HAMER c. ROYAUME-UNI

APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 7114/7 5 Alan Stanley HAMER v/the UNITED KINGDOM Alan Stanley HAMER c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 13 October 1977 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 octobre 1977 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Articfe 12 of the Convention : Detention, as such, does not prevent in fact the exercise of the right to marry. Can the refusal to grant a prisoner the necessary faciliries to marry, be considered as a measure taken under "nationaf laws governing the exercise" of the right to marry ? Delaying the exercise of the right to marry may affect the substance of this right. IAppfication declared admissible) .
Artic% 12 de la Convention : La dÃ©tention, en elfe-mÃ©me, ne constitue pas un empÃªchement de fait d'exercer le droit au mariage . L'interdiction faite Ã un dÃ©tenu de contracter mariage peut-elle Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©e comme une mesure prise en application des "fois nationales rÃ©gissant l'exercice" du droit au mariage ? DiffÃ©rer l'exercice du droit au mariage peut affecter le contenu mÃªme de ce droit . IRequÃ©te dÃ©cfarÃ©e recevabfel .
THE FACTS
I franGais : voir p . 1891
The principal facts of ihe case as submitted by the parties and apparently not in dispute between them may be summarised as follow s The applicant was born in 1947 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom At the date of introduction of his application he was detained in Gariree Prison . He is now resident in a pre-release hostel at Exeter Prison . The applicant initially conducted his own case before the Commission . He is now represented by Mr Cedric Thornberry, barrister-at-law, London .
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On 19 December 1974 the applicant was sentenced to a total of five years imprisonment on a number of charges including obtaining property by deception and theft . His earliest date of release is in January 1978 . He has had the opportunity of taking home leave since about May 1977 . On 7 March 1975 the applicant petitioned the Home Secretary for permission to marry and on 21 March 1975 was informed in reply that "in accordance with the regulations it is not possible to allow you temporary release for the purpose of marriage as consent is only given if there is a child to legitimisÃ©" . He petitioned again on 7 April 1975 and received a reply to similar effer, on 25 April 1975 . He repeated this request on a number of occasions thereafter, without succes s The decision to refuse the applicant permission to marry was taken in accordance with the then current practice of the Home Office in respect of the marriage of prisoners in England and Wales . Under this practice a prisoner was allowed temporary absence in order to marry only if it would have the effect of legitimising a child of the prisoner . Otherwise prisoners were not allowed to be absent in order to marry, although exceptionally permission was given on compassionate ground s Where a prisoner is allowed to marry, arrangements are made for his escort to a registry office, church or chapel . In the later stages of their sentences certain prisoners may be granted periods of temporary release and may make their own arrangements for marriage during such periods . Correspondence took place between the Home Office and the applicant's fiancÃ©e and Members of Parliament on the matter . In a letter of 12 May 1975 from the Under Secretary of State at the Home Office to the applicant's Member of Parliament it was said inter alia that : "Prisoners or their fiancÃ©es quite often ask to be allowed to marry during their sentence ; but I am afraid that it would be impossible administratively, even if it were thought desirable as a matter of policy, to grantall such requests . . . The present rule . . gives us an objective criterion which avoids our having to assess whether the marriage would otherwise be desirable . Any such assessment would be an impossible and intolerable burden for us and would also lead to complaints about favouritism from prisoners who were turned down . . I am afraid I can find no reason to treat Ithe applicant) exceptionally by granting him permission to marry during his sentence . "
Complaints The applicant complains that he was denied the right to marry during his sentence, in violation of Art . 12 of the Convention .
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PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION The Commission examined the admissibility of the application on 16 July 1976 and decided, in accordance with Rule 42 (2) Ib1 of its Rules of Procedure that notice of it should be given to the Government of the United Kingdom and that they should be invited to submit observations in writing on its admissibility . The Government's observations were submitted on 21 September 1976 and the applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 12 October 1976 . On 11 March 1977 the Commission carried out a further examination of the admissibility of the case and decided in accordance with Rule 42 121 Ibl ot the Rules of Procedure to invite the parties to appear before it to make oral explanations on its admissibility and merits . By letter of 20 September 1977 the applicant's representative firstly requested the Commission to obtain from the respondent Government a copy of a new Circular Instruction relating to the marriage of prisoners which, he stated, appeared to have been adopted as from 1 September 1977 . Secondly he alleged that a letter written by the applicant in about April 1975 concerning his request to marry had been stopped by the authorities and requested observations as to whether such seizure might now be made the subject of a complaint under An . 8 of the Convention . Thirdly, he stated that it was contemplated that two issues might be raised under Art . 14 in conjunction with Art . 12, namely lal, that official interference with the right to marry was limited to prisoners and Ibl, that such interference arbitrarily discriminated among different categories of prisoner, both in breach of Art . 14 . Finally, he stated that for various reasons it might be necessary for the "effective exercise" of the applicant's right of petition, that he should himself be present at the hearing and requested the Commission to raise the matter with the respondent Government . On 5 October 1977 the Commission decided not to request the respondent Government to arrange for the applicant's temporary release from custody to enable him to attend the hearing . On 8 October 1977 the Commission decided not to request the Government to produce a copy of the new Circular Instruction at the present stage of proceedings at least . It decided to inform the parties that it did not wish to hear any submissions under Art . 8 of the Convention in respect of the alleged stoppage of a letter, it being open to the applicant to introduce a separate application in respect of any complaint in this respect if he so wished . It also decided that in principle it would allow the applicant's representative to raise the issues under Art . 14 referred to in his letter of 20 September 1977 . On 13 October 1977 the Commission heard the parties' oral submissions on the admissibility and merits of the application .
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SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIE S Submissions of the respondent Governmen t The respondent Government submitted in their writlen observations that Art 12 was formulated in very general terms and was not to be regarded as giving every man and woman an unrestricted right to marry . Account must be taken of the particular circumstances in which individuals found themselves as well as the national laws governing marriage . Referring to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Golder case (Series A . Vol . 18, pp . 18-19) they submitted that the exercise of the right to marry under Art . 12 fell into the category of provisions which, not being narrowly defined, were subject to limitations by implication The application of such limitations in this case must be considered in the light of the applicant's position as a person lawfully detained in conformity with Art 5(1 ) (a) of the Convention . They referred also to the Commission's decision on the admissibility of Applrcation No . 892/60, X . v. the Federal Republic of Germany IYearbook IV, p . 240 at pp. 254 .25b1, and to a judgment of the Court of Appeal for England and Wales (R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs and Another, ex parte Bhajan Singh, 7975 2 All ER 108 1 at pp . 1093-1034) . They submitted that regard should be had to the restrictions on liberty entailed by a sentence of imprisonment and also : (a) to the requirements of order and discipline operating in a prison establishment and the need for appropriate rules to regulate the grant of facilities to enable prisoners to marry ; Ibl to the fact that the refusal of facilities did not involve a complete bar on the applicant's marriage but only a delay until he was finally released or granted home leave or other temporary release ; Icl to the fact that if he was granted facilities to marry, he would not, while detained in prison, be able to live together with his wife . In the light of these circumstances, the respondent Government did not accept that the refusal of such facilities could be regarded as being inconsistent with the right to marry under Art . 12 . They therefore requested the Commission to declare the application incompatible with the provisions of the Convention, or alternatively manifestly ill-founded, and therefore inadmissible under Art . 27 . In their oral submissions the Government observed that the applicant and his fiancÃ©e no longer wished to marry . They also observed that the applicant had been free to marry both before and after his arrest . He had been arrested in October 1974 but had been released on bail . He had been free to marry until 15 December 1974 . The applicant had also been eligible for consideration for parole from about the middle of 1976 onwards and had applied for it i n
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December 1976 . He had had the possibility of home leave in May 1977 and had actually taken it on three occasions in August and October 1977 . He had been living outside the prison, in a pre-release hostel since July 1977 and had been free to marry but had not done so . The interpretation of Art . 12 raised certain difficulties and showed that there must be limitations on the right to marry . It was not a unlilateral right in the first place . There must be another person able and willing to marry . Secondly, if literally interpreted . Art . 12 added nothing to the rights prescribed by national law, although the Government accepted that the intention was to guarantee certain minimum rights . There was no concept of "marriageable age" outside that prescribed by national laws and it was not clear why this term had been included since it appeared to add nothing to the reference to "national laws" It was unclear why the phrase "men and women" had been used when the phrase "inter-marry", which would have been expected if the intention had been to confine the right to men marrying women, had not been used . The concept of the right to marry involved the existence of two persons able and willing to exercise the right . If a person volunteered to live or work in a situation where there was no opportunity for a person of the opposite sex to be present, how could he exercise the right and how could he complain if he was unable to do so ? This might be the case of a sailor at sea or a person living on an uninhabited island . A person who chose to live and work in such a way put it out of his power to exercise the right . This was of importance in considering the position of a person who chose to commit a crime and found himself in prison as a resul t The right was clearly not absolute Art . 12 obviously could not mean that the right could be exercised at any time in all circumstances . It was now recognised that very young persons could not marry . This had not always been the case . The insane could not marry in the United Kingdom . In some countries the medically unfit could not do so Marriage within prohibited degrees of consanguinity was forbidden in all countries . All these matters depended on national law and no national law permitted the exercise of the right at any time and in all circumstances . English law restricted the time within which a marriage could be celebrated and the Marriage Act of 1949 provided that it must be in a place to which the public had access . A prison was not a place in which a marriage could be performed since the public had no access to it . The object of this provision was to ensure full publicity of the marriage . Marriage was regarded as a question of status, not merely private right . The result was that if a prisoner was permitted to marry special arrangements had to be made for him to be escorted to a public place . This could involve considerable security precautions and cost . It would not be justifiable to put prisoners in a privileged position by allowing them to marry in private A special licence to do so could only be granted in very limited circumstance s
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The practice had been not to permit a prisoner temporary absence to marry unless there had been a child to legitimise . If there was a child permission would always be given, for its benefit . There had also been very rare cases in which permission had been given where there were overriding compassionate circumstances . English law did not in any way forbid the marriage of a prisoner . It merely controlled the exercise of the right to do so in the same way as in the case of anyone else who, by his conduct, put it out of his reach to exercise the right A prisoner put the exercise of the right out of his reach since as a result of his criminal conduct he was deprived of his liberty and unable in the ordinary way, without permission in the circumstances outlined, to go to a public place where he could marry . The sailor did the same by his decision to live on the seas, as did the Jesuit priest through the way he chose to live . A prisoner did not need Home Office consent to marry, he merely needed permission to leave prison . Only the deprivation of liberty precluded him from going to an authorised place . Art . 12 was in very wide general terms . To give sense to it, there were necessarily limitations . Unlike Art . 8 and other Articles, there were no specific limitations . This suggested that there must be implied limitations and the Government again referred to the Golder case in this respect . The particular circumstances must be taken into account . Art . 5 (1) (a) must be taken into account in the case of a prisoner . Secure conditions were required for detention and United Kingdom law did not allow for marriage in prison . National law must plainly govern the exercise of the right, namely the time, the place, prohibited degrees, etc . The Government again referred to the Commission's decision in Application No . 897/ 6 7 and the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Bhajan Singh (sup . cit .) . They also reterred to the Commission's decision on admissibility in Application No. 6564/74 (Decisions and Reports 2, p . 7 05 1 . They submitted that the Commission's observations in that decision on the right to found a family applied equally to the right to marry . Art . 12 did not mean that a person must at all times be given the actual possibility to marry and the situation of a lawfully convicted prisoner delayed his right to marry but did not otherwise infringe it . There must be rules and regulations in prison, controlling the activities of prisoners . Prisons faced staff problems and escorting a prisoner to his marriage might deprive other prisoners of their opportunities for exercise, recreation etc . It was also relevant that a prisoner could not cohabit or consummate his marriage . It was difficult to see the particular merit, apart from legitimisation of a child, of marrying in these circumstances . All that was involved was delay ; there was no abrogation of the right . The applicant himself appeared to recognise this in his written observations . Questions of the time, place and circumstances in which a person could marry must be left to the national Government within its margin of appreciation . The practice followed in the United Kingdom had been fair and sensible .
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No distinction was drawn between different categories of prisoner . The practice had been applied uniformly . The two prisoners referred to in the applicant's written observations had been allowed to marry to legitimise children . The rules had been changed since August 1977 so that if a prisoner had over 12 months left to serve, he was eligible for temporary absence to marry whether there was a child to legitimise or not . There had not been any inconsistency in following the practice . The Government were not able to accept the truth of all the factual allegations made on behalf of the applicant at the hearing They emphasised that if the applicant had been concerned to marry he could have done so before or after his arrest . They also stated that in August 1975 the applicant had informed a prison welfare officer that he intended to continue with his applications and petitions (to get marriedl "to keep the authorities busy-his contribution to irritate authority" . They did not suggest that the application was abusive but wished to draw this information to the Commission's attention . Dealing wlth the six points of law raised by the applicant at the hearing, the Government accepted firstly that it had to comply with national law (as it had donel and secondly that national law had to comply with the Convention . The applicant's third point, namely that there could be no implied limitations to Art 12 which must be interpreted literally, was fatal to his argument since ii Art . 12 was interpreted literally it added nothing to national law . It was implicit in the language that there had to be limitations . As to the fourth point, the Government did not dispute that there could be no limitations which destroyed the protected right However the delay in this case in exercising the right to marry with a particular person did not injure the substance of the right . Fifthly, the applicant had said that any limitations must be compatible with the policy of the Convention and purpose of prison . However there was an immediate conflict between imprisonment and the preservation of the family unit . Rule 58 of the Standard Minimum Rules ior the Treatment of Prisoners and the observations by Lord Kilbrandon which the applicant had quoted, emphasised that the vital feature of imprisonment was the deprivation of liberty . It was the deprivation of liberty which prevented exercise of the right to marry The applicant had also suggested that any limitations must be construed strictly, but this suggestion overlook the margin of appreciation which the Court had held was left to states . The Government submitted that Art . 12 did not guarantee a right to marry a particular person at a particular time . The practice followed in the applicant's case had been compatible with it . They asked the Commission to declare the application inadmissible on the ground that it was manifestly ill-founded . 2 . Submissions of the applican t In his written observations the applicant submitted that the practice described by the Government encouraged immorality and discriminated against persons who behaved responsibly by ensuring that they did not have children ou t
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of wedlock . Illegitimacy was no longer a barrier in life and the applicant did not accept as a valid argument that the Government's concern was to legitimise illegitimate children . Nor did the applicant accept that it was necessary for a prisoner to leave his prison in order to get married . Every prison had a chaplain on its staff and it should be possible to arrange for marriages within prisons . They very wording of the rule described by the Government, namely that "prisoners were noi normally allowed to be temporarily absent . . . in order to marry" implied that they were concerned more with the temporary absence of the prisoner than with prÃ©vention of his marriage . The applicant accepted that a man who wished to marry whilst in prison taced disadvantages and strains, as did his intended wife . However, the final decision must lie with the people concerned and the applicant did not accept that the State ever had the right to preveni iwo people of marriageable age from being married, notwithstanding that one was held in custody . The formula employed in Art . 12, "Men and women . . ", was, contrary to what the Government submitted, infinitely more specific than the formula "Everyone has the right . . ." employed in other Articles It was used to indicate that the Article applied only to persons of marriageable age Only two conditions were laid down for exercising the right to marry The first concerned age and the second was that the right to marry was granted according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right . The Article was not concerned with "domestic practicÃ©" but only with "national laws" and the Government's arguments as to domestic practice were irrelevant . Nowhere in their observations was there the slightest reference to the relevant "national laws" . This indicated that no law disallowed the marriage of a prisoner, as was indeed the case, since the laws on marriage concerned ihemselves mainly with bigamy, polygamy, marriageable age and the menially subnormal, and did not refer to prisoner s The provisions of Art 12 were narrowly defined and not subject to limitation and the Golder case was not relevant . Furthermore the decision in Application No . 892/60 was irrelevant since it concerned ihe national laws of Germany, not the United Kingdom . The facts ot the case were also different . Art . 12 had been misinterpreted in the Court of Appeal decision quoted by the Government . There were no conditions, either specific or implied, other than the two laid down in Art . 12 . There was no mention of the "circumstances" in which people were placed . These had nothing to do with Art . 12 . A sailor at sea might not be capable of exercising his right to marry, but this right was not diminished by the circumstances . Referring to the position of a soldier posted on active service, the applicant submitted that a person's entitlement to remain at home had nothing to do with his right to marry under Art . 12 . This remained intact provided the conditions of Art . 12 were satisfied .
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The applicant submitted that his basic right to marry was being thwarted . He wished to marry at the time of his choice, within reason, and not at the time chosen by the Government . His rights had been continually thwarted since March 1975 . Art . 12 was not subject to Art 5 or any other Article of the Convention . The applicant was not seeking permission to leave prison in order to marry He merely wished his right to marry to be acknowledged and granted . It was not necessary to leave prison in order to be married . Nothing in the Convention connected Art . 12 with Art . 5 . There was no evidence at all to support the suggestion by the Government that allowing a prisoner to marry would necessarily prejudice good order and discipline in prison . In this connection the applicant referred to the cases of two men who, he alleged, had been convicted of murdering their wives but had nevertheless been allowed to marry . He submitted that there had been many other examples but there had never been a single incident of conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline as a result . It could not possibly be suggested that his own marriage would have any effect on good order and discipline in Gartree Prison Referring to the Government's suggestion that the refusal of facilities merely involved a delay on his marriage, and not a complete bar, the applicant submitted that a bar operative for such a long time (i .e . from 7 March 1975 to his releasel was the same as a deprivation of his rights under Art . 12 . Any "refusal" was per se a deprivation of a person's rights under Art 12 . It would be different if there were a delay for administrative reasons but when the Government said that they would not grant a prisoner the right to marry, they were contravening Art 12 . They did not have the right under Art . 12 to impose delay for the reasons given . The applicant satisfied the only two conditions for the exercise of rights under Art . 12 . The fact that the applicant would not be able to live with his wife whilst detained had nothing to do with Art . 12 . If the Government were so concerned at the tact that a prisoner could not live with his wife, it must be asked why they had allowed certain persons serving life sentences to marry . The fact that the Government referred to the "refusal'' of facilities showed that their action contravened Art . 12 . The applicant requested the Commission to disregard the Government's observations and uphold his application . In his oral submissions the applicant's representative suggested that the issue of law might now be greater than the issue of fact . The applicant was no longer able to exercise his right to marry in respect of the particular lady . However there was nothing abstract about his submissions . He felt a strong and justified sense of grievance at what had occurred . The issue was not whether his rights were being interfered with now, but whether there had in fact been an interference in the past .
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Al the time of his arrest the applicant had been living with his fiancÃ©e . There had been no impediment in law to their getting married and nor had there been until about April 1976 . They had known each other for virtually the whole of their lives and, as stated in the applicant's petition to the Home Office of 7 March 1975, at the time of his arrest had considered themselves engaged to be married "in the near future, certainly within 6 months" . The Home Office had replied to that petition that "in accordance with the regulations it is not possible to allow you temporary absence for the purpose of marriage . . . . . . That was a slightly misleading suggestion, since it was not necessary to release a prisoner to enable him to marry . The applicant had attempted to write to the NCCL on the matter in April 1975, but the letter had been stopped . The refusal of the applicant's second petition, in April 1975, had led inexorably to a crisis in the relationship . Visits between the applicant and his fiancÃ©e had been supervised and listened in to by prison staff . It appeared that his fiancÃ©e had instanced the form of the Home Office refusals, in conversation with friends, as showing that the applicant had not really been trying . Her last visit to the applicant had been on 10October 1975 . Thereafter the applicant had received one or two letters from her, but about six months later he had heard that she had married someone else . The applicant had had a real intention to marry . He had had a bad record and far from satisfactory early home life . He had, it was believed, been trying to make sensible and concrete plans for his future . It was not clear how consistently the authorities had applied their own rules . The applicant made no firm submission under Art . 14 but suggested that this was a matter going to the nature of Art . 12 . A terrible paucity of evidence was advanced in favour of the propositions in the Under Secretary of State's letter of 12 May 1975 . It was not clear what was meant when it was said that it would be "impossible administrativelÃ¿" . It was not even clear what the rules currently operative were . Certain recently reported cases indicated that ihey had been changed and whatever were previously thought to be insuperable administrative difficulties had faded . These cases showed the problems which arose when major questions of civil or human rights were left within the discretion of official bodies, however well-intentioned . This was not a matter regulated by law but by administrative discretion . The Government's written observations on admissibility did not mention the domestic laws of marriage . There was nothing relating to the marriage of prisoners in the Marriage Act 1949 or the section on Husband and Wife in Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol . 19) which set out the English law of marriage in compendious detail . Nor was there anything about the right of the Home Office to prevent such marriage, until the case of Singh which had been relied on by the Government . The law set out certain restrictionson the right to marry . It referred to consanguinity and marriageable age . In the case of persons under the age of 18 it provided that refusal of parental consent could be overruled by a court . The law went to that length to avoid arbitrariness in respect of a n
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especially important human right . It provided in detail for the forms and processes of marriage and the licensing and registration of premises where a marriage could take place . Nothing in the law would preclude the chapel of any prison being registered in terms of S .41 of the Marriage Act as a place where marriage could take place . Nor was there any apparent reason why a Superintendent or Registrar of Marriage might not have an office within a prison in terms of S45 of the Act . Under the Ecclesiastical Licences Act of 1533, the Archbishop of Canterbury or his proper officers could grant a special Ilcence authorising marriage at any convenient time or place This could even be in a private house IHalsbury, opcif ., Vol . 19, pp. 785 and 800) . It was not the case that English law did not contemplate marriage in other than a public place . In any event there was nothing to prevent the Government from introducing legislation making it possible for marriages to take place in prison . Whilst the applicant submitted that such legislation was not necessary, it might make the malter perfectly clear . Provided the requirements of the law in matters such as capacity and form were met, the fact that a man was subject to imprisonment in no way affected the validity of his marriage . The fact that the Home Office had refused permission would not affect the validity of a marriage if it were performed . The Commission was not dealing with a case relating to the domestic law of marriage, but with an issue of executive discretion which involved the exercise of physical and concret constraints upon an individual in custody over and above the deprivation of liberty . It might be that Art . 12 referred to marriage laws regulating marriage in a universal manner in the particular country, rather than such discretionary powers . The exercise of these discretionary powers had not been contrary to law and could not be challenged in the courts The applicant made six submissions in law . In the first place he submitted that, to be lawful in terms of the Convention, the authorities' action must comply with the domestic law of marriage The domestic law of marriage did not contain the limitation contended for by the Government . The "law" referred to in Art . 12 was the law dealing with consent, marriageable age and other such matters . The discretionary system of controls maintained by the Home Office over prisoners was not national law governing the exercise of the right to marry within the meaning of Art 12 . Secondly the domestic law and its application must comply with Convention requirements and was subject to the supervision of the Commission and Court . It was not sufficient for a Government to show that its practice complied with domestic law Thirdly, the applicant submitted that there was no implied limitation to the rights guaranieed in Art . 12 The Convention left no place for inherent limitations and in this respect the applicant adopted the argument in Jacobs : The European Convenrion on Human Righrs, pp. 794-201 . The Government's suggestion that limitations must be implied was contrary to a number of fundamental rules o f
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construction . In particular words must be given their literal meaning, as was upheld in the Vienna Convention and elsewhere . Furthermore limitations were set out elsewhere in substantive Articles of the Convention and should not be implied where they were not set out . They should not be implied any more in Art . 12 ihan in respect of Art . 3 . In the Golder case the Court had suggested thai in the case of rights which the Convention "set forth without in the narrow sense of the term defining'' there was room for limitations permitted by implication (Judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A, Vol . 18, para . 38) . However, the Court had clarified what they meant by referring to the Belgian Linguisrics Case, where the idea of "regulation", rather than "limitation", of a right had been used . Finally, the idea of implied limitation did not appear to have been used previously in relation to Art . 12 and it was questionable whether it was right as a matter of law to insert the idea now . Fourthly, even if there might be limitations, no limitation such as that contended for by the Government would be valid . A limitation which prohibited the exercise of the right in toro for any prolonged period, could not properly be called a limitation . A limitation was an action which regulated and sel bounds to a right, not one which totally prevented its exercise . In the Golder case (sup . cit . paras . 39 and 401, the Court had been very cautious about formulating any general theory about implied limitations . What had been involved there was a limitation on the right of a prisoner to seek legal advice during a period of some 2 years and 3 months . At the end of that time he had been free to obtain advice . There had been a delay, but his right had not been destroyed . In the present case, the applicant had been stopped from marrying for a considerable period after his petition in March 1975 and at the end of the period his fiancÃ©e had no longer been there . His right had not only been interfered with, but by the nature of the situation it had been extinguished . By his imprisonment he had been effectively prevented altogether from exercising his right . The Court had said in the Golder case Ipara . 38) that any implied limitation must never injure the substance of the right . This was clearly a case where the substance of the right had been injured . Fifthly the applicant submitted that any implied limitation must be compatible with the objectives of public policy expressed in the Convention and analogous standards pertaining to the purpose and nature of imprisonment and the importance of the family unit . Whilst Art . 12 might lack exactitude, the drafters clearly had in mind the exercise of an individual choice . It was not the business of the state to dictate whom a person should marry or when he should marry or when it was good or bad for him to marry . Rule 1 of the United Kingdom Prison Rules stated that the purpose of prison training and treatment should be to encourage and equip the inmates to lead a good and useful life . Rule 31 also provided for prisoners to be encouraged to maintain ouside relationships which would promote the interests of his familv and his own social rehabilitation . The applicant also referred to Rules 58-62 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Resolution 73 (5) of the Committee o f
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Ministers of the Council of Europe) and a published statement by Lord Kilbrandon to the effect that imprisonment should involve no more than the deprivation of liberty . Finally, the applicant submitted thar each proposed limitation which a Government might advance must be strictly proved to be necessary within the framework of a legitimate policy regarding prisoners The evidence advanced by the respondent Government as to what was necessary in the context of prisons and marriage was not sufficiently convincing .
The applicant invited the Commission to declare the application admissible and to seek to obtain a settlement in accordance with Art 28 of the Convention .
THE LAW 1 . The applicant complains that he was denied the possibility of marrying whilst serving his prison sentence and alleges that his righl to marry as guaranteed by Art . 12 of the Convention was thus violated . The respondent Government have denied that there was any violation of the applicant's rights under this Article and have submitted that his complaint is manifestly ill-founded since Art . 12 does not confer an unrestricted right to marry on a detained person . 2 . Art . 12 of the Convention is in the following terms : "Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right ." The Commission first recalls certain salient facts . The applicant first peti3 tioned the Home Secretary for permission to marry on 7 March 1975 and was refused temporary release for that purpose on 21 March 1975 . The decision which was maintained subsequently was taken in accordance with the then current practice of the prison authorities . Under this practice prisoners were not, save in exceptional circumstances irrelevant to the present case, allowed temporary release to marry unless the effect of the marriage would be to legitimise a child (born or unbornl The applicant's marriage would not have had this effect . Whilst there is some dispute between the parties as to whether English law prevents a marriage from being celebrated in a prison, it is clear that no facilities to marry in prison were available to the applicant . The effect of the decision was thus that he was unable to marry until such time as he found himself outside prison lon home leave or parole or pre-release employmentl and was able to make the necessary arrangements . In the applicant's case the earliest dale on which he would have been eligible for parole was after one-third of his sentence, namely in June 1976 . It appears that he first asked to be considered for parole in December 1976, but that it was not granted . The possibility of home leave would first have arisen in May 1977, although the applicant did not, in fact, take it for the first time unti l
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August 1977 . Since July 1977, when he moved to a pre-release hostel, he has been free to marry . When his petition was refused in March 1975, the applicant was thus faced with a situation where he had no possibility of marrying for a period of at least 15 months or over 2 years if (as eventually occurred) he were not to be granted parole . The applicant's submissions indicate that he wished to marry, and was in a position to marry when he made his petition in March 1975 . However the relationship between the applicant and his fiancÃ©e subsequently ended . It is not clear precisely when this occurred, but the applicant has stated that he last received a visit from her in October 1975, that he received one or two letters thereafter and that he heard some six months later that she had married another person . 4 . It is not in dispute that the Home Secretary's decision was in accordance with English law and that the applicant could not have challenged it successfully in court . The application was introduced within 6 months of the Home Secretary's decision and ihe Commission finds that the requirements of Art . 26 have been complied with . 5 . In support of their contention that the application is manifestly ill-founded the respondent Government have submitted that the right to marry, as guaranteed by Art 12, is not an absolute one . They have suggested that the applicant's right to marry was not interfered with, but that the applicant was simply in a situation (comparable to that of a soldier on active service, a sailor at sea or a priest) where he was unable to exercise the right . They have submitted that national law may regulater matters such as the time and place at which a marriage may be celebrated and that the applicant, by his own conduct, had put it out ot his reach to comply with the requirements of relevant United Kingdom law . This required that a marriage be celebrated in a public place . They have submitted furthermore that the rights guaranteed by Art . 12 may be subject to implied limitations and that the circumstances of a prisoner, including the requirements for order in prisons, as also the provisions of Art . 5(1 ) (a) of the Convention, must be taken into account . Art 12 does not, in the Government's submission, guarantee the right to marry at a particular time and place . The applicant's right to marry was delayed but not othenvise infringed . There was no violation of Art . 12 in the Government's submission . 6 . The Commission does not consider that the position of a convicted prisoner is necessarily comparable to that of a person who, voluntarily or otherwise, is placed in circumstances which make it impossible for him to marry . Nor is it necessarily analogous to that of a person such as a priest who decides, for religious or other reasons, not to exercise his right to marry . A prisoner may wish to marry, as the present applicant apparently did, notwithstanding that he is deprived of his libeny . It is possible for the authorities to permit his marriage, either by allowing him to be escorted out of prison, as is the practice in the United Kingdom when permission is given, or by making provision for marriage
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within prison, as is done in a number of other countries A prisoner's ability to exercise his right to marry whilst he is deprived of his liberty may thus arguably be a matter within the control of the state, similarly to his ability to exercise other rights such as access to the courts under Art . 6, and not dependent solely on the factual circumstances in which he is placed . 7 . Art . 12 guarantees the right to marry " . . . according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right" . It contains no other express qualification or limitation of the right . There was no impediment under English law to the marriage of the present applicant . He was of full legal capacity and had the right to marry provided he was able to exercise it . However no provision of English law expressly governs the exercise of this righl by prisoners . The question whether a prisoner is to be allowed the necessary facilities to do so is decided by the Home Secretary and prison authorities in the exercise of discretionary administrative powers . Assuming that the respondent Government, and not the applicant himself, were responsible for his inability to marry, a further question would therefore arise as to whether the decision to refuse him the necessary facilities was permissible under the Convention on the basis that it was a measure taken under a law governing the exercise of the right to marry within the meaning of Art 12, or by virtue of any implied limitation on the right to marry .
The Commission recalls the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 8 Rights in relation to the question of limitations on the right to education under Art 2 of Protocol No . 1, and on the right of access to a court under Art . 6 111 . It recalls in particular that the Coun held that a measure which regulates the exercise of a right must not injure the substance of the right itself (See Belgian Lingurstics Case, Judgment of 23 July 19 64, Series A, No . 6, p . 32, para . 5 ; Golder Case, Judgment ol 21 February 1975, Series A, No . 18, pp . 18-19, para 381 . It is true that in the present case there was no legal impediment on the applicant's marriage and that, in a sense, his ability to exercise his right was merely delayed . However this does not necessarily exclude the possibility of an injury to the substance of his right to marry In this connection the Commission recalls that the Court also held in the Golder case tha t "Hindrance in fact can contravene the Convention just like a legal impediment ;" and tha t " . hindering the effective exercise of a right may amount to a breach of that right, even if the hindrance is of a temporary character" IGo/der case, sup cit ., para . 261 . 9 . Having regard to the above considerations and jurisprudence, the Commission considers that the applicant's complaint that he was denied the possibility of marrying during his sentence raises substantial questions under Art . 12 of the Convention concerning, in particular, the responsibility of the respondent Government for the applicant's inability to marry, and the question whether or not th e
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refusal of facilities was in violation of the applicant's right to marry . The application cannot therefore be described as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art . 27 121 . No other ground of inadmissibility appears and the Commission therefore finds that this complaini is admissible . 10 . Finally, having regard to the terms of the submissions made by the applicant's representative at the hearing on admissibility, the Commission finds that it is not called upon to decide on the admissibility of any separate complaini under Art . 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Art . 12 in connection with the consistency with which the practice as to granting of permission to marry was applied as between different prisoners . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the applicant's complaint that he was denied the possibility of marrying during his prison sentence .
(TRADUCTION ) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils sont prÃ©sentÃ©s par les parties et ne faisant apparemment l'objet d'aucune contestation entre elles, peuvent, pour l'essentiel, se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant, nÃ© en 1947, est un ressortissant britannique . Au moment de l'introduction de sa requÃªte, il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu Ã la prison de Gartree . Il se trouve maintenant dans un foyer de semi-libertÃ© annexÃ© Ã la prison d'Exeter . Le requÃ©rant qui, Ã l'origine, avait prÃ©sentÃ© lui-mÃªme son dossier devant la Commission, est maintenant reprÃ©sentÃ© par M . Cedric Thornberry, avocat Ã Londres . Le 19 dÃ©cembre 1974, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© Ã un total de cinq annÃ©es d'emprisonnement pour diverses infractions, notamment appropriation frauduleuse et vol . II ne doit pas Ãªtre libÃ©rÃ© avant janvier 1978 mais il a pu bÃ©nÃ©ficier de congÃ©s pÃ©nitentiaires depuis mai 1977 environ . Le 7 mars 1975, le requÃ©rant demanda au Ministre de l'intÃ©rieur (Home Secretary) l'autorisation de se marier . Il reÃ§ut le 21 mars 1975 la rÃ©ponse suivante : Â« conformÃ©ment Ã la rÃ©glementation en vigueur, il n'est pas possible de vous accorder une mise en libertÃ© temporaire pour vous marier, l'autorisation n'Ã©tant accordÃ©e que s'il y a un enfant Ã lÃ©gitimer Â» . Le requÃ©rant a renouvelÃ© sa demande le 7 avril 1975 . II rÃ©itera sa demande Ã plusieurs reprises par la suite mais toujours sans succÃ©s .
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La dÃ©cision de refuser au requÃ©rant l'autorisation de se marier est conforme Ã l'usage suivi alors par le MinistÃ©re de l'intÃ©rieur quant au mariage des dÃ©tenus en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles . Selon cet usage, un dÃ©tenu ne pouvait bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'une autorisation d'absence temporaire pour se marier que si le mariage avait pour effet de permettre la lÃ©gitimation d'un enfant du dÃ©tenu . Dans tous les autres cas, les dÃ©tenus n'Ã©taient pas autorisÃ©s Ã s'absenter pour contracter mariage, des autorisations exceptionnelles Ã©tant toutefois dÃ©livrÃ©es pour raisons humanitaires . Lorsqu'un dÃ©tenu est autorisÃ© 9 contracter mariage, des dispositions sont prises pour le faire escorier jusqu'au bureau de l'Ã©tat-civil, l'Ã©glise ou la chapelle Vers la fin de leur peine, certains dÃ©tenus peuvent bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'une mise en libertÃ© temporaire et prendre alors eux-mÃ©mes leurs dispositions pour se marier Ã ce moment-12 . Il y eut Ã ce sujet un Ã©change de correspondance entre le MinistÃ©re de l'IntÃ©rieur, la fiancÃ©e du requÃ©rant et certains parlementaires . Une lettre du 12 mai 1975, adressÃ©e par le Sous-SecrÃ©taire d'Etat Ã l'IntÃ©rieur aux parlementaires de la circonscription du requÃ©rant, disait notamment que : Â« Il est IrÃ©quent que les dÃ©tenus ou leurs financÃ©es sollicitent l'autorisation de contracter mariage pendant qu'ils purgent leur peine ; il serait Ã mon avis impossible du point de vue administratif de faire droit Ã toutes ces demandes, mÃ¨me si l'on jugeait la chose souhaitable en rÃ©gle gÃ©nÃ©rale . . . La rÃ©glementation actuelle . . . nous fournit un critÃ©re objectif qui nous Ã©vite d'avoir 8 apprÃ©cier si le mariage serait par ailleurs souhaitable Ce genre d'apprÃ©ciation nous serait une tÃ che impossible et une charge insupportable qui amÃ©nerait les dÃ©tenus Ã qui l'autorisation aurait Ã©tÃ© refusÃ©e Ã se plaindre du favoritisme de l'administration . Je regrette de ne trouver aucune raison de faire une exception pour autorlser (le requÃ©rantl Ã se marier pendant qu'il purge sa peine . Â»
GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant se plaint de s'Ãªtre vu refuser le droit de se marier pendant l a durÃ©e de sa peine, contrairement Ã l'article 12 de la Convention .
PROCÃDURE DEVANT LA COMMISSIO N La Commission a examinÃ©, le 16 jui3let 1976, la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte et dÃ©cidÃ©, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 42, par 2 Ibl de son RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur de donner connaissance de la requÃ©te au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et de l'inviter Ã prÃ©senter par Ã©crit ses observations sur sa recevabilitÃ© . La Commission a reÃ§u les observations du Gouvernement le 21 septembre 1976 et la rÃ©ponse du requÃ©rant le 12 octobre 1976 . Le 11 mars 1977, la Commission a effectuÃ© un examen complÃ©mentaire de la recevabilitÃ© de l'affaire et dÃ©cidÃ©, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 42, par . 2 Ibl de so n
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RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur, d'inviter les parties Ã comparaÃ®tre devant elle pour lui prÃ©senter verbalement des observations sur la recevabilitÃ© et le fond de l'affaire . Par lettre du 20 septembre 1977, le reprÃ©sentant du requÃ©rant a tout d'abord priÃ© la Commission d'obtenir du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur copie' d'une nouvelle Directive concernant le mariage des dÃ©tenus, adoptÃ©e, selon lui, Ã partir du 1â¢1 septembre 1977 . DeuxiÃ©mement, il a allÃ©guÃ© qu'une lettre Ã©crite par le requÃ©rant aux environs d'avril 1975 et concernant sa demande de contracter mariage avait Ã©tÃ© interceptÃ©e par les autoritÃ©s ; il priait la Commission de lui faire savoir si cette saisie pourrait Ã prÃ©sent faire l'objet d'une plainte au regard de l'article 8 de la Convention . TroisiÃ©mement, le reprÃ©semant du requÃ©rant dÃ©clarait que deux problÃ©mes pouvaient se poser au regard de l'article 14 lu en liaison avec l'article 12 . al l'atteinte gouvernementale au droit de coniracter mariage se limite aux dÃ©tenus et b) cette atteinte fait une discrimination arbitraire entre diffÃ©rentes catÃ©gories de dÃ©tenus, deux choses contraires Ã l'article 14 . II dÃ©clarait erifin, que, pour diverses raisons, il pourrait s'avÃ©rer nÃ©cessaire Ã a l'exercice effectif Â» du droit de requÃªte que le requÃ©rant comparaisse en personne Ã l'audience et il priait en consÃ©quence la Commission de soulever la question avec le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur . Le 5 octobre 1977, la Commission dÃ©cida de'ne pas demander au Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur de libÃ©rer provisoirement le requÃ©rant pour lui permettre de comparaitre Ã l'audience . Le 8 octobre 1977, elle dÃ©cida de ne pas demander au Gouvernement, au stade actuel de la procÃ©dure tout au .moins, de produire une copie des nouvelles directives . Elle dÃ©cida aussi d'informer les parties qu'elle ne dÃ©sirait entendre aucune argumentation au titre de l'article 8 de la Convention concernant la prÃ©tendue interception d'une lettre, Ã©tant prÃ©cisÃ© que le requÃ©rant conserve la facultÃ© d'introduire une requÃªte distincte concernant tout grief qu'il aurait Ã formuler Ã cet Ã©gard . Elle dÃ©cida enfin de permettre en principe Ã l'avocat du requÃ©rant de soulever, au regard de l'article 14, les questions litigieuses qu'il Ã©voquait dans sa lettre du 20 septembre 1977 . Le 13 octobre 1977, la Commission entendit les parties au cours d'une audience sur la recevabilitÃ© et sur le fond de la requÃªte .
ARGUMENTATION DES PARTIE S 1 . Argumentation du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeu r Dans ses observations Ã©crites, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur fait valoir que l'article 12 est rÃ©digÃ© en termes trÃ¨s gÃ©nÃ©raux et qu'il ne faut pas le considÃ©rer comme donnant Ã tout homme et Ã toute femme le droit illimitÃ© de contracter mariage . Il faut tenir compte des circonstances particuliÃ©res dans lesquelles se trouvent les individus ainsi que des lois nationales rÃ©gissant le mariage . Evoquant l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire Go/der IsÃ©rie A . Vol . 18, pp . 18-19), le Gouvernement fait valoir qu e
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l'exercice du droit de se marier inscrit Ã l'article 12 rentre dans la catÃ©gorie des rÃ¨gles qui, n'Ã©tant pas Ã©troitement prÃ©cisÃ©es, sont soumises Ã des limitations implicites . Il faut en l'occurrence, examiner l'application de ces limitations Ã la lumiÃ©re de la situation particuliÃ©re au requÃ©rant, rÃ©guliÃ©rement dÃ©tenu conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 5, par . 1 lal de la Conventio n Le Gouvernement se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã© galement Ã la dÃ©cision de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te NÂ° 892/60, X . clRÃ©publique / Ã©dArale d'Allemagne IAnnuaire 4, p . 240, aux pages 254 Ã 256) et Ã l'arrÃ¨t rendu par la Cour d'appel d'Angleterre et du Pays de Galles IR.c . Mintsrre de l'intArieur et autres, ex parte Bhajan Singh, 1975, 2 Al1 ER 1 08 1 aux pages 1083-70841 . II fait valoir qu'il faut tenir compte des restrictions Ã la libertÃ© qu'entraÃ®ne une peine de prison et Ã©galement : a) des exigences d'ordre et de discipline prÃ©valant dans un Ã© tablissement pÃ©nitentiaire et de la nÃ©cessitÃ© de rÃ©glementer comme il se doit l'octroi des possibilitÃ©s pour les dÃ©tenus de contracter mariage ; bl du fait que le refus d'offrir cette possibilitÃ© dans l'immÃ©diat n'impliquait pas que les autoritÃ©s interdisaient complÃ¨tement la mariage au requÃ©rant mais seulement qu'elles le retardaient jusqu'Ã ce qu'il soit dÃ©finitivement libÃ©rÃ© ou qu'il obtienne un congÃ© pÃ©nitentiaire ou toute autre forme de libÃ©ration provisoire ; c) du fait que, mÃ¨me si on lui avait donnÃ© la possibilitÃ© de se marier, le requÃ©rant n'aurait pas pu, pendant qu'il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu en prison, vivre avec son Ã©pouse . Au vu de ces circonstances, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur n'admet pas que l'on puisse considÃ©rer le refus des autoritÃ©s comme incompatible avec le droit de se marier consacrÃ© par l'article 12 . II prie donc la Commission de dÃ©clarer la requÃ©te incompatible avec les dispositions de la Convention ou, Ã titre subsidiaire, manifestement mal fondÃ©e, et donc irrecevable conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 2 7 Dans ses observations orales, le Gouvernement a fait remarquer que le requÃ©rant et sa fiancÃ©e ne dÃ©siraient plus se marier . Il a fait Ã©galement observer que le requÃ©rant avait eu toute latitude de contracter mariage tant avant qu'aprÃ©s son aÂ«estation En effet, arrÃ©tÃ© en octobre 1974, il avait par la suite Ã©tÃ© mis en IlbertÃ© sous caution et aurait donc pu se marier jusqu'au 15 dÃ©cembre 1974 . Par ailleurs, Ã partir du milieu de 1976, le requÃ©rant remplissait les conditions pour bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'une libÃ©ration conditionnelle et il l'a effectivement sollicitÃ©e en dÃ©cembre 1976 . II a eu par ailleurs la possibilitÃ© de demander un congÃ© en mai 1977 et en a effectivement bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© Ã trois reprises en ao0t et en octobre 1977 Enfin, depuis juillet 1977, le requÃ©rant vit hors de la prison dans un foyer de semi-libertÃ©, et est parfaitement libre de contracter mariage, mais il ne l'a pas fait . L'interprÃ©tation de l'article 12 pose certaines difficultÃ©s qui montrent bien qu'il doit y avoir des limitations au droit de se marier . PremiÃ©rement, il ne s'agit pas d'un droit de caractÃ¨re unilatÃ©ral puisqu'il faut l'existence d'une autr e
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personne capable et dÃ©sireuse de contracter mariage . DeuxiÃ¨mement, si on l'interprÃ©te au sens littÃ©ral, l'article 12 n'ajoute rien aux droits figurant dans la lÃ©gislation nationale, mais le Gouvernement reconnaÃ®t toutefois que l'intention des rÃ©dacteurs Ã©tait de garantir certains droits minimums . Il n'existe par exemple aucun concept de Â« l'Ã¢ge nubile Â» autre que celui prescrit par les lÃ©gislations nationales et on ne voit pas bien pourquoi cette expression figure dans l'article puisqu'elle ne semble rien ajouter Ã la rÃ©fÃ©rence aux Â« lois nationales u . On ne voit pas clairement non plus pourquoi les rÃ©dacteurs ont utilisÃ© l'expression rs l'homme et la femme n alors qu'ils n'ont pas employÃ© le terme Â« mariage entre personnes de sexes diffÃ©rents ri, auquel on aurait pu s'attendre si leur intention avait Ã©tÃ© de limiter le droit de se marier Ã des hommes Ã©pousant des femmes . La notion de droit au mariage implique aussi l'existence de deux personne s capables et dÃ©sireuses d'exercer ce droit . Dans l'hypothÃ©se oÃ¹ une personne choisirait de vivre ou de travailler dans une situation telle qu'elle n'aurait aucune occasion de rencontrer une personne de sexe opposÃ©, comment pourrait-elle exercer ce droit et comment pourrait-elle se plaindre de ne pas pouvoir l'exercer 7 Tel pourrait Ãªtre le cas d'un marin en mer ou d'une personne vivant sur une i7e dÃ©serte . Quiconque choisirait de vivre ou de travailler ainsi se mettrait dans l'impossibilitÃ© d'exercer ce droit . C'est lÃ une idÃ©e qui a son importance au moment oÃ¹ l'on envisage la situation d'un individu qui choisit de commettre un dÃ©Gt et, Ã la suite de cela, se trouve en prison . Il est manifeste que ce droit n'est pas absolu . L'article 12 ne saurait Ã©videmment signifier que le droit peut Ãªtre exercÃ© Ã tous moments en toutes circonstances . Il est maintenant admis que les trÃ©s jeunes personnes ne peuvent pas contracter mariage mais il n'en a pas toujours Ã©tÃ© ainsi . Les malades mentaux ne peuvent pas se marier au Royaume-Uni et, dans certains pays, les individus dÃ©clarÃ©s mÃ©dicalement inaptes au mariage ne peuvent pas contracter mariage . Les mariages consanguins sont, Ã divers degrÃ©s, interdits dans tous les pays . Toutes ces questions dÃ©pendent de la lÃ©gislation nationale et aucune loi nationale ne permet l'exercice du droit Ã tout moment et en toute circonstance . La loi anglaise limite la pÃ©riode pendant laquelle un mariage peut Ã©tre cÃ©lÃ©brÃ© et la loi de 1949 prÃ©voit que le mariage doit avoir lieu en un endroit accessible au public . Or, une prison n'est pas un endroit oÃ¹ l'on peut cÃ©lÃ©brer un mariage, puisque le public n'y a pas accÃ©s . Cette disposition a pour but d'assurer une entiÃ©re publicitÃ© au mariage . On considÃ¨re en effet que le mariage est une question de statut et non seulement un droit Ã caractÃ©re privÃ© . Il s'ensuit que si un dÃ©tenu est autorisÃ© Ã se marier, des dispositions particuliÃ©res doivent Ãªtre prises pour l'escorter jusqu'Ã© un lieu public, ce qui implique des prÃ©cautions considÃ©rables en matiÃ¨re de sÃ©curitÃ© et aussi des frais . Il serait injustifiable de mettre les dÃ©tenus dans une situation privilÃ©giÃ©e en les autorisant Ã se marier en privÃ© . Une autorisation spÃ©ciale de se marier en privÃ© ne peut en effet Ãªtre accordÃ©e qu'en de trÃ©s rares circonstances .
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Il est d'usage de ne pas autoriser un dÃ©tenu Ã quitter provisoirement la prison pour contracter mariage Ã moins qu'il y ait un enfant Ã lÃ©gitimer . Dans ce cas, l'autorisation est toujours accordÃ©e, dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t de l'enfant . Il y a Ã©galement des cas, trÃ©s rares, oÃ¹ l'autorisation a Ã©tÃ© accordÃ©e pour des raisons humanitaires trÃ©s spÃ©ciales . La loi anglaise n'interdit absolument pas le mariage d'un dÃ©tenu . Elle rÃ©gleniente simplement l'exercice du droit de contracter mariage comme elle fait pour tout autre individu qui, en raison de son comportement, s'est placÃ© hors d'Ã©tat d'exercer ce droit . Or, un dÃ©tenu s'est mis hors d'Ã©tat d'exercer ce droit puisque, par son comportement dÃ©llctueux, il est privÃ© de sa libertÃ© et donc incapable au sens habituel du mot, Ã dÃ©faut d'autorisation donnÃ©e dans des circonstances bien prÃ©cises, de se rendre en un lieu public oÃ¹ il pourra se marier . Le marin fait de mÃªme en dÃ©cidant de vivre sur les mers, de mÃªme que le jÃ©suite par le mode de vie qu'il choisit . Pour contracter mariage, un dÃ©tenu n'a pas besoin du consentement du MinistÃ©re de l'intÃ©rieur, il lui faut simplement l'autorisation de quitter la prison . Seul, le fait qu'il est privÃ© de libertÃ© l'empÃªche de se rendre en un lieu autoris Ã© L'article 12 est libellÃ© en termes trÃ©s gÃ©nÃ©raux qui, pour avoir un sens, doivent nÃ©cessairement comporter des limitations . A la diffÃ©rence de l'article 8 et d'autres articles de la Convention, le texte ne comporte pas de limitations expresses, ce qui donne Ã penser qu'il doit y en avoir d'implicites et, Ã cet Ã©gard, le Gouvernement renvoie encore Ã l'affaire Golder Il faut tenir compte des circonstances particuliÃ©res Ã l'espÃ©ce L'article 5, par 1 lal doit Ãªtre pris en considÃ©ration lorsqu'il s'agit d'un dÃ©tenu . Toute dÃ©tention exige certaines dispositions de sÃ©curitÃ© et, par ailleurs, la loi britannique n'autorise pas le mariage en prison . La loi ne fait que rÃ©gir l'exercice du droit, c'est-Ã -dire en prÃ©voir le temps, le lieu, le degrÃ© de parentÃ© portant empÃªchement, etc . Le Gouvernement se rÃ©fÃ©re ici encore Ã la decision rendue par la Commission dans la requÃªte NÂ° 89216 7 et Ã l'arrÃªt de la Cour d'appel dans l'affaire de Rhajan Singh, citÃ©es plus haut . II Ã©voque Ã©galement la dÃ©cision de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 6564/74 (DR . 2, p . 705 ) . Le Gouvernement soutient que les considÃ©rations Ã©mises par la Commission dans cette dÃ©cision sur le droit de fonder une famille valent Ã©galement pour le droit de contracter mariage . L'article 12 ne signifie pas qu'il faille Ã tout moment donner Ã un individu la possibilitÃ© effective de se marier et la situation d'un dÃ©tenu rÃ©guliÃ©rement condamnÃ© retarde l'exercice de son droit de contracter mariage mais n'y porte pas autrement atteinte . La vie en prison suppose des rÃ©gles et des rÃ©glements pour contrÃ´ler les activitÃ©s des dÃ©tenus . Les prisons doivent faire face Ã des problÃ¨mes de personnel pÃ©nitentiaire et donner une escorte Ã un prisonnier pour lui permettre d'aller se marier peut priver d'autres dÃ©tenus de possibilitÃ©s de prendre de l'exercice, de profiter des loisirs, etc . Il faut Ã©galement, en l'espÃ©ce, tenir compte du fait qu'un dÃ©tenu ne peut pas cohabiter avec son conjoint ni consommer son mariage . Aussi voit-on mal, en pareille circonstance, quel intÃ©rÃ©t prÃ©cis il y a Ã se marier hormis celui de lÃ©gitimer un enfant En dÃ©finitive, il s'agit uniquement d'une question de dÃ©lai et non d e
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suppression d'un droit . Le requÃ©rant lui-mÃ©me semble le reconnaitre dans ses observations Ã©crites . II faut laisser au Gouvernement, dans le cadre de sa marge d'apprÃ©ciation, le soin de rÃ¨gler les question de temps, de lieu et de conditions Ã remplir pour pouvoir se marier . La pratique suivie jusqu'ici au Royaume-Uni est Ã©quitable et raisonnable . Par ailleurs, aucune distinction n'est faite entre diffÃ©rentes catÃ©gories de dÃ©tenus . L'usage est appliquÃ© uniformÃ©ment . Les deux dÃ©tenus dont le cas est signalÃ© dans les observations Ã©crites du requÃ©rant ont Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ©s Ã se marier pour lÃ©gitimer des enfants . Il est vrai que la rÃ©glementation a changÃ© depuis ao0t 1977, en ceci qu'un dÃ©tenu qui a encore plus de douze mois de peine Ã purger peut bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'une autorisation d'absence temporaire pour se marier, qu'il y ait ou non un enfant Ã lÃ©gitimer . Mais il n'y a eu aucun arbitraire dans l'application de l'usage . Le Gouvernement ne peut pas admettre comme exactes toutes les allÃ©gations de fait formulÃ©es Ã l'audience au nom du requÃ©rant . Il souligne que si l'intÃ©ressÃ© avait vraiment voulu se marier, il aurait pu le faire avant ou aprÃ¨s son arrestation . II indique Ã©galement qu'en aoÃ»t 1975, le requÃ©rant a informÃ© l'agent des services sociaux pÃ©nitentiaires qu'il avait l'intention de continuer ses requÃªtes et ses demandes d'autorisation (de se marier) Â« pour occuper les autoritÃ©s - sa faÃ§on Ã lui d'irriter l'administration Â» . Le Gouvernement ne veut pas dire que la requÃ©te soit abusive mais dÃ©sire tout de mÃªme signaler ce fait Ã la Commission . Quant aux six points de droit soulevÃ©s Ã l'audience par le requÃ©rant, le Gouvernement reconnait d'abord que la mesure doit Ã©tre conforme Ã la loi nationale (ce qu'elle Ã©tait) et ensuite que la loi nationale doit Ãªtre conforme Ã la Convention . Le troisiÃ¨me point Ã©voquÃ© par le requÃ©rant, Ã savoir qu'il ne saurait y avoir de limitation implicite Ã l'article 12, dont le texte devrait Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ© Ã la lettre, dÃ©truit complÃ©tement son argumentation, puisque s'il fallait interprÃ©ter Ã la lettre l'article 12, le texte n'ajouterait rien Ã la loi nationale . Par contre, le libellÃ© mÃªme du texte suppose qu'il doit y avoir des limitations . Quant au quatriÃ©me point, le Gouvernement ne conteste pas qu'il ne saurait y avoir de limitation qui dÃ©truise le droit protÃ©gÃ© par le texte . Mais en l'occurrence, le retard apportÃ© Ã l'exercice du droit d'Ã©pouser une cenaine personne n'a pas ponÃ© atteinte au contenu mÃªme de ce droit . CinquiÃ©mement, le requÃ©rant a affirmÃ© que toute limitation doit Ãªtre conforme Ã l'Ã©conomie de la Convention et au but de l . Pourtant il y a un conflit immÃ©diat entre la dÃ©tention et la sauvegard ae dÃ©tenio
de l'unitÃ© de la famille . L'article 58 des RÃ©gles minimas pour le traitement des dÃ©tenus et les observations de Lord Kilbrandon citÃ©es par le requÃ©rant soulignent que la dÃ©tention a pour caractÃ©ristique essentielle de priver l'intÃ©ressÃ© de sa libertÃ© . Or, c'est prÃ©cisÃ©ment cette privation de libertÃ© qui a empÃªchÃ© l'intÃ©ress . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©galement avancÃ© qu'iÃ©d'exrcsonit aermg l faut interprÃ©ter strictement toute limitation, mais c'est lÃ mÃ©connaPtre la marge d'apprÃ©ciation que la Cour europÃ©enne a dÃ©clarÃ© laisser aux Etats . Le Gouvernement soutient que l'article 12 ne garantit pas le droit d'Ã©pouser une personne dÃ©terminÃ©e Ã un moment dÃ©terminÃ© . L'usage suivi en l'espÃ©ce es t
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pleinement conforme Ã cet article Aussi le Gouvernement demande-t-il Ã la Commission de dÃ©clarer la requÃªte irrecevable comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e . 2 . Argumentation du requÃ©ran t Dans son mÃ©moire, le requÃ©rant fait valoir que la pratique dÃ©crite par le Gouvernement encourage l'immoralitÃ© et opÃ©re une discrimination au dÃ©triment de personnes qui se comportent de maniÃ©re responsable en s'assurant qu'elles n'ont pas d'enfant hors mariage . L'illÃ©grtimitÃ© n'Ã©tant d'ailleurs plus un obstacle dans l'existence, le requÃ©rant n'admet pas comme un argument valable que le souci du Gouvernement soit de lÃ©gitimer des enfants naturels . "Le requÃ©rant n'accepte pas non plus l'argument selon lequel il faut qu'un dÃ©tenu quitte la prison pour pouvoir se marier . Toutes les prisons ayant un aumÃ´nier, il serait possible d'organiser un mariage Ã l'intÃ©rieur de l'Ã©tablissement . Le libellÃ© mÃªme de la rÃ©gle dÃ©crite par le Gouvernement, A savoir que Â« les dÃ©tenus ne peuvent gÃ©nÃ©ralement pas bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'une autorisation d'absence temporaire . . . pour pouvoir se marier Â» dÃ©note que le Gouvernement se prÃ©occupe davantage de l'absence temporaire du dÃ©tenu que de l'obstacle 9 son mariage . Le requÃ©rant reconnaPt qu'un homme qui dÃ©sire se marier alors qu'il est en pfison doit surmonter nombre d'inconvÃ©nients et de difficultÃ©s, de mÃªme que sa fjiture Ã©pouse . Toutefois, c'est aux intÃ©ressÃ©s qu'il appartient de prendre la dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive et le requÃ©rant n'accepte pas que l'Etat puisse jamais avoir le droit d'empÃªcher deux personnes d'Ã¢ge nubile de contracter mariage, nonobstant le fait que l'une d'elles soit dÃ©tenue en prison . Contrairement 9 ce que soutient le Gouvernement, la formule mÃ©me employÃ©e Ã© l'article 12 Â« I'homme et la femme . . Â» est infiniment plus prÃ©cise que la formule Â« toute personne a droit . . Â» utilisÃ©e dans d'autres articles . Elle a Ã©tÃ© employÃ©e pour indiquer que l'article en question ne s'applique qu'aux personnes d'Ã¢ge nubile . Deux conditions seulement sont mises Ã l'exercice du droit de se marier : la premiÃ©re concerne l'Ã¢ge et la seconde est que le droit de se marier soit accordÃ© selon les lois nationales en rÃ©gissant l'exercice . L'article ne parlant pas de Â« pratique interne Â» mais seulement de Â« lois nationales Â», les arguments du Gouvernement relatifs Ã une pratique interne sont sans pertinence en l'espÃ¨ce Nulle part dans les observations du Gouvernement on ne relÃ¨ve la moindre rÃ©fÃ©rence aux Â« lois nationales n pertinentes, ce qui indique bien qu'aucune loi n'interdit le mariage d'un dÃ©tenu ; en effet, les lois sur le mariage visent essentiellement la bigamie, la polygamie, l'Ã¢ge nubile et les arriÃ©rÃ©s mentaux mais pas les dÃ©tenus . Les dispositions de l'article 12 Ã©tant Ã©troitement dÃ©finies, elles ne sont pas soumises Ã limitations et l'affaire Golder n'a rien 9 voir en l'espÃ¨ce . Il en est de mÃªme de la dÃ©cision rendue dans la requÃªte NÂ° 892/60 qui concerne les lois allemandes et non britanniques . Les faits de la prÃ©sente affaire sont eux aussi diffÃ©rents .
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L'article 12 a Ã©tÃ© mal InterprÃ©tÃ© dans l'arrÃ©t de la cour d'appel citÃ© par le Gouvernement . Il n'existe en effet aucune condition, expresse ou tacite, autre que les deux stipulÃ©es Ã l'article 12 . Le texte ne mentionne pas les rr circonstances Â» dans lesquelles les gens sont placÃ©s et cette question est Ã©trangÃ©re Ã l'article 12 . Il se peut qu'un marin en mer ne puisse pas exercer son doit de contracter mariage mais les circonstances ne restreignent en rien son droit . oue si l'on se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã la situation d'un militaire en poste, le requÃ©rant remarque que le fait qu'un individu civil peut rester chez lui n'a rien Ã voir avec son droit de contracter mariage selon l'article 12 . Ce droit demeure intact sous rÃ©serve que les conditions de l'article 12 soient bien remplies . Le requÃ©rant soutient qu'il a Ã©tÃ© mis obstacle Ã son droit fondamental de se marier . Il dÃ©sirait se marier au moment de son choix, pour des raisons valables, et non au moment voulu par le Gouvernement . Depuis mars 1975, l'exercice de ce droit a Ã©tÃ© constamment contrariÃ© . L'article 12 n'est pas subordonnÃ© Ã l'article 5 ni Ã aucune autre disposition de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant ne demandait pas l'autorisation .de quitter la prison pour pouvoir se marier . Il dÃ©sirait simplement voir reconnu et accordÃ© son droit de contracter mariage . Il ne lui Ã©tait pas nÃ©cessaire de pouvoir quitter la prison pour se marier . Rien dans la Convention ne lie l'article 12 Ã l'article 5 . Absolument rien ne prouve ce qu'avance le Gouvernement Ã savoir que permettre Ã un prisonnier de se marrer nuirait nÃ©cessairement au bon ordre et Ã la discipline de l'Ã©tablissement pÃ©nitentiaire . Le requÃ©rant Ã©voque Ã cet Ã©gard le cas de deux hommes qui, d'aprÃ¨s lui, avaient Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ©s pour avoir tuÃ© leur Ã©pouse mais ont nÃ©anmoins Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ©s Ã se marier par la suite . Il soutient qu'il y a eu quantitÃ© d'autres exemples mais que jamais un seul incident prÃ©judiciable au bon ordre et Ã la discipline de la prison ne s'est prodult de ce fait . On ne saurait prÃ©tendre que le mariage du requÃ©rant aurait eu un effet quelconque sur le bon ordre et la discipline de la prison de Gartree . Evoquant l'opinion du Gouvernement selon laquelle le refus des facilitÃ©s demandÃ©es ne faisait que retarder le mariage mais ne l'interdisait pas complÃ©tement, le requÃ©rant soutient qu'une interdiction qui persiste si longtemps (soit du 7 mars 1975 jusqu'Ã© sa libÃ©ration) revient Ã priver l'intÃ©ressÃ© des droits que, lui reconnait l'article 12 . Tout a refus Â» revient, en soi, Ã priver un individu des droits que lui garantit l'article 12 . II en irait autrement s'il s'agissait d'un retard pour raisons administratives mais lorsque le Gouvernement dit qu'il n'accorde pas Ã un dÃ©tenu le droit de se marrer, il contrevient Ã l'article 12 . Le Gouvernement n'a pas, au regard de l'article 12, le droit d'imposer un dÃ©lai pour les motifs qu'il invoque car le requÃ©rant remplissait bien les deux seules conditions nÃ©cessaires Ã l'exercice des droits prÃ©vus Ã l'article 12 . Le fait que le requÃ©rant ne puisse pas vivre avec son Ã©pouse pendant sa dÃ©tention n'a rien Ã voir avec l'article 12 . En effet, si le Gouvernement se prÃ©occupe du fait qu'un dÃ©tenu ne puisse pas vivre avec son Ã©pouse, il faut se demander pourquoi il a autorisÃ© Ã se marier certains dÃ©tenus qui purgent des peines de prison Ã vie .
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Le fait que le Gouvernement Ã©voque le a refus x des facilitÃ©s demandÃ©es montre bien que son action Ã©tait contraire Ã l'article 12 . Le requÃ©rant prie donc la Commission de ne pas tenir compte des observations du Gouvernement et il maintient sa requÃªt e A l'audience, le reprÃ©sentant du requÃ©rant a laissÃ© entendre qu'en l'espÃ©ce les questions de droit pourraient bien Ã©tre maintenant plus importantes que les questions de fait . En effet, le requÃ©rant n'est plus en mesure d'exercer son droit de se marier Ã l'Ã©gard de la dame dont il s'agissait Ã l'Ã©poque . Mais il n'y a rien d'abstrait dans on argumentation car il ressent un sentiment d'injustice, puissant et justifiÃ©, devant ce qui s'est passÃ© . Le problÃ©me n'est pas de savoir s'il y a actuellement atteinte Ã ses droits mais s'il y a effectivement eu une atteinte dans le passÃ© . A l'Ã©poque de son arrestation, en effet, le requÃ©rant vivait avec sa fiancÃ©e . Il n'y avait aucun empÃªchement juridique Ã ce qu'il se marie et il n'y en a pas eu jusqu'en avril 1976 environ . Les intÃ©ressÃ©s se connaissaient pratiquement depuis toujours et, comme l'a indiquÃ© le requÃ©rant dans sa demande adressÃ©e au MinistÃ©re de l'intÃ©rieur le 7 mars 1975, l'un et l'autre se considÃ©raient, Ã l'Ã©poque de son arrestation, comme devant se marier Â« dans un proche avenir, certainement dans les six mois Â» Le MinistÃ¨re de l'intÃ©rieur a rÃ©pondu Ã cette demande : Â« conformÃ©ment Ã la rÃ©glementation en vigueur, il n'est pas possible de vous accorder un congÃ© pour vous marier . . . Â» . Mais c'est 19 un point de vue assez trompeur puisqu'il n'est pas nÃ©cessaire de libÃ©rer un dÃ©tenu pour lui permettre de se marier . Le requÃ©rant a essayÃ© d'Ã©crire Ã ce propos au NCCL (Conseil national des libertÃ©s civiques) en avril 1975 mais la lettre a Ã©tÃ© interceptÃ©e . Par ailleurs, le refus opposÃ© Ã la deuxiÃ¨me demande du requÃ©rarrt, en avril 1975, a conduit inÃ©vitablement Ã une crise dans ses relations avec sa future Ã©pouse . Les visites entre le requÃ©rant et sa fiancÃ©e avaient lieu sous surveillance et Ã©taient Ã©coutÃ©es par les gardiens . Il semble qu'au cours de conversations avec des amis, sa financÃ©e ait citÃ© comme exemple la forme des refus opposÃ©s par le MinistÃ©re de l'intÃ©rieur pour montrer que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas vÃ©ritabiement essayÃ© de se marier . Sa derniÃ©re visite Ã son fiancÃ© date du 10 octobre 1975 Par la suite, le requÃ©rant a reÃ§u une ou deux lettres d'elle mais a appris six mois plus tard qu'elle avait Ã©pousÃ© quelqu'un d'autre . Le requÃ©rant a effectivement eu l'intention de se marier . Il avait de mauvals antÃ©cÃ©dents et une vie privÃ©e loin d'Ã¨tre satisfaisante auparavant . Mais il a vÃ©ritablement essayÃ© . on peut le croire, de faire pour son avenir des plans sensÃ©s et concrets . On ne sait pas exactement dans quelle mesure les autoritÃ©s ont uniformÃ©ment appliquÃ© la rÃ©glementation . Si le requÃ©rant n'a pu faire une dÃ©monstration irrÃ©futable quant Ã l'article 14, ceci tient Ã la nature de l'article 12 . Les arguments avancÃ©s le 12 mai 1975 dans la lettre du Sous-SecrÃ©taire d'Etat Ã l'IntÃ©rieur sont terriblement faibles . On ne voit pas bien ce que ce dernier entendait par Â« impossible du point de vue administratif Â» . On ne voit mÃªme pas clairement c e
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que sont les rÃ©gles en vigueur . Certains cas, signalÃ©s rÃ©cemment indiquent qu'elles ont Ã©tÃ© modifiÃ©es, Ã©liminant ce que l'on croyait auparavant Ãªtre des difficultÃ©s administratives insurmontables . Ces cas montrent bien les problÃ©mes qui se posent lorsqu'on laisse les grandes questions des droits de l'homme et du citoyen Ã la discrÃ©tion des instances administratives, mÃªme bien intentionnÃ©es . La question n'est pas rÃ©gie par la loi mais par le bon vouloir de l'administration . Les observations Ã©crites du Gouvernement sur la recevabilitÃ© de l'affaire ne mentionnent pas la lÃ©gislation nationale sur la mariage . Il n'y a en effet rien qui concerne le mariage des dÃ©tenus dans le texte de la loi de 1949 sur le mariage ou dans le chapitre sur les Ã©poux dans l'ouvrage de Halsbury Â« Laws of England Â» 13^ Ã©dition, Vol . 19) qui contient un rÃ©sumÃ© assez complet du droit anglais du mariage . Jusqu'9 l'affaire Singh que le Gouvernement a invoquÃ©e, il n'y avait absolument rien non plus concernant le droit pour le MinistÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur d'empÃ¨cher un tel mariage . La loi fixe certaines restrictions au droit de se marier lorsqu'elle Ã©voque la consanguinitÃ© et l'Ã¢ge nubile . Elle prÃ©voit par ailleurs que, pour les moins de 18 ans, il peut Ã©tre passÃ© outre par un tribunal au refus 'du consentement parental : la loi en est arrivÃ©e IB pour Ã©viter l'arbitraire dans l'application d'un droit de l'homme particuliÃ©rement important . Elle prÃ©voit dans le dÃ©tail les formes et les procÃ©dures du mariage ainsi que la nÃ©cessitÃ© de cÃ©lÃ©brer le mariage dans des locaux dÃ»ment autorisÃ©s et agrÃ©Ã©s . Rien dans la loi n'empÃ©che d'agrÃ©er la chapelle d'une prison comme un lieu oÃ¹, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 41 de la loi sur le mariage, un mariage pourrait Ãªtre cÃ©lÃ©brÃ© . On ne voit pas non plus pourquoi un officier d'Ã©tat civil ne disposerait pas d'un bureau Ã l'intÃ©rieur d'une prison, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 45 de la loi . Selon la loi de 1533 sur les autorisations Ã©cclÃ©siastiques IEcclesiastical licences Act) l'ArchevÃªque de Canterbury ou ses reprÃ©sentants peuvent accorder une autorisation spÃ©ciale de cÃ©lÃ©brer le mariage Ã un moment ou en un lieu convenable, et dans une maison particuliÃ©re IHalsbury, op . cit. Vol. 19, pp . 785-8001 . On ne saurait donc soutenir que la loi anglaise n'a pas envisagÃ© le mariage dans un lieu autre qu'un lieu public . Au demeurant, rien n'empÃªche le Gouvernement de mettre en ceuvre une lÃ©gislation permettant le mariage en prison Selon le requÃ©rant, pareille lÃ©gislation n'est pas nÃ©cessaire mais elle mettrait les choses au clair . Le fait qu'un homme soit soumis Ã dÃ©tention n'af ecte nullement la validit Ã© de son mariage si, par ailleurs, les exigences de la loi en matiÃ©re, par exemple, de capacitÃ© de contracter mariage et de forme du mariage, sont bien remplies . Le fait que le MinistÃ¨re de l'intÃ©rieur ait refusÃ© l'autorisation de se marier n'affecterait pas la validitÃ© d'un mariage s'il Ã©tait malgrÃ© tout cÃ©lÃ©brÃ© . La Commission n'est pas saisie d'une affaire concernant le droit interne sur le mariage mais d'un problÃ¨me de pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire de l'exÃ©cutif inettant en jeu l'exercice de contraintes physiques et tangibles exercÃ©es sur un individu en dÃ©tention et venant s'ajouter Ã la privation de la libertÃ© . Il se peut que l'article 12 se rÃ©tÃ©re aux lois sur le mariage rÃ©gissant le mariage en gÃ©nÃ©ral dans un pays donnÃ© plutÃ´t que l'exercice de ce pouvoir discrÃ©tionnairÃ©, mais comme cet exercice n'a pas Ã©tÃ© contraire Ã la loi, il ne saurait Ãªtre contestÃ© devant les tribunaux .
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Le requÃ©rant a prÃ©sentÃ© six arguments de droit . Tout d'abord, il a fait valoir que pour Ãªtre lÃ©gale aux termes de la Convention, l'action des autoritÃ©s doit Ã©tre conforme Ã la lÃ©gislation interne sur le mariage . Or, la lÃ©gislation interne sur le mariage ne renferme pas la limitation qui est l'objet . du litige avec le Gouvernement . Les a lois Â» Ã©voquÃ©es Ã l'article 12 sont la lÃ©gislation traitant du consentement, de l'Ã ge nubile et d'autres questions de ce genre . Le systÃ¨me discrÃ©tionnaire du contrÃ´le exercÃ© par le Ministre de l'intÃ©rieur sur les dÃ©tenus n'est pas une loi nationale rÃ©gissant l'exercice du droit de se marier, au sens de l'article 1 2 DeuxiÃ©mement, le droit interne et son application doivent Ã¨[re conformes aux exigences de la Convention et Ãªtre assujettis au contrÃ´le de la Commission et de la Cour . Il ne suffit pas Ã un Gouvernement d'Ã©tablir que sa pratique est conforme Ã la lÃ©gislation interne . TroisiÃ©mement, le requÃ©rant soutient qu'il n'y a pas de limitation Â« inhÃ©rente x aux droits garantis par l'article 12 . La Convention ne laisse pas place Ã des limitations inhÃ©rentes et le requÃ©rant adopte Ã cet Ã©gard la thÃ©se de Jacobs dans son ouvrage Â« La Convention europAenne des Droits de l'Homme n, pp. 198-201 . La proposition, formulÃ©e par le Gouvernement, qu'il doit nÃ©cessairement y avoir des limitations implicites est contraire Ã un certain nombre de rÃ©gles fondamentales d'interprÃ©tation du texte . Il faut notamment donner aux termes leur signification littÃ©rale, comme il est indiquÃ© dans la Convention de Vienne et ailleurs . De plus, des limitations figurent expressÃ©ment dans d'autres dispositions substantielles de la Convention, mais il ne doit pas en Ã¨tre admis IA oÃ¹ il n'en est pas d'explicites . Il ne faut pas plus en admettre implicitement pour l'article 12 que pour l'article 3 Certes, dans l'affaire Golder, la Cour a laissÃ© entendre que s'agissant d'un droit que le Convention Â« reconnait sans le dÃ©finir au sens Ã©troit du mot Â», il y a place pour des limitations implicitement admises IArrÃ©t du 21 fÃ©vrtÃ©r 1975, sÃ©rie A, Vo1. 1$ par. 38) Toutefois, la Cour s'est expliquÃ©e sur ce qu'elle entendait en se rÃ©fÃ©rant Ã l'Affaire linguistique belge, oÃ¹ elle a employÃ© la notion de Â« rÃ©glementation Â» plutÃ´t que de a limitation Â» d'un droit . Enfin, la notion de limitation implicite ne semble pas avoir jamais Ã©tÃ© utilisÃ©e Ã propos de l'article 12 et on peut se demander s'il est juste, du point de vue juridique, d'y insÃ©rer maintenant cette idÃ©e QuatriÃ©mement, mÃªme s'il peut y avoir des limitations, aucune limitation du genre de celle que soutient le Gouvernement ne serait valable . On ne saurait en effet appeler ainsi une limitation qui interdit complÃ¨tement et pour longtemps d'exercer le droit en question . Une limitation est une mesure qui rÃ©glemente un droit et lui fixe des limites mais n'empÃ¨che pas complÃ©tement de l'exercer . Dans l'affaire Golder IcitÃ©e plus haut, par . 39 et 40), la Cour s'est montrÃ©e trÃ©s prudente sur la formulation d'une thÃ©orie gÃ©nÃ©rale des limitations implicites . Pourtant, ce dont il s'agissait alors, c'Ã©tait de limiter le droit pour un dÃ©tenu de consulter un avocat pendant une pÃ©riode de quelque deux ans et trois mois mais passÃ© ce dÃ©lai, le dÃ©tenu avait Ã©tÃ© libre de le faire . Sans doute y avait-il eu un dÃ©lai, mais le droit du dÃ©tenu n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© anÃ©anti . En l'espÃ¨ce au contraire, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© empÃ©chÃ© de se marier pendant une longue pÃ©riode aprÃ©s s a
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â¢requÃ©tedemars 1975 et, Ã la fin de la pÃ©riode en question, sa fiancÃ©e n'Ã©tait plus lÃ© . Son droit a donc Ã©tÃ© non seulement violÃ©, mais vu la nature de la situation, il s'est trouvÃ© Ã©teint . Par son emprisonnement, le dÃ©tenu a effectivement Ã©tÃ© empÃªchÃ© d'exercer son droit . La Cour a dÃ©clarÃ© dans l'affaire Golder (par . 38) qu'aucune limitation implicite ne doit jamais entraÃ®ner d'atteinte Ã la substance du droit . Or, nous avons lÃ manifestement un cas oÃ¹ il a Ã©tÃ© portÃ© atteinte Ã la substance du droit . CinquiÃ©mement, le requÃ©rant a fait valoir que toute limitation implicite doit Ãªtre compatible avec les objectifs d'ordre public exprimÃ©s dans la Convention et avec les normes,analogues attachÃ©es tant Ã l'objet et Ã la nature de la dÃ©tention qu'Ã l'importance de l'unitÃ© de la famille . Si les termes de l'article 12 manquent peut-Ã©tre de prÃ©cision, les rÃ©dacteurs songeaient manifestement Ã l'exercice d'un choix individuel . Ce n'est pas l'affaire de l'Etat d'imposer Ã quiconque un conjoint ni indiquer .le moment oÃ¹ il doit se marier, ni quand il est bon ou mauvais pour lui de contracter mariage . L'articie 1^' du RÃ©glement pÃ©nitentiaire britannique IPrison Rules) indique que formation et traitement pÃ©nitentiaires ont pour objet d'encourager et d'armer les dÃ©tenus afin qu'ils mÃ©nent une existence convenable et utile . L'article 31 prÃ©voit Ã©galement que les prisonniers doivent Ã©tre incitÃ©s, dans l'intÃ©rÃªt de leur famille et de leur propre rÃ©insertion dans la sociÃ©tÃ©, Ã maintenir des relations avec l'extÃ©rieur . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©voquÃ© Ã©galement les articles 58 Ã 62 des RÃ©gles minima pour le traitement des dÃ©tenus IRAsolution 1731 5 du ComitÃ© des /vlinistres du Consei/ de l'Europel et une dÃ©claration publiÃ©e par Lord Kilbrandon selon laquelle la dÃ©tention ne doit rien emporter d'autre que la privation de libertÃ© . Enfin, le requÃ©rant fait valoir que lorsqu'un Gouvernement propose une limitation Ã l'exercice d'un droit, il faut qu'il prouve qu'elle est rigoureusement nÃ©cessaire dans le cadre d'une politique gÃ©nÃ©rale lÃ©gitime concernant les dÃ©tenus . Or, les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuves avancÃ©s par le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, sur les limitations nÃ©cessaires en matiÃ©re de dÃ©tention et de mariage ne sont pas suffisamment convaincants . Le requÃ©rant invite donc la Commission Ã dÃ©clarer la requÃ©te recevable et Ã procÃ©der Ã un rÃ©glement conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 28 dÃ¨ la Convention
T
.ENDROI
1 . LerequÃ©rant se plaintdes'Ã©tre vu refusÃ© la possibilitÃ© de se marier pendant qu'il purgeait sa peine de .prison, refus qui, selon lui, emporte violation du droit de se marier que lui garantit l'article 12 de la Convention . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeurnie qu'il y ait eu aucune violation des droits du requÃ©rant au regard de cet article et soutient que son grief est manifestement mal fondÃ© . . puisque l'article 12 ne confÃ©re-pas9 un dÃ©tenu tle droit illimitÃ© de contractermariage .
2 . L'article 12 de Ila -Convention est ainsi libellÃ© : Â« A partir de l'Ã¢ge nubile, l'homme et la femme ont le droit de se marier et de fonder une famille selon les lois nationales rÃ©gissant l'exercice de ce droit n .
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3 . La Commission rappelle d'abord certains faits saillants Le requÃ©rant s'est adressÃ© une premiÃ¨re fois le 7 mars 1975 au Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur pour lui demander l'autorisation de se marier et il s'est vu refuser le 21 mars 1975 le congÃ© nÃ©cessaire au mariage . Celte dÃ©cision, qui fut ultÃ©rieurement confirmÃ©e, a Ã©tÃ© prise conformÃ©ment Ã l'usage alors suivi par les autoritÃ©s pÃ©nitentiaires . Selon cet usage, hormis des circonstances exceptionnelles Ã©vangÃ©res au cas d'espÃ¨ce, les dÃ©tenus n'Ã©taient pas autorisÃ©s Ã s'absenter provisoirement de la prison pour se marier, Ã moins que le mariage n'ait pour effet de lÃ©gitimer un enfant InÃ© ou Ã naitrel Or, le mariage du requÃ©rant ne devait pas avoir cet effet . Il semble y avoir contestation entre les parties quant au point de savoir si la lÃ©gislation anglaise empÃ©che de cÃ©lÃ©brer un mariage en prison, mais il est clair toutefois que le requÃ©rant n'avaitâ¢ aucune possibilitÃ© de se marier en prison . La dÃ©cision a donc eu pour effet de l'empÃ¨cher de se marier jusqu'au moment oÃ¹ il se irouverait hors de la prison (soit en congÃ© pÃ©nitentiaire, soit en 6bertÃ© conditionnelle ou employÃ© dans un centre de semi-libertÃ©) et qu'il pourrait prendre lui-mÃ¨me les dispositions nÃ©essaires Ã son mariage . Dans le cas du requÃ©rant, la premiÃ¨re date Ã laquelle il remplissait les conditions pour bÃ©nÃ©ficier de la libertÃ© conditionnelle Ã©tait juin 1976, soit aprÃ©s avoir purgÃ© un tiers de sa peine . II a, semble-t-il, demandÃ© Ã ce que son dossier soit examinÃ© en vue d'une libÃ©ration conditionnelle en dÃ©cembre 1976 mais il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© fait droit Ã sa demande . La premiÃ©re possibilitÃ© de bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'un congÃ© pÃ©nitentiaire se situe en mai 1977 mais le requÃ©rant n'en a profitÃ© en rÃ©alitÃ© pour la premiÃ¨re fois qu'en ao0t 1977 Depuis juillet 1977, date de son transfert dans un loyer de semi-libertÃ©, il a eu la facultÃ© de se marier . Lorsque sa demande a Ã©tÃ© . refusÃ©e en mars 1975, le requÃ©rant se trouvait donc confrontÃ© Ã une situation oÃ¹ il ne lui Ã©tait pas possible de se marier pendant au moins 15 mois et mÃªme plus de deux ans si (comme cela s'est finalement produitl il ne bÃ©nÃ©ficiait pas d'une libÃ©ration conditionnell e 5 . Pour Ã©tayer sa thÃ¨se que la requÃ©te est manifestement mal fondÃ©e, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a fait valoir que le droit de se marier, tel que le garantit l'article 12, n'est pas un droit de caractÃ©re absolu . Il a avancÃ© qu'il n'y avait pas eu atteinte au droit du requÃ©rant de contracter mariage mais que l'intÃ©ressÃ© se trouvait simplement dans une situation (comparable Ã celle d'un militaire en service actif, d'un marin en mer ou d'un prÃ¨tre) oÃ¹ il Ã©tait incapable d'exercer ce droit . Le Gouvernement soutient que la lÃ©gislation nationale peut fort bien rÃ©glementer des questions telles que celles du moment et du lieu oÃ¹ un mariage peut Ãªtre cÃ©lÃ©brÃ© et que, par son propre comportement, le requÃ©rant s'Ã©tait lui-mÃ©me placÃ© dans l'impossibilitÃ© de satisfaire aux conditions posÃ©es par la loi britannique y affÃ©rente La loi exige en effet qu'un mariage soit cÃ©lÃ©brÃ© en un lieu public . Le Gouvernement soutient en outre que les droits garantis par l'article 12 peuvent Ã©tre l'objet de limitations dites inhÃ©rentes et qu'il faut tenir compte de la situation particuliÃ¨re d'un dÃ©tenu, et notamment des exigences du maintien de l'ordre dans les prisons, ainsi que des dispositions de l'article 5, par . 1 lal de la Convention . Selon le Gouvernement, l'article 12 ne garantit pas le droit de se
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marier en un lieu dÃ©terminÃ© ou Ã un moment dÃ©terminÃ© . L'exercice du droit du requÃ©rant de se marier a bien Ã©tÃ© retardÃ© mais n'a pas subi d'autre atteinte . Le Gouvernement estime qu'il n'y a donc pas eu violation de l'article 12 . 6 . La Commission n'estime pas que la situation d'un condamnÃ© soit nÃ©cessairement comparable Ã celle d'un individu qui, volontairement ou non, se met dans une situation telle qu'il lui est impossible de se marier . La situation des condamnÃ©s n'est pas non plus nÃ©cessairement analogue Ã celle d'une personne comme un prÃ¨tre qui, pour des raisons religieuses ou autres, dÃ©cide de ne pas exercer son droit de contracter mariage . Un dÃ©tenu peut fort bien dÃ©sirer se marier, comme cela fut apparemment le cas du requÃ©rant, indÃ©pendamment du fait qu'il est privÃ© de sa libertÃ© . Il est possible aux pouvoirs publics d'autoriser son mariage soit en lui permettant d'Ãªtre escortÃ© hors de la prison, comme c'est l'usage au Royaume-Uni lorsque l'autorisation est accordÃ©e, soit en prenant des dispositions pour que le mariage soit cÃ©lÃ©brÃ© Ã l'intÃ©rieur de la prison, comme c'est le cas dans plusieurs autres pays . On peut donc soutenir que la possibilitÃ© pour un dÃ©tenu d'exercer son droit de se marier pendant qu'il est privÃ© de sa libertÃ© peut Ãªtre une question qui relÃ©ve de l'Etat, de mÃªme que son aptitude Ã exercer d'autres droits, comme l'accÃ©s aux tribunaux conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 6, et qui ne dÃ©pend pas seulement des circonstances de fait oÃ¹ il se trouve placÃ© . 7 . L'article 12 garantit le droit de se marier s . . . selon les lois nationales rÃ©gissant l'exercice de ce droit Â» . Le texte ne renferme aucune autre prÃ©cision ni autre limitation du droit . Il n'existait en droit anglais aucun empÃªchement au mariage du requÃ©rant, qui avait pleine capacitÃ© juridique pour se marier et en avait le droit, pourvu qu'il pÃ¹t l'exercer . Toutefois, aucune disposition du droit anglais ne rÃ©git expressÃ©ment l'exercice de ce droit par un dÃ©tenu . La dÃ©cision de savoir si un dÃ©tenu pourra bÃ©nÃ©ficier des facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires pour se marier appartient au Ministre de l'intÃ©rieur et aux autoritÃ©s pÃ©nitentiaires dans l'exercice de leurs pouvoirs administratifs discrÃ©tionnaires . Si l'on admet que le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, et non le requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme, Ã©tait Ã l'origine de son incapacitÃ© de se marier, une autre question se pose : celle de savoir si la dÃ©cision de lui refuser les facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã©tait admissible au regard de la Convention en partant de l'idÃ©e que c'Ã©tait lÃ une mesure prise conformÃ©ment Ã une loi rÃ©gissant l'exercice du droit de se marier, au sens de l'article 12, ou dÃ©coulant d'une limitation implicite au droit de se marier . La Commission rappelle la jurisprudence de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits 8. de l'Homme concernant les limitations au droit Ã l'instruction prÃ©vue par l'article 2 du Protocole nÂ° 1 et au droit d'accÃ©s aux tribunaux conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 6, par . 1 . Elle rappelle notamment que la Cour a dÃ©clarÃ© qu'une mesure qui rÃ©glemente l'exercice d'un droit ne doit pas entrainer d'atteinte Ã la substance du droit lui-mÃªme (cf. Affaire linguistique be/ge, ArrÃªt du 23 juillet 1968, sÃ©rie A, nÂ° 6, p . 32, par. 5 ; Affaire Golder, ArrÃªt du 21 fAvrier 1975, sArie A, nÂ° 18, pp . 18-19, par. 38) . Il est exact qu'en l'espÃ¨ce, il n'existait aucun empÃªchement juridique au mariage du requÃ©rant et qu'en un sens, son aptitude Ã exercer ce droit a
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simplement Ã©tÃ© retardÃ©e . Mais cela n'exclut pas nÃ©cessairement la possibilitÃ© qu'il y ait eu atteinte 9 la substance de son droit Ã se marier . La Commission rappelle Ã cet Ã©gard, que, dans l'affaire Go/der, la Cour a Ã©galement dÃ©clarÃ© que : Â« Un obstacle de fait peut enfreindre la Convention Ã l'Ã©gal d'un obstacle juridiqu e et qu e n . . . une entrave Ã l'exercice efficace d'un droit peut porter atteinte Ã ce droit mÃªme si elle revÃªt un caractÃ¨re temporaire Â» IAffaire Golder, citÃ©e supra, par . 261 . 9 Vu les considÃ©rations qui prÃ©cÃ©dent et la jurisprudence citÃ©e, la Commission estime que le grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel il s'est vu refuser la possibilitÃ© de se marier pendant qu'il purgeait sa peine pose des questions du fond sous l'angle de l'article 12 de la Convention et notamment a) quant Ã la responsabilitÃ© du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur dans l'impossibilitÃ© oÃ¹ se trouvait le requÃ©rant de se marier et b) quant au point de savoir si le refus de lui accorder les facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã©tait ou non contraire Ã son droit de contracter mariage On ne saurait donc considÃ©rer la requÃ©te comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, par 2 En l'absence de tout autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ©, la Commission estime donc que ce grief est recevable . 10 . Enfin, vu les termes de l'argumentation prÃ©sentÃ©e par le reprÃ©sentant du requÃ©rant Ã l'audience sur la recevabilitÃ©, la Commission ne s'estime pas appelÃ©e 9 dÃ©cider de la recevabilitÃ© d'un grief distinct tirÃ© de l'anicle 14 de la Convention conibinÃ© avec l'article 12, et concernant l'uniformitÃ© d'application entre les diffÃ©rents prisonniers de l'octroi des autorisations de se marie r Pour ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE RECEVABLE, tout moyen de fond Ã©tant rÃ©servÃ©, dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant se plaint de n'avoir pas eu la possibilitÃ© de se marier pendant qu'il purgeait sa peine de prison .
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| HAMER c. ROYAUME-UNI

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