son RÃ¨glement .
EN DROIT 1 . Le requÃ©rant formule un certain nombre de griefs liÃ©s Ã la dÃ©cision des autoritÃ©s du Royaume-Uni relative Ã son expulsion . Il allÃ©gue la violation des articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 et 11 de la Convention, pris tant isolÃ©ment qu'en combinaison avec l'article 14 . II se plaint en particulier que des allÃ©gations diffamatoires ont Ã©tÃ© formulÃ©es contre lui sans qu'il y ait possibilitÃ© de recours judiciaire, en violation des articles 3 et 8 . II allÃ¨gu e
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qu'en l'espÃ©ce son expulsion en tant que telle impliquerait la violation des articles 3 et 5 . II soutient que la mesure prise par les autoritÃ©s en vue de son expulsion implique ou impliquerait la violation des articles 8, 10 et 11 de la Convention . Il allÃ©gue aussi que l'article 6 a Ã©tÃ© violÃ© dans la mesure oÃ¹ il n'a aucune possibilitÃ© d'obtenir un recours judiciaire pour les dÃ©clarations prÃ©tendument diffamatoires et dans la mesure oÃ¹ la dÃ©cision relative Ã son expulsion correspond en substance Ã une dÃ©cision sur des accusations en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©es contre lui, qui aura Ã©tÃ© prise sans procÃ©s devant un tribunal, comme l'exige l'article 6 . 2 . La Commission fait observer que la dÃ©cision des autoritÃ©s du Royaume-Uni d'expulser le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ©e Ã ce dernier le 15 novembre 1976 . La Commission n'est pas d'avis que le droit d'adresser des reprÃ©sentations Ã la commission consultative (organe qui n'a pas le pouvoir de prendre une dÃ©cision sur la question) ou au Home Secretary lautoritÃ© responsable de la dÃ©cision) peut btre considÃ©rÃ© comme une voie de recours efficace et suffisante que le requÃ©rant est tenu d'exercer d'aprÃ¨s l'anicle 26 de la Convention . En consÃ©quence elle a examinÃ© l'affaire en partent de l'hypothÃ©se que la dÃ©cision communiquÃ©e au requÃ©rant Ã©tait la a dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive a en ce qui concerne son expulsion et que les exigences de l'article 26 Ã©taient satisfaites . 3 . La Commission examinera successivement chaque aspect des griefs du requÃ©rant, c'est-Ã -dire ses allÃ©gations selon lesquelles il a Ã©tÃ© diffamÃ© ou calomniÃ©, ses griefs relatifs Ã son expulsion imminente elle-mÃªme et Ã ses consÃ©quences et son grief selon lequel sa cause n'a pas Ã©tÃ© entendue Ã©quitablement .
a . Grief selon lequel le requÃ©rent a AtA diffamÃ© publiquemen t 4 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue qu'il a Ã©tÃ© dHfamÃ© publiquement, ce qui a compromis gravement sa carriÃ©re et ses moyens d'existence, sans qu'il y ait possibilitÃ© de recours judiciaire et que cela Ã©quivaut Ã un traitement dÃ©gradant qui viole l'article 3 . II allÃ¨gue aussi qu'une telle atteinte Ã son honneur et Ã sa rÃ©putation contrevient Ã l'article B . 5. La Commission fait observer que le motif sur lequel se fonde la dÃ©cision d'expulser le requÃ©rant est que le Home Secretary estime que son dÃ©part du RoyaumeUni serait dans l'intÃ©rBt de la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale . Une brÃ©ve dÃ©claration relative Ã la nature de certaines informations qui ont apparemment amenÃ© le Home Secretary Ã cette conclusion a Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ©e au requÃ©rant et rÃ©itÃ©rÃ©e devant le Parlement le 18 novembre 1976 par le Home Secretary, en rÃ©ponse Ã une question parlementaire . Les autoritÃ©s ne semblent pas avoir donnÃ© d'autre publicitÃ© matÃ©rielle aux motifs de l'expulsion, bien que la presse ait accordÃ© une attention considÃ©rable Ã cette affaire . 6 . La Commission ne trouve pas que les dÃ©clarations faites par le Home Secretary au Parlement, dans lesquelles il a donnÃ©, de faÃ§on objective et neutre, de brefs renseignements sur les considÃ©rations qui l'ont amenÃ© Ã prendre sa dÃ©cision, peuvent Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©es comme ayant impliquÃ© un traitement dÃ©gradant du requÃ©rant, au sens de l'article 3, ou comme ayant portÃ© atteinte Ã son droit au respect de sa vie privÃ©e, tel qu'il est garanti par l'article 8 .
En consÃ©quence, dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant se plaint de dÃ©clarations prÃ©tendument diffamatoires en tant que telles, ses griefs sont manifestement mal fondÃ©s au sens de l'article 27 (2) de la Convention . b . Griefs concernent la dÃ©cision d'expulser le requÃ©rant et ses consÃ©quence s 7 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que la mesure d'expulsion pourrait en elle-mÃªme Ã©quivaloir Ã un traitement dÃ©gradant violant l'article 3, du fait qu'il s'agit d'une sanction arbitraire, injustifiÃ©e ou disproportionnÃ©e . Il allÃ©gue aussi que, dans des circonstances particu-
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liÃ©res telles que celles qui se prÃ©sentent dans son affaire, cette mesure pourrait impliquer la violation de son droit Ã la libertÃ© et Ã la sÃ¹retÃ© personnelle, garanti par l'article 5 . II allÃ©gue aussi que, en l'espÃ©ce, ladite mesure reprÃ©senterait une ingÃ©rence dans sa vie familiale, qui serait contraire Ã l'article 8 de la Convention . Il allÃ¨gue qu'il est implicite que l'ordonnance d'expulsion est prise en raison des activitÃ©s professionnelles qu'il a exercÃ©es en recevant et en communiquant des informations et qu'il en rÃ©sulterait une violation des droits qui lui sont garantis par l'article 10 . II soutient aussi que la libertÃ© d'association, qui lui est garantie par l'article 11, est violÃ©e, dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'allÃ©gation selon laquelle il a Â« entretenu des contacts rÃ©guliers avec des agents de renseignement Ã©trangers Â» constitue, puisqu'elle est liÃ©e Ã la sanction de l'expulsion, une restriction non justifiÃ©e par la Convention . i . Griefs relevant des articles 3 et 5 8. Le requÃ©rent allÃ©gue que son expulsion serait contraire Ã la Convention en ce qu'elle violerait les a rt icles 3 et 5 . 9 . La Commission rappelle tout d'abord qu'elle a toujours soulignÃ© que le droit pour un Ã©tranger de rÃ©sider sur le territoire d'une Haute Partie contractante n'est pas garanti en tant que tel par la Convention . En outre, l'article 5 (1) (f) de la Convention et les articles 3 et 4 de son Protocole additionnel NÂ° 4 montrent clairement que les Hautes Parties contrectantes ont l'intention de se rÃ©server Ã elles-mÃªmes la facultÃ© d'expulser des Ã©trangers de leur territoire . Par ailleurs, la Commission a reconnu que, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, l'expulsion peut impliquer une violation de la Convention, par exemple lorsqu'il y a un risque sÃ©rieux qu'un traitement contraire Ã l'article 3 soit infligÃ© dans l'Etat de destination . Ainsi, les Hautes Parties contractantes ont un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire pour dÃ©cider de l'expulsion d'un Ã©tranger qui se trouve sur leur territoire, mais ce pouvoir doit Ãªtre exercÃ© de telle sorte qu'il ne porte pas atteinte aux droits garantis Ã l'intÃ©ressÃ© par la Convention . 10 . II semble qu'en l'espÃ©ce le requÃ©rant ne risque aucunement d'Ã©tre soumis, dans le pays de aestination, Ã un traitement contraire Ã l'article 3, s'il agit par exemple des Etats-Unis, bien que des poursuites puissent y Ãªtre engagÃ©es contre lui . NÃ©anmoins, le requÃ©rant a estimÃ© que, dans les circonstances particuliÃ©res de son affaire, l'expulsion serait contraire Ã l'article 3 car elle constituerait une sanction arbitraire, injustifiÃ©e ou disproportionnÃ©e . Toutefois, l'expulsion d'un Ã©tranger pour des motifs de sÃ©curitÃ© nationale ne peut, tout au moins dans des circonstances normales, Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme une peine et, en l'espÃ©ce, il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© dÃ©montrÃ© que l'intention des autoritÃ©s Ã©tait de punir le requÃ©rant, comme il l'a suggÃ©rÃ©, plutÃ´t que de protÃ©ger la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale . Une expulsion de ce genre ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme Ã©tant contraire en elle-mÃªme Ã l'article 3 . Par consÃ©quent il n'y a pas d'apparence de violation de l'article 3 . 11 . En ce qui concerne les griefs relevant de l'article 5, la Commission fait observer tout d'abord que le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©tÃ© privÃ© de sa libertÃ©, tout au moins jusqu'Ã prÃ©sent . Par consÃ©quent, la question se pose seulement de savoir si la dÃ©cision d'expulser le requÃ©rant implique nÃ©anmoins une autre atteinte au droit Ã la Â« libertÃ© et Ã la sÃ»retÃ© Â» qui lui est garanti par l'article 5 111 . 12 . La Commission estime que la protection du droit Ã la Â« sOretÃ© Â» garanti par l'article 5 a trait Ã l'ingÃ©rence arbitraire d'une autoritÃ© publique dans la Â« libertÃ©Â» personnelle d'un individu . En consÃ©quence, toute dÃ©cision relevant du domaine de l'article 5 doit se conformer, afin de garantir le droit Ã la Â« sÃ»retÃ© Â» de l'individu, aux conditions de procÃ©dure et de fond spÃ©cifiÃ©es par une loi prÃ©existante .
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En l'espÃ¨ce, la dÃ©cision d'expulser le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© prise en vertu de certaines dispositions de la loi de 1971 sur l'immigration et rien ne permet de prÃ©sumer que les conditions posÃ©es par cette loi n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© remplies . L'article 3 (5) de la loi en 1971 prÃ©voit que l'expulsion peut Ãªtre ordonnÃ©e pour le motif qu'elle est dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t du bien public et l'article 15 (4) laisse clairement entendre que cela peut inclure des motifs de sÃ©curitÃ© nationale . La dÃ©claration du Home Office indique les motifs pour lesquels il a Ã©tÃ© admis que la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale exigeait le dÃ©part du requÃ©rant . En outre, rien n'indique qu'il soit interdit au requÃ©rant de quitter le Royaume-Uni et de se rendre dans le pays de son choix . 13 . Par consÃ©quent, la Commission ne constate pas non plus une apparence de violation de l'article 5 de la Convention et elle conclut que, dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant se plaint de ce que son expulsion en tant que telle violerait la Convention, la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e . ii . Grief relarif Ã©% ingÃ©rence dans la vie familiale du requÃ©rent, en violation de l'article 8 14 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que son expulsion impliquerait aussi une ingÃ©rence dans sa vie familiale qui serait contraire Ã l'article 8 de la Convention . 15 . Le requÃ©rant et sa femme, qui ont vÃ©cu apparemment ensemble en Angleterre depuis 1973, sont tous deux des Ã©trangers, de nationalitÃ© diffÃ©rente . lis ont rÃ©sidÃ© au Royaume-Uni sur une base temporaire et il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© dÃ©montrÃ© qu'ils ne seront pas en mesure de prendre des dispositions raisonnables pour vivre ensemble en dehors du Royaume-Uni, alors mÃªme qu'ils prÃ©fÃ©reraient y rester . 16 . Lorsque, dans des circonstances de ce genre, la femme a la possibilitÃ© de suivre son mari en dehors du pays, cela ne constitue pas, d'aprÃ©s la Commission, une ingÃ©rence dans la vie familiale qui sereit contraire Ã l'article 8 (1) Ivoir par exemple requÃ©te NÂ° 5269/71, X . et Y . c/le Royaume-Uni, Annuaire XV, p . 564, Recueil de dÃ©cisions 39, p . 104) . 17 . En consÃ©quence, tout en admettant que la vie familiale du requÃ©rant sera inÃ©vitablement quelque peu perturbÃ©e par son expulsion, la Commission estime qu'il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© dÃ©montrÃ© que cela impliquerait en l'espÃ©ce une violation de son droit au respect de cette vie familiale au sens de l'article 8 . Ce grief est donc aussi manifestement mal fondÃ© . iii . Grief relatif Ã une ingÃ©rence dans la libertÃ© d'expression du requArant qui serait contraire Ã l'article 10 18 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue qu'il ressort des allÃ©gations formulÃ©es par le Home Secretary (et en particulier des allÃ©gations selon lesquelles il a Ã©tÃ© impliquÃ© dans la diffusion d'informations prÃ©judiciables Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© du Royaume-Uni et a aidÃ© et conseillÃ© d'autres personnes Ã obtenir des informations de ce genre en vue de leur publication lque'ordnacxplsiotÃªre naisdctvÃ©profesinl qu'il a exercÃ©es en recevant et en communiquant des informations . Il allÃ¨gue que cela implique la violation de l'article 10 . 19 . L'article 10 11) de la Convention stipule notamment que toute personne a droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression et que ce droit comprend la libertÃ© s de recevoir ou de communiquer des infonnations ou des idÃ©es sans qu'il puisse y avoir ingÃ©rence d'autoritÃ©s publiques . . . e . Cependant, l'article 10 n'accorde pas en lui-mÃªme un droit d'asile ou un droit pour un Ã©tranger de sÃ©journer dans un pays donnÃ© . Par consÃ©quent, l'expulsion pour des motifs de sÃ©curitÃ© ne constitue pas en tant que telle une ingÃ©rence dans les droit s
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garantis par l'article 10. II s'ensuit que les droits garantis Ã un Ã©tranger par l'article 10 sont distincts de son droit Ã sÃ©journer dans le pays et qu'ils ne possÃ©dent pas ce dernier droit . Dans la prÃ©sente affaire, le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©tÃ© soumis, pendant qu'il se trouvait sur le territoire du Royaume-Uni, Ã la moindre restriction Ã ses droits Ã recevoir et Ã communiquer des informations . Il n'a pas non plus Ã©tÃ© dÃ©montrÃ© que la dÃ©cision relative Ã l'expulsion constituait en rÃ©alitÃ© une sanction infligÃ©e au requÃ©rant pour avoir exercÃ© les droits qui lui Ã©taient garantis par l'article 10 de la Convention, plutdt que l'exercice normal, pour des motifs de sÃ©curitÃ©, du pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire rÃ©servÃ© aux Etats de procÃ©der Ã une expulsion . 20 . La Commission estime par consÃ©quent qu'il n'y a aucune apparence d'une ingÃ©rence dans le droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression du requÃ©rant tel qu'il lui est garanti par l'article 10 (1) et que ce grief est donc aussi manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27 (2) . iv . Grief relatif A l'ingÃ©rence dans le droit 6/a libertÃ© d'association du requÃ©rant geranti par l'artic% 1 1 21 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que la mesure prise par les autoritÃ©s viole l'article 11 dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'allÃ©gation selon laquelle il a Â« entretenu des contacts rÃ©guliers prÃ©judiciables Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© du Royaume-Uni avec des agents de renseignement Ã©trangers n constitue, en relation avec la sanction de l'expulsion, une restriction Ã sa libertÃ© d'association non justifiÃ©e par la Convention . 22 . Toutefois, la Commission n'estime pas que l'article 11 peut Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ© comme interdisant Ã un Etat d'expulser un Ã©tranger pour le motif qu'il a Ã©tÃ© en contact avec des agents de renseignement Ã©trangers mÃªme si, d'aprÃ¨s l'article 11, il Ã©tait en droit d'avoir des contacts avec des personnes de ce genre pendant qu'il se trouvait sur le territoire de l'Etat intÃ©ressÃ© . Il n'y a aucune indication selon laquelle il y aurait eu ingÃ©rence dans la libertÃ© d'association du requÃ©rant pendant qu'il se trouvak au Royaume-Uni . La Commission estime par consÃ©quent que ce grief est aussi manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27 (2) . v . Griefs selon lesquels la cause du requÃ©rant n aureit pas AtE entendu Ã©quitablerrrent 23 . Le requÃ©rant a allÃ©guÃ© que l'article 6 de la Convention a Ã©tÃ© violÃ© dans la mesure oÃ¹ sa cause n'a pas Ã©tÃ© entendu Ã©quitablement en ce qui concerne premiÃ©rement les dÃ©clarations prÃ©tendument diffamatoires formulÃ©es au Parlement et deuxiÃ¨mement la dÃ©cision relative Ã son expulsion .
24 . L'article 6(1) stipule notamment que : Â« Toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement, publiquement et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial, Ã©tabli par la loi . . . Â»
25 . La Commission a examinÃ© tout d'abord le grief relatif aux dÃ©clarations formulÃ©es au Parlement . Le requÃ©rant a allÃ©guÃ© qu'il n'a pas de recours en ce qui concerne ces dÃ©clarations prÃ©tendument diffamatoires . Il allÃ¨gue que le droit de dÃ©fendn : sa rÃ©putation est un Â« droit de caractÃ¨re civil Â» au sens de l'article 6, mais que sa cause ne sera pas entendue Ã©quitablement en raison de l'argument de l'immunitÃ© absolue . 26 . Cependant, la Commission a dÃ©jÃ constatÃ© Ã propos de la requÃªte NÂ° 3374/67, X . c/Autriche IAnnuaire 12, p . 246 ; Recueil 29, p . 29) que l'article 6 (1) doit Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ© compte dÃ»ment tenu de l'immunitÃ© parlementaire, telle qu'elle est traditionnellement reconnue dans les Etats parties Ã la Convention . Le principe de l'immunit Ã©
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en ce qui concerne les dÃ©clarations de ce genre est gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnu comme un attribut d'un Â« rÃ©gime politique vÃ©ritablement dÃ©mocratique u au sens du prÃ©ambule de la Convention . Dans la prÃ©sente affaire, le requÃ©rant ne peut se plaindre devant les tribunaux du Royaume-Uni des dÃ©clarations faites au Parlement, en raison du principe du privilÃ©ge parlementaire, qui fait partie du droit du Royaume-Uni . Ce principe offre une protection absolue aux personnes qui font des dÃ©clarations de ce genre . Bien que les droits Ã la protection de la rÃ©putation, qui sont garantis Ã une personne par le droit national, constituent de faÃ§on gÃ©nÃ©rale des r droits de caractÃ¨re civil Â» au sens de l'article 6 (1), le requÃ©rant n'a aucun droit, d'aprÃ¨s le droit du Royaume-Uni, Ã la protection de sa rÃ©putation, dans la mesure oÃ¹ cette rÃ©putation peut Ãªtre affectÃ©e par les dÃ©clarations incriminÃ©es. Par consÃ©quent, l'article 6 (1) ne garantit pas le droit d'engager une procÃ©dure Ã propos de ces dÃ©clarations, puisque le requÃ©rant n'a pas de Â« droit de caractÃ©re civil Â» Ã la protection de sa rÃ©putation contre ces dÃ©clarations . Il s'ensuit que la Commission n'est pas compÃ©tente pour examiner ce grief et qu'elle doit le rejeter comme incompatible ratione meteriae avec la Convention, en application de l'article 27 (2) de la Convention . 27 . La Commission a examinÃ© ensuite le grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel sa cause n'a pas Ã©tÃ© entendue Ã©quitablement en ce qui concerne la dÃ©cision relative Ã son expulsion . Le requÃ©rant a allÃ©guÃ© que l'ordonnance d'expulsion impliquait en substance une dÃ©cision relative Ã une accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale, puisque les allÃ©gations formulÃ©es contre lui Â« constituent la base d'accusations en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale e, notamment d'aprÃ¨s la loi sur les secrets officiels . La Commission a aussi examinÃ© ex officio si l'ordonnance d'expulsion impliquait une dÃ©cision sur des droits et obligations de caractÃ©re civil .
28 . Cependant, la Commission observe que le droit pour un Ã©tranger de rÃ©sider dans un pays particulier est une question qui est rÃ©gie par le droit public . Elle estime que lorsque les autoritÃ©s publiques d'un Etat dÃ©cident d'expulser un Ã©tranger pour des motifs de sÃ©curitÃ©, cela constitue un acte de l'Etat qui relÃ¨ve du domaine public et que cela ne reprÃ©sente pas une dÃ©cision relative Ã des droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil au sens de l'article 6 . II s'ensuit que, bien que la dÃ©cision d'expulser le requÃ©rant puisse entrainer des consÃ©quences Ã propos de droits de caractÃ¨re civil, en particulier de sa rÃ©putation, l'Etat n'est pas tenu, dans des cas de ce genre d'entendre la cause du requÃ©rant conformÃ©ment aux exigences de l'article 6 (1) . 29 . II reste Ã dÃ©terminer si, en l'espÃ©ce, l'ordonnance d'expulsion impliquait une dÃ©cision sur une accusation en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre le requÃ©rant . Bien qu'aucun reproche spÃ©cifique relatif Ã un comportement criminel n'a Ã©tÃ© formulÃ© contre lui, il est tout au moins implicite que la dÃ©cision du Home Secretary se fonde sur des informations selon lesquelles il s'est rendu coupable d'un comportement punissable . Cependant, de l'avis de la Commission, cela ne fait pas rentrer la dÃ©cision dans le domaine pÃ©nal, puisque l'expulsion constitue une procÃ©dure qui se distingue entiÃ©rement de poursuites ou d'une condamnation pÃ©nales . Comme la Commission l'a dÃ©jÃ© observÃ©, l'expulsion ne peut pas normalement Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©e comme une sanction . 30 . La Commission estime par consÃ©quent que le grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel sa cause, contrairement Ã l'article 6, n'a pas Ã©tÃ© entendue Ã©quitablement en ce qui concerne la dÃ©cision relative Ã son expulsion est incompatible ratione materiae avec la
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Convention au mot'rf que l'ordonnance relative Ã l'expulsion du requÃ©rant n'impliquait aucune dÃ©cision sur ses droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil ni sur le bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre lui . c . Grief relevant de l'article 1 4 Le requÃ©rant a allÃ©guÃ© que, outre le fait qu'il a Ã©tÃ© victime d'une violation des articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 et 11, il a aussi Ã©tÃ© victime d'une violation de l'article 14 pris conjointement avec ces articles . Cependant, la Commission ne discerne aucune raison de penser qu'il a fait l'objet, en violation de l'article 14, d'une discrimination en ce qui concerne la jouissance de l'un des droits en question . Son statut d'Ã©tranger fournirait en lui-mÃªme une justification objective et raisonnable du fait qu'il est soumis, dans le domaine de la lÃ©gislation en matiÃ©re d'immigration, Ã un traitement diffÃ©rent de celui appliquÃ© aux personnes possÃ©dant la nationalitÃ© britannique . La Commission considÃ©re donc ce grief comme Ã©tant manifestement mal fondÃ© . Par ces motifs, la Commission DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTEIRRECEVABLE .
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| AGEE c. ROYAUME-UNI

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