Y. c. ROYAUME-UNI

APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 6870/75 Y . v/the UNITED KINGDO M Y . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 14 May 1977 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 14 mai 1977 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 3 of the Convention : Living conditions of a mental patient committed to hospital. Complaint declared admissible . Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Convention : Detained mental patient prevented from sending a telegram . Message nevertheless transmitted in sufficient time . Manifestly ill-founded. Article 26 of the Convention : Exhaustion of domestic remedies . Where living conditions of a mental patient committed to hospital are concerned, a claim for a declaratory judgment or damages under the Law of tort ls not, in the particular case, a remedy which had to be exhausted .
Article 3 de la Convention : Conditions de vie d'un malade mental internÃ© . Grief dÃ©ciarÃ© recevable . Article 8, paragraphe 1, de La Convention : interr/iction faite Ã© un malade mental internÃ© d'envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme . Message nÃ©anmoins transmis en temps utile . DÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . Article 26 de la Convention : Epuisement des voies de recours internes . S'agtssant des conditions de vie d'un malade mental internÃ©, une demande tendant Ã un jugement dÃ©claratoire ou Ã des dommages-intÃ©rÃªts pour acte illicite (Law of tort ) ne constitue pas, en l'espÃ©ce, un recours qu'il Ã© tait nÃ©cessaire d'exercer.
I francais : voir p. 681
THE FACTS
The facts of the case as submitted by the parties and apparently not in dispute may be summarised as follows : The applicant was born on 28 February 1950 . He is normally resident in F ., but is now detained in Broadmoor Hospital . He was originally represented by hi s
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parents, Mr and Mrs A .X . He is now represented by Mr G ., a barrister of the New York bar, and Ms M ., a solicitor, both of the Legal and Weltare Rights Service of MIND Ithe National Association for Mental Health), London . On 30 November 1973, following the applicant's conviction on certain fraud charges, an order was made by L . Crown Court that he be detained in Broadmoor Hospital under S .60 of the Mental Health Act 1959 and that his release be restricted under S .65 of the Act, without limit of time . S .60 of the 1959 Act empowers courts in certain circumstances to order the detention of a convicted person in a mental hospital . S .65 empowers a Crown Court to order that the discharge of such a person should be subject to restrictions Imeaning essentially that decisions about discharge etc . are the responsibility of the Home Secretary) either for a limited or unlimited time . The Home Secretary is empowered under S .66 of the Act to revoke an order made under S .65 when he thinks fit to do s o Broadmoor Hospital is a "special hospital" provided Inowl under the provisions of S .40 of the National Health Service Reorganisation Act 1973, which requires the Secretary of State for Social Services to provide and maintain establishments for persons, subject to detention under the 1959 Act, who, in his opinion, require treatment under conditions of special security on account of their dangerous, violent or criminal propensities . After a period on remand in L . Prison, the applicant was transferred to Broadmoor Hospital on 19 December 1973 . He has been detained there since . The applicant applied for leave to appeal against his sentence and thi s application came before the full Court of Appeal in July 1974 and was dismissed . Shortly before the appeal was heard the applicant was refused permission by the hospital staff to send a telegram to his parents . S .66 of the 1959 Act provides that the Secretary of State may refer the case of a patient restricted under S .65 to a Mental Health Review Tribunal for advice . In addition, if the patient requests him, he must do so within two months unless he discharges the patient . The patient may make one such request in the course of his second year in hospital and a further request in the course of each two-year period after the end of the second year . The Tribunal cannot order the discharge of a patient but advises the Secretary of State . The applicant's case was reviewed by a Mental Health Review Tribunal in March 1975 and again in December 1976 . The first review was at the request of the applicant . On the second occasion the Secretary of State referred the case to the tribunal on his own initiative . The original complaints of the applican t In his application the applicant made various complaints concerning the court proceedings in his case, the refusal of permission to send a telegram ,
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medical reports prepared by doctors concerned in his case, the conditions of his detention and proceedings before the Mental Health Review Tribunal in March 1975 . In particular the applicant complained that he had been refused permission to contact his parents urgently (by telegram) in relation to his appeal following the last-minute withdrawal of the solicitors acting for him . He also alleged that the conditions in which he had been detained in Broadmoor Hospital since 19 December 1973 had involved the violation of Art . 3 of the Convention . He submitted a statement concerning conditions in Broadmoor which were also referred to in other documents submitted with the application . He stated that he was held in "extreme slum conditions" and alleged that Broadmoor was grossly overcrowded and lacking in adequate sanitary facilities He referred in particular to the allegedly filthy condition of toilet facilities and lack of washing facilities . He alleged that he had to live constantly with murderers, rapists, arsonists, sexual perverts and other lunatics and that there was a constant atmosphere of violence . He alleged that in the dormitories the beds were only six to twelve inches apart, that observalion lights were kept on all night, that seriously disturbed patients occasionally went on the rampage at night, shouting and screaming and that the atmosphere in the dormitories was foul and airless since the majority of the windows were screwed shut . He alleged that he had no privacy and little fresh air or exercise . In his application the applicant stated that he had received no treatment whatever since being in Broadmoor, which, he said, demonstrated that he was not in need of inental care in the first place . It was stated that in July 1975 the applicant was offered treatment but refused and that in November 1975 his responsible medical officer IRMDI indicated that he needed monthly injections of a drug "Modicate" . It was alleged that this drug had various side-effects which had not been explained to the applicant or his parents and that an allegation by the RMO that this drug was needed because the applicant had a potentiality for violent outbursts was unsubstantiated . It was further alleged that in July and November 1975 his RMO incited the applicant to institute legal proceedings against him in respect of allegedly false statements concerning the applicant and his family . The applicant also indicated that he was not sufficiently employed and found the daily routine boring and stated that he received no preparation for return to the world outside, and was afraid of vegetating . It appears from his parents' submission to the Mental Health Review Tribunal in 1975 that they were concerned that he would become institutionalised and feared that he would be harmed by continued incarceration in Broadmoor . They expressed worry that apathy and resentment would develop and that the task of rehabilitation to normal life would become more difficult the longer he was kept in Broadmoor . In support of his allegations the applicant quoted from the Interim Report of Lord Butler's Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, published in July 1974 .
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In the passage quoted the Committee expressed astonishment and shock at overcrowding in Broadmoor and obse rv ed that in some wards beds were no more than eighteen inches apart, and that the patients, who lived out of suitcases for lack of cupboard room, had no privacy . They also noted that a sub-committee of the Parliamentary Estimates Committee had reported that they were " appalled" at the conditions when they visited the hospital in 1967-68 . On 10 September 1974 the applicant's parents wrote to the Secretary of State for Social Services complaining about the conditions in which the applicant was held, and requesting a Public Inquiry . In a reply dated 17 December 1974 the Department of Health and Social Security said inter alia that they had been well aware of, and much concerned about the conditions at Brbadmoor for a long time . They said that these mostly stemmed from the fact that the hospital had far more male patients than it had been built for, and that the buildings were over 100 years old, and it ;was thus impossible to introduce improvements in washing and toilet facilities or sleeping conditions . They stated that the only real solution was the building of a new special hospital expected to open in part in 1977 . They stated that part of this hospital had already opened and that by January 1975 some 70 patients would have moved from Broadmoor . The final report of the Butler Committee, published in October 1975, indicates that 70 patients had been transferred from Broadmoor and that theyhad been informed by the Department of Health and Social Security that it was not intended to refill these places . The Committee stated however that overcrowding in the special hospitals remained a serious problem . Details of the remaining complaints originally made by the applicant are set out in the Commission's partial decision on the admissibility of the application, taken on 27 September 1976' . PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSIO N The Commission examined the admissibility of the application on 27 September 1976 It decided to bring it to the notice of the respondent 'Government under Rule 42 121 (b) of its Rules of Procedure and to request them to submit written observations on its admissibility insofar as it concerned : a . the applicant's complaint that he had been refused permission tosend a telegram, insofar as it might raise an issue under Art . 8 of the Conventlon only . the applicant's complaint that the conditions of his detention and treat;b ment in Broadmoor Hospital from 19 December 1973 onwards had involved the violation of Art . 3 of the Convention, having due regard to the alleged lack of privacy in Broadmoor,Hospital, in addition to the other matters complained of by the applican t ' Not published .
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c . in connection with the applicani's complaints concerning the proceedings before the Menial Health Review Tribunal, the question whether the rights of review available to the applicant under the Mental Health Act 1959, or otherwise, satisfied the requirements of Art . 5 (4) of the Convention . The Commission adjourned its examination of the application insofar as it concerned these matters and declared the remainder of the application inadmissibl e The observations of the respondent Government were submitted on 23 November 1976 . The applicant's observations in reply were received on 4 February 1977 . On 4 March !1977 the-Commission decided, in accordance with Rule 42 (2) in fine of its Rules of Procedure, to invite the parties to appear before it in order to make oral submissionson â¢the admissibility and merits of the application insofar as it raised issues under Arts . 3 and 5 of the Convention . It requested the parties to take into consideration in their submissions certain questions relating to Arts . 3, 5 111 and 141 and 26 of the Convention . It decided to hear submissions on the admissibility and merits of three other applications against the United Kingdom INos . 6840/74, 6998/75 and 7099/75) raising connected issues, at the same time' . The Commission also decided to inform the parties to the present appEcation that it did -not require any further submissions on the issue arising under Art 8 of the Convention . The hearing before the Commission took place on 11 and 12 May 1977 .
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIE S The refusal~of : permission to send a telegram - Art . 8 a . Submissions .ot .the respondent Governmen t In their written observations the Government stated that it was a practice of Broadmoor Hospital to allow patients to send telegrams only in exceptional circumstances, such as an acute family crisis . This was to protect the telephone exchange, which was heavily overloaded, from further overloading and to protect porters from having to make unnecessary journeys to the village Post Office . The applicant's parents had visited him three times weekly and had visited him on the early afternoon of 11 June 1974 . After the visit the applicant had found a letter from the Court of Appeal waiting for him . He had asked to send a telegram . The slaff ~had anticipated that his parents would visit him again on 13 June las in fact they did) and had considered there was insufficient urgency to warrant sending a -telegram . The applicant could have wrilten a letter . The Commission, in its partial decision, had found no indication that the applicant had been hindered inpreparing his case before the Court of Appeal . See D .R 8/106antl D .R . 10/5.
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With regard to Art . 8 of the Convention, the Government stated that the applicant was afforded visiting facilities . Two of his three visits weekly included 20-minute promenades on the terrace With regard to the right to respect for correspondence, it was not clear whether this right extended to telegrams and the Government reserved their position on this point . In any event there was no interference with the applicant's ability to correspond, since the situation was not urgent and the applicant had been able to correspond by letter or communicate in person shortly afterwards . In the case of a person deprived of his liberty, Art . 8 (1) read with Art . 8 121 did not give unlimited freedom to correspond or to choose the means of correspondence, nor unlimiied freedom of access to different means of communication . The facts did not disclose any failure to "respect" the family life and correspondence of the applicant within the meaning of Art . 8 and this complaint was therefore manifestly ill-founded . b . Submissions of the applican t In his written observations in reply, the applicant stated that in June 1974 the solicitors acting in his appeal had suddenly withdrawn . He had been faced with the task of finding new solicitors and counsel . At about 16 .30 hours on the afternoon of 11 June 1974, after his mother's visit, he had been handed a letter from the Court of Appeal stating that his case would be heard on 18 June 1974 . He had immediately asked if he could send a telegram to his parenls to try to get the hearing postponed until new legal representation could be arranged . The nursing staff and also, on 12 June 1974, his responsible medical officer, had refused permission . He had thus been prevented from communicating with his parents by telegram on an urgent and important matter . The hospital authorities had not had sufficient information to make a proper judgment as to the urgency of the situation and did not take notice of the applicant's explanation . They were in any event in breach of Art . 8 in preventing the applicant from sending the telegram, whatever its urgency . The applicant could not be certain that his parents would visit him again on 13 June . The journey from their home was difficult and lenglhy . Their visit could have been postponed, particularly as they were not aware of his wish to see them urgently . It was too late for the applicant to send a letter on 11 June . If he had written the following day, the letter would not have reached his parents until 13 June at the earliest . In fact his mother had left the house on the morning of 13 June before the post was delivered . She was told about the letter from the Court of Appeal that afternoon and thus had only two working days to apply to the Court for postponement of the hearing . The respondent Government had stated that the applicant's parents visited him three times weekly . In fact visits on days other than Saturdays and Sundays were restricted to seven per month . Special application had to be made for extra visits . Only two promenades per month were authorised,subject to staff availability and weather conditions . They were often cancelled at short notice without reasons being given and lasted only 15 minutes, not 20 as suggested . _42_
The refusal of permission to send the telegram was a violation of Art . 8 111 . The case could be distinguished from those relating to prisoners in which the Commission had applied an "inherent limitations" doctrine (e .g . No . 2749/66, De Courcy v . the United Kingdom, Yearbook X, p . 3881, since a hospital order was made for purposes of therapy not punishment . In any case the doctrine no longer applied . The European Court of Human Rights had held in the Golder case that the righis in Art . 8 were not subject to any "implied limitations" . The Court had also said that to impede someone from even initiating correspondence constituted one of the most far-reaching forms of interference with the exercise of the right to respect for correspondence . Even if the Commission applied a modified "inherent limitations" doctrine, the Vagrancy cases suggested a very narrow scope indeed . Interierence with correspondence should not be permissible except insofar as clearly justified by the cause of detention . Nominally the reason for detention in the applicant's case was to provide treatment . If correspondence was interfered with where there was clear evidence that it would be detrimental to the best therapeutic interests of the patient, arguably this would not contravene the Convention . However, the Government relied only on the administrative convenience of the staff . 8 121, there was some question whether the actio n .WithrencoA was "in accordance with law" . The Mental Health Act 1959 empowered interference with an outgoing postal packet, including a telegram, only if it appeared that it would be offensive, defamatory or likely to prejudice the interests of the patient . The Government's justification of the practice was questionable . What evidence was ihere that lifting of the restriction would overburden the telephone exchange ? The porters did not have to take telegrams in person to the Post Office but merely to telephone them . No provisions of the Convention authorised interference with correspondence on grounds of administrative convenience . The correspondence of detained persons in respect of their defence was especially privileged . This followed from Art . 6 (3) Ibl of the Convention .
Conditions of detention and treatment in Broadmoor Hospital - Art . 3 a . Written observations of the respondent Government The Government stated that Broadmoor Hospital had been built in the nineteenth century and in recent years had been overcrowded . When he had made his application to the Commission the applicant had been located in a dormitory of 24 beds . The beds were close together . There was a flush toilet and wash-basin in the dormitory . It was inspected throughout the night, not less frequently than at hourly intervals by nursing staff . There had been disturbances in the dormitory but only very rarely . Nursing staff could be summoned b . Dimmed lights were kept on at night to allow observation of th ye presingabl patients . The windows could be opened at will . Ventilation was aided by ians, but these were noisy and ventilation was less than satisfactory .
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In the daytime at the time when the application was made, some 60 patients had shared a large day-room, dining-room and broad corridor space with reading and recreational facilities . Patients had access to eight wash-basins, three WCs and two stand urinals . On five occasions each week they had opportunity for fresh air and exercise in the garden, or playing or watching games on the sports field, in addition to expeditions from the ward to work areas, hospital shop, chapel, social functions etc . The applicant had been visited three times weekly by his family . It had been difficult to institute meaningful treatment with which he was prepared to co-operate . As regards employment, he was laundryman for his ward and appeared not unhappy with his role . The Government accepted (hat conditions in the hospital were less than satisfactory on account of overcrowding . Accordingly a new special hospital was being built . Seventy patients had been transferred from Broadmoor to an advance unit and in 1978 and 1979 it was expected that 30 and 100 further patients would leave Broadmoor for the new hospital, which was due to be completed in 1980 . The reduction in the number of patients in Broadmoor would then allow it to be rebuilt in stages The respondent Government referred to the definitions of inhuman and degrading treatment given by the Commission in the Greek case fYearbook XII, p . 186) . They submitted that whilst conditions were less than satisfactory, they did not cause severe suffering or grossly humiliate patients or drive them to act against their will or conscience . The conditions of the applicant's detention did not therefore amount to a violation of Art . 3 . b . Written observations of the applicant in reply In support of his complaint concerning conditions in Broadmoor, the applicant submitted, with his observations, a statement by his father and an extract from a complaint to the Department of Health and Social Security . The statement by his father emphasised that in the period from 19 December 1973 onwards, conditions had not always been as described by the Government . Thus there was no reference to the use of urinal pots in dormitories or the lack of, and refusal to provide, toilet paper . The Government had referred to a flush toilet lately fitted in the applicant's present dormitory . They did not mention that there had been no door or cover to it for some time after it was installed, nor that there was now only a curtain . The applicant's bed was adjacent to it and he was disturbed through the night by patients using it . It was not kept clean . Many patients were very dirty in their personal habits and left toilets, and often the floors of wards and dormitories, in a filthy condition . This was degrading and incontinent patients should be housed separately . There was no privacy . The applicant was one of a crowd 24 hours per day . By day he had to mix with murderers, rapist, arsonists and mental degenerates o f
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all kinds . By night he was locked in a dormitory with them, with beds as little as 12-18 inches apart . There were frequent disturbances from patients and he had also witnessed incidents of violence . Disturbances were also caused by the night nurses' inspections . Sleep was difficult or impossible . All the windows did not open . Some were screwed shut, for instance those at Cornwall House where the applicant was from February to April 1974 . There was an ever-present fear of violence . The applicant was eve r conscious of the dangers, particularly at night when all were locked in the dormitory . Even in prisons people were segregated in cells in ones, twos or threes, according to their dangerous or violent propensities . There was no place for a patient to sit quietly . The so-called "Quiet Rooms" were either kept locked or liable to be disturbed by patients . The lack of privacy, lack of conditions for a good night's sleep and ever-present fear of violence did constitute severe suffering over such a long period . The Government's reference to availability of 8 wash-basins ignored the fact that plugs were often missing so that washing was impossible for so many people in the time allowed . People had to shave every other day by arrangement . Even the basic furniture of a hospital was missing . The applicant had only one tin locker, of one cubic toot and two suitcases of his own for his possessions . Standards as to the amount of space for patients laid down by the Government were far from being met at Broadmoor, yet doctors and the Department of Health and Social Security IDHSSI knowingly continued to admit patients and continued the dreadful state of overcrowding . Senior management in the DHSS took neither interest nor effective action on this overcrowding . On average the time for fresh air and exercise lon Wednesdays, Saturdays, Sundays and some summer evenings) worked out at 4'h hours per week . This was not enough . The applicant's application for "terrace parole" had not been approved . There was no internal exercise area . Even in prisons there was provision for an hour's exercise per day . The limitation of opportunities for fresh air and exercise daily was degrading and contributed much to institutionalisation . The restrictions on family visits were unnecessary in a hospital . No library was available to patients At the time the application was made the applicant had no work after cleaning the corridors, finishing at 09 .30 hours . He had nothing at all to do for the rest of the day during the first year . During the second year he had had a part-time job cleaning and washing up in the nurses' staff-room . His request to work in the gardens had been refused . It was degrading and inhuman to allow a young, fit man to sit around all day with nothing to do and nothing to look forward to under a sentence of indefinite detention . The Government had said the Responsible Medical Officer (RMP) had had difficulty instituting meaningful treatment with which the applicant was prepared to co-operate . However the need for treatment had not been explained . The RMO had alleged that he had a "history of assaultive behaviour" . The Court of Appeal had thrown this allegation out . He alleged that the applicant had a potentiality fo r
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violence but this was impossible to predict as the Butler Report had emphasised . In 2'/: years after the applicant's arrival in December 1973 his RMO had seen him for a total of only 42 minutes, spread over 7 interviews . "Treatment" had first been mentioned in January 1975 when the RMO had asked what sort of treatment he expected . Only in November 1975 had he suggested monthly injections of "Modicate" . He had made this a condition for transfer to an ordinary hospital . The applicant had seen the horrific after-effects of such drugs . The need for such drugs and details of possible side-effects had not been explained nor had the applicant's parents been consulted until April 1976 . In July 1976 the RMO had switched to requesting the applicant to join a special psychotherapeutic group to determine his attitudes and interpersonal relationships and improve his social skills The need for this had not been explained . The conclusion was that the RMO had sought to drive the applicant to act against his will and conscience with the promise of release from Broadmoor on condition that he accepted treatment, without explanation of the need for, or after-effects of, the treatment . The Government had not mentioned the industrial action by nursing staff between about 22 November and 18 December 1974, when they had prevented patients leaving their wards for recreation and when, apart from the last few days, visits by relatives had not been allowed To be shut up during this time amidst patients who were not forced to continue courses of treatment and where nursing staff refused to interfere in fights or touch patients in any way had been a degarding and inhuman experience . The lire precautions in the hospital were inadequate . Patients were locked in dormitories every night, fire exits were obstructed and there were no fire-drills . Inflammable materials were readily available for arsonists to start fires with and this had happened in Kent House . There was real fear as to what could happen in the event of a fire . In addition medical care was inadequate . There had been delays in providing attention in respect of complaints of eye-strain by the applicant in January 1974 . A check-up had not been arranged until March 1975 . There had also been delays of some five days in providing medical attention on two occasions when the applicant had received sporting injuries . The most degrading and inhuman experience was the number of false statements made by doctors which had contributed fo the applicant's detention for over three years . In the complaint to the Department of Health and Social Security many of the applicant's complaints to the Commission were repeated . A number of other complaints were also made, for instance on excessive canteen prices and inadequate laundry facilities . In the body of the applicant's written observations it was submitted that th e applicant had provided evidence from various sources of numerous aspects of the conditions in Broadmoor, which, taken together, constituted a violation of Art . 3 .
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These were, in particular : overcrowding, lack of privacy, inadequate and totally unsanitary washing and toilet facilities, lack of exercise facilities and day-time occupation, danger of fire and inadequate medical treatment and supervision . Broadmoor was a hospital and not a prison . The conditions described were totally unacceptable in any hospital . The respondent Government had accepted that conditions were "less than satisfactory on account of overcrowding" and explained that some patients would be transferred to a new special hospital . However the fact that overcrowding might be alleviated in the future did not excuse the violation of Art 3, from which there could be no derogation . The conditions constituted a violation of Art . 3 which was not excused by the proposed policy of building a new hospital . c Oral submissions of the respondent Governmen t i . lnrroductory In their oral submissions at the hearing, the respondent Government first recalled that the applicant was held by virtue of a court order made under SS .60 and 65 of the 1959 Act . A restriction order under S .65 could only be made if the court considered it necessary for the protection of the public . Furthermore, the court had ordered that the applicant should be held in a special hospital provided for persons who required treatment under conditions of special security on account of dangerous, violent or criminal propensities . These factors were very relevant to consideration of the issues under Art . 3, since in addition to an obligation to provide the most satisfactory treatment possible in the circumstances, the Secretary of State had responsibility for security . The special hospitals contained some of the most dangerous members of the community, and this was an important responsibility . The Government referred to a book of photographs and file of documents concerning Broadmoor . Whilst there were aspects of the hospital which were not as good as they would wish, there were also attractive aspects . The Government particularly stressed the occupational and recreational facilities which were provided . The problem of overcrowding was recognised . There was a historical explanation for this, namely that with changing medical attitudes leading to a reduction of the restrictions placed on patients in ordinary mental hospitals, it had been found that apart from the special hospitals there were very few hospitals that could offer any security . This had resulted in great pressure on the special hospitals . Steps had been put in hand to try to overcome the problem . The position at Broadmoor was not now as acute as it had been and it was now possible to carry out improvements there .
ii . Domestic remedies in relarion to the An . 3 complain t If there was negligent treatment of a patient, the Secretary of State was liable in damages for the discomfort suffered . Furthermore a declaration could be obtained against the Crown to the effect that the conditions contravened the law s
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of tort . By long established practice the Crown treated a declaration as equivalent to an injunction (a remedy not available against it) . Damages could be awarded for loss of the pleasures or amenities of life, in addition to damages for pain and suffering or loss of earning power . The Secretary of State would be vicariously liable for the negligence of his servants, such as the hospital cleaning staff . Matters such as those complained of by the applicant could sound in damages . Furthermore, whilst the Government were aware of no case in the law of tort which established that damages for mental distress alone were recoverable, damages could be recovered in the law of contract for mental distress which was the direct and inevitable consequence of the conduct complained ot . The present tendency was to assimilate the position in relation to damages under the law of contract to those under the law of tort . There was no logical reason why such damages could not also be obtainedin .the law of tort . The jurisprudence of the Court and Commission indicated that a high standard of conduct had to be alleged to amount to contravention of Art . 3 . If mental distress was suffered as a result of such conduct, there was a strong probability that damages could be obtained even if that were the only kind ot damage suffered . In any event other kinds of damage could be recovered and declaratory relief could be obtained . If the conduct complained of by the applicant fell for consideration under Art . 3, which in the Government's submission it did not, it could sound in damages . The applicant had not attempted to exhaust the available remedies . It was enough that the possibility of a remedy existed, the outcome of which could not be predicted with certainty . Mere doubt as to the existence and prospects of success of a remedy did not absolve an applicant from exhausting it . The national courts must have had the opportunity of ruling on the matter before any appeal to the Commission . IApplication No . 1661/62, X & Y v. Belgium, Yearbook Vl, p. 360, Collection o/Decisions 7t7, p. 20 ; Eur. Court H .R ., Handyside Case, Judgment of 27 December 1976, Series A . No . 24, para . 48. ) In reply to the applicant's submissions on the matter Isee below) the Government submitted that difficulties in bringing proceedings were not as great as had been indicated . The very ability of the applicant to bring his application, to obtain medical reports and access to his legal adviser, showed this . If the conduct complained of amounted to a contravention of Art . 3, it would not be the case either that it would be uneconomic to bring proceedings or that an application for legal aid would be dismissed as a trifling matter . The applicant argued that the Government's submission as to the law of damages was controversial . This was not so . Whilst there was no direct precedent for a claim of this precise nature, such a claim was clearly not one where it could be said that there was no reasonable cause of action . The Government submitted that the applicant's complaints under Art . 3
were therefore inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies .
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iii . The issues under Arr . 3 The Government first referred to the Commission's approach to Art . 3 in the Greek case, which was, they submitted, a proper one . The whole sense of Art . 3 was to confine itself to matters which were gross . They then gave details, with reference to the photographs, of the accommodation which the applicant had occupied during his period in Broadmoor and of recreational and occupational facilities which he had used or which had been available . With reference to the toilet facilities, account had to be taken of the problems which could arise in treating patients of the sort held in Broadmoor . There could be anti-social activities and, whatever the conditions, such patients could be subject to stresses which would not occur in a hospital dealing with different types of patient There was no way in which patients such as the applicant could be protected from the totality of the consequences of the environment which was necessary in the interests of security . It had been difficult to institute meaningful treatment of the applicant because of his refusal of medication and rejection of attempts at social therapy . A distinction had to be drawn between the needs of a long-stay patient suffering from a condition which changed slowly, and those of a patient suffering an acute condition needing intensive whole-time medical attention . The applicant's RMO, the consultant psychiatrist, was head of a clinical team consisting of nurses, psychologists, educationalists, occupational officers and others, all of whom had contact with the patient . The consultant psychiatrist regularly met his team and was aware of the state and progress of the patient from their reports . His personal intervention and formal examination of the patient might not be necessary more than a few times a year . He was in any event in his ward every day and saw his patient going about his daily activity . The circumstances and nature of the patients being detained created the type of problems to which the applicant referred, in particular with reference to his statements about fear . Because of the sort of inmates in Broadmoor, it was necessary to have the security which caused the disadvantages the applicant complained of . It was true that possibly 40% of the patients were not gainfully employed . This figure must be read in the light of the total commitment of the hospital . Newly arrived patients going through the assessment process, and other categories of patient who were ill or having special treatment would be unable to work . The stress that had been placed on occupational difficulties and the type of persons with whom the applicant had to associate, indicated how far the case departed from the sort of questions which might arise under Art . 3 . The Government also referred to two medical reports produced by the applicant at the hearing . These represented the views of two doctors . Other doctors could take a different view as the Mental Health Review Tribunal which had recently reviewed the applicant's case had done . The one desire of those responsible was, as long as it was consistent with public safety, to ensure tha t
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people in Broadmoor went to hospitals with less security or were released as soon as possible, since although steps had continuously been taken to improve conditions at Broadmoor, there remained a real problem about accommodation . There was a world of difference between overcrowding and a breach of Art . 3 . It would be wrong if the difficulties that arose as a result of doing one's best in inadequate hospital facilities were allowed to be treated as creating matters wholly inappropriate for consideration as a contravention of Art . 3 . The allegation of violation of Art . 3 was manifestly ill-founded .
d . Oral submissions of the applican t i . lntroductory The applicant's representative first observed that he had been convicted of a non-violent fraud and had not had a previous criminal record . If he had been dealt with under the ordinary provisions of criminal law he would have been unlikely to have received any custodial sentence . At most it would have been a short one . He had been detained for over three years . Evidence given to the Butler Committee by the Broadmoor psychologists themselves, suggested that there was no better basis for predicting potential dangerousness in the case of mentally abnormal offenders ihan there was in the case of mentally normal offenders The Court of Appeal had itself (in R. v. McFarlane, &7 Criminal Appeal Reports, p 3201 expressed doubt as to whether the applicant should have gone to a special hospital and questioned how the criterion in S .40 of the National Health Service Reorganisation Act, 1973 had been met . ii . Domestic remedies Tfie applicant submitted that in English law it was necessary, before damages could be recovered for mental distress, first to show that physical injury or a manifestable physical or mental illness had been suffered . Damages for loss of amenities of life would only be awarded where the loss had been caused by physical injury . Mere physical discomfort would not, it was submitted, be a ground of damages without an accompanying physical injury . Practical difficulties would arise if a patient in a closed institution were to try to bring an action of the kind pointed to bythe Government . An applicant was not required to exhaust a remedy if, in view of the consistent case law of the national courts, this remedy had no reasonable chance of success . In the present case there would be no reasonable chance of success because of practical difficulties . The applicant had no financial means and would have to apply for legal aid . This would only be granted by the Law Society if there was a reasonable chance of success . When making its decision it would look to see whether reasonable damages would be available . The allegations of the applicant, for instance that the beds were eight inches apart, would not give rise to a significant amount of damages . The Law Society would also have to look at the grounds of the case . It would be the applicant's word against that of the hospita l
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and he could not recover documents to confirm his allegations . Finally a patient in Broadmoor was in a closed institution without access to information or understanding that he could bring an action, or how he could do so . The Government had not raised the matter in their origianl observations . Their novel argument about physical discomfort had been put forward by a team of lawyers to try to think of any theoretical possibility of raising an action . It was unlikely that a patient would understand he could do so . Furthermore a patient would have to apply to the High Court under S .141 of the 1959 Act for permission to bring his action, and would .have to show on affidavit evidence, without being able to present his full case, that there was substantial ground to show that the person to be proceeded against had acted in bad failh or withoul reasonable care . Experience in other cases, where the remedy was clearer than in the present one, showed that it was a futile exercise first to get legal aid, ihen to obtain permission under S .141, then to prove the case in court, all to obtain a small sum of damages . The applicant therefore submitted that it was theoretically impossible to obtain a remedy since mental distress alone would not give rise to a cause of action and, in any event, it would be a futile effort . iii . The issues under Art. 3 It was first submitted that the applicant was being detained not because of his offence but in his own best interests and because he needed treatment . In these circumstances, the conditions in the hospital had to measure up to a reasonable minimum standard which would have benefited the applicant . If the Government exercised the power to take a person's liberty for the purpose of treatment, it had the equal responsibility to provide a facility which served that purpose . The applicant submitted firstly that he had been detained with virtually nothing to do all day . This led to secondary schizophrenic dementia, or institutionalisation, when the patient became withdrawn and apathetic and lost his capacity to cope with ordinary life . The applicant had seen his RMO for a total of only 94 minutes between May 1974 and July 1976 and had not seen him at all since then . The photographs showing the opportunities for employment were not relevant since the applicant had not participated in any of the activities shown . 44% of the patients did not leave the ward area to work but remained there as the applicant had done for most of his detention . The applicant alleged that until his move to the laundry room, he had worked for considerably less than 1 7: hours per day . He spent only about 4'/x hours per week in exercise . This was not sufficient . The Prison Rules provided for a minimum of one hour's exercise per day for prisoners . A number ot medical reports, including two recently submitted to the Commission, agreed that whilst the applicant had been mentally ill at the time of his admission to hospital, he was not now . Yet it would be
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difficult for them to suggest that he should not be in a local hospital since he was suffering from a secondary schizophrenic illness, the process of institutionalisation which had been describe d . The applicant's second submission concerned the general overcrowding and lack of privacy . The hospital had been built in 1863 and as long ago as 1948 had 984 patients . The Government had been well aware of the situation since them . In addition the applicant referred to the comments made on the overcrowding by the Parliamentary Estimates Committee in 1968 and the Butler Committee in 1974 . The minimum standard for space at night, set in 1972 by the Department of Health and Social Security, was 50 square feet per bed . The space now available at Broadmoor was 46 square feet per bed, and this was after there had been a reduction in the number of patients . It was estimated that in 1974 the figure would have been 37 square feet per bed The applicant had no privacy and there was a real potential for violence at night . The applicant was in constant fear of this The applicant's third submission involved toilets and sanitary conditions . No toilets were available in single rooms or in several of the very overcrowded dormitories and there was lack of privacy . In this respect the applicant referred to relevant passages in the Hospital Advisory Service Report on the hospital . Finally the applicant submitted that the fire precautions were inadequate . The applicant submitted that the conditions were inhuman and degrading for any patient, whether or not he was psychotic, delusionary or unable to communicate . However, the medical reports suggested that although he had once been suffering from a mental illness, he was not now suffering a psychosis or unsoundness of mind . His allegations should be viewed in this context . His case might be similar to the Simon-Herold case IApplication No. 4340/69 SimonHerold v . Austria, Yearbook XIV, p . 352, Collection of Decisions 38, p . 18), where the applicant had been kept in psychiatric conditions although not at the time mentally ill .
3 . Issues arising under Art . 5 of the Conventio n a . Written observations of the respondent Government The Government observed that the applicant's case had been considered by a Mental Health Review Tribunal on 11 March 1975 following a request by the applicant to the Secretary of State . The Home Secretary had decided to refer the case to a Tribunal again and it would hear it in December 1976 . Two parts of English law had to be considered . In the first place the Home Secretary had powers under S .66 of the Act in connection with the discharge of restricted patients . If he was satisfied that the restriction order was no longer necessary he could direct that the patient should cease to be subject to the special restrictions . While a restriction order was in force, he could discharge a patient absolutely or subject to conditions .
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The Home Secretary could refer the case of a restricted patient to a Mental Health Review Tribunal for its advice at any time . In addition if a patient requested him, he had to refer his case to a Tribunal within two months unless he discharged the patient during that time . Such requests could be made during the second year from the date of the hospital order and once thereafter during each period of two years . Secondly a person detained in England or Wales could apply to a court for a writ of habeas corpus, the purpose of which was to direct the organisation detaining the applicant to produce him before the court which investigated whether the correct procedures had been carried out without which the detention would be unlawful . The application for a writ of habeas corpus provided full and complete compliance with Art . 5(4 ) The orders under which the applicant was detained had been made by the Crown Court . In the Vagrancy Cases, the European Court of Human Rights had said as follows : . . "Where the decision depriving a person of his liberty is one taken by an administrative body, there is no doubt that Article 5 (4) obliges the Contracting States to make available to the person detained a right of recourse to a court , but there is nothing to indicate that the same applies when the decision is made by a court at the close of judicial proceedings . In the latter case ihe supervision required by Article 5 (4) is incorporated in the decision ; this is so, lor example, where a sentence of imprisonment is pronounced after 'conviction by a competent court' IArticle 5(1) (a) of the Convention) . It may therefore be concluded that Article 5(4) is observed if the arrest or detention . . . provided for in paragraph (1) le), is ordered by a 'court' within the meaning of paragraph 141" . This had been confirmed in para . 77 of the Court's judgment of 8 June 1976 in the case of Engel and othe rs . Since the procedural legality of the applicant's detention could be tested at any time by application for habeas corpus and the two orders under which the applicant was detained had been made by a court, Art . 5 (4) was complied with . In considering the position of a person who continued to be detained under Art 5(1) lel of the Convention, a distinction had to be drawn between the, "lawfulness" of his continued detention and the substantive justification for it . Unsoundness of mind was subject to gradual amelioration or deterioration and the cases of persons detained should therefore be reassessed at appropriate intervals . The Convention did not require that this reassessment should be carried out or reviewed by a court, which was not an appropriate body to determine whether the degree of recovery or risk of relapse was such as to justify conditional or unconditional release . There might be serious difficulties in allowing a person of unsound mind access to report and other material which in the opinion of the authorities justified his continued detention . Nor would it be reasonably possible ,
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nor in many cases desirable from the patient's point of view, to allow him to conduct before a court repeated applications for his release . In its jurisprudence the Commission had to some extent recognised that special considerations applied in the case of a mental patient by saying that the obligation to disclose all relevant material did not necessarily apply in his case and that a right to submit a reapplication only after a lapse of six months from a previous application for review of detention was not contrary to the obligation to have the lawfulness of detention decided "speeddy" However the Government would go further and submit that whilst the lawfulness of the detention udner Art . 5 111 (e) must be subject to periodic review, the substantive justification for it could not reasonably be susceptible of recurrent review by a court and that Art . 5 (4) did not impose such as obligation . The Mental Health Review Tribunal reassessed the mental health of a restricted patient such as the applicant but did not carry out the functions of a court . The lawfulness of the detention could be scrutinised by the Divisional Court in habeas corpus proceedings . The Home Secretary, who was responsible to Parliament for the safety and protection of the public, gave great weight to the advice of the Tribunal, but the final decision must be his . It was submitted that there was thus no violation of Art . 5 141 . The Government accordingly requested the Commission to declare this complaint incompatible with the Convention or manifestly ill-founded . b
Written observations of the applicant in reply
Art . 5 required, in the applicant's submission, that the initial detention must be lawful and that there must be a periodic review of the substantive justification for it . The writ of habeas corpus was available to test the legality of the original detention . However the court had taken a very limited view of its functions in this area . In the case of a person detained under SS .60 and 65 of the 1959 Act, it seemed that the writ could only lie in extremely narrow circumstances, for instance it an irregularity or want of jurisdiction in the court making the orders could be proved . If, on the face of the papers before the court, all the procedures laid down in the Act had been observed, a writ of habeas corpus would not lie . This remedy did not test the substantive justification for the detention . It was interestjhg in this regard to refer to the Court of Appeal's remarks in the McFarlane case, to the effect that the applicant was a "petty fraudsman" with no history of mental illness or violence and that "special hospitals should not be cluttered up with cases of this sort" . If the applicant had been dealt with as an "ordinary" offender he would have received a non-custodial sentence, or possibly a very short prison sentence . Instead he had been dealt with as an "abnormal" offender and had beendetained for 3 years thus far . The justification for this could not be the crime, which had been trivial . The length of detention on penal grounds should only be proportionate to the gravity of the offence . Furthermore the continued detentio n
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could not be justified on the grounds of inental disorder since the doctor at Broadmoor had no right to discharge the applicant and there was no appeal to any other body . It was important to note that, according to DHSS statistics for 1973, 64% of all persons detained under S .60 of the 1959 Act were diagnosed as psychopathic or subnormal . Tliese patients would not be subject to detention under the civil portions IPart IVI of the Act . Furthermore there were several cases where the Home Secretary had refused discharge although the responsible medical officer had recommended it . c . Oral submissions of the respondent Governmen t The respondent Government first submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in relation to his complaint under Art . 5 of the Convemlon . Remedies were available in the form of the prerogative wrils of habeas corpus, ceniorari; prohibition and mandamus . Each remedy supplemented the other and together they provided a formidable armoury for those wishing to attack administrative decisions . In the present case habeas corpus was perhaps the most important . The extent of thÃ© role of that remedy was now much greater than it had been . The procedure in all four remedies was speedy and simple . The practice was normally for an appGcation for habeas corpus to be combined with an application for one of the other writs, under which the order for detention could be quashed . However, the courts were increasingly prepared to grant habeas corpus where the order was one which could be quahsed, even where the formality of certiorari had not occurred . The courts in England were increasingly saying that there was a duty on bodies laking administrative decisions to act fairly . If they did not there was a breach of the rules of natural justice and the order made would either be treated as a nullity or quashed as a result of certiorari. This was a developing field of law and the attitude of the courts was that there should be no set pattern ot what was fair in all circumstances . The courts had recently hold that the Home Secretary was under a duty to act fairly in deciding whether to put a prisoner into a particular category and the courts could review his conduct to see if had done so . By analogy there could be no doubt that he was under a duty to act fairly in his review function under S .65 of the 1959 Act . If it was suggested that he had not done so, relief could be sought . In appropriate circumstances the courts could make an order of mandamus directing the Home Secretary to reconsider the matter in a fair manner . If the court concluded that the only conclusions a reasonable Secretary of State could come to was that the person concerned should be released, there might be grounds for saying that there should also be an order of habeas corpus . The courts would also review the Home Secretary's decision .if'he had madean error of law, or if there was no evidence to support his decision, or no evidence on which he could reasonably have come to his decision .
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These remedies did not amount to a straight appeal against the Secretary of State's decision . If two doctors took different views of a case and the Secretary of State reasonably chose one rather than the other, his decision could not be attacked . There was no impediment on a person being independently medically examined in Broadmoor . If a medical report were obtained to the effect that there was no reason for detention under a restriction order any longer, this would be the son of malerial that might lead the Divisional Court to require the Home Secretary to make an answer . If the courts found that he had other evidence which had caused him to come to a different conclusion, they could not intervene . If there had been no reasonable basis for the Secretary of State's conclusion, the court could intervene, as they could if he had acted unfairly . Although the Home Secretary was not required to give reasons for his decislons, the case of Padfield' showed that the scrutiny of the courts could not be avoided by giving no reasons . If a prima lacie case were produced indicating that something should have been done, and no reason was given for a decision to the opposite, the court would infer that there could be no valid reason and that the decision was bad . Thus, if it were alleged that there was no valid reason for detaining a person under a restriction order, and there was medical evidence to this effect, if no explanation was given as to why the Secretary of State took a ditterent view, the court could infer that he had no reason for acting in the way he had and quash the order . The Mental Health Review Tribunal advised 1he Secretary of State . If it were shown that the procedure before it had been unfair, the Secretary of State's decision could be the subject of surveillance by the court . The Government referred to a number of cases illustrating the development of the principle of fairness in English law â¢ If the applicant considered that because of his medical state there could be no proper reason why he should still be subject to restriction and detained and he obtained, as had allegedly been done, medical reports showing that there was no justification for detaining him, the onus would be placed on the Secretary of State to justify his detention If he did not do so the court could, in appropriate circumstances, grant relief by way of an order of mandamus and an order of habeas corpus . In prerogative proceedings it was unusual for evidence to be heard orally in view of the speed of the procedure . It was normally dealt with by affidavit . However there was an alternative, which was to bring declaratory proceedings to â¢ Pedfield v . Minister of Apriculture, Feheriea and Food, 1196B1 . 1 AII E .R . 694 . â¢â¢ Re . H .K . (an infantl . 1196711 All E .R .226 ; Re . Godden, 119711 AII E .R . 20 : R . v . Board of Control, ex pparte Runy . 119561 1 AII E .R . 769 .
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obtain a declaration that the Secretary of State could not lawfully detain the person concerned under restriction . In such proceedings witnesses were called and discovery of documents could be obtained . The applicant accordingly had a remedy which fell within Art 26 of the Convention but which had not been exhausted . Referring to the applicant's submissions in reply, the Government submilted that the Hassan case' merely said that where the Secretary of State purported to act under the authority of an Act, it was for the applicant for habeas corpus to show a prima /acie case . It did not say that if the applicant established a prima /acie case that something was wrong, the courts could not consider it merely because the Secretary of State said he was relying on statute . The Padfield case had made a big change in the law since the Stafford case " was decided . The Padfield case said that where the Secretary of State was given an unlimited discretion, it was not open to him to thwart the policy of the Act under which it was given . The 1959 Act dealt with the detention of persons suffering from mental abnormality and the Secretary of State could only exercise his discretion within the content of the purpose of the Act . He could consider the interests of the patient and the protection of the public . It was not an answer for the applicant to say that he would have no reasonable chance of success in his case . What he must show was that in a proper case there would be no such chance . The Government accepted that the court could not substitute its discretion for that of the Secretary of State, but there was great scope for review . Referring to Art . 5 of the Convention and the questions put by the Commission the Government reiterated their submission that if the initial deprivation of liberty was made by an order of a court, Art . 5 141 did not provide a right to further review . They accepted that the detention must continue to be lawful throughout and accepted that in the case of detention under Art . 5 (1) lel it was broadly true that it must throughout be justifiable be reference to one of the purposes set out . However, it was possible to set down precise limits as to when detention of a person of unsound mind ceased to be justifiable and a margin of appreciation must be allowed to the State to decide whether the condition had changed . It was accepted that a prima lacie case of inental ill health must be shown to justify detention on this ground under Art . 5 (1) (e) . There was no requirement that the detention should be necessary . This put the matter too high . What had to be indicated was that there were proper grounds for making the order, either for the public interest or in the interest of the person detained and a margin of discretion to decide the matter must be left to the body concerned . â¢ R . v . Governor or Risley Prison, ex aerte Wejid Haaen, 119761 2 AII E .R . 123 . â¢' R . y . Governor of Leeds Prison, e. carte Stafford, 119641 1 AII E .R . 610 .
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Art . 5 ( 1) (e) implied that there must be some form of continuing .orperiodic review of the mental health of the detainee . It would otherwise be impossibleto say that the detention was indeed detention of a person of unsound mind . This should at least be partially a medical review . The question whether there should be an administrative or judicial element in the review depended very much on the type of detention . Where a restriction order was made for protection of the public, it could not be right that the review should be solely medical . Considerations wider than purely medical ones had to be taken into account . A court was not an appropriate body to determine whether the degree of recovery of a patien . There would also be serious difficulties in allowin gotwasuchjifyrelas a patient access to reports and confidential material which formed the basis of an assessment by doctors or a Mental Health Review Tribunal . Furthermore, a court procedure was too formalised for this sort of task and would normally be inconsistent with full and confidential disclosure of necessary information relating to a person's condilion . Art 5(1 ) le) did not imply a right to treatment . Treatment was available in the United Kingdom and it was the desire and intent of the United Kingdom that it should be received when needed . Nevertheless there might be conditions which would not respond to treatment but where the person still had to be detained . There was no logical reason why the jurisprudence of the Court in the Vagrancy cases in relation to Art . 5(4) should not apply in relation to persons detained for an unlimited period as being of unsound mind . The position of a person held on an unlimited restriction order was analogous to that of a person sentenced to life imprisonment . Just as in the case of parole on a life sentence, the fact that there was a right of recall enabled the Secretary of State to weigh up the risks differently, in favour of the patient . There was a much greater flexibility than there would be if Art . 5 (4) conlinued to apply throughout the period of restriction . Even if Art . 5 (4) did continue to apply, habeas corpus proceedings and the other prerogative writs and declaratory proceedings provided the necessary review . The review required by Art . 5 (4) was a review of legality, to see that the previous decision was in accordance with law . In any event the Government submitted that it was possibly wrong to emphasise Art . 5 0) (e) and 5 (4) since the applicant's detention fell within Art . 5 (1) ( a), being detention after conviction by a competent court . Art . 5(4) was not therefore applicable . In reviewing the cases of patients subjectto S .65 restriction orders, th e Mental Health Review Tribunal acted in an advisory, not a judicial capacity . The Secretary of State could refer a case for advice at any time and the patient had a right to review at certain intervals . The person concerned was entitled to an interview by the Tribunal . The Tribunal included an independent medical member and thepractice was to allow patients to bring forward medical evidence of thei r
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own . The patient could be represented, legally or otherwise . The patient was not informed of the Tribunal's opinion since the decision was the Home Secrelary's . Up to the end of 1975, 31 .6% of discharge recommendations had been rejected by the Home Secretary . However, he might have adopted some other course, such as uansfer to an open hospital . There was usually a conflict of medical opinion in such cases . In these cases the role of the Secretary of State was of initial importance since the Tribunal was largely concerned with the mental condition and interests of the patient, whilst the Secretary of State had to take into account the protection of the public . In addition the Home Secretary might take lurther advice from an advisory board on restricted patients, which examined the potential risk inherent in discharge . As to the suitability of a court to assess the need for detention, the Government submitted that there was greater need for scrutiny at the initial stage when detention was ordered than later . There was a possibility that procedures would be abused at that stage and it was important that the court should intervene then . In addition the court had initially decided on the guilt of the accused person but it would be inappropriate to refer the case back to a criminal court for review . Subsequently relationships were established between the patient and medical staff and confidence had to be respected if the staff were to perform their role properly and also make full and frank reports . This would be difficult in a court procedure . The Secretary of State would keep in continuous contact with the situation after detention had been ordered in a way that a court could not . The subsequent review was thus better carried out by an administrative authority, such as the Secretary of State . He was also better suited to decide in the case of polentially dangerous patients than a body such as the Mental Health Review Tribunal . The public would not feel that their interests were properly protected by such a body . The Home Secretary was answerable to Parliament . Furthermore, to entrust decisions to a central administrative authority brought about consistency of policy . Summarising their arguments under Art . 5, the Government submitted that the detention of the applicant was authorised under Art 5 111 lal and that was the end of the matter Alternatively if there was any temporal limitation on Art 5111 lal meaning that they could no longer rely on it in connection with subsequent reviews, then Art . 5 f11 lel required that grounds of detention should be related to the person's unsoundness of mind . This was the only basis of detention under the Mental Health Act 1959 . It could not be relied on to detain a person for matters unconnected with unsoundness of mind . Although the review procedure which took place was not by a court, Art . 5 141, assuming it was relevant, was complied with . Habeas corpus proceedings were sulficient in themselves but the extended review possible by use of the other prerogative writs complied with the requirements of Art . 5 (4) insofar as they involved consideration of anything more than the procedural matters which were admirably capable of being resolved on an application for habeas corpus .
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The Government submitted that it could not be said that they had contravened Art . 5 by adopting the procedure laid down in the Mental Health Act Act 1959 . The Secretary of State had not been shown to have contravened any of the discretions properly given him by the Act . No violation of Art . 5, properly interpreted, had been made out .
d . Oral Submissions of the applicant in reply The applicant submitted that the remedies available in domestic law were not as wide as the Government had suggested . Where the matter was left to the exercise of executive discretion, it was virtually impossible for a prisoner who alleged that he no longer suffered from a mental defect to obtain review by the courts . The release of a patient subject to restrictions was expressly made dependent on the Home Secretary being satisfied that a restriction order was no longer required for the protection of the public IS .66 111 of the 1959 Act) . Until the Home Secretary had exercised his discretion under S .66, no writ of habeas corpus could issue . The applicant could not therefore secure a review by a court of the material justification for his detention . The applicant referred to two cases which he submitted illustrated the limitations of habeas corpus proceedings' . The Hassan case showed that the onus was on the applicant to show that his detention was illegal, once the jailor produced a return showing on the face of it that the detention was legal from a technical point of view In the Stafford case the Home Secretary had submitted that the court had no jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus in a case concerned with remission of sentence, since he had absolute discretion in the matter . The court had also expressed doubt as to whether it had jurisdiction . The applicant was not obliged to exhaust a remedy if there were no reasonable prospects of success . It was very doubtful if it would be practicable to obtain legal aid in a situation such as the applicant's . There was no prospect that in the present state of the case law on habeas corpus the applicant could persuade a Legal Aid Committee that he had a reasonable case in seeking review by a court of his present condition . There was a distinction between the unfettered discretion which the Home Secretary had in the case of a restricted mental patient and a discretion with fetters on it such as that considered in the re H .K . case, where the criteria for exercising the discretion had been laid down by statute . In the case of a mental patient there was no power of any court to look at the fairness with which the Home Secretary exercised his discretion . The habeas corpus proceedings in Application No . 6998/75" showed that the court did not evaluate the material justification for the decision to recall the applicant . ' R . v . Governor of Risley Prison, experte Wajid Hemen, 119781 2 AII E .R . 123 . R . v . Governor of Leeds Prison, ex perre Stafford, 11989) 1 All E .R . 610 . See D .R . 8/106.
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Where Parliament gave a minister authority to make a decision, it could expressly provide a right of appeal to a court or it could give the minister complete and unfettered discretion . The Home Secretary had such discretion under S .66 of the 1959 Act . It had not been Parliament's intention to allow judicial review, and the courts could not substitute their own decision for that of the Home Secretary . The Hosenball case, recently decided by the House of Lords, showed that the courts could not review an absolute discretion of a minister . The decision could only conceivably be overturned where the minister acted in bad faith and maliciously or intentionally tried to thwart the purposes of the Act . It was not suggested that that was the case here . A close reading of the Padfield case revealed that the court said that the minister could not act contrary to what was intended by Parliament in the statute . In this case what the Home Secretary was doing was fully in accordance with his powers under law, but the domestic law clearly violated Art . 5 of the Convention . The Home Secretary had made no error in law . He had absolute discretion and could use variables which were not appropriate under the Convention . The applicant impugned S5 .65 and 66 of the 1959 Act, not the way the Home Secretary acted . The Government had referred to no precedent involving the detention of a mental patient . There was only a tenuous, speculative and academic connection between the cases they had referred to and that of the applicant . It could not be realistically said that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies . Moreover the remedies referred to did not provide the effective review envisioned by Art . 5 141 . Since the 1959 Act had been passed, no patient had had an effective review using the procedures suggested by the Government . The overriding principle of Art 5 was the right to liberty . A person could not be deprived of his liberty unless three conditions were met . The deprivation must be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law and the detention must be lawful throughout . This must concern something other than procedural lawfulness . Most critically, the detention must throughout fall into one of the categories authorised in Art . 5 111 lal to Ifl . Each of those six conditions was by its nature limited in point of time . If they were not limited there would be no reason why a person could not be detained for ever if the condition had been present initially . Once the condition ceased to exist the detention was unalwful . Art . 5 (1) lal did not mean that detention would remain lawful indefinitely no matter what the crime or criminal record . Detention under Art . 5 111 lal which was clearly disproportionate to the nature of the offence would be inhuman and degrading . The applicant's case was not analogous to that of a person serving a life sentence, which could be imposed only for certain very grave offences . No court could have given him anything approaching a life sentence . The Government must therefore rely on Art . 5 111 lel to justify his detention . Like all the conditions referred to in Art . 5 (1), unsoundness of mind was subject to change . It must last throughout the period of detention .
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Under Art . 5(1 ) (e) a prima facie case of mental ill-health must be shown and the detention must also be necessary . Was it too much to ask, when liberty was at stake, that detention be necessary ? It would be unjust to detain a person if care or treatment could eftectively be given in the community and it was generally recognised that such treatment was preferable whenever possible . The detention must be necessary not only initially, but throughout . The requirement that unsoundness of mind should conlinue throughout the period of detention meant, as the Government seemed to recognise, that there must be a determination or review at reasonable intervals to show that the person continued to be of unsound mind . Art . 5(1 ) did not specify the kind of review, but it must be reasonable . It would be unfair to have the detaining authority as the decision maker . There must be a genuine review of the question of unsoundness of mind . The criteria to be considered were medical ones . Para . 68 of the Court's Judgment in the Vagrancy Cases' showed the type of review (though not the body) necessary . The Court asked whether the criteria applied were compatible with the usual meaning of the term "vagrancy" and whether the criteria had been applied correctly . If these two conditions were not met, the detention would be arbitrary and unlawful . The question was whether the review by the Home Secretary met this standard . Was it on medical criteria ? The Home Secretary was under no legal obligation, and in practice did not, release a person of unsound mind if he considered that there would be a danger to the public . The Home Secretary might thus refuse to release a person who was considered by the Mental Health Review Tribunal or his Responsible Medical Officer to be of sound mind . The Hospital Advisory Service Report recognised this . Furthermore, whilst the criteria used by the Home Secretary were not necessarily medical criteria, and in fact Ilew in the face of medical criteria, the most condemning point was that he had no criteria at all . Under S66 of the 1959 Act it was completely within his discretion whether or not to release a patient or accept the advice of the Tribunal or RMO . The Commission could not really look to see whether the criteria applied were compatible with the usual meaning of the term "unsoundness of mind" . The Court had also considered in the Vagrancy Cases whether the criteria had been applied correctly . This implied that the Commission might, in an appropriate case, review the question whether in fact a person was of unsound mind . In this respect the applicant referred to the medical reports which had been produce d As to the applicability of Art . 5(4) subsequently to the initial decision, the applicant referred to the separate opinion of Judge Zekia in the Vagrancy Cases and the Commission's decisions in Applications Nos . 6692/74 and 6859/74 against Belgium" as showing that it applied . The Home Secretary was not a court as Art . 5(4) required, nor was the Menial Health Review Tribunal, which was merely an advisory body . ' Eur . Court H .R ., Senes A, Vol . 12 . tkcisions and Reports 2, p . 108 and 3 p . 139 .
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With reference to the questions put by the Commission, the applicant submitted that it a person was detained because of his mental condition and need for treatment, his confinement would not be lawful if the treatment was not forthcoming . The applicant submitted that in considering the applicability of Art . 5(4) in the Vagrancy Cases (para . 76), the Court had not been referring to the continuing detention but had merely held that where the initial detention was ordered by a court there was no need tor an appeal in terms of that initial detention . Art 5 (4) required a review of the substantive justification for the detention and not merely a review of the procedural formalities . As to the nature of the proceedings before a Mental Health Review Tribunal the applicant agreed with the respondent Government's submissions in most respects . He stressed, however, that the tribunal was not independent of the executive . In restricted cases questions of procedure and other matters were often referred to the Home Secretary . The efficacy of the tribunal's review was doubtful in view of the frequency with which its recommendations were rejected . The figure of 31 .6% rejection of recommendations for discharge given by the Government applied to all decisions since 1961 . In recent years such rejections had been more frequent, namely 59% in 1972, 40% in 1973, 46% in 1974 and 31Â°/u in 1975 . When the tribunal recommended discharge it did so on the basis of comprehensive medical evidence . It seemed unfair that the Home Secretary, without hearing witnesses or giving reasons, should reject the recommendations in so many cases . A court as specified in the judgment in the Neumeister Case, i .e . a body independent of the executive and the parties to the case, did not have to be unduly formal . Mental Health Review Tribunals in non-restricted cases provided the perfect example of the expediency and appropriateness of having a court deal with the questions of detention and unsoundness of mind . It was inconceivable that the Home Secretary could keep the cases of mental patients under constant review . The Home Secretary only looked to see whether a restricted patient should be released when he got a positive recommendation frÃ´m one of his advisory bodies . He did not in fact supervise them . Whilst at first sight it might seem reasonable that the Home Secretary should be able to detain somebody on the ground that he was a danger to the public, there was no evidence that ordinary offenders who were released from prison were less dangerous than abnormal offenders . The Butler Report, for instance, suggested that if anything an ordinary offender was more dangerous . There were no corresponding powers of detention and recall in their case . Summarising the argument, the applicant submitted that all the conditions authorising detention under Art . 5(1) had an implicit limit of time and therefore there should be a periodic determination at reasonable intervals to assess whether the cause or condition had ceased . Art . 5(1) (e) might rule out the Hom e
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Secretary as ari appropriate body by implication but in any event ruled him out because of how he decided . The criteria applied were not related to the purpose of detention . Art . 5 (4) ruled out the Home Secretary because of who he was regardless of how he decided . Even in a"proper casÃ©', where there was substantial medical evidence that a person was not of unsound mind, the Home Secretary would still be acting within the policy of the 1959 Act if he refused to release him on the ground that he considered him a danger to the public, but without giving other reasons . The Home Secretary at times took into account political considerations . In 1972, after a particularly violent crime when the Home Secretary was under political pressures, the level of discharges had dropped greatl y As to whether the applicant himself had a "proper case", he had been convicted for a minor offence and detained for a long period . The Home Secretary refused to release him or give reasons for not doing so . On the question of danger, the applicant had had no previous criminal record . There was some ambiguity in the interpretation of the word "lawfulness' in Art . 5 (4) . It was not procedural lawfulness but it was not clear whether it meant lawfulness in domestic law or substantive justification . The overriding principle of the Article should take precedence, namely the right to liberty . Even if Art . 5 141 only related to strict lawfulness it was doubtful if there was an effective review, in view ot the difficulties of obtaining legal aid and arguing the vagaries of the law . This was not the type of review, whatever view was taken of Art . 5 (4), which the Convention was seeking to promote .
THE LAW 1 . The Commission has first examined the applicant's complaint that, in June 1974, he was refused permission to send a telegram to his parents and has considered whether this discloses any appearance of a violation of his rights under Art . 8 of the Convention . Art 8 111 of the Convention provides that :"Everyone has the right to respect for . . . his correspondence" . However, the applicant was not prevented from corresponding with his parents since he could have communicated with them by letter . There is no indication that he was restricted in writing to them in any way . It is true that he was not allowed to communicate by telegram a message which appears to have had some degree of urgency, in that the applicant apparently wished to arrange for the postponement of a court hearing fixed to take place one week later . The Commission sees no reason to suppose that this communication could not have been made by letter within the time available . Moreover, apart from that possibility the .applicant was in fact able to give the message to his mother in person when she visited him two days later, on one of her regular visits . This allowed her sufficient time to arrange the postponement which the applicant desired .
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In these circumstances the Commission finds, even assuming that a telegram falls within the meaning of the term "correspondence" in Art . 8(1 ) , that the refusal to allow the applicant to send the telegram is not shown to have interfered materially with his ability to correspond with his parents . It accordingly finds this complaint to be manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art . 27 (2) of the Convention . 2 . The Commission has next examined the applicant's complaint that the conditions of his detention and treatment in Broadmoor Hospital from 19 December 1973 onwards have involved a violation of his rights under Art . 3 of the Convention which prohibits inter alia inhuman and degrading treatment . The applicant has suggested that it is unnecessary for him to be detained in Broadmoor . He has submitted that he has not received any treatment there, that he has had only very limited contact with his responsible medical officer and that the necessity for treatment has not been explained to him . He has also complained of the conditions in the hospilal and in particular has alleged that the hospital is grossly overcrowded, that there is lack of privacy and a constant atmosphere of violence, that the conditions are insanitary, that the fire precautions are inadequate and that he is or has been under-occupied, leading to a process of institutionalisation . The respondent Government have denied that there has been any violatio n of Art . 3 in the applicant's case . They have submitted that his detention in Broadmoor was considered necessary by those treating him and by the Mental Healih Review Tribunal . They have submitted that the applicant has refused all attempts to institute meaningful treatment . Whilst accepting that the hospital is overcrowded and that conditions there are in some respects unsatisfactory, they have submitted that the conditions are not such as to give rise to any question under Art . 3 of the Convention and that this part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded . The respondent Government has also submitted that this part of the application is inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Arts . 26 and 27 131 of the Convention . They have submitted that if the matters complained of fall within the category of conduct prohibited by Art . 3 , which they deny, remedies would be available to the applicant . It would be open to him to institute proceedings for damages or for a declaration that the conditions he complained of contravened the law of tort . The applicant, on the other hand, has denied that any remedy is available to him . He has submitted that before damages can be recovered it is necessary to show that physical injury or illness has been suffered . He has submitted that there would also be no reasonable prospect of success in civil proceedings, in particular because of practical difficulties arising from his situation as a detained mental patient without financial means . The Commission has therefore first considered, in the light of its own and the Court's previous case-law, whether the applicant's complaints under Art . 3 o f
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the Convention are inadmissible on the ground that he has not exhausted the remedies referred to by the Government . It recalls that it has previously held that in order to comply with the requirements of Art . 26 of the Convention an applicant is obliged to make "normal use" of remedies "likely to be effective and adequate" to remedy the matters of which he complains . (See : Application No. 788 1 60, Austria v. Italy, Yearbook IV, p . 172 ; Application No . 4330/ 69, Simon-Herold v. Austria, Yearbook X/V, p . 352 ; Applications Nos. 5577-558 4/72, Donnelly and others v . the United Kingdom, Decisions and Reports 4, p . 4 at p . 64) . The European Court of Human Rights has held that Art . 26 demands the use only of such remedies as are " . . . sufficient, that is to say capable of providing redress for (the) complaints" . (See e .g . The Vagrancy Cases, Series A, No . 12, p . 33, para. 60 l . At the same time the Commission has consistently held that the mere existence of doubts as to the prospects of success of a given remedy does not absolve an applicant from exhausting it, since it is for the domestic courts to determine the matter in the first instance . ISee e .g . Application No . 772/60, RET/MAG v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook IV, p . 384, Col%ction of Decisions 8, p. 29 ; Application No. 1661/62, X and Y v . Be/gium, Yearbook Vl, p . 360, Collectton of Decisions 10, p . 201 . The applicant's complaints under Art . 3 of the Convention are concerned primarily with the alleged inadequacy of the facilities provided for his detention and treatment as a person considered to be suffering from mental illness necessitating treatment in some degree of security They arise very largely from the admitled state of overcrowding in secure mental hospitals, and Broadmoor Hospital in particular . The applicant does not complain that he has suffered injury, illness or material loss . The respondent Government have accepted that there is no direct precedent in the English law of tort for an award of damages in such circumstances . Since the effects which the applicant alleges he has suffered consist primarily in various forms of mental distress, such as boredom and fear, it appears to the Commission that any such award would involve a material change in established domestic cas-law referred to by the applicant . In any event the Commission is not satisfied that either an award o f damages or a declaration could reasonably have bÃ©en expected to provide sufficient redress for the applicant's complaints, given that no alternative accommodation considered suitable for his continuing detention has apparently been available . In these circumstances the Commission finds that it has not been established that any remedy existed in United Kingdom law which was capable of providing redress for the applicant's complaints under Art . 3 and which has not been exhausted . These complaints cannot therefore be rejected for nonexhaustion of domestic remedies . The Commission has next considered whether the applicant's complaints under Art . 3 are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art . 27 121 of the Convention . The physical conditions in Broadmoor Hospital are admittedly un-
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satisfactory and have been criticised by different official bodies over a number of years . Whilst the hospital staff may themselves, as the Government have submitted, do their best to cope with these inadequacies, this does not itself exclude the possibility that the physical conditions of detention could in themsevies give rise to a question under Art . 3 The Commission considers that the applicant's different allegations concerning the conditions of his detention and the question ol his medical treatment must be looked at together and, if so examined, raise issues under Art . 3 which require investigation and examination on the merits . They cannot therefore be described as manifestly ill-founded . Accordingly the Commission considers these complaints to be admissible . 3 . The Commission has finally considered the issues which arise under Art . 5 of the Convention . It observes that a question first arises as to whether the applicant's detention in Broadmoor is justified under Art . 5(1 ) of the Convention, either on the ground that he is lawfully detained "after conviction by a competent court" as authorised by Art . 5(1 ) (a) or on the ground that his detention is lawful detention of a person "of unsound mind" as authorised by Art . 5(1 ) lel . Secondly the question arises whether the provisions of Art . 5(4) of the Convention have been complied with . This provides that everyone deprived of his liberty is entitled "to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful" . The respondent Government have denied that there has been any violation of Art . 5 . They have also submitted that the applicant has failed to exhaust certain domestic remedies available to him in respect of his complaints under Art . 5 and that this part of the application is therefore inadmissible for nonexhaustion of domestic remedies . They have submitted that it would have been open to the applicant to challenge his continued detention by applying for one or more of the prerogative writs habeas corpus, cerrrbrari; prohibition or mandamus . The applicant has denied that these remedies would have been effectiv e The Commission observes that it will be called upon to examine the scope and effectiveness of the review provided by the above-mentioned procedures in its examination on the merits of the issues arising under Art 5 in Application No . 6998/75, which it has declared admissible . It accordingly considers it appropriate to adjourn its consideration of the question of the effectiveness of these procedures as remedies in the present case, pending further examination of Application No . 6998/75 .
For these reasons, the Commission : DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the applicant's complaint that he was refused permission to send a telegram ;
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2 . DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the applicant's complaints concerning the conditions of his detention and the question of medical treatment in Broadmoor Hospita l 3 . ADJOURNS its consideration of the issues arising under Art . 5 of the Convention pending further examination on the merits of Application No .6998/75' .
(TRADUCTION ) EN FAIT Les faits de la cause prÃ©sentÃ©s par les parties et apparemment incontestÃ©s peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant est nÃ© le 28 fÃ©vrier 1950 . II rÃ©side normalement Ã F ., mais il est actuellement dÃ©tenu Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor . II a Ã©tÃ© reprÃ©sentÃ© d'abord par ses parents, M . et Mme A .X ., et il est maintenant reprÃ©sentÃ© par Me G ., avocat Ã New-York, et Me M ., solicitor, l'un et l'autre du Legal and Welfare Rights Service de MIND (National Association for Mental Health), Londres . Le 30 novembre 1973, le requÃ©rant ayant Ã©tÃ© reconnu coupable de plusieurs dÃ©lits d'escroquerie, la Crown Court de L . a ordonnÃ© qu'il soit dÃ©tenu Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor en vertu de l'article 60 de la loi de 1959 sur les malades mentaux (Mental Health Act, 1959) et que sa libÃ©ration soit soumise Ã restriction, en vertu de l'article 65 de cette loi, sans limitation de temps . L'article 60 de la loi de 1959 autorise dans certaines circonstances les tribunaux Ã ordonner la dÃ©tention d'un condamnÃ© dans un hÃ´pital psychiatrique . L'article 65 habilite une Crown Court Ã ordonner que l'Ã©largissement de cette personne soit soumis Ã des restrictions (consistant essentiellement Ã confier au Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur la responsabilitÃ© des dÃ©cisions d'Ã©largissement) pour un temps limitÃ© ou illimitÃ© . Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur est habilitÃ© par l'article 66 de la loi Ã© rÃ©voquer une ordonnance rendue en vertu de l'article 65 lorsqu'il le juge bon . L'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor est un a hbpital spÃ©cial Â» constituÃ© (Ã¢ l'heure actuelle) conformÃ©ment aux dispositions de l'article 40 de la loi de 1973 sur la rÃ©organisation des services nationaux de santÃ© publique, qui oblige le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat aux services sociaux Ã fournir et Ã© entretenir des Ã©tablissements pour les personnes soumises Ã la dÃ©tention en vertu de la loi de 1959 qui, selon lui, nÃ©cessitent un traitement dans des conditions de sÃ©curitÃ© spÃ©ciales en raison de leurs tendances dangereuses, violentes ou criminelles .
See D .R . a/106 .
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6B
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AprÃ©s une pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention provisoire Ã la prison de L ., le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ©, le 19 dÃ©cembre 1973, Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor oÃ¹ il se trouve encore dÃ©tenu . Le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© l'autorisation d'interjeter appel contre la peine . Sa demande a Ã©tÃ© soumise en juillet 1974 Ã la cour d'appel, qui l'a rejetÃ©e . Peu aprÃ¨s, le requÃ©rant s'est vu refuser par le personnel hospitalier l'autorisation d'envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme Ã ses parents . L'article 66 de la loi de 1959 dispose que le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat peut soumettre le cas d'un malade faisant l'objet de restrictions en vertu de l'article 65, Ã une commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen pour avis . En outre, sur demande du malade, il doit procÃ©der Ã cette consultation dans les deux mois, Ã moins de libÃ©rer le malade . Le malade peut prÃ©senter une telle requÃªte au cours de la deuxiÃ©me annÃ©e de son sÃ©jour Ã l'hÃ´pital, puis une nouvelle requ@te au cours de chaque pÃ©riode de deux ans Ã l'issue de la deuxiÃ¨me annÃ©e . La commission de rÃ©examen ne peut pas ordonner l'Ã©largissement d'un malade, mais elle fournit un avis au SecrÃ©taire d'Etat . Le cas du requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© examinÃ© par une commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen en mars 1975, puis Ã nouveau en dÃ©cembre 1976 . Le premier examen s'est fait Ã la demande du requÃ©rant . La deuxiÃ©me fois, le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat a soumis le cas de son propre chef Ã la commission de rÃ©examen . Plaintes initiales du requÃ©ran t Dans sa requÃªte, le requÃ©rant a formulÃ© plusieurs griefs concernant la procÃ©dure judiciaire dans son affaire, le refus d'autorisation d'envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme, les rapports mÃ©dicaux Ã©tablis par les mÃ©decins chargÃ©s de son cas, les conditions de sa dÃ©tention et la procÃ©dure devant la commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen en mars 1975 . En particulier, le requÃ©rant se plaint qu'on lui air refusÃ© l'autorisation de prendre contact d'urgence avec ses parents (par tÃ©lÃ©gramme) au sujet de son recours, aprÃ©s le retrait en derniÃ©re minute des solicitors agissant en son nom . II a Ã©galement allÃ©guÃ© que les conditions dans lesquelles il avait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor depuis le 19 dÃ©cembre 1973 constituaient une violation de l'article 3 de la Convention . Il a soumis une dÃ©claration sur les conditions de vie Ã Broadmoor, qui sont Ã©galement Ã©voquÃ©es dans d'autres documents soumis avec sa requÃ©te . Il a dÃ©clarÃ© avoir Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu dans des Â« conditions d'extrÃ©me misÃ©re Â» et allÃ©guÃ© que Broadmoor,Ã©tait gravement surpeuplÃ© et manquait d'installations sanitaires nÃ©cessaires . Il a allÃ©guÃ© en particulier la saletÃ© des toilettes et le manque d'installations pour se laver . Il a exposÃ© qu'il devait vivre constamment en compagnie d'assassins, de violeurs, d'incendiaires, de pervertis sexuels et autres aliÃ©nÃ©s, qu'il rÃ©gnait en permanence une atmosphÃ©re de violence . Dans les dortoirs les lits n'Ã©taient sÃ©parÃ©s que de quinze Ã trente centimÃ©tres, les lumiÃ¨res d'observation restaient allumÃ©es toute la nuit, les malades gravement agitÃ©s s e
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mettaient parfois Ã crÃ©er du dÃ©sordre la nuit, Ã crier et Ã hurler et l'air des dortoirs Ã©tait rare et putride, la plupart des fenÃªtres Ã©tant hermÃ©tiquement fermÃ©es . II a allÃ©guÃ© qu'il n'y avait aucune vie privÃ©e et peu d'occasions de prendre l'air ou de faire de l'exercice . Dans sa requÃªte, il a dÃ©clarÃ© n'avoir reÃ§u aucune espÃ©ce de soins depuis son sÃ©jour Ã Broadmoor, ce qui lui paraissait dÃ©montrer tout d'abord qu'il n'avait pas besoin de soins psychiatriques . Il a ajoutÃ© qu'en juillet 1975 un traitement lui avait Ã©tÃ© offert, qu'il l'avait refusÃ© et qu'en novembre 1975 le mÃ©decin responsable avait indiquÃ© qu'il lui fallait chaque mois des piqÃ»res de Â« Modicate Â» . Ce mÃ©dicament a divers effets secondaires qui n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© expliquÃ©s au requÃ©rant ou Ã ses parents et l'affirmation du mÃ©decin responsable dÃ©clarant ce mÃ©dicament nÃ©cessaire parce que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait sujet Ã de violents Ã©clats n'a pas Ã©tÃ© soutenue par des preuves . En outre, en juillet et en novembre 1975, le mÃ©decin responsable l'a incitÃ© Ã engager une action judiciaire contre lui pour des dÃ©clarations prÃ©tendument fausses sur le requÃ©rant et sa famille . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©galement indiquÃ© qu'on n'avait pas suffisamment recours Ã ses services, que le train-train quotidien Ã©tait ennuyeux, qu'il n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© prÃ©parÃ© Ã un retour au monde extÃ©rieur et qu'il craignait de vÃ©gÃ©ter . Il ressort de l'argumentation prÃ©sentÃ©e par ses parents Ã la commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen en 1975 qu'ils avaient exprimÃ© la crainte qu'il soit placÃ© dans une institution et qu'il pitisse d'une incarcÃ©ration permanente Ã Broadmoor . Ils ont aussi exprimÃ© la crainte que l'apathie et le ressentiment ne se dÃ©veloppent chez lui et que la rÃ©adaptation Ã la vie normale soit de plus en plus difficile Ã mesure que son sÃ©jour Ã Broadmoor se prolongerait . A l'appui de ses allÃ©gations, le requÃ©rant a citÃ© le rapport intÃ©rimaire de la Commission des dÃ©linquants mentalement anormaux de Lord Butler, paru en juillet 1974 . Dans le passage citÃ©, cette commission s'est montrÃ©e Ã©tonnÃ©e et choquÃ©e par le surpeuplement Ã Broadmoor et elle a fait observer que dans certains quartiers l'intervalle entre les lits n'Ã©tait pas supÃ©rieur Ã 45 centimÃ¨tres et que les malades, rÃ©duits par l'absence d'armoire Ã se servir de leurs valises, n'avaient pas de vie privÃ©e . Elle a Ã©galement constatÃ© qu'une sous-commission de la Commission parlementaire de vÃ©rification des dÃ©penses s'Ã©tait dÃ©clarÃ©e Â« effrayÃ©e Â» par la situation qu'elle avait trouvÃ©e lors de sa visite Ã l'hÃ´pital en 1967-68 . Le 10 septembre 1974 les parents du requÃ©rant ont Ã©crit au SecrÃ©taire d'Etat aux services sociaux pour se plaindre des conditions dans lesquelles le requÃ©rant Ã©tait dÃ©tenu et pour demander une enquÃªte publique . Dans une rÃ©ponse datÃ©e du 17 dÃ©cembre 1974, le MinistÃ¨re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale a notamment dÃ©clarÃ© qu'il en Ã©tait conscient et qu'il s'inquiÃ©tait depuis longtemps de la situation Ã Broadmoor, que cette situation Ã©tait due principalement au fait que l'hÃ´pital avait beaucoup plus de pensionnaires masculins qu'il n'avait Ã©tÃ© prÃ©vu lors de la construction et que les bÃ¢timents Ã©taient plus que centenÃ¢ires, ce qui rendait impossible l'amÃ©lioration des salles d'eau et destoilettes ou des dortoirs . La seul e
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vraie solution Ã©tait la construction d'un nouvel hÃ´pital spÃ©cial, dont l'ouverture Ã©tait prÃ©vue en partie pour 1977 . Le MinistÃ©re a dÃ©clarÃ© que cette partie de l'hÃ´pital avait dÃ©jÃ© Ã©tÃ© ouverte et qu'avant janvier 1975 environ 70 malades de Broadmoor y auraient Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ©s . Le rapport final de la Commission Butler, paru en octobre 1975, indique que 70 malades de Broadmoor y ont Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ©s et qu'elle a Ã©tÃ© avisÃ©e par le MinistÃ©re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale qu'il n'Ã©tait pas envisagÃ© de combler les vides ainsi crÃ©Ã©s . La Commission Butler a cependant dÃ©clarÃ© que la surpopulation dans les hÃ´pitaux spÃ©ciaux restait un problÃ©me sÃ©rieux . Des dÃ©tails concernant les autres griefs initialement prÃ©sentÃ©s par le requÃ©rant figurent dans la dÃ©cision panielle de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te, rendue le 27 septembre 1976 . '
PROCÃDURE DEVANT LA COMMISSIO N La Commission a examinÃ© la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte le 27 septembre 1976 . Elle a dÃ©cidÃ© de porter celle-ci Ã la connaissance du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur en vertu de l'anicle 42, Â§ 2(b ) , de son RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur et de lui demander de soumettre des observations Ã©crites sur la recevabilitÃ© en ce qui concerne : a . le grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel on lui avait refusÃ© l'autorisation d'envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme, dans la mesure oÃ¹ il peut soulever une question touchant Ã l'article 8 de la Convention seulement ; b . le grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel les conditions de sa dÃ©tention et de son traitement Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor Ã partir du 19 dÃ©cembre 1973 auraient constituÃ© une violation de l'article 3 de la Convention, eu Ã©gard Ã la prÃ©tendue absence de vie privÃ©e Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor et aux autres plaintes prÃ©sentÃ©es par le requÃ©rant ; c . quant aux griefs du requÃ©rant relatifs Ã la procÃ©dure devant la commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen, la question de savoir si les recours dont disposait le requÃ©rant en vertu de la loi de 1959 sur les malades mentaux ou de tout autre texte Ã©taient ou non conformes aux exigences de l'article 5, Â§ 4, de la Convention .
La Commission a ajournÃ© son examen de la requÃªte .sur ces points et dÃ©clarÃ© le reste de la requÃªte irrecevable . Les observations du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur ont Ã©tÃ© soumises le 23 novembre 1976 . Les observations du requÃ©rant en rÃ©ponse ont Ã©tÃ© reÃ§ues le 4 fÃ©vrier 1977 . Le 4 mars 1977, la Commission a dÃ©cidÃ©, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 42, Â§ 2 in fine, de son RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur, d'inviter les parties Ã comparaitre devant elle pour prÃ©senter leur argumentation orale sur la recevabilitÃ© et le fond de la requÃ©te, dans la mesure oÃ¹ elle pose des questions touchant aux articles 3 et 5 de l a Non publiÃ©e .
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Convention . Elle a demandÃ© aux parties de traiter dans leur argumentation certaines questions relatives aux articles 3, 5Â§Â§ 1 et 4 et 26 de la Convention . Elle a dÃ©cidÃ© d'entendre en mÃªme temps les argumentations sur la recevabilitÃ©-et sur le fond de trois autres requÃªtes dirigÃ©es contre le Royaume-Uni INos . 6840/74, 6998/75 et 7099/751 qui posent des questions connexes' . La Commission a Ã©galement dÃ©cidÃ© d'informer les parties Ã la prÃ©sente procÃ©dure qu'elle ne demandait pas de nouvelle'argumentation sur le problÃ©me posÃ© par l'article 8 de la Convention . L'audience devant la Commission a eu lieu les 11 et 12 mai 1977 .
ARGUMENTATION DES PARTIE S Le refus de l'autorisation d'envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme - Article 8 a Argumentation du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeu r Dans ses observations Ã©crites, le Gouvernement a dÃ©clarÃ© qu'il Ã©tait d'usage Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor de ne permettre aux malades d'envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme que dans des circonstances exceptionrielles, par exemple une grave crise familiale . Cet usage a pour but d'empÃ¨cher une aggravation de la surcharge dÃ©jÃ forte des lignes tÃ©lÃ©phoniques et d'Ã©pargner aux messagers l'inconvÃ©nientâ¢d'avoir Ã se rendre inutilement Ã la poste du village . Les parents du requÃ©rant lui avaient rendu visite trois fois par semaine et notamment au dÃ©but de l'aprÃ©s-midi du 11 juin 1974 . AprÃ©s leur visite, le requÃ©rant a trouvÃ© dans son courrier une leitre de la cour d'appel . Il a demandÃ© Ã envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme . Comme le personnel prÃ©voyait une nouvelle visite de ses parents le 13 juin ivisite qu'ils ont d'ailleurs faite), il a estimÃ© que l'urgencen'Ã©tait pas de nature Ã justifier l'envoi d'un tÃ©lÃ©gramme . Le requÃ©rant pouvait Ã©crire~une lettre . La Commission, dans sa dÃ©cision partielle, n'a trouvÃ© aucun Ã©lÃ©ment indiquant que le requÃ©rant ait Ã©tÃ© gÃ©nÃ© pour prÃ©parer la prÃ©semation de son dossier devant la cour d'appel . En ce qui concerne l'article 8 de la Convention, le Gouvernement a dÃ©clarÃ© que le .requÃ©rant avait disposÃ© de facilitÃ©s en ce qui concerne :les visites . Deux de ses trois visites hebdomadaires comprenaient vingt minutes-de promenade .surla terrasse Quant au droit au respect de la correspondance, ibn'est pas .certain~qu1l s'applique aux tÃ©lÃ©grammes et le Gouvernement a rÃ©servÃ© sa position sur ce point . En tout cas, rien n'empPchait le requÃ©rant d'envoyer une lettre puisqu'iln'y avait pas urgence et qu'il pouvait Ã©crire ou communiquer en personnepeu :aprÃ¨s . Dans le cas d'une personne privÃ©e de libertÃ©, l'article 8, Â§ 1 en combinaison avec l'article 8, Â§ 2 n'accorde pas une libertÃ© illimitÃ©e de la correspondance ni quant au choix du moyen de correspondance ni quant Ã l'accÃ¨s Ã un autre moyen de communication . Les faits ne rÃ©vÃ©lentaucun manquemÃ©ntâ¢aua respect Â» de la vie familiale et dela correspondance du requÃ©rant au sens de . l'article 8 etrce griÃ©f est par consÃ©quenl mal fondÃ© . ' Cf . D .R . 8 p . 106 et D .R . 10 p . 5.
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b . Argumentation du requÃ©ran t Dans ses observations Ã©crites en rÃ©ponse, le requÃ©rant a dÃ©clarÃ© qu'en juin 1974 les solicitors agissant en son nom avaient soudainement mis fin Ã leur mandat . Il avait dÃ¹ trouver de nouveaux solicitors et un nouvel avocat . Vers 16 heures 30, l'aprÃ©s-midi du 11 juin 1974, aprÃ¨s la visite de sa mÃ©re, on lui a remis une lettre de la cour d'appel dÃ©clarant que sa cause serait entendue le 18 juin 1974 . II a immÃ©diatement demandÃ© la permission d'envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme Ã ses parents envue d'oblenir que l'audience soit remise jusqu'A dÃ©signation d'un nouveau reprÃ©sentant . Les infirmiers et mÃ¨me, le 12 juin 1974, son mÃ©decin responsable luiont refusÃ© cette permission . Il a donc Ã©tÃ© empÃ¨chÃ© de communiquer avec ses parents par tÃ©lÃ©gramme sur une affaire urgente et importante . Les autoritÃ©s hospitaliÃ©res Ã©taient insuffisamment informÃ©es pour juger valablement de l'urgence de la situation et elles n'ont pas tenu compte de 'I'explication du requÃ©rant . En tout cas, elles ont violÃ© l'article 8 en empÃªchant le â¢requÃ©rant d'envoyer le tÃ©lÃ©gramme, quelle que soit son urgence . Le requÃ©rant ne pouvait pas Ãªtre certain que ses parents lui rendraient Ã nouveau visite le 13 juin . Ils avaient un voyage long et difficile Ã faire . Leur visite aurait pu Ãªtre ajournÃ©e, d'autant plus qu'ils ne savaient pas que le requÃ©rant ,voulait les voir d'urgence . Il Ã©tait trop tard le 11 juin pour envoyer une lettre et s'il avait Ã©crit le lendemain, la lettre ne serait pas parvenue Ã ses parents avant le 13 juin au .plus tBt . De fait, sa mÃ©re a quittÃ© son logement le matin du 13 juin avant l'arrivÃ©e du courrier . C'est l'aprÃ©s-midi qu'elle a eu connaissance de la lettre envoyÃ©e-par la cour d'appel, si bien qu'elle n'a eu que deux jours ouvrables pour demander Ã la cour l'ajournement de l'audience . Le 'Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a dÃ©clarÃ© que les parents du requÃ©rant lui rendaient visite trois fois par semaine . En rÃ©alitÃ©, en dehors des samedis et des dimanches, le nombre des visites est limitÃ© Ã sept par mois . Une demande spÃ©cialeest exigÃ©e pour un nombre supÃ©rieur . Seules deux promenades par mois sont-autorisÃ©es, en fonction du personnel et du temps disponibles . Elles Ã©taient souvent annulÃ©es sans prÃ©avis ni justification et ne duraient que quinzÃ© minutes, etnon pas vingt comme il a Ã©tÃ© indiquÃ© . Le refus d'autoriser l'envoi du tÃ©lÃ©gramme viole l'article 8, Â§ 1 . La prÃ©sente affaire peut Ãªtre distinguÃ©e de celles qui ont trait aux prisonniers, dans lesquelles la Commission a appliquÃ© la doctrine des Â« restrictions inhÃ©rentes Â» (par exemple NÂ° 2749/66, De Courcy contre Royaume-Uni, Annuaire 70 p . 3881, car une mesure,hospitaliÃ©re est prise dans un but thÃ©rapeutique et non pas punitif . .â¢Quoi qu'ilâ¢.enâ¢soit, cette doctrine a Ã©tÃ© abandonnÃ©e . La Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme a estimÃ© dans l'affaire Golder que les droits prÃ©vus Ã l'article 8 ne sont soumis-B aucune Â« restriction implicite Â» . La Cour a Ã©galement estimÃ© que le fait d'emp@cher quelqu'un d'engager une correspondance constituait l'une des formes lesplus graves d'ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice du droit au respect de la correspondance .
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MÃ©me si la Commission appliquait une doctrine modifiÃ©e des Â« restrictions inhÃ©rentes Â», les Affaires de vagabondage limitent Ã©troitement sa portÃ©e . L'intervention dans la correspondance est inadmissible, sauf lorsqu'elle est clairement justifiÃ©e par le but de la dÃ©tention . Or, le but explicite de la dÃ©tention, dans le cas du requÃ©rant, est d'appliquer un traitement On pourrait soutenir qu'une intervention dans la correspondance ne viole pas la Convention s'il Ã©tait clairement Ã©tabli que cette correspondance nuit aux intÃ©rÃ©ts thÃ©rapeutiques du malade . Mais le Gouvernement n'a considÃ©rÃ© que la commoditÃ© administrative du personnel . A propos de l'article 8, Â§ 2, la question se pose de savoir si l'acte incriminÃ© est Â« conforme Ã la loi Â» . La loi de 1959 sur les malades mentaux ne permet de s'opposer Ã l'envoi d'un colis postal, y compris un tÃ©lÃ©gramme, que s'il apparaÃ®t injurieux ou diffamatoire ou s'il risque de nuire aux intÃ©rÃ©ts du malade . La justification apportÃ©e par le Gouvernement Ã cet usage est contestable . Quelle preuve y a-t-il qu'en levant cette restriction on surchargerait les lignes tÃ©lÃ©phoniques ? Les messagers n'ont pas Ã porter en personne les tÃ©lÃ©grammes Ã la poste, mais Ã les communiquer simplement par tÃ©lÃ©phone . Aucune disposition de la Convention n'autorise l'Interruption de la correspondance pour des motifs de commoditÃ© administrative . La correspondance des dÃ©tenus relative Ã leur dÃ©fense est parliculiÃ©rement protÃ©gÃ©e . Ce point ressort de l'article 6, Â§ 3 Ibl, de la Convention . 2 . Conditions de dÃ©tention et de traitement Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor - Article 3
a . Observations Ã©crites du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur Le Gouvernement a dÃ©clarÃ© que l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor avait Ã©tÃ© construit au 19" siÃ¨cle et que depuis quelques annÃ©es il Ã©tait surpeuplÃ© . Lorsqu'il a introduit sa requÃªte Ã la Commission, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait logÃ© dans un dortoir de 24 lits sÃ©parÃ©s par de faibles intervalles . Il y a une toilette avec chasse d'eau et un lavabo dans le dortoir Le personnel soignant exerce sa surveillance toute la nuit Ã des intervalles qui ne sont pas infÃ©rieurs Ã une heure . Certes, il y a eu des dÃ©sordres bruyants dans le dortoir, mais trÃ©s rarement . On peut appeler les infirmiers en dÃ©clenchant une sonnette . Des veilleuses restent Ã©clairÃ©es la nuit pour permettre l'observation des malades . Les fenÃ©tres peuvent Ãªtre ouvertes Ã volontÃ© . L'aÃ©ration est facilitÃ©e par des ventilateurs qui toutefois sont bruyants et elle n'est pas suffisante . Au moment oÃ¹ la requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© rÃ©digÃ©e, une soixantaine de malades se partageaient pendant la journÃ©e une grande piÃ©ce de sÃ©jour, une salle Ã manger et un large couloir amÃ©nagÃ© pour la lecture et la dÃ©tente . Huit lavabos, trois toilettes et deuxurinoirs Ã©taient Ã la disposition des malades . Cinq fois par semaine ils pouvaient prendre l'air et faire de l'exercice dans le jardin ou participer ou assister Ã des jeux sur le terrain de sport, se rendre du bÃ timent principal aux ateliers, au magasin de l'hÃ´pital, Ã la chapelle, exercer des activitÃ©s sociales, etc . Le requÃ©rant a reÃ§u la visite de sa famille trois fois par semaine . Il a Ã©tÃ© difficile d e
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mettre sur pied un traitement cohÃ©rent qu'il se soit dÃ©clarÃ© prÃ©t Ã suivre . EmployÃ© comme blanchisseur dans son secteur, il ne paraissait pas malheureux d'exercer cette fonction . Le Gouvernement a reconnu que les conditions de vie Ã l'hÃ´pital Ã©taient peu satisfaisantes en raison de son surpeuplement . C'est pourquoi un nouvel hÃ´pital spÃ©cial est en construction . Soixante-dix malades de Broadmoor ont Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ©s dans un Ã©tablissement moderne et en 1978 et 1979 il est prÃ©vu que trente malades, puis cent autres, quittent Broadmoor pour ce nouvel hÃ´pital, qui doit Ãªtre achevÃ© en 1980 . La diminution du nombre des pensionnaires Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor permettra alors de le reconstruire par Ã©tapes . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a rappelÃ© les dÃ©finitions du traitement inhumain et dÃ©gradant donnÃ©es par la Commission dans l'Affaire grecque tAnnuaire 12 p . 187) . Il soutient que si les conditions de vie sont peu satisfaisantes, elles ne causent pas de souffrance grave aux malades, ne les humilient pas et ne les poussent pas Ã agir contre leur volontÃ© ou leur conscience . Les conditions de la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant, par consÃ©quent, ne constituent pas une violation de l'article 3 . b . Observations Ã©crites du requÃ©rant en rÃ©pons e A l'appui de son grief relatif aux conditions de vie Ã Broadmoor le requÃ©rant a joint Ã ses observations une dÃ©claration de son pÃ©re et un extrait d'une plainte adressÃ©e au MinistÃ¨re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale . La dÃ©claration de son pÃ©re souligne qu'Ã© partir du 19 dÃ©cembre 1973, la situation n'a pas toujours Ã©tÃ© celle qu'a dÃ©crite le Gouvernement . C'est ainsi que l'usage d'urinaux dans les dortoirs ou l'absence de papier de toilette et le refus d'en fournir n'est pas mentionnÃ© . Le Gouvernement a parlÃ© d'une toilette avec chasse d'eau installÃ©e rÃ©cemment dans le dortoir actuel du requÃ©rant . Il n'a pas dit qu'aprÃ¨s son installation, elle est restÃ©e quelque temps sans porte ou sans cache et qu'elle ne comporte maintenant qu'un rideau . Le lit du requÃ©rant Ã©tant adjacent Ã cette toilette, celui-ci est dÃ©rangÃ© toute la nuit par les malades qui s'en servent . Elle n'est pas tenue propre . Bien des malades ont des habitudes malpropres et laissent les toilettes souillÃ©es ainsi que, souvent, le sol des salles et des dortoirs . C'est dÃ©gradant et les malades souffrant d'incontinence devraient Ãªtre logÃ©s Ã part . Il n'y a pas de vie privÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant est un Ã©lÃ©ment perdu dans la masse vingt-quatre heures sur vingt-quatre . De jour, il doit accepter la promiscuitÃ© avec des assassins, des violeurs, des incendiaires et des dÃ©gÃ©nÃ©rÃ©s mentaux de toute espÃ©ce . De nuit, il est enfermÃ© dans un dortoir avec eux dans des lits sÃ©parÃ©s par des intervalles de trente Ã quarante-cinq centimÃ©tres . Les malades crÃ©ent souvent du dÃ©sordre et il a assistÃ© Ã des incidents violents . Les visites des infirmiers de nuit causent aussi de l'agitation . Le sommeil est difficile ou impossible . Les fenÃªtres n'ouvrent pas toutes . Certaines sont bloquÃ©es, par exemple celles de Cornwall House oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant a sÃ©journÃ© de fÃ©vrier Ã avril 1974 .
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La peur de la violence est omniprÃ©sente . Le requÃ©rant avait constamment la conscience du danger, en particulier la nuit lorsque tout le monde est enfermÃ© dans le dortoir . MÃªme dans les prisons, les gens sont isolÃ©s ou sÃ©parÃ©s en cellules de deux ou trois selon leurs propensions dangereuses ou violentes . Il est impossible Ã un malade de rester assis tranquillement Les piÃ¨ces dites tranquilles sont fermÃ©es Ã clef ou risquent d'Ã©tre perturbÃ©es par les malades . Le manque de vie privÃ©e, l'absence des conditions nÃ©cessaires Ã une bonne nuit de sommeil et la peur omniprÃ©sente de la violence constituent sur une aussi longue pÃ©riode une grande souffrance . En mentionnant l'existence de huit lavabos, le Gouvernement a omis de dir e qu'il y manque souvent les bouchons, si bien que de nombreuses personnes ne peuvent pas se laver dans le temps imparti Les pensionnaires doivent se mettre d'accord pour se raser tous les deux jours . Il manque jusqu'au mobilier essentiel d'un h6pital . Le requÃ©rant n'a qu'une armoire en fer blanc de 0,03 m3 et deux valises lui appartenant pour ses effets . Les minima d'espace fixÃ©s pour les malades par le Gouvernement sont loin d'Ã©tre atteints Ã Broadmoor et pourtant les mÃ©decins et le MinistÃ©re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale continuent, sachant cela, Ã admettre des malades et perpÃ©tuent ce terrible surpeuplement . La direction de ce MinistÃ¨re ne s'intÃ©resse pas Ã ce surpeuplement et ne prend pas de mesures pour y remÃ©dier . En moyenne le temps des sÃ©jours Ã l'air libre et des exercices (le mercredi, le samedi, le dimanche et certains soirs d'Ã©tÃ©) est de quatre heures et demie par semaine . Ce n'est pas assez La demande du requÃ©rant sollicitant un Â« droit de terrasse Â» n'a pas Ã©tÃ© agrÃ©Ã©e . Il n'y a pas Ã l'intÃ©rieur d'espace pour les exercices . MÃ¨me dans les prisons, il est possible de prendre une heure d'exercice par jour . La limitation des occasions de prendre l'air frais et de faire de l'exercice chaque jour est dÃ©gradante et contribue pour beaucoup Ã donner un caractÃ©re fermÃ© Ã l'internement . Les restrictions des visites familiales sont inutiles dans un hÃ´pital . Il n'existe pas de bibliothÃ¨que pour les malades . A l'Ã©poque oÃ¹ la requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© introduite, le requÃ©rant n'avait pas de travail aprÃ©s avoir nettoyÃ© les couloirs, c'est-8-dire Ã 9 heures 30 , durant la premiÃ¨re annÃ©e, il n'avait rien Ã faire le reste de la journÃ©e . La deuxiÃ¨me annÃ©e, il a eu un emploi Ã temps partiel consistant Ã nettoyer et Ã laver la salle des infirmiers . Sa demande tendant Ã obtenir un travail dans les jardins a Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©e . Il est dÃ©gradant et inhumain de laisser, en vertu d'une condamnation Ã une dÃ©tention indÃ©finie, un homme jeune et robuste assis toute la journÃ©e sans rien faire et sans rien avoir Ã espÃ©rer . Le Gouvernement a dÃ©clarÃ© que le mÃ©decin responsable avait eu peine Ã mettre au point un traitement cohÃ©rent que le requÃ©rant soit disposÃ© Ã suivre . Or, la nÃ©cessitA d'un traitement n'a pas Ã©tÃ© dÃ©montrÃ©e Le mÃ©decin responsable a prÃ©tendu que le requÃ©rant avait Â« des antÃ©cÃ©dents de comportement agressif Â» . La cour d'appel a rejetÃ© cette allÃ©gation . Il a prÃ©tendu que le requÃ©rant avait un potentiel de violence mais, comme le rapport Butler l'a soulignÃ©, une telle prÃ©vision est impossible . Dans les deux annÃ©es et demie qui ont suivi l'arrivÃ©e du requÃ©rant, en dÃ©cembre 1973, son mÃ©decin responsable l'a vu en tout quarante-
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deux minutes seulement, rÃ©parties sur sept entretiens . Le Â« traitement Â» a Ã©tÃ© mentionnÃ© pour la premiÃ©re fois en janvier 1975 lorsque le mÃ©decin responsable a demandÃ© Ã quelle sorte de traitement il s'attendait . C'est seulement en novembre 1975 que le mÃ©decin a proposÃ© des piqÃ»res mensuelle de Â« Modicate Â» . Il en a fait une condition pour son transfert dans un hÃ´pital ordinaire . Le requÃ©rant a mesurÃ© les horribles effets secondaires de ce mÃ©dicament . La nÃ©cessitÃ© d'un tel mÃ©dicament et le dÃ©tail des effets secondaires possibles ne lui ont pas Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s et les parents du requÃ©rant n'ont Ã©tÃ© consultÃ©s qu'en avril 1976 . En juillet 1976, le mÃ©decin responsable, changeant d'attitude, a demandÃ© au requÃ©rant de se joindre Ã un groupe psychothÃ©rapeutique spÃ©cial pour qu'on puisse dÃ©terminer ses comportement et ses relations personnelles et amÃ©liorer ses aptitudes sociales . La nÃ©cessitÃ© n'en a pas Ã©tÃ© expliquÃ©e . Il en rÃ©sulte que le mÃ©decin responsable a poussÃ© le requÃ©rant Ã agir contre sa volontÃ© et sa conscience en lui promettant de le libÃ©rer de Broadmoor Ã condition qu'il accepte le traitement sans que sa nÃ©cessitÃ© et ses effets secondaires lui soient expliquÃ©s . Le Gouvernement n'a pas mentionnÃ© l'action de revendication professionnelle du personnel soignant qui, entre le 22 novembre et le 18 dÃ©cembre 1974 environ, a empÃ©chÃ© les malades de quitter leur secteur pour se dÃ©tendre et, sauf dans les derniers jours, Ã interdit les visites de la famille . Etre enfermÃ© pendant tout ce temps au milieu de malades qui n'Ã©taient plus obligÃ©s de suivre leur traitement, alors que les infirmiers refusaient absolement d'intervenir dans les rixes ou de toucher les malades Ã©tait dÃ©gradant et inhumain . Les prÃ©cautions prises Ã l'hÃ´pital contre l'incendie Ã©taient insuffisantes . Les malades Ã©taient enfermÃ©s toutes les nuits dans les dortoirs, les sorties de secours Ã©taient obstruÃ©es et il n'y avait pas d'exercice d'incendie . Les incendiaires pouvaient se procurer facilement des matÃ©riaux inflammables pour mettre le feu et c'est de qui est arrivÃ© Ã Kent House . La peur de ce qui pouvait arriver en cas d'incendie Ã©tait rÃ©elle . De plus, les soins mÃ©dicaux Ã©taient insuffisants . On a tardÃ© Ã prÃ©ter attention Ã la fatigue oculaire dont le requÃ©rant s'est plaint en janvier 1974 . Un bilan n'a pu Ã¨tre fait qu'en mars 1975 . On a Ã©galement attendu environ cinq jours avant de traiter mÃ©dicalement deux blessures reÃ§ues par le requÃ©rant au cours d'un exercice sportif . Le plus dÃ©gradant et le plus inhumain a Ã©tÃ© le nombre de fausses dÃ©clarations faites par les mÃ©decins, qui ont contribuÃ© Ã la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant pendant plus de trois ans . La plainte adressÃ©e au MinistÃ©re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale contient plusieurs des griefs soumis par le requÃ©rantÃ© la Commission . Plusieurs autres plaintes y figuraient aussi, par exemple sur les prix excessifs Ã la cantine et sur l'insuffisance des installations de blanchissage .
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Dans ses observations Ã©crites, le requÃ©rant fait valoir que par divers moyens il a apportÃ© la preuve que de nombreux aspects de la vie Ã Broadmoor, dans leur ensemble, constituent une violation de l'article 3 . Ce sont en particulier : le surpeuplement, le manque de vie privÃ©e, l'insuffisance et la totale insalubritÃ© des installations sanitaires, l'absence de possibilitÃ© d'exercice et d'une occupation dans la journÃ©e, le danger d'incendie et l'insuffisance du traitement mÃ©dical et de la surveillance . Broadmoor est un hÃ´pital et non une prison . La situation qui y rÃ¨gne est parfaitement inacceptable dans un hÃ´pital . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a reconnu que la situation Ã©tait Â« peu satisfaisante en raison du surpeuplement n et il a indiquÃ© que certains malades seraient transfÃ©rÃ©s dans un nouvel hÃ´pital spÃ©cial . Cependant, le fait que le surpeuplement puisse Ãªtre attÃ©nuÃ© Ã l'avenir n'excuse pas la violation de l'article 3, auquel il ne saurait Ã´tre dÃ©rogÃ© . Cette situation constitue une violation de l'article 3, que n'excuse pas le projet de construction d'un nouvel hÃ´pital . c . Argumentation orale du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeu r il lntroduction A l'audience, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a d'abord rappelÃ© que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait dÃ©tenu en vertu d'une ordonnance judiciaire rendue conformÃ©ment aux articles 60 et 65 de la loi de 1959 . Une ordonnance de restriction conforme Ã l'article 65 ne peut Ãªtre rendue que si le tribunal la juge nÃ©cessaire pour la protection de la sociÃ©tÃ© . En outre, le tribunal a ordonnÃ© que le requÃ©rant soit dÃ©tenu dans un hÃ´pital spÃ©cialement prÃ©vu pour les personnes nÃ©cessitant un traitement dans des conditions de sÃ©curitÃ© spÃ©ciales en raison de leurs tendances dangereuses, violentes ou criminelles . Ces Ã©lÃ©ments sont dÃ©terminants pour l'examen des questions soulevÃ©es sous l'angle de l'article 3 puisque, outre l'obligation d'assurer le traitement le plus satisfaisant possible dans les circons . tances, le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat a la charge de la sÃ©curitÃ© . Les hÃ´pitaux spÃ©ciaux hÃ©bergent quelques-uns des membres les plus dangereux de la communautÃ© et c'est une responsabilitÃ© importante . Le Gouvernement renvoie Ã un recueil de photographies et Ã un dossier de documents sur Broadmoor . Si certains aspects de l'hÃ´pital ne sont pas aussi satisfaisants qu'on le souhaiterait, il existe aussi des aspects attrayants . Le Gouvernement a soulignÃ© en particulier les possibilitÃ©s professionnelles et rÃ©crÃ©atives qui y sont offertes . Le problÃ©me de la surpopulation est reconnu . Il en existe une explication historique, Ã savoir que l'Ã©volution de la mÃ©decine a attÃ©nuÃ© la sÃ©vÃ©ritÃ© du rÃ©gime des malades dans les hÃ´pitaux psychiatriques ordinaires, si bien qu'en dehors des hÃ´pitaux spÃ©ciaux, trÃ©s peu d'hÃ´pitaux peuvent offrir une certaine sÃ©curitÃ© . De ce fait, les hÃ´pitaux spÃ©ciaux ont Ã©tÃ© l'objet de fortes pressions . Des dÃ©marches ont Ã©tÃ© faites pour essayer de rÃ©soudre ce problÃ©me . A Broadmoor, la situation n'est pas aussi aiguÃ« qu'elle l'a Ã©tÃ© et il est maintenant possible d'y apporter des amÃ©liotations .
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iil Les voies de recours internes quant au grief relatif Ã l'article 3 S'il y a eu nÃ©gligence dans le traitement d'un malade, le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat est tenu d'accorder des dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts pour l'inconfort subi . En outre, il est possible de se retourner contre la Couronne en obtenant un jugement dÃ©clarant que les conditions sont incompatibles avec le droit relatif aux actes illicites . La Couronne a coutume de traiter une telle dÃ©cision dÃ©claratoire comme une injonction (dÃ©cision qu'on ne peut pas obtenir contre elle) . Des dommages-intÃ©rÃªts sont accordÃ©s pour perte d'agrÃ©ment ou de commoditÃ© en plus du pretium doloris ou de l'indemnitÃ© pour perte de capacitÃ© de travail . Le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat, par dÃ©lÃ©gation, est responsable de la nÃ©gligence de ses subordonnÃ©s, par exemple du personnel hospitalier affectÃ© au nettoyage . Les plaintes comme celles du requÃ©rant peuvent donner lieu Ã des dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts . En outre, bien que le Gouvernement n'ait pas connaissance de cas de jurisprudence, en matiÃ©re de droit relatif aux actes illicites, dont il ressort qu'une indemnitÃ© puisse Ã¨tre allouÃ©e pour dÃ©sarroi mental uniquement, des dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts auraient pu Ã©tre accordÃ©s en vertu du droit des contrats pour dÃ©sarroi mental rÃ©sultant directement et inÃ©vitablement de la conduite incriminÃ©e . La tendance actuelle est d'assimiler les questions d'indemnisation ressortissant au droit des contrats Ã celles ressortissant au droit relatif aux actes illicites . Il n'y a aucune raison logique qui s'opposerait Ã l'octroi de ces dommages-intÃ©rÃ¨ts en vertu du droit relatif aux actes illicites . La jurisprudence de la Cour et de la Commission montre que la conduite incriminÃ©e doit Ãªire grave pour contrevenir Ã l'article 3 . Si un dÃ©sarroi mental rÃ©sulte de cette conduite, il est fort probable que des dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts peuvent Ãªtre accordÃ©s, mÃªme si le prÃ©judice ne porte que sur ce point . En tout cas, des dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts peuvent Ãªtre accordÃ©s sur d'autres points et un jugement dÃ©claratoire pourrait Ãªtre obtenu . Si la conduite incriminÃ©e par le requÃ©rant tombait sous le coup de l'article 3, quod non, elle donnerait lieu Ã des dommagesintÃ©rÃ©ts . Le requÃ©rant n'a pas essayÃ© d'Ã©puiser les voies de recours disponibies . Il suffit que la possibilitÃ© d'un recours existe dont l'issue n'est pas certaine . Le seul fait de mettre en doute la rÃ©alitÃ© et les perspectives de succÃ¨s d'un recours ne dispense pas un requÃ©rant de l'exercer . Les tribunaux nationaux doivent pouvoir statuer sur ce point avant qu'un recours soit introduit devant la Commission (RequÃªte NÂ° 1667/62, X . et Y. contre Belgique, Annuaire 6 p . 367, Recueil de DÃ©cisions 10 p . 20 ; Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, Affaire Handyside, ArrÃ©t du 27 dAcembre 1976, SÃ©rie A NÂ° 24 paragraphe 481 . En rÃ©ponse Ã un argument du requÃ©rant sur ce point (voir ci-aprÃ©s), le Gouvernement a fait valoir que la difficultÃ© d'introduire une action n'est pas aussi grande que le requÃ©rant l'a indiquÃ© . Le fait mÃªme que le requÃ©rant ait pu introduire la prÃ©sente requÃªte, obtenir des rapports mÃ©dicaux et entrer en relations avec son conseil le montre . Si la conduite incriminÃ©e contrevient Ã l'article 3, il n'est pas exact de dire qu'il serait peu Ã©conomique d'introduire une action ni qu'une demande d'assistance judiciaire serait considÃ©rÃ©e comme une affaire nÃ©gligeable et rejetÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant a prÃ©tendu que l'argument du Gouvernement tirÃ© du droit sur les dommages-intÃ©r@ts Ã©tait controversÃ© . Ce n'est pas exact .
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Certes, il n'y a pas de prÃ©cÃ©dent direct d'une plainte de cette nature, mais une telle plainte n'est pas de celles sont on pourrait dire qu'elles ne prÃ©sentent pas de chances raisonnables . Le Gouvernement en conclut que les griefs du requÃ©rant relatifs Ã l'article 3 sont irrecevables pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . iii) Les questions relarives Ã l'article 3 Le Gouvernement a d'abord rappelÃ© le point de vue de la Commission sur l'article 3 dans l'Affaire grecque, point de vue qu'il approuve . Le sens gÃ©nÃ©ral de l'article 3 indique que la portÃ©e de cet article doit Ãªtre limitÃ©e aux affaires graves Se rÃ©fÃ©rant Ã des photographies, le Gouvernement dÃ©crit en dÃ©tail le logement que le requÃ©rant a occupÃ© pendant cette pÃ©riode Ã Broadmoor et les possibilitÃ©s de dÃ©tente et d'occupation dont il a bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© ou dont il disposait . En ce qui concerne les toilettes, il convient de tenir compte des problÃ©mes qui peuvent se poser dans le traitement de ce type de malades, dÃ©tenus Ã Broadmoor . Il peut y avoir des comportements antisociaux et, de toute faÃ§on, ces malades sont sujets Ã des tensions qui seraient inconnues dans un hÃ´pital traitant des malades de type diffÃ©rent . Il n'existe pas de moyens de protÃ©ger des malades comme le requÃ©rant contre toutes les consÃ©quences de l'environnement nÃ©cessaire Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© . Il a Ã©tÃ© difficile de mettre sur pied un traitement cohÃ©rent du requÃ©rant en raison de son opposition au traitement mÃ©dicamenteux et aux tentatives de sociothÃ©rapie . Il faut faire une distinction entre les besoins d'un malade longtemps hospitalisÃ© et souffrant d'un Ã©taf qui se modifie lentement et les besoins d'un malade souffrant de troubles aigus nÃ©cessitant des soins mÃ©dicaux intensifs et permanents . Le mÃ©decin responsable du requÃ©rant, psychiatre consultant, Ã©tait Ã la tÃ©te d'une Ã© quipe clinique comprenant infirmiers, psychologues, Ã© ducateurs, agents de formation professionnelle et autres, qui tous ont Ã© tÃ© en contact avec le malade . Le psychiatre consultant a rÃ©uni rÃ©guliÃ©rement les membres de son Ã©quipe et il connaissait l'Ã©tat et les progrÃ©s du malade d'aprÃ¨s leurs rappo rt s . Son intervention personnelle et un examen complet du malade n'Ã©taient pas forcÃ©ment indispensables plus de quelques fois par an . En tout cas, il Ã©tait tous les jours Ã l'hÃ´pital et il a vu son malade exercer ses activitÃ©s quotidiennes . La situation et le caractÃ©re des malades dÃ©tenus sont Ã l'origine du type de problÃ©me auquel le requÃ©rant a fait allusion, en particulier en ce qui concerne ses sentiments de crainte . En raison du genre de pensionnaires que reÃ§oit Broadmoor, il est indispensable d'assurer la sÃ©curitÃ©, ce qui a causÃ© au requÃ©rant les inconvÃ©nients dont il s'est plaint . Certes, il est possible que 40 % des malades ne soient pas employÃ©s utilement, mais ce chiffre doit Ãªtre comparÃ© Ã l'ensemble des tÃ¢ches de l'hÃ´pital . Les nouveaux venus qui passent par une pÃ©riode d'observation et d'autres catÃ©gories de malades, par exemple ceux qui subissent un traitement spÃ©cial, sont incapables de travailler . L'importance accordÃ©e au x
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difficultÃ©s d'occupation et au type de personnes avec qui le requÃ©rant devait Ãªtre en contact montrent combien cette affaire est Ã©loignÃ©e des situations auxquelles s'applique l'article 3 . A propos des deux rapports mÃ©dicaux produits par le requÃ©rant Ã l'audience, le Gouvernement relÃ©ve qu'ils expriment les vues de deux mÃ©decins . D'autres mÃ©decins auraient pu adopter une attitude diffÃ©rente, comme la commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen, qui a rÃ©cemment examinÃ© le cas du requÃ©rant . Le dÃ©sir des responsables, pour autant qu'il est compatible avec la sÃ©curitÃ© publique, est de faire en sorte que les pensionnaires de Broadmoor soient admis dans des hÃ´pitaux oÃ¹ la surveillance est moins stricte ou bien qu'ils soient libÃ©rÃ©s le plus tOt possible, car malgrÃ© les efforts continus pour amÃ©liorer la situation Ã Broadmoor, il reste une rÃ©elle difficultÃ© de logement . Il y a un monde entre une situation de surpeuplement et une violation de l'article 3 . II ne faudrait pas que les difficultÃ©s dues Ã la volontÃ© de faire au mieux dans des conditions hospitaliÃ©res insuffisantes soient considÃ©rÃ©es comme faisant problÃ©me, alors qu'en rÃ©alitÃ© elles ne sauraient Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©es comme contrevenant Ã l'article 3 . L'allÃ©gation de la violation de l'article 3 est manifestement mal fondÃ©e .
d . Argumentation orale du requÃ©ran t
il Introduction Le ReprÃ©sentant du requÃ©rant fait d'abord observer que celui-ci a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© pour une escroquerie sans violence et qu'il n'a pas d'antÃ©cÃ©dents criminels . S'il avait Ã©tÃ© traitÃ© conformÃ©ment aux dispositions ordinaires du droit pÃ©nal, il n'aurait probablement pas Ã©tÃ© frappÃ© d'une peine privative de libertÃ© ; tout au plus aurait-il Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© Ã un bref emprisonnement . Or, il a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu plus de trois ans . Les tÃ©moignanges apportÃ©s Ã la Commission Butler par les psychologues de Broadmoor ont indiquÃ© qu'il n'existait pas de moyen plus sÃ»r pour prÃ©dire le caractÃ©re dangereux des dÃ©linquants mentalement anormaux que pour celui des dÃ©linquants mentalement normaux . La cour d'appel elle-mÃªme (in R . contre McFarlane, 6 7 Criminal Appeal Reports p . 320) s'est demandÃ©e si le requÃ©rant devait bien Ãªtre envoyÃ© dans un hÃ´pital spÃ©cial et dans quelle mesure le critÃ©re de l'article 40 de la loi de 1973 sur la rÃ©organisation nationale du service de santÃ© publique avait Ã©tÃ© respectÃ© . iil Voies de recours internes Le requÃ©rant soutient qu'en droit anglais il faut, si l'on veut toucher des dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts pour dÃ©sarroi mental, prouver qu'une lÃ©sion physique ou une maladie physique ou mentale visible a Ã©tÃ© contractÃ©e . Les dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts pour perte d'agrÃ©ment ne sont accordÃ©s que si cette perte a Ã©tÃ© causÃ©e par une lÃ©sion physique . Le simple inconfort physique, selon lui, ne donne pas lieu Ã des dommages-intÃ©rÃªts s'il ne s'accompagne pas d'une lÃ©sion physique . Des difficultÃ©s pratiques apparaissent lorsqu'un malade en institution fermÃ©e veut intenter une action comme celle que mentionne le Gouvernement . U n
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requÃ©rant n'est pas tenu d'exercer un recours si, en l'Ã©tat de la jurisprudence des tribunaux nationaux, cette voie de recours n'a pas raisonnablement une chance de succÃ©s . En l'occurrence, elle n'en aurait pas eu en raison de difficultÃ©s pratiques . Le requÃ©rant n'avait pas de moyens financiers et il aurait dÃ¹ demander l'assistance judiciaire, qui ne lui aurait Ã©tÃ© accordÃ©e par la Law Society que s'il avait eu raisonnablement une chance de succÃ©s . Pour prendre . sa dÃ©cision, cette sociÃ©tÃ© aurait examinÃ© s'il pouvait raisonnablement s'attendre Ã l'octroi de dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts . Les faits allÃ©guÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, par exemple, l'intervalle de vingt centimÃ©tres entre les lits, n'auraient pas donnÃ© lieu Ã un montant apprÃ©ciable de dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts . La law Society aurait aussi dÃ» examiner les moyens de preuve . La parole du requÃ©rant aurait Ã©tÃ© mise en parallÃ¨le avec celle de l'hÃ´pital et le requÃ©rant n'aurait pas pu se procurer de documents pour confirmer ses allÃ©gations . Enfin, un malade de Broadmoor se trouve dans une institution fermÃ©e, oÃ¹ il ne peut pas accÃ©der Ã des informations ou Ã des indications sur ses possibilitÃ©s et ses moyens d'intenter une action . Le Gouvernement n'a pas soulevÃ© cette question dans ses observations initiales Son nouvel argument relatif Ã l'inconfort physique a Ã©tÃ© avancÃ© par une Ã©quipe d'avocats dans un effort d'envisager toutes les possibilitÃ©s thÃ©oriques d'action en justice . Il Ã©tait peu probable qu'un malade puisse concevoir qu'il avait Ã faire de mÃªme . Au surplus, un malade doit, en vertu de l'article 141 de la loi de 1959, demander Ã la High Court la permission d'intenter une action et il doit produire des moyens de preuve sous forme de dÃ©clarations, sans pouvoir prÃ©senter l'ensemble de son affaire Ces dÃ©clarations doivent montrer Ã suffisance que la personne devant Ã¨tre incriminÃ©e a agi de mauvaise foi ou nÃ©gligÃ© d'apporter des soins raisonnables . Des affaires prÃ©cÃ©dentes, oÃ¹ les chances du recours Ã©tait plus claires que dans l'affaire prÃ©sente, ont montrÃ© qu'il Ã©tait vain de demander d'abord l'assistance judiciaire, puis d'obtenir la permission prÃ©vue par l'article 141 et d'avoir gain de cause au tribunal pour obtenir finalÃ©ment de faibles dommagesintÃ©rÃ©ts . Par consÃ©quent, le requÃ©rant a soutenu qu'il Ã©tait thÃ©oriquement impossible de disposer d'une voie de recours, puisque le dÃ©sarroi mental Ã lui seul ne justifierait pas une action et que, de toute faÃ§on, ce serait un effort inutile .
iii) Questions relatives Ã l'artic% 3 Il faut d'abord admettre que le requÃ©rant Ã© tait dÃ©tenu non pas en raison de son dÃ©lit, mais dans son propre intÃ©rÃ©t et parce qu'il avait besoin d'un traitement . Par consÃ©quent, les conditions de vie Ã l'hÃ´pital devaient atteindre un niveau minimum raisonnable qui soit profitable au requÃ©rant . Si le Gouvernement fait usage de son pouvoir de priver une personne de libertÃ© en vue de son traitement, il a Ã©galement le devoir de crÃ©er les conditions nÃ©cessaires pour y parvenir . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue en premier lieu qu'il a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu sans avoir presque rien Ã faire de toute la journÃ©e . Il en est rÃ©sultÃ© une dÃ©mence schizophrÃ©niqu e
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secondaire, dite institutionnalisation, le malade Ã©tant devenu renfermÃ© et apathique et ayant perdu son aptitude Ã mener une vie normale . Le requÃ©rant n'a vu son mÃ©decin responsable que 94 minutes en tout entre mai 1974 et Juillet 1976 et il ne l'a pas vu du tout depuis . Les photographies montrant les possibilitÃ©s d'occupation sont sans pertinence, puisque le requÃ©rant n'a participÃ© Ã aucune des activitÃ©s indiquÃ©es . 44 % des malades ne quittent pas le secteur hospitalier pour aller travailler mais restent Ã l'hÃ´pital, comme ce fut le cas du requÃ©rant pendant la plus grande partie de son internement . Avant d'Ãªtre transfÃ©rÃ© Ã la buanderie, il a travaillÃ© beaucoup moins d'une heure et demie par jour et n'a fait que quatre heures et demie d'exercice par semaine, ce qui n'est pas suffisant . Le RÃ¨glement des prisons prÃ©voit un minimum d'une heure d'exercice par jour pour les dÃ©tenus . Plusieurs rapports mÃ©dicaux, notamment deux rÃ©cemment soumis Ã la Commission, ont reconnu que si le requÃ©rant Ã©tait mentalement malade au moment de son admission Ã l'hÃ´pital, il ne l'Ã©tait plus maintenant . Pourtant, il serait difficile de s'opposer Ã son sÃ©jour dans un hÃ´pital local puisqu'il souffrait d'une schizophrÃ©nie secondaire, le processus d'institutionnalisation dont il a Ã©tÃ© question . Le deuxiÃ©me argument du requÃ©rant concerne le surpeuplement gÃ©nÃ©ral et l'absence de vie privÃ©e . L'hÃ´pital, construit en 1863, comptait dÃ©jÃ 984 malades en 1948 . Le Gouvernement est parfaitement conscient de la situation . En outre, le requÃ©rant a rappelÃ© les observations sur le surpeuplement faites par la Commission parlementaire d'estimation des dÃ©penses en 1968 et par la Commission Butler en 1974 . L'espace minimum pour la nuit, fixÃ© en 1972 par le MinistÃ©re de la SantÃ© publique et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale Ã©tait de 50 pieds carrÃ©s par lit . L'espace actuellement disponible Ã Broadmoor est de 46 pieds carrÃ©s par lit, aprÃ©s rÃ©duction du nombre des malades . On a estimÃ© qu'en 1974 le chiffre devait Ãªtre de 37 pieds carrÃ©s par lit . Le requÃ©rant n'a pas eu de vie privÃ©e et le risque de violence la nuit Ã©tait rÃ©el . Le requÃ©rant en a toujours eu peur . Le troisiÃ©me argument du requÃ©rant pone sur les toilettes et l'Atat sanitaire . Il n'y avait pas de toilettes dans les piÃ¨ces d'isolement ni dans plusieurs dortoirs surpeuplÃ©s et il n'y avait pas de possibilitÃ© d'intimitÃ© . A cet Ã©gard, le requÃ©rant cite les passages pertinents du rapport des Services consultatifs hospitaliers IHospital Advisory Service Report) concernant l'hÃ´pital . Enfin, le requÃ©rant a fait valoir que les prÃ©cautions contre l'incendie Ã©taient insuffisantes . Le requÃ©rant estime que les conditions de vie Ã©taient inhumaines et dÃ©gradantes pour un malade, qu'il souffre ou non de psychose, d'hallucinations ou d'incapacitÃ© de communiquer . Cependant, les rapports mÃ©dicaux indiquent que, s'il a souffert un jour de maladie mentale, il n'est atteint actuellement ni de psychose ni de dÃ©bilitÃ© mentale . Ses allÃ©gations doivent Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©es dans ce contexte . Son affaire pourrait se rapprocher de l'affaire Simon-Herold IRequÃ©re NÂ° 4340/69, Simon-Herold contre Autriche, Annuaire 14, page 353, Recueil de DActsions 38, page 18), dans laquelle le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© maintenu dans des conditions psychiatriques bien qu'il n'ait pas Ã©tÃ© mentalement malade Ã l'Ã©poque .
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3 . Questions relatives Ã l'article 5 de la Conventio n a . Observafions Ã©crites du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeu r Le Gouvernement a fait observer que le cas du requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© examinÃ© par une commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen le 11 mars 1975, sur demande de ce dernier adressÃ©e au SecrÃ©taire d'Etat . Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur a dÃ©cidÃ© de soumettre encore une fois le cas Ã une commission de rÃ©examen qui l'a examinÃ© en dÃ©cembre 1976 . Il faut considÃ©rer deux domaines du droit anglais . PremiÃ¨rement, l'article 66 de la loi confÃ©re des pouvoirs au Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur en ce qui concerne la libÃ©ration des malades soumis Ã restriction . Si celui-ci est convaincu que l'ordonnance de restriction n'est plus nÃ©cessaire, il peut ordonner que le malade cesse d'Ãªtre soumis aux restrictions spÃ©ciales . Tant qu'une ordonnance de restriction est en vigueur, il peut libÃ©rer un malade purement et simplement ou sous condition . Le Minlstre de l'IntÃ©rieur peut en tout temps renvoyer le cas d'un malade soumis Ã restriction Ã une commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen pour avis . En outre, si un malade le lui demande, il doit soumettre son cas Ã une commission de rÃ©examen dans les deux mois, Ã moins de libÃ©rer le malade avant ce dÃ©lai . De telles demandes peuvent Ãªtre prÃ©sentÃ©es pendant la deuxiÃ¨me annÃ©e Ã compter de la date de l'ordonnance d'internement et ensuite une fois tous les deux ans . DeuxiÃ¨mement, une personne dÃ©tenue en Angleterre ou au pays de Galles peut demander Ã un tribunal une ordonnance d'habeas corpus, dont le but est d'enjoindre Ã l'organisme dÃ©tenant le requÃ©rant de le faire comparaÃ®tre devant le tribunal, lequel examine si les procÃ©dures Ã dÃ©faut desquelles la dÃ©tention serait illÃ©gaie ont bien Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©es . La demande d'ordonnance d'habeas corpus rÃ©pond entiÃ©rement et parfaitement aux exigences de l'article 5(4) . Les ordonnances par lesquelles le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu ont Ã©tÃ© rendues par la Crown Court . Dans les affaires de vagabondage, la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme a di t Â« Si la dÃ©cision privative de libertÃ© Ã©mane d'un organe administratif, l'article 5, paragraphe 4 astreint sans nul doute les Etats Ã ouvrir au dÃ©tenu un recours auprÃ¨s d'un tribunal, mais rien n'indique qu'il en aille de mÃªme quand elle est rendue par un tribunal statuant Ã l'issue d'une procÃ©dure judiciaire . Dans cette derniÃ©re hypothÃ©se, le contrÃ´le voulu par l'article 5, paragraphe 4, se trouve incorporÃ© Ã la dÃ©cision ; tel est le cas, par exemple, d'une 'condamnation' Ã l'emprisonnement prononcÃ©e'par un tribunal compÃ©tent' larticle 5, paragraphe 1(a) de la Convention) . On peut en conclure que l'article 5, paragraphe 4 est respectÃ© si l'arrestation ou la dÃ©tention . . . visÃ©es au paragraphe 1 lel sont ordonnÃ©es par un 'tribunal' au sens du paragraphe 4 x Cette jurisprudence a Ã©tÃ© confirmÃ©e au paragraphe 17 de l'aÂ« Ã©t de la Cour rendu le 8 juin 1976 dans l'affaire Engel et autres .
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Comme la lÃ©galitÃ© formelle de la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant pouvait Ãªtre vÃ©rifiÃ©e Ã tout moment grÃ¢ce Ã une demande d'habeas corpus et que les deux ordonnances en vertu desquelles le requÃ©rant Ã©tait dÃ©renu avaient Ã©tÃ© rendues par un tribunal, l'article 5, paragraphe 4, a Ã©tÃ© respectÃ© . Quand on considÃ©re la situation d'une personne qui reste dÃ©tenue en vertu de l'article 5 111 (e) de la Convention, il faut faire la distinction entre la Â« lÃ©galitÃ© n du maintien en dÃ©tention et sa justification matÃ©rielle . La dÃ©bilitÃ© mentale est sujette Ã une amÃ©lioration ou Ã une dÃ©tÃ©rioration progressive et les cas des personnes dÃ©tenues doivent donc Ãªtre rÃ©apprÃ©ciÃ©s Ã intervalles convenables . La Convention n'exige pas que cette rÃ©apprÃ©ciation soit effectuÃ©e ou vÃ©rifiÃ©e par un tribunal, lequel n'est pas un organe appropriÃ© pour dÃ©terminer si le degrÃ© de rÃ©tablissement ou le risque de rechute est propre Ã justifier une libÃ©ration conditionnelle ou inconditionnelle . Il peut y avoir de graves inconvÃ©nients Ã laisser une personne mentalement malade accÃ©der Ã des rapports et autres documents qui, de l'avis des autoritÃ©s, justifient le maintien de sa dÃ©tention . Il ne serait pas raisonnable ni souhaitable dans bien des cas, du point de vue du malade, de le laisser soumettre Ã un tribunal des demandes rÃ©itÃ©rÃ©es de libÃ©ration Dans sa jurisprudence, la Commission a reconnu dans une certaine mesure que des considÃ©rations spÃ©ciales s'imposent dans le cas d'un malade mental lorsqu'elle a dÃ©clarÃ© que l'obligation de rÃ©vÃ©ler tous les documents pertinents ne s'appliquait pas nÃ©cessairement Ã son cas et que l'exigence d'un dÃ©lai de six mois entre deux demandes de rÃ©vision de la dÃ©tention n'Ã©tait pas contraire Ã l'obligation de faire statuer Â« bref dÃ©lai Â» sur la lÃ©galitÃ© de la dÃ©tention . Toutefois, le Gouvernement va plus loin et soutient que, si la lÃ©galitÃ© d'une dÃ©tention selon l'article 5 (1) (e) doit Ãªtre soumise Ã un examen pÃ©riodique, sa justification matÃ©rielle ne saurait raisonnablement Ãªtre susceptible de rÃ©examen rÃ©gulier par un tribunal et que l'article 5 141 n'impose pas une telle obligation . La commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen rÃ©examine l'Ã©tat mental d'un malade soumis Ã restriction, tel que le requÃ©rant, mais elle n'exerce pasles fonctions d'un tribunal . La lÃ©galitÃ© de la dÃ©tention peut Ã©tre examinÃ©e par le tribunal divisionnaire (Divisional Court) dans une procÃ©dure d'habeas corpus . Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur, qui est responsable devant le Parlement de la sÃ©curitÃ© et de la protection des citoyens, accorde beaucoup d'attention Ã l'avis de la commission de rÃ©examen, mais la dÃ©cision finale lui appartient . Il n'y a donc pas eu violation de l'article 5 (4) . Le Gouvernement demande donc Ã la Commission de dÃ©clarer ce grief incompatible avec la Convention ou manifestement mal fondÃ© .
b . Observations Ã©crites du requÃ©rant en rÃ©pons e De l'avis du requÃ©rant, l'article 5 exige que la dÃ©tention initiale soit lÃ©gale et qu'il y ait un rÃ©examen pÃ©riodique de son bien-fondÃ© . L'ordonnance d'habeas corpus permet de vÃ©rifier la lÃ©galitÃ© de la dÃ©tention initiale . Toutefois, les tribunaux ont une conception trÃ©s Ã©troite de leurs fonctions dans ce domaine . Dans le cas d'une personne dÃ©tenue en vertu des articles 60 et 65 de la loi d e
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1959, il semble qu'une telle ordonnance soit limitÃ©e Ã des circonstances extrÃªmement prÃ©cises, par exemple si une irrÃ©gularitÃ© ou l'incompÃ©tence du tribunal ayant ordonnÃ© la dÃ©tention peut Ã¨tre Ã©tablie . Si, d'aprÃ©s les piÃ¨ces dont le iribunal est saisi, toutes les formes prÃ©vues dans la loi ont Ã©tÃ© observÃ©es, l'habeas corpus ne joue pas . Cette voie de recours ne vÃ©rifie pas le bien-fondÃ© de la dÃ©tention . Il est intÃ©ressant Ã cet Ã©gard de rappeler que dans l'affaire McFarlane la cour d'appel avait fait observer que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait Â« un petit escroc Â» sans antÃ©cÃ©dents de maladie mentale ou de violence et que Â« les hÃ´pitaux spÃ©ciaux ne doivent pas Ãªtre encombrÃ©s de cas de cette espÃ¨ce n Si le requÃ©rant avait Ã©tÃ© traitÃ© comme un dÃ©linquant Â« ordinaire Â», il aurait reÃ§u une peine non privative de 6bertÃ© ou peut-Ã©tre une brÃ©ve peine d'emprisonnement . En rÃ©alitÃ©, il a Ã©tÃ© traitÃ© comme un dÃ©linquant Â« anormal Â» et il est maintenant dÃ©tenu depuis trois ans . La justification ne saurait en Ã©tre le dÃ©lit, qui Ã©tait bÃ©nin . La longueur d'une dÃ©tention pÃ©nale doit Ã¨tre proportionnÃ©e Ã la gravitÃ© du dÃ©lit En outre, le maintien de la dÃ©tention ne peut Ã©tre justifiÃ© par des troubles mentaux puisque le mÃ©decin de Broadmoor n'a pas le droit de libÃ©rer le requÃ©rant et qu'il n'y a pas de recours possible Ã quelque autre organe . Il importe de noter que, selon les statistiques de 1973 de la DHSS, 64 % des personnes dÃ©tenues en vertu de l'article 60 de la loi de 1959 avaient un diagnostic de psychopathes ou de subnormaux . De tels malades ne seraient pas soumis Ã la dÃ©tention en vertu du chapitre IPartie IV) de cette loi relatif aux cas civils . Au surplus, il existe plusieurs cas dans lesquels le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur a refusÃ© la libÃ©ration bien que le mÃ©decin responsable l'ait recommandÃ© e
c Argumentation orale du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient en premier lieu que le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes en ce qui concerne son grief relatif Ã l'article 5 de la Convention . Il existe des recours sous la forme des ordonnances d'habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition et mandamus, qui correspondent Ã des droits . Ces voies de recours se complÃ©tent et dans leur ensemble elles constituent un formidable arsenal pour ceux qui veulent attaquer les dÃ©cisions administratives . En l'occurrence, l'habeas corpus Ã©tait peut-Ã¨tre le recours le plus important . Ce recours joue maintenant un rÃ´le beaucoup plus grand qu'autrefois La procÃ©dure relative aux quatre recours citÃ©s est rapide et simple . L'usage consiste normalement Ã demander l'habeas corpus en mÃªme temps que l'une des autres ordonnances qui pourraient casser l'ordonnance de dÃ©tention . Toutefois, les tribunÃ¢ux sont de plus en plus disposÃ©s Ã accorder l'habeas corpus lorsque l'ordonnance est de celles qui peuvent Ã¨tre cassÃ©es, mÃªme si la formalitÃ© du certiorari n'a pas Ã©tÃ© remplie . Les tribunaux d'Angleterre ont de plus en plus tendance Ã estimer que les organes qui prennent des dÃ©cisions administratives sont tenus d'agir Ã©quitablement, faute de quoi ils violent les rÃ¨gles de la justice naturelle et l'ordonnance rendue est tantbt considÃ©rÃ©e comme entachÃ©e de nullitÃ© tantÃ´t cassÃ©e Ã la suite du certiorari. C'est un domaine juridique en Ã©volution et l'attitude des tribunau x
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consiste Ã ne pas dÃ©finir abstraitement ce qu'est l'Ã©quitÃ© en toute circonstance . Les tribunaux ont rÃ©cemment estimÃ© que le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur avait le devoir d'agir Ã©quitablement en dÃ©cidanl s'il fallait placer un dÃ©tenu dans une catÃ©gorie particuliÃ©re et les tribunaux ont veillÃ© Ã ce qu'il remplisse ce devoir . Par analogie, il est hors de doute qu'il avait le devoir d'agir Ã©quitabelement dans sa fonction de surveillance en vertu de l'article 65 de la loi de 1959 . Si l'on pense qu'il ne l'a pas fait, il est possible de demander rÃ©paration . Le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, les tribunaux peuvent rendre une ordonnance de mandamus faisant obligation au Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur de reconsidÃ©rer la question de maniÃ©re Ã©quitable . Si le tribunal estime que la seule conclusion Ã laquelle un SecrÃ©taire d'Etat raisonnable puisse parvenir est de libÃ©rer l'intÃ©ressÃ©, il peut estimer qu'une ordonnance d'habeas corpus s'impose Les tribunaux pourraient aussi revoir la dÃ©cision du Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur s'il a fait une erreur de droit, s'il n'y a pas de preuves Ã l'appui de sa dÃ©cision ou s'il n'y a pas de preuves sur lesquelles il puisse raisonnablement se fonder pour justifier sa dÃ©cision . Ces recours n'Ã©quivalent pas Ã un vÃ©ritable appel de la dÃ©cision du SecrÃ©taire d'Etat . Si deux mÃ©decins jugent un cas diffÃ©remment et si le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat choisit raisonnablement une opinion plutÃ´t que l'autre, sa dÃ©cision ne peut pas Ã©tre attaquÃ©e . Rien ne s'oppose Ã l'examen mÃ©dical indÃ©pendant d'une personne Ã Broadmoor Un rapport mÃ©dical indiquant qu'il n'y a plus de raison de maintenir la dÃ©tention en vertu d'une ordonnance de restriction fait partie des piÃ¨ces qui pourraient amener le tribunal divisionnaire IDivisional Court) Ã solliciter une rÃ©ponse du Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur . Si les tribunaux estiment que celui-ci a d'autres Ã©lÃ©ments lui permettant de parvenir Ã une autre conclusion, ils ne peuvent pas intervenir . S'il n'y a pas de base raisonnable sur laquelle la conclusion du SecrÃ©taire d'Etat puisse s'appuyer, le tribunal peut intervenir, comme il peut intervenir si le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat a agi inÃ©quitablement . Bien que le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur ne soit pas tenu de motiver ses dÃ©cisions, l'affaire de Padfield' a montrÃ© que le fait de ne pas donner de motifs ne doit pas empÃªcher l'examen par les tribunaux . S'il existe des indices que quelque chose aurait dÃ¹ Ãªtre fait et qu'aucun motif n'est donnÃ© pour une dÃ©cision en sens contraire, le tribunal conclut que celle-ci n'est pas fondÃ©e sur des motifs valables et qu'elle est mauvaise . Par exemple, s'il est allÃ©guÃ© qu'il n'y a pas de raison valable de dÃ©tenir une personne en vertu d'une ordonnance de restriction et qu'un rapport mÃ©dical conclut dans ce sens : si aucune explication n'est donnÃ©e sur les motifs de l'attitude contraire du SecrÃ©taire d'Etat, le tribunal peut estimer que l'action du SecrÃ©taire d'Etat n'est pas motivÃ©e et annuler l'ordonnance . La commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen conseille le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat . S'il apparaÃ®t que sa procÃ©dure n'a pas Ã©tÃ© Ã©quitable, la dÃ©cision du SecrÃ©taire d'Etat peut faire l'objet d'un examen par le tribunal . Pedfield contre Ministre de l'Apriculture, des PÃªches et de l'Alimentmion 11 9681, 1 AII E :R . 694 .
_B7_
Le Gouvernement se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã plusieurs affaires qui illustrent l'Ã©volulion du principe de l'Ã©quitÃ© en droit anglais ' Si le requÃ©rant estimait qu'en raison de son Ã©tat mÃ©dical il n'y avait pas de raison valable de le soumettre encore Ã des restrictions et de le dÃ©tenir et si, comme il l'a allÃ©guÃ©, il avait obtenu des rapports mÃ©dicaux indiquant que sa dÃ©tenlion n'Ã©tait pas justifiÃ©e, l'obligation de justifier la dÃ©tention auraii appartenu au SecrÃ©taire d'Etat . Si celui-ci ne pouvait le taire, le tribunal aurait pu, le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, accorder satisfaction au requÃ©rant par la voie d'une ordonnance de mandamus et d'une ordonnance d'habeas corpus . Dans la procÃ©dure relative Ã ces ordonnances, il n'est pas d'usage, pour des raisons de rapiditÃ©, d'ordonner une procÃ©dure orale Normalement, on a recours Ã l'affidavit . NÃ©anmoins, il est Ã©galement possible d'introduire une procÃ©dure pour obtenir une dÃ©cision dÃ©claratoire indiquant que le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat ne peut pas lÃ©galement dÃ©tenir l'intÃ©ressÃ© dans des conditions restrictives . Dans une telle procÃ©dure, les tÃ©moins sont citÃ©s et il est possible d'obtenir que des documents soient produits . En consÃ©quence, le requÃ©rant disposait d'une voie de recours, contorme Ã l'article 26 de la Convention, dont il n'a pas fait usage . Commentant l'argumentation du requÃ©rant en rÃ©ponse, le Gouvernement a soutenu que l'affaire Hassan"a simplement montrÃ© que lorsque le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat se propose d'agir sous l'autoritÃ© d'une loi, il appartient au demandeur de l'habeas corpus de faire Ã©lat d'un commencement de preuve . Il ne ressort pas de ce prÃ©cÃ©dent que si le requÃ©rant produit des indices montrant quelque chose d'irrÃ©gulier, les tribunaux peuvent ne pas tenir compte de ces indices du seul fail que le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat a dÃ©clarÃ© se fonder sur une loi . L'affaire Padfield a profondÃ©ment modifiÃ© le droit depuis que l'affaire Stafford"'a Ã©tÃ© jugÃ©e . L'affaire Padfield monlre que lorsque le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat disposed'un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire, il ne lui appartient pas de tourner les mesures prÃ©vues par la loi qui lui accorde ce pouvoir . La loi de 1959 traite de la dÃ©tention des personnes souffrant d'une anomalie mentale et le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat ne peut exercer son pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire que dans les limites de cette loi . Il peut prendre en considÃ©ration les intÃ©rÃ©ts du malade et la protection des citoyens . Dire, comme le fait le requÃ©rant, qu'il n'aurait pas eu de chance raisonnable de succÃ¨s dans son affaire n'est pas une rÃ©ponse . Ce qu'il doit montrer, c'est qu'une bonne cause n'aurait pas eu de chance de succÃ©s . Le Gouvernement admet que le tribunal ne peut pas substituer son pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire Ã celui du SecrÃ©taire d'Etat, mais il y a place pour un large examen .
' Re . HK . (enfant en bas dpel, 119671 1 AII E .R . 226 ; Re . Godden, (1971) AII E .R . 20 ; R . contre Board of Control, ex parte Rutty, 119561 1 AII E .R . 769 . R . contre Directeur de la Prison de Risley, ex pene Wa]id Hassan, 119761 2 AII E .R . 123 . " R . contre Directeur de la Prison de Leeds, ex nerte Stafford, (1964) 1 AII E .R . 610 .
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A propos de l'article 5 de la Convention et des questions posÃ©es par la Commission, le Gouvernement maintient que si la privation initiale de libertÃ© est ordonnÃ©e par un tribunal, l'article 5,par 4, ne donne pas un droit de recours supplÃ©mentaire . Il admet que la dÃ©tention doit rester lÃ©gale et que, dans le cas de la dÃ©tention visÃ©e par l'article 5, par, . 1 (e), il est gÃ©nÃ©ralement exact qu'elle doit demeurer justifiÃ©e par l'un des objectifs exposÃ©s dans cette disposition . NÃ©anmoins, il n'est pas possible de dire avec prÃ©cision Ã quel moment la dÃ©tention d'un malade mental cesse de se justifier et il faut reconnaitre une marge d'apprÃ©ciation Ã l'Etat pour dÃ©cider si la situation a changÃ© . Le Gouvernement admet que des indices de maladie mentale doivent Ãªtre produits pour justifier une dÃ©tention pour ce motif en vertu de l'article 5, par . 1 lel, mais il n'est pas nÃ©cessaire que la dÃ©tention soit indispensable , ce serait aller trop loin . Ce qu'il faut indiquer, c'est que l'ordonnance Ã©tait justifiÃ©e soit dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t des citoyens soit dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t du dÃ©tenu et il faut laisser Ã l'organe compÃ©tent une marge d'apprÃ©ciation pour prendre sa dÃ©cision . L'article 5, par . 1 (e) sous-entend qu'il doit y avoir sous une forme ou sous une autre, un examen continu ou pÃ©riodique de l'Ã©tat mental du dÃ©tenu, sans quoi il serait impossible de dire que la dÃ©tention est bien la dÃ©tention d'un aliÃ©nÃ© . Cet examen, au moins en partie, doit Ãªtre mÃ©dical La question de savoir s'il doit y avoir un Ã©lÃ©ment administratif ou judiciaire dans l'examen dÃ©pend beaucoup du type de dÃ©tention . Lorsqu'une ordonnance de restriction a Ã©tÃ© rendue pour la protection de la sociÃ©tÃ©, il ne serait pas juste que l'examen soit purement mÃ©dical car des considÃ©rations autres que purement mÃ©dicales doivent intervenir . Un tribunal n'est pas l'organe appropriÃ© pour dire si le rÃ©tablissement d'un malade est suffisant pour justifier sa libÃ©ration . Il y aurait aussi de graves inconvÃ©nients Ã laisser un malade accÃ©der aux rapports et aux documents confidentiels constituant le matÃ©riel sur lequel se fondent les mÃ©decins ou une commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen . Au surplus, une procÃ©dure judiciaiie apparait trop formaliste pour cette sorte de tÂ®che et elle est normalement incompatible avec la rÃ©vÃ©lation entiÃ©re et confidentielle des informations nÃ©cessaires sur l'Ã©tat de l'intÃ©ressÃ© . L'article 5, par . 1 lel n'implique pas un droit au traitement . Un traitement est dispensÃ© au Royaume-Uni, qui souhaite et veut que ce traitement soit administrÃ© lorsqu'il est nÃ©cessaire . NÃ©anmoins, il peut y avoir des circonstances qui ne se prÃ©tent pas au traitement et qui exigent le maintien de l'intÃ©ressÃ© en dÃ©tention . Logiquement, il n'y a pas de raison pour que la jurisprudence de la Cour dans les Affaires de vagabondage relativement Ã l'article 5, par . 4 ne s'appliquent pas aux personnes dÃ©tenues pour aliÃ©nation mentale pendant une pÃ©riode illimitÃ©e . La situation d'une personne dÃ©tenue en vertu d'une ordonnance illimitÃ©e de restriction est analogue Ã celle d'une personne condamnÃ©e Ã l'emprisonnement Ã vie . Tout comme dans le cas de la libÃ©ration conditionnelle d'un dÃ©tenu Ã vie, le droit de rÃ©voquer la libÃ©ration permet au SecrÃ©taire d'Etat de peser diffÃ©remmen t
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les risques, et cela en faveur du malade . La souplesse est beaucoup plus grande qu'elle ne serait si l'article 5, par . 4 continuait Ã s'appliquer pendant toute la pÃ©riode de restrictio n MÃªme si l'article 5, par . 4 restait applicable, la procÃ©dure d'habeas corpus, les autres ordonnances et les procÃ©dures tendant Ã une dÃ©cision dÃ©claratoire apporteraient le recours nÃ©cessaire . Le recours prÃ©vu par l'article 5, par . 4 porte sur la lÃ©galitÃ©, c'est-Ã -dire sur le point de savoir si la dÃ©cision rendue est conforme Ã la lol . Quoi qu'il en soit, le Gouvernement soutient qu'il n'y a peut-Ã©tre pas lieu de mettre l'accent sur l'article 5, par . 1(e) et sur l'article 5, par . 4, puisque la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant, motivÃ©e par une condamnation infligÃ©e par un tribunal compÃ©tent . est visÃ©e par l'article 5, par . 1(a) . L'article 5, par . 4 n'est donc pas applicable . En examinant le cas des malades soumis aux ordonnances de restriction prÃ©vues Ã l'article 65, la commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen exerce une fonction consultative et non pas judiciaire . Le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat peut Ã tout moment la consulter sur un cas et le malade a le droit de soumettre son cas Ã un examen Ã certains intervalles . L'intÃ©ressÃ© a droit Ã cire personnellement entendu par cette Commission, qui comprend un mÃ©decin indÃ©pendant et qui a pour habitude de permettre aux malades de prÃ©senter eux-mÃ©mes des piÃ¨ces mÃ©dicales . Le patient peut se taire reprÃ©senter par un juriste ou une autre personne . Le malade n'est pas informÃ© de l'avis de cette Commission puisque la dÃ©cision appartient au Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur . Jusqu'Ã la fin de 1975, 31,6 % des recommandations d'Ã©largissement ont Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©es par le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur ; mais il a pu Ã©ventuellement prendre une autre dÃ©cision, par exemple le transfert dans un hÃ´pital ouvert II y avait en gÃ©nÃ©ral, dans ces cas-lÃ , des divergences d'avis mÃ©dicaux . Le rÃ´le du SecrÃ©taire d'Etat a alors une importance essentielle puisque la commission de rÃ©examen se prÃ©occupe essentiellement de l'Ã©tat mental et des intÃ©rÃ¨ts du malade, alors que le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat doit prendre en considÃ©ration la protection de la sociÃ©tÃ© . En outre, le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur peut demander l'avis d'un conseil consultatif sur les malades soumis Ã restriction, lequel examine le risque inhÃ©rent Ã l'Ã©largissement . Sur le point de savoir si un tribunal est apte Ã apprÃ©cier la nÃ©cessitÃ© de l'internement, le Gouvernement estime que le besoin d'une enquÃ¨te se faisait sentir au moment oÃ¹ l'internement est ordonnÃ© plutÃ´t qu'Ã un stade ultÃ©rieur . C'est au moment de l'internement qu'il y a danger d'abus et qu'il importe qu'un tribunal intervienne . De plus, le tribunal a dÃ©cidÃ© Ã l'origine de la culpabilitÃ© de l'accusÃ©, mais il ne conviendrait pas de renvoyer l'affaire Ã un tribunal pÃ©nal pour rÃ©vision . Ensuite, des relations s'instaurent entre le malade et le personnel mÃ©dical et la confiance doit s'Ã©tablir pour que le personnel puisse exercer convenablement sa fonction et rÃ©diger des rapporis complets et sincÃ¨res . Ce serait difficile dans une procÃ©dure judiciaire . Le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat reste au contact de la situation aprÃ¨s que l'internement a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ©, ce qu'un tribunal ne pourrait pas faire aussi
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bien et il vaut mieux que l'examen ultÃ©rieur de la situation soit le fait d'une autoritÃ© administrative comme le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat . Lorsqu'il s'agit de malades pouvant Ãªtre dangereux, il est d'ailleurs mieux placÃ© pour trancher qu'un organe comme la commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen . Un tel organe ne donnerait pas aux citoyens l'impression de pouvoir bien protÃ©ger leurs intÃ©rÃ©ts Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur est responsable devant le Parlement . En outre, pour assurer la cohÃ©sion des mesures, il importe de confier les dÃ©cisions Ã une autoritÃ© administrative centrale . RÃ©sumant ses arguments sur l'article 5, le Gouvernement conclut que la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant est autorisÃ©e par l'article 5 111 lal, auquel cas tout est dit . Si toutefois on veut limiter dans le temps les disposilions de l'arlicle 5(1 ) (a), ce qui signifierait qu'on ne pourrait plus l'invoquer en ce qui concerne les examens subsÃ©quents, il reste que l'article 5 (1) lel exige que les motifs de la dÃ©tention aient trait Ã l'aliÃ©nation de l'intÃ©ressÃ© . C'est la seule base de dÃ©tention prÃ©vue par la loi de 1959 sur les malades mentaux, qui ne prÃ©voit pas la dÃ©tention d'une personne pour des motifs sans rapport avec l'aliÃ©nation . Bien que la procÃ©dure d'examen uliÃ©rieur ne soit pas confiÃ©e Ã un tribunal, l'article 5 141, Ã supposer qu'il s'applique, a Ã©tÃ© respectÃ© . La procÃ©dure d'habeas corpus suffit en elle-mÃªme, mais l'examen plus Ã©tendu que permet le recours aux autres ordonnances est conforme aux exigences de l'article 5(4), dans la mesure oÃ¹ elles comportent un examen qui dÃ©passe les questions formelles qu'une demande d'habeas corpus peut parfaitement rÃ©gler . Le Gouvernement affirme qu'on ne peut pas dire qu'il ait contrevenu Ã l'article 5 en adoptant la procÃ©dure fixÃ©e dans la loi de 1959 sur les malades mentaux . II n'a pas Ã©tÃ© dÃ©montrÃ© que le SecrÃ©taire d'Etat avait mÃ©susÃ© des pouvoirs que lui confÃ©re la loi . Aucune violation de l'article 5, si on l'interprÃ©te convenablement, n'a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©montrÃ©e . d . Argumentation orale du requÃ©rant en rÃ©pons e Le requÃ©rant rÃ©plique que les voies de recours disponibles en droit interne ne sont pas aussi larges que le prÃ©tend le Gouvernement . Lorsque le pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire s'exerce, il est pratiquement impossible, pour un dÃ©tenu qui prÃ©tend ne plus souffrir d'une anomalie mentale, d'obtenir un examen de son cas par les tribunaux . L'Ã©largissement d'un malade soumis Ã restriction est expressÃ©ment subordonnÃ© Ã la conviction du Ministre de l'InrÃ©rieur qu'une ordonnance de restriction n'est plus requise pour la protection de la sociÃ©tÃ© (article 66 (1), de la loi de 1959 ) . Tant que le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur exerce son pouvoir en vertu de l'article 66, aucune ordonnance d'habeas corpus ne peut Ãªtre rÃ©ndue . Le requÃ©rant ne peut donc pas obtenir l'examen par un tribunal du bien-fondÃ© de sa dÃ©tention . Le requÃ©rant a rappelÃ© deux affaires qui, selon lui, illustrent les limites de la procÃ©dure d'habeas corpus' . L'affaire Hassan a montrÃ© qu'il incombe au demanR . contre Directeur de la prison de Risley, ex perte Waiid Hassan, 119761 2 AII E .R . 123 . R . contre Directeur de la prison de Leads, ex perte Stafford, 119641 1 All E .R . 610 .
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deur de prouver que sa dÃ©tention est illÃ©gale lorsque le gardien de prison produit un ordre d'Ã©crou montrani que la dÃ©tention est lÃ©gale d'un point de vue technique . Dans l'affaire Stafford, le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur a soutenu que le tribunal n'avait pas compÃ©tence pour accorder l'habeas corpus dans une affaire de remise de peine, puisqu'il avait lui-mÃ«me sur ce point un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire . Le tribunal a aussi Ã©mis des doutes sur sa propre compÃ©tence . Le requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait pas tenu d'exercer un recours s'il n'y avait pas raisonnablement de perspective de succÃ©s . II est fort douteux qu'il soit possible d'obtenir l'assistance judiciaire dans une situation comme celle du requÃ©rant et, en l'Ã©tat actuel de la jurisprudence sur l'habeas corpus, le requÃ©rant n'aurait eu aucune chance de persuader une commission d'assistance judiciaire qu'il Ã©tait fondÃ© Ã demander une rÃ©vision de sa situation actuelle par un tribunal . Il y a une distinction entre le pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire dont dispose le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur dans le cas d'un malade mental soumis Ã restriction et le pouvoir limitÃ© comme celui dont il est question dans l'affaire H.K., oÃ¹ les critÃ©res d'exercice du pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire ont Ã©tÃ© fixÃ©s par la loi . Dans le cas d'un malade mental, les tribunaux n'ont aucune compÃ©tence pour examiner dans quelle mesure le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur exerce son pouvoir Ã©quitablement . La procÃ©dure d'habeas corpus, dans la RequÃ¨te NÂ° 6998/75', montre que le tribunal n'a pas procÃ©dÃ© Ã une apprÃ©ciation du bien-fondÃ© de la dÃ©cision d'annuler la libÃ©ration du requÃ©rant . Lorsque le Parlement donne Ã un Ministre le pouvoir de prendre une dÃ©cision, il peut expressÃ©ment prÃ©voir un droit de recours devant un tribunal ou bien donner au Ministre un pouvoir entiÃ©rement discrÃ©tionnaire . Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur a reÃ§u un tel pouvoir en vertu de l'article 66 de la loi de 1959 . L'intention du Parlement n'Ã©tait pas de prÃ©voir un recours judiciaire et les tribunaux ne peuvent substituer leur dÃ©cision Ã celle du Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur . L'affaire Hosenball, rÃ©cemment tranchÃ©e par la Chambre des Lords, a montrÃ© que les tribunaux ne pouvaient pas apprÃ©cier une dÃ©cision relevant de l'absolue discrÃ©tion d'un ministre . La dÃ©cision ne peut Ãªtre annulÃ©e que si le Ministre a agi de mauvaise foi et dans l'intention de nuire ou d'Ã©luder le but de la loi . Le requÃ©rant ne prÃ©tend pas que tel soit le cas en l'espÃ¨ce . La lecture attentive de l'affaire Padfield rÃ©vÃ©le que le tribunal a estimÃ© que le Ministre ne pouvait pas agir contrairement Ã l'intention exprimÃ©e par le Parlement dans la loi . Dans le cas prÃ©sent, les actes du Ministres de l'IntÃ©rieur Ã©taient parfaitement conformes aux pouvoirs que lui confÃ©re la loi, mais le droit interne viole manifestement l'article 5 de la Convention . Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur n'a pas commis d'erreur de droit . Ayant un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire, il dispose de plusieurs moyens qui ne sont pas conformes Ã la Convention . Le requÃ©rant fait grief aux articles 65 et 66 de la loi de 1959, non au comportement du Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur . Le Gouvernement n'a pas citÃ© de prÃ©cÃ©dent concernant l'internement d'un malade mental . II n'existe qu'un lien tÃ©nu, de caractÃ©re spÃ©culatif et acadÃ©miqu e ' Voir D .R . 8, p
1 06.
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enue les attaires qu"il a InentionnÃ©es et celle du requÃ©rant
Il n'est pas rÃ©allste de plÃ©tendre que le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours intmrnes . D'aillews, les voies de recours signalÃ©es n'offrent pas la possibilitÃ© de recours etteclif envisagÃ© par l'arlicle 5, par . 4 . Depuis l'adoplion de la loi de 1959, aucun Inalade n'a disposÃ© d'un recours ellectif selon les procÃ©dules proposÃ©es par le Gouvernement . Le principe essentiel de l'article 5 esI le droil ;1 Lt libertÃ© . Nul ne peul Ã¨tie privÃ© de sa IiberlÃ© Ã rrmolns que Irois conditions soient remplies : La privauon de libenÃ© doit avoir eu lieu selon les voies Ibgales eI la dhtention ne doit pas cessel d'Ã¨tre lÃ©gale . Ceci dÃ©passe la sinlple IÃ©gaGtÃ© formelle . TrÃ©s e,xac.Ierrmenl, la dÃ©tention doit enlrer en pernranernce dans l'urne des catÃ©gories piÃ©vues Ã l'article 5, par . 1 lal Ã 111 . Chacune de ces six coridilioris est par nature limirÃ©e dans le terrmps . Si elle n'Ã©tait pas limitÃ©e, il n'y aurait pas de raison pour qu'une personne ne puisse pas Ã©tre dÃ©tenue Ã perpÃ©luitÃ© pourvu que la condition ait Ã©tÃ© reniplie au dÃ©bul . Lorsque la condiuon cesse d'Ã¨tre remplie, la dÃ©tention est dlÃ©gale L'article 5, par . 1 (a) ne veul pas dire que la dÃ©lenlion soit lÃ©gale indÃ©tinimenl, quel que soit le dÃ©lit ou les anlÃ©cÃ©dents . Une dÃ©temion conlornle Ã l'article 5, par 1 lal qui serail manifestenienl dlsproportionnÃ©e avec la natwe du dÃ©lil selail inhumaine et dÃ©gradante . Le cas du requÃ©lant ne se compare pas Ã celtn d'une personne purgeanl une peine de prison Ã perpÃ©tuitÃ©, qui ne peul sanctionner que certains crimes IrÃ©s graves . Aucun Iriburlal n'aumit pu lui inllignr une peinc ressemblant de prÃ©s ou de lour Ã urne condamnalion Ã perpÃ©luilÃ© Le Gouvelnenternl doit donc invoquer l'article 5, par 1 lel pour justiliel la dÃ©temiun . Comme toutes les conditions ntentionnÃ©es Ã l'article 5, par . 1, l'aliÃ©nation esl sujelle Ã des changenienls . Elle doil dwer pendanl toute la pÃ©riode de dÃ©lentio n En vertu de l'article 5,par . 1 lel, des indices de maladw menlale doivent Ã©tie rÃ©unis et l'internenlenl doit apparaitre comme nÃ©cessaire . Est-ce Irop demander que la dÃ©tenrion soit nÃ©cessailc, lorsque la libenÃ© est en jeu ? Il serait Injuste de dÃ©tenir une personne qui pourrait iecevoir des soins ou un trailemenl au scin de la collectivitÃ© et il est gÃ©nÃ©ralentent adniis qu'un tel traitement est prÃ©fÃ©mble chaque fois qu'il est possible . La dÃ©tenGon doit Ã©tre indispensable, non seulemenl au dÃ©bul, ntais pendanl loule sa durÃ©e .
Le lait que l'aliÃ©nalion ntentale doive exister pendant loulc la dulÃ©e de la dÃ©lention signifie, comnie le Gouvernenwnl semble le leconnaiue, qu'un examen oti une rÃ©vision sonl indispensables Ã intervalles raisonnables pour v6+itier si l'aliÃ©nalion de l'intÃ©ressÃ© perdure . L'arlicle 5, par . 3 ne prÃ©cise pas les ntodalilÃ©s de cet examen, niais il doit Ã¨tre raisolulable . Il semit injusre que l'organe charqÃ© de la dÃ©tenlion prenne la dÃ©cision . Il faul qu'un examen rÃ©el de la question de l'aliÃ©nalion ait lieu, sul h base de critÃ©res ntÃ©dicaux . Dans les A/laire.c rle vagabondage', l'arrÃ©l de la Cour en son paragraphe 68 indique le type d'examen Onais non pas l'organel nÃ©cessaire . La Cour exanline si les clitÃ©res appGquÃ©s son l Cour europ9enno des Droits de l'Homme, SArie A . vol . 12 .
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compatible avec le sens habituel du terme Â« vagabondage Â» et si les critÃ©res ont Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©s correctement . Si ces deux conditions ne sont pas remplies, la dÃ©tention est arbitraire et illÃ©gale . La question est de savoir si l'examen auquel procÃ©de le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur rÃ©pond Ã ces exigences . S'est-il appuyÃ© sur des critÃ©res mÃ©dicaux ? Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur n'est pas tenu en droit de libÃ©rer un aliÃ©nÃ©, et il ne le fait pas en pratique, s'il considÃ©re qu'il reprÃ©sente un danger pour la sociÃ©tÃ© . Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur peut ainsi refuser de libÃ©rer une personne qui est jugÃ©e saine d'esprit par la commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen ou par son mÃ©deoin responsable . Le rapport du Service consultatif des hÃ´pitaux l'a reconnu . Au surplus, pulsque les critÃ©res appliquÃ©s par le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur ne sont pas nÃ©cessairement des critÃ©res mÃ©dicaux et qu'ils vont mÃ¨me Ã l'encontre des critÃ©res mÃ©dicaux, le plus condamnable est qu'il n'applique aucun critÃ©re du tout . En vertu de l'article 66 de la loi de 1959, il relÃ©ve de son absolue discrÃ©tion de dÃ©cider le maintien en dÃ©tention ou la libÃ©ration d'un malade ou de se ranger Ã l'avis du tribunal ou du mÃ©decin responsable . La Commission ne peut pas rÃ©ellement examiner si les critÃ©res appliquÃ©s sont compatibles avec le sens habituel du terme Â« aliÃ©nation mentale n . La Cour a aussi examinÃ© dans les Affaires de vagabondage si les critÃ©res ont Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©s correctement . Par consÃ©quent, le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, la Commission peut se saisir de la question de savoir si une personne est rÃ©ellement aliÃ©nÃ©e Sur ce point, le requÃ©rant rappelle les rapports mÃ©dicaux qui ont Ã©tÃ© produits . En ce qui concerne l'appllcabilitÃ© de l'article 5, par . 4 aprÃ¨s la dÃ©cision initiale, le requÃ©rant rappelle l'opinion individuelle du juge Zekia dans les Affaires de vagabondage et les dÃ©cisions de la Commission dans les RequÃ¨tes NÂ° 6692/74 et NÂ° 6859/74 contre la Belgique' montrant que cet article s'applique . Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur n'est pas un cribunal, comme l'article 5, par . 4 l'exige, ni d'ailleurs la commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen, qui est simplement un organe consultatif . En ce qui concerne les questions posÃ©es par la Commission, le requÃ©rant a soutenu que si une personne est dÃ©tenue en raison de son Ã©tat mental et de son besoin de soins, son internement n'est pas licite s'il n'y a pas de traitement en vue . Le requÃ©rant soutient qu'en examinant l'applicabilitÃ© de l'article 5, par 4 dans les Affaires de vagabondage (par 16), la Cour ne s'est pas rÃ©fÃ©rÃ©e Ã la suite de la dÃ©tention, mais a simplement estimÃ© que lorsque la dÃ©tention initiale est ordonnÃ©e par un tribunal il n'y a pas nÃ©cessitÃ© d'un recours pour ce qui concerne cette dÃ©tention initiale . L'article 5, par . 4 exige un rÃ©examen du bien-fondÃ© de la dÃ©tention et non pas seulement un rÃ©examen des formalitÃ©s de procÃ©dure . Sur la nature de la procÃ©dure devant une commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen, le requÃ©rant souscrit sur la plupart des points Ã l'argumentation du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur . II souligne toutefois que cette commission n'est pas â¢ D .R . 2, p . 108 et 8 . p . 139
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indÃ©pendante de l'exÃ©cutif . Dans les cas de restriction, des questions de procÃ©dure et des questions diverses sont souvent soumises au Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur . L'efficacitÃ© du rÃ©examen par ces commissions est douteuse, Ã©tant donnÃ© la frÃ©quence avec laquelle leurs recommandations sont rejetÃ©es . Le chiffre de 31,6 % de rejets des recommandations d'Ã©largissement, que le Gouvernement a donnÃ©, s'applique Ã toutes les dÃ©cisions depuis 1961 . Ces derniÃ©res annÃ©es, ces rejets ont Ã© tÃ© plus frÃ©quents, soit 59 % en 1972, 40 % en 1973, 46 % en 1974 et 31 % en 1975 . Lorsque la commission recommande l'Ã©largissement, elle le fait en tenant compte d'un solide dossier mÃ©dical . Il paraÃ®t injuste que le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur, sans entendre de tÃ©moins ni donner de motifs, rejette les recommandations dans de si nombreux cas . Un tribunal, selon la dÃ©finition donnÃ©e dans l'arrÃªt Neumeister, c'est-Ã©-dire un organe indÃ©pendant de l'exÃ©cutif et des parties en cause, doit Ã©viter l'excÃ©s de formalisme . Dans les cas oÃ¹ il n'y a pas de restriction, les commissions psychiatriques de rÃ©examen illustrent de faÃ§on exemplaire la rapiditÃ© et la compÃ©tence d'un tribunal traitant des questions de dÃ©tention et d'aliÃ©nation . II n'est pas vraisemblable que le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur puisse garder constamment sous sa surveillance les cas des malades mentaux . II ne se soucie d'examiner si un malade soumis Ã restriction doit Ã¨tre libÃ©rÃ© que lorsqu'il reÃ§oit une recommandation en ce sens de l'un de ses organes consultatifs . En rÃ©alitÃ© il ne les surveille pas . A premiÃ¨re vue il semblerait raisonnable que le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur puisse dÃ©tenir une personne en raison du danger qu'elle reprÃ©sente pour la sociÃ©tÃ©, mais il n'est pas prouvÃ© que les dÃ©linquants ordinaires IibÃ©rAs de prison soient moins dangereux que les dÃ©linquants anormaux . Le rapport Butler, par exemple, indique qu'un dÃ©linquant ordinaire est plutÃ´t plus dangereux . Or, il n'existe aucun pouvoir de dÃ©tention et de rÃ©incarcÃ©ration qui s'applique Ã leur ca s En rÃ©sumÃ©, le requÃ©rant conclut que toutes les conditions autorisant la dÃ©tention en vertu de l'article 5, par . 1 connaissent implicitement une limite dans le temps et que par consÃ©quent un examen pÃ©riodique doit avoir lieu Ã intervalles raisonnables pour Ã© tablir si la cause ou la condition de la dÃ©tention a cessÃ© . L'article 5, par . 1 lel exclut peut-Ãªtre implicitement le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur comme organe compÃ©tent, mais en tout cas il n'exclut pour la maniÃ©re dont il dÃ©cide parceque les critÃ©res qu'il applique ne sont pas appropriÃ©s au but de la dÃ©tention . L'article 5, par . 4 Ã© carte le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur en raison de la personne qu'il est, quelle que soit la faÃ§on dont il dÃ©cide . MÃ¨me dans une Â« bonne cause Â», oÃ¹ les rapports mÃ©dicaux montreraient abondamment qu'une personne n'est pas aliÃ©nÃ©e, le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur resterait dans le cadre de la loi de 1959 s'il refusait de libÃ©rer cette personne pour le motif qu'il la considÃ©re comme un danger pour la sociÃ©tÃ© et sans donner d'autres motifs . II arrive que le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur s'inspire de considÃ©rations politiques . En 1972, aprÃ©s un crime pa rt iculiÃ©rement odieux qui avait exposA le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur Ã des pressions politiques, le nombre des libÃ©rations avait fortement dÃ©clinÃ© .
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Sur le point de savoir si le requÃ©rant a une Â« bonne cause Â», on rappellera qu'il a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© pour un dÃ©lit mineur et dÃ©tenu pendant longtemps . Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur a refusÃ© de le libÃ©rer et de justifier son refus . Ouant au danger qu'il pourrait prÃ©senter, il est rappelÃ© que le requÃ©rant n'a pas d'antÃ©cÃ©dents criminels . Il y a une certaine ambiguÃ¯tÃ© sur la maniÃ©re dont il faut interprÃ©ter le mot a lÃ©galitÃ© Â» Ã l'article 5, par . 4 . II ne s'agit pas de la lÃ©galitÃ© procÃ©durale, mais on voit mal s'il s'agit de la lÃ©galitÃ© en droit interne ou du bien-fondÃ© . Le principe essentiel de cet article doit prÃ©valoir, Ã savoir le droit Ã la libertÃ© MÃ©me si l'article 5, par . 4 ne visait que la lÃ©galitÃ© au sens strict, on pourrait douter qu'il y ait en l'espÃ¨ce un recours eftectif, Ã©tant donnÃ© la difficultÃ© d'obtenir l'assistance judiciaire et de se retrouver dans les mÃ©andres de la loi . Ce n'est pas, quelle que soit l'interprÃ©tation de l'article 5, par . 4, le type de recours que la Convention a voulu promouvoir .
EN DROI T 1 . La Commission examinera en premier lieu le grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel il se plaint qu'en juin 1974 il s'est vu refuser la permission d'envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme Ã ses parents et elle examinera s'il y a apparence de violation des droits reconnus au requÃ©rant par l'article 8 de la Convention . L'article 8, par . 1 de la Convention dispose :Â« Toute personne a droit au respect de . . et de sa correspondance Â» . Toutefois, le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©tÃ© empÃ©chÃ© de correspondre avec ses parents, puisqu'il aurait pu communiquer avec eux par lettre . Rien n'indique qu'il ait Ã©tÃ© en quelque maniÃ©re empÃ©chÃ© de leur Ã©crire Certes, il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© Ã tÃ©lÃ©graphier un message qui semble avoir eu un certain degrÃ© d'urgence, puisque le requÃ©rant voulait, semble-t-il, faire ajourner une audience de tribunal qui devait avoir lieu une semaine aprÃ©s . La Conimission n'a aucune raison de penser que cette communication n'aurait pas pu Ãªtre faite par lettre dans un temps utile . De plus, en dehors de cette possibilitÃ©, le requÃ©rant a pu en rÃ©alitÃ© transmettre le message Ã sa mÃ©re en personne lorsqu'elle l'a vu deux jours plus tard Ã l'occasion d'une de ses visites rÃ©guliÃ©res . Elle a eu ainsi le temps d'obtenir l'ajournement souhaitÃ© par le requÃ©ran t Dans ces conditions, le Commission constate, mÃªme en supposant que les tÃ©lÃ©grammes soient visÃ©s par le terme a correspondance Â» Ã l'article 8, par . 1, que le requÃ©rant n'a pas montrÃ© que le refus de l'autoriser Ã envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme ait sensiblement perturbÃ© ses moyens de correspondance avec ses parents . Elle est donc d'avis que ce grief est manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, par . 2 de la Convention . 2 . La Commission examinera ensuite le grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel les conditions de sa dÃ©tention et de son traitement Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor Ã parti r
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du 19 dÃ©cembre 1973 ont constituÃ© une violation des droits que lui reconnaÃ®t l'article 3 de la Convention, qui interdit notamment les traitements inhumains et dÃ©gradants . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend que sa dÃ©tention Ã Broadmoor Ã©tait inutile . Il a allÃ©guÃ© qu'il n'y avait pas reÃ§u de traitement, qu'il n'a eu que de rares contacts avec son mÃ©decin responsable et que la nÃ©cessitÃ© du traitement ne lui a pas Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©e . Il s'est plaint Ã©galement des conditions de vie Ã l'hBpital et il a allÃ©guÃ© en particulier que celui-ci est fortement surpeuplÃ©, que l'absence d'intimitÃ© et une atmosphÃ¨re constante de violence y rÃ©gnent, que les installations sont insalubres, que les prÃ©cautions contre l'incendie sont insuffisantes, qu'il est ou a Ã©tÃ© sous-occupÃ©, ce qui a dÃ©terminÃ© chez lui un processus d'institutionnalisation . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a niÃ© qu'il y ait eu violation de l'article 3 dans le cas du requÃ©rant et affirmÃ© que sa dÃ©tention Ã Broadmoor Ã©tait jugÃ©e nÃ©cessaire tant par les personnes qui le soignaient que par la commission psychiatrique de rÃ©examen et soutenu que le requÃ©rant s'est opposÃ© Ã toutes les tentatives de mise sur pied d'un traitement valable . Tout en reconnaissant que l'hÃ´pital est surpeuplÃ© et que les conditions de viey sont Ã certains Ã©gards peu satisfaisantes, il a soutenu que celles-ci ne sont pas telles qu'elles puissent faire naÃ®tre un problÃ©me sous l'angle de l'article 3 de la Convention ; que cette partie de la requÃªte serait par consÃ©quent manifestement mal fondÃ©e . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient aussi que cette partie de la requÃªte est irrecevable pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, en vertu des articles 26 et 27, par . 3 de la Convention . Selon lui, si l'objet des griefs constituait des comportements interdits par l'article 3, quod non, le requÃ©rant aurait des recours Ã sa disposition . Il lui serait loisible d'engager une procÃ©dure en dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts ou une procÃ©dure tendant Ã une dÃ©cision de caractÃ©re dÃ©claratoire dont il ressortirait que les conditions dont il se plaint contreviennen . De son cBtÃ©, le requÃ©rant conteste avoir eu u n taudroielfxcst recours Ã sa disposition . Pour se voir allouer des dommages-intÃ©rÃªts, il faut, selo . Un neqllui,fareÃ©tpcsÃ 'ui,dneÃ©o'maldiephysu action civile n'aurait aucune perspective raisonnable de succÃ©s, en particulier Ã cause des difficultÃ©s pratiques qui rÃ©sultent de sa situation de malade mental dÃ©tenu et dÃ©nuÃ© de moyens financiers . La Commission commencera donc par examiner, Ã la lumiÃ©re de sa jurisprudence et de celle de la Cour, si les griefs du requÃ©rant touchant l'article 3 de la Convention sont irrecevables pour nomÃ©puisement des voies de recours indiquÃ©es par le Gouvernement . Elle rappelle qu'elle a dÃ©jÃ dÃ©clarÃ© que pour satisfaire aux exigences de l'article 26 de la Convention, un requÃ©rant est tenu de Â« faire un usage normal des recours vraisemblablement efficaces et suffisants Â» pour porter remÃ¨de Ã ses griefs (voir RequÃªte NÂ° 788 1 60, Autriche contre ltalie, Annuaire 4, page 173 ; RequÃ©re NÂ° 4330/6 9, Simon-Herold contre Autriche, Annuaire 14, page 353 ; RequÃªtes NÂ° 577-5583/72, Donnelly et autres contre Royaume-Uni, DÃ©cisions et Rapports 4, page 4, voir p . 64) . La Cour europÃ©enne des Droits d e
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l'Homme a 7ugÃ© que l'article 26 n'exige que l'usage des recours Â« adÃ©quats, c'est-Ã -dire de nature Ã porter remÃ©de aux griefs Â» (Voir par exemple Les Affaires de vagabondage, SÃ©rie A nÂ° 12, p . 33, paragraphe 60) . D'autre part, la Commission a toujours estimÃ© que le seul fait qu'il existe des doutes quant aux perspectives de succÃ¨s d'une voie de recours dÃ©terminÃ©e ne dispense pas un requÃ©rant d'en faire usage, car il appartient aux tribunaux nationaux de statuer en premier lieu (voir par exemple RequÃ©te NÂ° 712/60, RfTIMAG contre RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne, Annuaire 4, page 285 ; Recueil de DÃ©cisions 8, page 29 ; RequÃªte NÂ° 7661/62, X et Y contre Be/gique, Annuaire 6, page 361, Recueil de DÃ©crstbns 70, page 20) . Les griefs du requÃ©rant touchant l'anicle 3 de la Convention portent essentiellement sur la prÃ©tendue insuffisance des facilitÃ©s disponibles pour la dÃ©tention et le traitement d'une personne qui, comme lui, est considÃ©rÃ©e comme souffrant d'une maladie mentale exigeant un traitement dans certaines conditions de sÃ©curitÃ© . Pour une large part, ces griefs dÃ©coulent de l'Ã©tat non contestÃ© de surpeuplement dans les hÃ´pitaux psychiatriques dits de sÃ©curitÃ© et en particulier Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor . Le requÃ©rant ne se plaint pas d'avoir subi une lÃ©sion, une maladie ou une perte matÃ©rielle . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur admet qu'il n'existe pas directement, en droit anglais relatif aux actes illicites (tort), de prÃ©cÃ©dent oÃ¹ des dommages-intÃ©rÃªts aient Ã©tÃ© accordÃ©s en pareil cas . Comme les effets dont le requÃ©rant se plaint consistent essentiellement en diverses formes de dÃ©sarroi mental, telles que l'ennui et la peur, la Commission estime que l'octroi de dommages-intÃ©rÃ¨ts constituerait une modification sensible de la jurisprudence nationale visÃ©e par le requÃ©rant . Quoi qu'il en soit, la Commission n'est pas persuadÃ©e que l'octroi de dommages-intÃ©rÃ¨ts ou une dÃ©cision de caractÃ¨re dÃ©claratoire auraient pu raisonnablement constituer un remÃ©de suffisant aux griefs du requÃ©rant, Ã©tant donnÃ© qu'aucun autre logement jugÃ© convenable pour le maintien de sa dÃ©tention ne semble avoir Ã©tÃ© disponible . Dans ces conditions, la Commission estime qu'il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli qu'il existe en droit britannique un recours qui puisse porter remÃ©de aux griefs du requÃ©rant touchant l'article 3 et que le requÃ©rant n'aurait pas exercÃ© . Il s'ensuit que ces griefs ne sauraient Ãªtre rejetÃ©s pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . La Commission examinera ensuite si les griefs du requÃ©rant touchant l'article 3 sont manifestement mal fondÃ©s, au sens de l'article 27, par . 2 de la Convention . Il est admis que les conditions de vie physiques Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor ne sont pas satisfaisantes et sont critiquÃ©es par diffÃ©rents organes officiels depuis plusieurs annÃ©es . Si le personnel hospitalier lui-mÃªme, comme le Gouvernement l'a soutenu, fait de son mieux pour faire face Ã ces insuffisances, on ne peut nÃ©anmoins exclure la possibilitÃ© que les conditions physiques de la dÃ©tention soulÃ©vent en elles-mÃ¨mes des problÃ©mes relevant de l'article 3 . La Commission estime que les diverses allÃ©gations du requÃ©rant relatives aux condition s
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de sa dÃ©tention et Ã la question de son traitement mÃ©dical doivent Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©es comme un tout et que, ainsi envisagÃ©es, elles posent des questions, sous l'angle de l'article 3, qui exigent une enquÃ©te et un examen de fond . Elles ne peuvent donc pas Ã©tre dÃ©clarÃ©es manifestement mal fondÃ©es . En consÃ©quence, la Commission estime que ces griefs sont recevables . Enfin, la Commission examinera les questions qui se posent sous l'angle de 3 l'article 5 de la Convention . La premiÃ¨re de ces questions est celle de savoir si la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant Ã Broadmoor est justifiÃ©e aux termes de l'article 5, par . 1 de la Convention, soit pour le motif qu'il est rÃ©guliÃ©rement dÃ©tenu a aprÃ©s condamnation par un tribunal compÃ©tent Â», comme l'autorise l'article 5, paY, 1 (a), soit pour le motif que sa dÃ©tention est la dÃ©tention rÃ©guliÃ©re d'une personne a aliÃ©nÃ©e Â», comme l'autorise l'article 5, par . 1 (e) . La deuxiÃ©me question est celle de savoir si les dispositions de l'article 5, par . 4 de la Convention ont Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©es . Ce texte stipule que Â« toute personne privÃ©e de sa libertÃ© . . . a le droit d'introduire un recours devant un tribunal, afin qu'il statue Ã bref dÃ©lai sur la lÃ©galitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention et ordonne sa libÃ©ration si la dÃ©tention est illÃ©gale Â» . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur conteste qu'il y ait eu violation de l'article 5 . II a Ã©galement soutenu que le requÃ©rant avait nÃ©gligÃ© d'Ã©puiser certaines voies de recours internes quant Ã ses griefs affÃ©rents Ã l'article 5 et que cette partie de la requÃ©te est par consÃ©quent irrecevable pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . Il estime qu'il aurait Ã©tÃ© loisible au requÃ©rant d'attaquer le maintien de sa dÃ©tention en demandant une ou plusieurs ordonnances (prerogative writs) : d'habeas corpus, de certiorari, de prÃ´hibition ou de mandamus . Le requÃ©rant a rÃ©pliquÃ© que ces recours n'auraient pas Ã©tÃ© efficaces . La Commission observe qu'elle sera appelÃ©e Ã examiner la portÃ©e de l'efficacitÃ© du recours offert par les procÃ©dures mentionnÃ©es dans son examen au fond des questions touchant Ã l'article 5 soulevÃ©es dans la RequÃ¨te NÂ° 6998/75, qui a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable . En consÃ©quence, il lui apparait convenable d'ajourner son examen de la question de l'efficacitÃ© de ces procÃ©dures comme moyens de reÃ©ours dans la prÃ©sente affaire en attendant un examen plus complet de la RequÃªte NÂ° 6998/75 .
Par ces motifs, la Commission : 1 . DÃCLARE IRRECEVABLE le grief du requÃ©rant dans lequel il se plaint de s'Ãªtre vu refuser l'autorisation d'envoyer un tÃ©lÃ©gramme ;
2 . DECLARE RECEVABLE, sans prÃ©juger du fond, les griefs du requÃ©rant relatifs aux conditions de sa dÃ©tention et Ã la question du traitement mÃ©dical Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor ; 3 . AJOURNE son examen des griefs tirÃ©s de l'article 5 de la Convention, en attendant un examen plus complet au fond de la RequÃ©te NÂ° 6998/75' . Cf. D .R . e p . 106 .
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| Y. c. ROYAUME-UNI

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