SOCIETE X. c. AUTRICHE

APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 7987/7 7 Company X . v/AUSTRIA SociÃ©tÃ© X . c/AUTRICH E DECISION of 13 December 1979 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 13 dÃ©cembre 1979 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Articfe 6, paragraph 1 of the Conventio n a) Proceedings concerning the fixing of expropriation compensation concern the determination of the civil rights and obligations of the expropriated party. b) The fact that proceedings commence with an administrative decision does not infringe upon the safeguard of judicial procedures if the administrarive decision can be annulled in the course of subsequent judicial proceedings . It is however re%vanr in respect of the safeguard of "reasonable time". cl Adminlstrative and subsequently judicial proceedings for the fixing of an expropriation compensation having lasted over 8 years . Complaint declared admissible .
dl The Commission mav examine how the evidence has been obtained, but not how it has been assessed by the Court, unless there has been gross unfairness or arbitrariness. Artic% 13 of the Convention : Lack of effective remedy before a national body in respect of the length of proceedings considered as excessive . Complaint declared admissible . Article 25 of the Convention : Before the decision on admissibility nothing prevents rhe applicant from adding a further complaint to his application after exhaustion of domestic remedies . Article 26 of the Convention : The hierarchical appeal provided for in section 78 of the Austrian Code of Judicial Organisation does not constitute an effective remedy against the length of proceedings which are considered excessive .
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Article 1 of First Protocol Expropriation with the award of compensation "subject to rhe conditions provided for by law" . To the extent that Article I of the First Protocol recognises to the expropriated party a right to compensation, it does not guarantee the right to a particular amount, except where a reduction affects the very substance of the right to compensation . Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of the First Protocol : A deniaf of compensation to an expropriated party taking into account a particular exploiting value when it was not envisaged in a foreseeable furure does not constitute discrimination .
Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Conventio n a) La procÃ©dure en fixation d'une indemnitÃ© d'expropriation comporte dÃ©cision d'une contestation portant sur des droits et obligations de caractÃ©re civil de t'expropriÃ© . b) Le fait qu'une procÃ©dure dÃ©bute par une dÃ©cision administrative ne porte pas atteinte Ã la garantie d'une procÃ©dure judiciaire si la dÃ©cision administrative peut Ã©tre mise Ã neant au cours d'une procÃ©dure judiciaire ultÃ©rieure. En revanche, if joue un rÃ´le quant B la garantie du Â« dÃ©tai raisonnable y .
cl ProcÃ©dure administrative puis judiciaire en fixation d'une indemnitÃ© d'expropriation, ayant durÃ© plus de 8 ans . Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable . dl La Commission peut examiner comment les preuves ont Ã©tÃ© admimistrÃ©es mais non comment elles ont Ã©tÃ© apprÃ©ciÃ©es par le tribunal, sauf iniquitÃ© ou arbitraire flagrants . Article 13 de la Convention Absence de recours effectif devant une instance nationale contre la durÃ©e jugÃ©e excessive d'une procÃ©dure. Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable .
Article 25 de la Convention : Avant dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ©, rien n'empÃªche le requÃ©rant d'ajouter un nouveau grief Ã sa requÃªte aprÃ©s Ã©putsement des voies de recours internes . Article 26 de la Convention Le recours htÃ©rarchique prÃ©vu Ã l'article 78 de la loi autrichienne sur l'organisation judiciaire ne constitue pas un recours efficace contre la durÃ©e excessive d'une procÃ©dure : Expropriation moyennant indemnit Ã© .Article1duPoaitnel n dans les conditions prÃ©vues par la /oi Â» . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'article 7 du Protocole l reconnait Ã f'expropriÃ© un droit Ã indemnisation, il ne garantit pas un droit Ã une indemnitÃ© dÃ©terminÃ©e, sauf rÃ©duction qui affecterait la substance mÃªme du droit Ã indemnisation .
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Article 14 de fe Convention, combinÃ© avec l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel : Ne constitue pas une discrimination le fait de refuser Ã l'expropriÃ© une indemnitÃ© tenant compte d'une valeur particuliÃ¨re d'exploitation, torsque celle-ci n'Ã©tait pas envisagÃ©e dans un avenir prÃ©visible.
THE FACTS
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. (franpats : voir p . 49)
The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant Company's manager, Mr H ., who is assisted by Mr N ., may be summarised as follows : The applicant company, which has its seat in A ., Upper Austria, was originally founded in 1891 and has existed as a limited partnership company since 1963 . Allegedly as a consequence of expropriation measures striking property of essential importance for the company's production of tiles, it was forced to apply for liquidation in 1972 . The company now complains of the said expropriation measures, and in particular of the allegedly insufficient amount of compensation awarded to it as well as of the conduct of the related civil proceedings . 1 . For the first time in 1964 the company learned that the Province of Upper Austria intended to claim one of its properties (lot 470, communal section H .) for the purpose of road construction . Already at the planning stage, the company filed objections stating that this location contained a clay deposit on which its production specialising in tiles was based, and no qualitatively adequate clay deposits existed on its other premises and that it was hence dependant on the possession of this particular area of land . It therefore requested that the road be planned in a different way . The company would not have raised any major objections against a previous project (widening of the existing road), for which it would have had to release already worked land . However, the construction, property acquisition and expropriation proceedings for the road took place in November 1964, despite the applicant company's above objections . 2 . On 26 January 1965 the Provincial Government ordered the construction of the road across the above-mentioned lot 470 . On 26 February 1965, the applicant company informed the Provincial Government that in its opinion there existed neither a valid agreement regarding property acquisition, nor a legal decision on expropriation . An agreement which had been signed in December 1964 by a commanditaire of the company without the knowledge and consent of the company's manager was not accepted by the latter . The validity of this agreement was subsequently made the subject of a lawsuit by the applicant company against the Province of Upper Austria, and the Regional Court of Linz eventually confirmed by a decision of 4 April 1968 that no agreement had been established .
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3 . Following this, the Provincial Government decided-to institute new expropriations proceedings in order to regularise the situation . The road had in the meantime already been constructed and' the applicant company therefore did not dispute the necessity of the expropriation as such . There was, however, disagreement between the Provincial Government and the applicant company as to the amount of compensation . In the administrative expropriation proceedings, the applicant company claimed, in addition .to the agricultural value of the land, compensation for the loss of the clay deposit, and for the diminished value â¢of certain investments which it had made with a view to its future exploitation . The clay had not been actually exploited, but the Provincial Government accepted that the compensation must, in principle, be determined not by reference to the use of the land at the time of expropriation, but having regard to the possibility, already existing at that time, to use it for Ã nother purpose . Accordingly, the Provincial Government asked an expert for brickworks to determine the valuÃ© of the clay deposit . In the opinion which this expert submitted on 12 February 1969, the total damage resulting from the loss of the clay deposit was estimated at some AS 83,000 .- . The expert did not consider that compensation should be paid for certain mechanical investments which according to the applicant company had become useless after the expropriation . This opinion was discussed at a hearing on 20 February 1969, when the municipal authorities of A ., being a party in the expropriation proceedings, raised the argument that a public way ran across the property in question thus making impossible the exploitation of the entire clay deposit . The applicant company objected that the rights in this way were extinguished due to prescription, but the expropriation authority asked the expert to supplement his opinion taking into account the existence of this public way . The expert subsequently reduced his evaluation of the damage to AS 58,000 .- . However, in the expropriation decision of 2 October 1969, the Provincial Government fixed the compensation at only AS 11,205 .-, representing the agricultural value of the lot . The company's claims for a separate compensation in respect of the clay deposit were dismissed on the ground that the above-mentioned public wÃ¢y cut off the expropriated part of the lot from the land worked by the company which did not . possess, had never possessed, and could not expect to obtain a permission to work the clay beyond that way' . The authority therefore considered that the company's production of tiles had not been affected in any way by the expropriation, and that the production had in fact been stopped for other reasons .
' In fact, the company had applied for such permission in March 1969, but the comoetent'district authority IBexirkshauptmannschaftl had decieed on 22 Mav 1969 to adjourn the matter untll the legal questions concerning the oublic way would have been clarified . -
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4 . The applicant company was dissatisfied with the above administrative decision and, on 2 December 1969, it applied to the competent District Court at R . to determine the compensation, under the procedure provided by the Railway Expropriation Act IBGBI . No . 71/1954) which was applicable according to the Upper Austrian Provincial Road Administration Act (Amtliche Linzer Zertung No . 1/1947) . This application had the effect that the administrative decision was set aside, and the determination of the compensation now became the exclusive task of the courts in non-contentious proceedings . In the court proceedings, the applicant company based its compensation claims, now valued at 30 million AS, on the loss of profit resulting from the discontinuation of its production which allegedly was exclusively due to the construction of the new road . The company argued that it had provisionally stopped its production of tiles in 1964 because the competent authorities were not prepared to indicate security measures which would have allowed to continue the exploitation of clay without endangering the new road . Eventually it turned out that the workable clay deposit was reduced from 65 .000 m3 to 15 .000 m3, and therefore the company was forced to discontinue the production definitively as the continuation of the production appeared no longer economically reasonable . The company's claim was supported by a private expert opinion submitted by a professor of the University of Mining Science at Leoben . 5 . It appears that in the first phase of the court proceedings the question of the public way allegedly running across the property in question still played a certain role . The municipality of A . brought an action in the District Court of R . to assert its rights in this public way . However, this action was eventually withdrawn and by a ruling of 31 January 1972 the R . District Court acknowledged that the character of a public way was lost by prescription acquisitive . On 5 December 1972 the way property was ascribed to the applicant company with the consent of the Linz Court of Appeal . 6 . In the expropriation case, the Court decided to consult several experts - two experts, specialists for expropriation compensations resident in Vienna and Villach respectively, were appointed on 5 May 1970 . Questions to these experts, however, were not formulated by the Court before 10 April 1976 . The opinion they submitted on 26 April 1976 . The opinion they submitted on 26 April 1976 concerned exclusively the agricultural value of the expropriated land . When these two experts claimed their costs of some 21 .000,-- and 19 .000 .-- AS respectivelv, the applicant comoany filed an objection stating that an opinion on the agricultural value could also have been obtained by experts residing in the Court district itself, and that the travel expenses and long delays caused by these experts were unjustified . The Provincial Government observed in a note of 18 May 1976 that in their view, too, the consultation of these experts was not necessary . - a geological expert who was asked to assess the value of the clay deposit on the basis of experimental drillings . The parties agreed to th e
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consultation of such an expert at a court hearing on 6 November 1970 . The Court appointed this expert on 8 January 1971 . He inspected the site in the presence of the parties on 20 December 1971 and submitted his opinion on 18 June .1973 . A hearingfixed for 22 November 1974 had to be cancelled because this expert could not be reached and the other two experts were also prevented from coming . The Court therefore fixed a new hearing for 23 January 1975 ; a further hearing took place on 12 March .1976, and on 23 June 1976, the Courn asked this expert to supplement his opinion . The expert's replies to the additional questions were submitted on 28 July 1976 . The main problem concerning this expe rt opinion was the question who should (provisionally) bear the costs . Already in its decision appointing the expert the Court ordered the Province of Upper Austria to pay an advance contribution of AS 30 .000,-- to the costs . This ruling was based on Section 44 of the Railway Expropriation Act which provides that the costs of determining the compensation have to be borne by the railway enterprise 1= the expropriator) unless they have been caused by an unjustified intervention of the expropriated party The Provincial Government appealed from the above decision claiming that the company's inte rv ention had been unjustified . The appeal was however rejected by the Regional Court of D . on 1 March 1971 . On 27 July 1972 the District Cou rt ordered the Province to pay certain further costs, including costs for experimental drillings amounting to some AS 131 .000 .-- . The Provincial Government appealed again, arguing that the question whether the company's inte rvention was justified could only be determined when the outcome of the lawsuit was known, and that the law did not provide for any advance payment of these costs . This appeal was partially upheld by the Regional Court which decided on 5 September 1972 that the costs must provisionally be borne by the office of the clerk of cou rt . On 6 November 1972, the clerk's office then issued payment orders to both parties in order to recover these costs . Both parties filed objections against these payments orders, the applicant company claiming that it was not at all obliged to bear these costs, the Provincial Government again relying on the allegedly unjustified attitude of the company and the non-existence of a duty to pay advance contributions . By a ruling of 16 January 1973 the President of the Regional Cou rt decided that the company's objections were justified while those of thÃ© GovernmenC had to be rejected . The Provincial Government's further appeal to the Administrative Court was not successful . The Court ruled on 18 October 1973 that th'e costs in question had to be borne by the Province not only provisionally but finally . The question whether or not the intervention of the expropriated pa rt y was unjustified did not dÃ©pend on the outcome of the lawsÃ»it, and in thepresent case there was no indication that the applicant company's inte rv ention had been unjustified . - an expert to deal with the applicant company's production method . This expert was appointed on 23 June 1976 following a suggestion by th e
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applicant company, which however filed an objection against the person appointed as expert . The Provincial Government also challenged the decision to call on this expert because they had not been previously consulted and had only learnt of his appointment when his opinion, dated 1 July 1976, was communicated to them on 3 August 1976 . The Provincial Government's appeals were, however, rejected by the Regional Court and the Supreme Court (decision of 13 January 1977) . 7 . Basing itself on the above expert opinions, the District Court of R . decided on 6 October 1977 to award a compensation of only AS 16 .079,70, and to reject the applicant company's additional claim of AS 29 .983 .920,30 . The Court found that the expropriated lots were partly used as agricultural land, partly as forest . They contained clay which was particularly suitable for the production of titles . The total surface was 9000 m2, and the workable surface had been reduced to 6800 m2 by the construction of the road . There remained 30 .400 m3 of clay which could be worked even after the construction of the road, and 17 .800 m3 (worth AS 67 .640 .--) were lost . Before 1935 , the company had worked the clay deposit in the direction of the new road, but after that date the clay pit had only been worked in vertical direction . The clay available after the road construction would have allowed the continued production of tiles for ten years on the basis of 1,5 million tiles per year, and for seven and a half years on the basis of 2 million tiles per year . The clay lost by the road construction could have been stocked and used up later . In this way, the production could have been prolonged to a period of 12 years . Since 1965, the economic situation of the company had deteriorated continuously . Eventually, it had to sell the production plants in 1972 . Before 1969, the company never had seriously tried to obtain a permission to work the clay in the relevant area . It was only in March 1969 that it applied for such permission to the competent district authority . When doing so, it expressly referred to the connection with the expropriation proceedings . In the course of these proceedings the company was told that it had to fulfil certain conditions before it could obtain the permission . As it did not fulfil these conditions, no decision was made . The company did not apply for a decision of the higher authority under Section 73 of the Code of General Administrative Procedure . The Court considered that the company's claim for compensation was based on the loss of profit which it could have made if the entire clay deposit had still been available to it . This profit could only have been achieved on a long-term basis, during a period extending Ã§onsiderably beyond the date of the expropriation . Since the company sold ;its production plants in 1972, it could not have used up the clay deposit remaining after the construction of the road by the time of the sale . Moreover, it would have been possible to excavate the entire clay deposit before the construction of the road and to, put it on stock . In this way the company would have had the possibility t o
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reduce the damage (as was its legal duty) and to use up the entire clay . The fact that the company had not applied for permission to work the clay before 1969 proved that it had not previously had the real intention to use the clay deposit in issue for its production . This application apparently had only been made wilh the intention to increase the basis of its compensation claim . The company therefore was not entitled to any compensation in regard of the clay deposit lost by the expropriation . The compensation therefore had to be determined exclusively on the basis of the agricultural and forestry value . 8 . The applicant company appealed from the above decision of the District Court, but the Regional Court of D . rejected the appeal on 24 January 1978 . The Regional Court considered that in the assessment of the value of a piece of land its future use for a particular purpose could only be taken into account if that use was not only legally possible but also probable in the near future . The facts in the present case showed that the negative development of the applicant company's production of tiles was not due to the construction of the road, but to economic difficulties of a general character . In addition to the findings of the District Court, it appeared that already in 1964 the applicant company had not had the intention to extend the excavation of the clay in the direction of the new road . If a real possibility to use the clay deposit lost by the construction of the road had not existed, there was no basis to claim compensation for the loss of the clay in question . It was true that at the time of the expropriation it could not be excluded that at some date in the future this clay might be needed again ; however, already at that date, it was forseeable that it would not be possible in the near future to draw profit from this clay deposit . This was confirmed in 1972 when the company sold its plants without selling at the same time the lots affected by the expropriation . This showed that the clay deposits contained in these lots were not of any particular interest for the buyer, and that their exclusion from the sales contract had not influenced the price . The Court concluded that the company had not suffered any loss of profit by the expropriation, and accordingly was not entitled to claim any compensation under this title . The District Court therefore had rightly determined the compensation on the basis of the agricultural and forestry value of the expropriated land . 9 . The applicant company appealed further to the Supreme Court, which, however, rejected this appeal as inadmissible on 1 June 1978 . The Supreme Court found that it was only competent to receive an appeal direcled against the decision of the appellate court confirming the decision of the first court if it contained a manifest violation of the law . The applicant company had based its appeal on the argument that the refusal of a compensation in respect of the clay deposit manifestly violated Section 4 (1) of the Railway Expropriation Act which provided for .a compensation in respect of all damages caused to the property of the expropriated party . The Suprem e
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Court, however, found that this legal provision was not so clear as to exclude any doubts as to the intentions of the legislator . The interpretation given of this provision by the Regional Court, namely that compensation in respect of mineral wealth contained in expropriated land must only be paid if its exploitation was not only possible, but probable in the near future, did not manifestly violate the law .
COMPLAINTS 1 . The applicant company now alleges breaches of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, of Article 1 of Protocol No . 1, and of Article 14 of the Convention in connection with Article 1 of the Protocol . 2 . The company complains under Article 6 of the Convention of the length of proceedings in the present case . In this respect it submits that it was in fact expropriated on 7 March 1966 when the Provincial Government ordered to begin the construction of the road in the relevant area, without a valid title . The decision to expropriate the company was only made on 2 October 1969, and on 2 December 1969 it applied to the court to determine the compensation . The court of first instance, however, did not decide the case before 6 October 1977 when the applicant company had already filed the present complaint with the Commission . In a letter of 6 February 1978 the Federal Chancellery admitted that "in view of the proceedings pending since 1969 it is difficult to speak of a 'reasonable time' (dass "angesichts des seit 1969 anhdngigen Verfahrens . . . von einer 'angermessenen Frist' schwerlich gesprochen werden" kann) . In the companys view this unreasonable length of procedure could neither be justified by the fact that the judge of the District Court changed five times before a decision was taken, nor by the difficulties to fix the court hearings at dates agreeable to all experts . Two of these experts declared that they were only competent to determine the agricultural value of the land, and the delays caused by these experts could easily have been avoided if the court had appointed an agricultural expert residing in the district of the competent Regional Court itself . Also the time needed by the geological expert to prepare his opinion (2S4 years between 8 January 1971 and 18 June 1973) and the delay until he found time to discuss this opinion with the court Ifor the first time on 23 January 19751 was unjustified . Moreover this opinion was not complete and needed to be supplemented several times . Finally the Court even renounced a discussion of the last supplementary opinion with the parties "because otherwise it would most probably have been obliged to obtain a further supplementary opinion" . The applicant company also considers as absolutely unnecessary the various delays caused by the imposition of costs on the Provincial Government and the Provincial Government's appeals concerning these cost decisions .
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3 . The applicant company fu rt her complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings in its case have not been feir . In this respect it refers in pa rt icular to the circumstance that the District Court renounced a discussion of the last supplementa ry opinion of the geological expert with the parties . In this connection, the District Court had relied on a dictum of the Supreme Court stating that it was not necessary that the contents of all investigations are brought to the knowledge of the parties . However, the applicant company considers this procedure incompatible with the principle of fair trial . The company further complains generally that the evidence in its case was taken in a one-sided way . According to the case-law of the Constitutional Court, it constitutes a violation of the principles of equality and fair trial if in a given situation a court only considers one set of circumstances and does not at the same time deal with reasons striking for a different interpretation . On this line of argument, the applicant company submitted inter alia, that a statement made by its manager had been used by the Court in a distorted way . Mr H . had admitted that, in general, the market for tiles was declining in 1964/1965 ; however, he had added that in his view there were still good chances to sell tiles for purposes of repair works . This was confirmed by the later development of the market, but the Cou rt had completely neglected the latter part of Mr H .'s statement . In the company's view it was also unfair that the Cou rt insinuated that the company had not had a real intention to continue its production . In fact, investments were made having regard to the available means until the year 1964, and were only stopped thereafter due to the effects of the road construction, when the authorities were not prepared to indicate the necessary security measures and threatened that they would hold the company responsible for any damages caused to the new road . The Court drew wholly absurd conclusions from the company's application of 6 March 1969, for permission to work the clay in the relevant area, and the company's failure to pursue this application any further . In this context, the Cou rt stated that the company had not fulfilled the conditions set by the administrative authority, but omitted to quote one essential condition, namely the clarification of the legal issues concerning the public way leading across the property in question . A settlement of this issue was only reached in 1972 when it was already too late to continue the production because the company's plant had been sold . ~ Furthermore, the company considered it as unfair that this sale was dealt with as if it had been effected voluntarily and not as a consequence of the expropriation proceedings . In fact, the tax auhorities had recognised that the sale was the consequence of the expropriation, and had accorded a reduction of the company's income tax .
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The Court had also failed to take into account the costs for putting the lost clay on stock, and the deterioration of the quality of the clay which would have been the consequence of this measure . This question could only be iudged by the brickworks expert, and not the geological expert who had in fact expressed doubts in this respect . Furthermore, the company considers as unfair the conclusions drawn by the Court from the exclusion of the land affected by the expropriation from the sale of its plant, and the court's statement that the clay contained in this land could not be used otherwise than in the company's own plant . The company could in fact name an enterprise which was interested in buying the said clay, and the land in question had been excluded from the contract only in order to safeguard the company's rights in the expropriation proceedings . 4 . The applicant company complains under Article 13 of the Convention that it has not had an effective remedy because its further appeal to the supreme Court had been rejected as inadmissible . The Supreme Court would only have accepted the appeal if there had been a violation of the express and clear text of the law, but it had had no doubts concerning the one-sided taking of evidence in the present case . In non-contentious proceedings, the courts were not in any way restricted in the manner in which they evaluated the evidence, and this had given rise to criticism in legal writings . Generally speaking, non-contentious proceedings were not well-suited to deal with contentious issues such as in the present case . 5 . As regards the alleged breach of the applicant company's property rights (Article 1 of Protocol No . 1), the company first of all complains that it was refused the legal compensation due to it as a consequence of the Court's failure to comply with the principles of fair trial or fair hearing (see under 3 above) The result is that not only compensation in respect of the loss of profit, but even in respect of the net value of the clay deposit has been refused to it, although the Courts recognised the principle that compensation must be determined on the basis of the loss of profit . This principle was also applied in other parallel cases (see under 6 below) . The applicant company further complains that no valorisation of the compensation since the date of the expropriation seems to be possible . This circumstance is aggravated by the particular length of proceedings in the present case and the rate of inflation during the relevant period (i .e . 70 per cent) . In expropriation proceedings the relevant time for determining the compensation is the date of the expropriation decision, while in contentious proceedings interests are always due from the date of bringing the action . The applicant company finally complains that it had to bear its own costs for legal representation and expert opinions amounting to some 2,5 million AS .
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6 . Finally as regards the alleged breach of Article 14 of the Convention lin connection with Article 1 of the Protocoll, the applicant company submits that in similar cases the courts awarded compensation in respect of clay deposits lost as a consequence of expropriation proceedings . In one case (Y . Ziegelwerk GmbHl the compensation under this title was 1,4 million, and in another case IZiegelei Z .), it was 4,5 million AS, although in those cases the clay in question was less valuable and not suited for the production of tiles . In another case which was decided by the Administrative Court because the restriction of property rights in that case was based on the Water Act, the Administrative Court had also recognised that compensation must be paid in respect of the loss of profit, and the value of the clay deposit in question . The company submits that the different treatment in its own case amounts to discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention .
THE LAW 1 . The applicant company complains of the conduct of court proceedings concerning the determination of an exprorpiation compensation . It has first alleged a breach of Article 6 111 of the Convention by reason of the failure of the court to give its decision within a reasonable time . It has further alleged a violation of the principles of fair trial . Article 6 111 provides inter alia that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law . a. The Commission first observes that while an expropriation as such may be considered as an administrative matter outside the scope of the above provision of the Convention, the fixing of the compensation to which this expropriation gives rise is a matter which concerns the determination of the civil rights and obligations of the expropriated party . It follows that Article 6 111 is applicable in this respect, and the applcant company's complaints based on this provision cannot therefore be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention . The proceedings concerning the determination of the expropriatio n .b compensation in the present case were conducted in two consecutive stages : According to the provisions of the Railway Expropriation Act applicable by virtue of the provisions of the Upper Austrian Provincial Road Administration Act, there was first an administrative proceeding taking place before the Provincial Government, and subsequently a non-contentious judicial proceeding taking place before the ordinary courts of three different degrees
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IDisctrict Court - Regional Court - Supreme Court) . The Commission is satisfied that the latter courts have the attributes of independent and impartial tribunals established by law as required by Article 6 (1) of the Convention . The fact that their decisions were preceded by an administrative decision of the Provincial Government does not in itself give rise to any doubts with regard to the observance of the institutional guarantees of a court procedure as laid down in Article 6 111 as the filing of an action with the District Court had the effect that the administrative decision was thereby completely set aside and the ensuing court proceedings were in no way bound by it or otherwise restricted when determining the amount of compensation . The fact that the court proceedings followed an administrative proceeding is, however, relevant for the question whether or not the determination of the civil rights and obligations in question has been made within reasonable time as required by Article 6 (1) . c. As regards the applicant company's complaint concerning the length of procedure, the Commission first observes that the company must be considered as having complied with the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies laid down in Article 26 of the Convention because the Austrian law apparently did not provide it with an effective remedy by which it could claim its right to a court decision within a reasonable time . As the Commission found in its decision of 5 December 1978 on the admissibility of Application No 7464/76 ID .R . 14 p . 51) the only available remedy, namely a hierarchical appeal under Section 78 of the Act on the Organisation of Courts of Law, cannot be considered as sufficient . The Commission furthermore recalls its consistent case law according to which a complaint regarding the length of procedure may be brought even before the termination of the proceedings in question . The Commission is therefore called upon to deal with the substance ot the above complaint . d. The Commission notes that the expropriation in the present case in fact took place in the year 1965 when the Provincial Government decided to construct a road accross the applicant company's property . Although this was done on the basis of a legal title, namely an agreement concluded between the Provincial Government and the company's commanditaire, it later turned out that this title was defective, and it is therefore only in the year 1969 that the expropriation proceedings were instituted . It does not appear that the applicant company complains of the length of the court proceedings prior to the institution of the expropriation proceedings, nor would it be entitled to do so several years after these proceedings have come to an end (cf . the six months' rule laid down in Article 26 of the Convention) . The Commission therefore considers that the "reasonable timÃ©" envisaged by Article 6 (1) of the Convention only started to run in the present case when the applicant company's civil rights and obligations with regard to the expropriation compensation were first considered in the context of th e
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expropriation proceedings (as distinguished 'from the earlier proceedings concerning the validity of the sales agreement of December 1964) . This was at some date between July 1968 and February 1969 . The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must .however be judged in the light of the particular circumstances of the case . Following the administrative proceedings before the Provincial Government of Upper Austria, the District Court of,R . was seized with the case by an apolication of 2 December 1969, but it did not take a decision before 60ctober 1977, i .e . several months after thelfiling of .the present application with the Commission and almost eight years after these proceedings were brought . The applicant company's appeal against that judgment was rejected by the Regional Court on 24 January 1978 and its further appeal declared inadmissible by the Supreme Court on'1 June 1978 . The proceedings concerned having thus continued during altogether more than eight years, the Commission is called upon to examine whether or not the applicant company's civil rightsâ¢and obligations were determined within a reasonable time, within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention In doing so, it must have regard to~the complexity of the case, to the manner in which the domestic authorities and courts handled it, and to the conduct of the applicant company itself (cf . the Commission's and Court's earlier case law, e .g . E .C .H .R ., judgment of 28 June 1978 in the Kbnig case, 4 99) . Having regard to all these factors and the position taken by the Government themselves-both in the letter addressed to the applicant company's manager by the Federal Chancellery on 6 February 1978 and in their observations on the admissibility of this application where they have refrained from contesting the applicant company's complaint concerning the length of procedure-the Commission comes to the ~conclusion that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . No other ground having been establsihed for declaring this part of the application inadmissible, the Commission must accept it for an examination as to its merits . e. The Commission now turns to the examination of the applicant company's further complaint under Article 6 (1), namely the complaint that it did not have a fair trial . In this respect, it is first necessary to deal with the Government's objection that the complaint is inadmissible for failure to exhaust the domestic remedies in accordance with the requirements of Article 26 of the Convention, the application having been filed before even the .court of first instance gave its decision . However, the Commission observes that in its original application of 12 May 1977 the applicant company's complaint unde r
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Article 6 ( 1) was in essence limited to the question of the length of procedure . The complaints concerning the fairness of the trial were only submitted on 26 July 1978, i .e . after the termination of the domestic proceedings by the Supreme Court's decision of 1 June 1978 . The fact that the applicant company had already previously entered an application with regard to the length of the procedure could not deprive it of its right under Article 25 of the Convention to lodge a further complaint regarding the fairness of the procedure once the domestic remedies have been duly exhausted, and there is nothing in the Convention which would bar the Commission from dealing with these two complaints in the same procedure . It also appears that the substance of the applicant company's complaints regarding the fairness of the procedure have already been raised in the domestic appeal proceedings . It follows that this complaint cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust the domestic remedies . Insofar as the applicant company complains of the judicial decisions in its case, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention . In particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention . The Commission refers, on this point, to its constant jurisprudence Isee e .g . decisions on the admissibility of Applications Nos . 458/59, Yearbook 3, pp . 22, 236 and 1140/61, Collection of Decisions 8, pp . 57, 62 ) It is true that in this case the applicant company also complains that the evidence was taken in a one-sided way, and in particular that the court renounced to a discussion of the last supplementary opinion of the geological expert with the parties . However, the Commission is satisfied that the taking of evidence was not in effect imbalanced or incomplete, and for that reason unfair . The only objection which in the Commission's opinion could be made against the court's approach to the taking of evidence from the standpoint of fairness is the fact that in the end it turned out that most of the very costly and time consuming geological expert opinions were in effect superfluous . This circumstance is already taken into account in the Commission's above finding that the applicant company's complaint concerning the length of procedure is not manifestly ill-founded . The Commission therefore considers that there is no appearance of an additional breach of the principle of fair trial by the same reason . What the applicant company really seems to complain of is not so much the court's method of taking the evidence but its evaluation of this evidence . This, however, is a matter which necessarily comes within th e
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appreciation of the independent and impartial courts and cannot be reviewed by the Commission unless there is an indication that the judge has drawn grossly unfair or arbitrary conclusions from the facts before him . This does not seem to be the case here . On the basis of the voluminous evidence which it had before it, the court came to the conclusion that the applicant company had not really intended to use the clay in the expropriated land within the near future, a legal condition which would have entitled it to compensation in respect of the value of the clay deposit . The court further came to the conclusion that the company's decisions to stop the production in 1965 and to sell its plant in 1972, although they may have been subjectively motivated by the expropriation, had been objectively unjustified for this reason . It therefore refused the compensation in respect of the claimed loss of profit . The District Court's findings on the facts were also shared by the Regional Court, and the Supreme Court could not discover a manifest error in the application of the law by the lower courts . The Commission considers that the reasons on which the courts based their above decisions are sufficient to exclude the assumption that the evaluation of the evidence had been arbitrary . The Commission therefore concludes that the applicant company's allegations of a violation of the principles of fair trial in the taking and evaluation of the evidence in this case are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . 2 . The applicant company has also alleged a violation of its right under Article 13 of the Convention to an effective remedy before a national authority, with regard to its above complaints under Article 6 (1) of the Convention . As the said complaints do in fact come within the scope of this provision, it follows that Article 13 is in principle applicable . a. Insofar as the applicant company complains of the absence of an effective domestic remedy by which it could have claimed its right to a court decision within a reasonable time, the Commission has already found above that no such remedy exists under the Austrian law . This complaint is not therefore manifeslty ill-founded and must be declared admissible . b . Insofar as the applicant company complains of the absence of an effective domestic remedy by which it could have claimed its right to a fair trial, the Commission has however found above that the domestic appeal proceedings had to be exhausted for the purpose of Article 26 of the Conventiori before an application relying on the obligation under Article 6 (1) to provide a fair trial could be made to the Commission . The Commission considers that these appeal proceedings also constituted an effective remedy to a national authority within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention . This part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
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3 . The applicant company has further complained that the refusal of an expropriation compensation in respect of the clay deposit contained in the expropriated land, and in respect of the loss of profit allegedly caused by the expropriation, amounted to a violation of its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No . 1 to the Convention . Paragraph 1 of this provision provides that no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law . The Commission notes that the applicant company was in fact deprived of its possessions by the expropriation . It is not contested that this expropriation was in the public interest . The applicant company being a legal person under Austrian law and with its seat in Austria, no issue arises as to the application of the principles of international law . The only question therefore is whether the deprivation of possessions was effected under the "conditions provided for by law" . One of the essential conditions for the lawfulness of an expropriation in Austria is the award of an adequate compensation (angemessene Schadloshaltung, Section 365 of the Civil Code) . In the present case, this compensation was determined by the courts in the procedure provided by the Railway Expropriation Act which was applicable by virtue of the Provincial Road Administration Act . According to the principles developed in the case law of the courts, the mineral wealth contained in a piece of land will only be taken into account if the exploitation of this mineral wealth is intended in the foreseeable future . This principle was applied to the applicant company in the present case, but the courts found that it had not intended to use the clay deposit contained in the expropriated land within the foreseeable future and therefore refused a compensation in respect of it . The courts further applied another principle according to which the loss of profit gives only rise to compensation when it is directly caused by the expropriation in question . The courts found that this was not so in the present case . The Commission, having found that the relevant court procedure did not give rise to any doubts as to its fairness, must accept that the result at which the courts arrived did in fact correspond to the legal situation in Austria . There is therefore no room to doubt the lawfulness of the expropriation under the domestic law . The only issue which could therefore still arise is the question whether the domestic law, and in particular the exclusion of compensation in respect of mineral wealth contained in expropriated land which the owner does not intend to exploit within the foreseeable future, is itself in conformity with the Convention and the Protocol, including the general principles expressed or implied therein (cf . European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 24 October 1979 in the Winterwerp case, Â§ 45) . However, even assumin g
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that Articfe 1 111 of the Protocol in principle presupposes a right to compensation in the case ot an expropriation, it could not be said that it gives a right to a particular amount of compensation . It is true that in some cases, a substantial reduction of the compensation could be regarded as affecting the very substance of the right to compensation (cf . mutatis mutandis, the Commission's Report on Application No . 5849/72, MÃ¼ller v . Austria, Decisions and Reports 3, pp . 25, 31321, but the Commission considers that the exclusion of compensation in respect of mineral wealth which is not intended to be used in the foreseeable future and the payment of a compensation based exclusively on the agricultural value of the land in question, does not interfere with the substance of the right to compensation . The same is true with regard to the exclusion of a compensÃ¢tion for loss of profit which is not directly caused by ihe expropriatio n It lollows that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 1(1 ) of Protocol No . 1 and the applicant company's complaint in this respect is therefore manifestly ill-founded . 4 . The applicant company has finally complained of discrimination with regard to its property rights because a compensation for the clay deposit and the loss of profit was refused to it while it was awarded to other expropriated brickworks in similar circumstances . The company invokes Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Protocol .
Article 14 of the Convention secures to everyone the enjoyment of th nierightsandfomerth Cnvowthudiscrmnao any ground . The Commission finds that in the present case the different treatment of the applicant company and the other brickworks resulted not from the application of the law by the various courts, having regard to the respective status of the expropriated parties, but trom the legal distinction made in the law itself between property which gives rise to full compensation lincluding compensation for the mineral wealth and the loss of profit) and property which gives rise to only limited compensation on the basis of the agricultural value of the land in question . The reason for this legal distinction seems to be that the compensation must be proportionate to the real damage resulting from the expropriation, and that thÃ© award of compensation for a particular use of the expropriated land is not considered as adequate if this particular use is not intended in the foreseeable future, and if the claimed loss of profit does not directly result from the expropriation . The Commission consider that these grounds provide a reasonable justification for the legal distinction in question and therefore there is no appearance of a discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention in this respect . It follows that also this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
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For these reasons, the Commission - DECLARES ADMISSIBLE and retains for a consideration of the merits the applicant company's complaint under Article 6 111 of the Convention regarding the length of procedure and the related complaint under Article 13 of the Convention that there was no effective remedy to a national authority in this respect
- DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application .
(TRADUCTION ) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le directeur de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante, M . H ., assistÃ© par M . N ., peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante qui a son siÃ©ge Ã A ., Haute-Autriche, a Ã©tÃ© fondÃ©e en 1891 et existe sous forme de sociÃ©tÃ© en commandite depuis 1963 . A la suite de mesures d'expropriation frappant un immeuble dont la possession lui Ã©tait indispensable pour produire des tuiles, la sociÃ©tÃ© aurait Ã©tÃ© obligÃ©e de demander sa mise en liquidation en 1972 . La sociÃ©tÃ© se plaint des mesures d'expropriation, en particulier de l'insuffisance de l'indemnitÃ© et du dÃ©roulement de la procÃ©dure civile y affÃ©rente . 1 . C'est en 1964 que la sociÃ©tÃ© apprit que la Province de Haute-Autriche entendait exproprier l'une de ses propriÃ©tÃ©s (parcelle 470, commune de H .) en vue de construire une route . DÃ©s le stade du projet, la sociÃ©tÃ© forma opposition, faisant valoir que dans le pÃ©rimÃ©tre visÃ© se trouvait un gisement d'argile dont elle avait besoin pour fabriquer des tuiles, qu'aucun autre gisement argileux de la qualitÃ© voulue n'existait dans ses autres propriÃ©tÃ©s et que la possession de ce terrain particulier lui Ã©tait donc indispensable . Elle demandait par consÃ©quent une modification du tracÃ© de la route . La sociÃ©tÃ© n'aurait pas Ã©levÃ© d'objections majeures Ã un projet prÃ©cÃ©dent (Ã©largissement de la route existante) pour lequel elle aurait dÃ» cÃ©der des terrains qui avaient dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© exploitÃ©s . NÃ©anmoins, la procÃ©dure en vue de la construction de la route, de l'acquisition des terrains et de l'expropriation fut entamÃ©e en novembre 1964, malgrÃ© les objections susmentionnÃ©es de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante .
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2 . Le 26 janvier 1965, le Gouvernement provincial ordonna la construction de la route au travers de la parcelle NÂ° 470 . Le 26 fÃ©vrier 1965, la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante informa le Gouvernement provincial qu'Ã son avis il n'existait ni un accord valable concernant l'acquisition de propriÃ©tÃ©, ni une dÃ©cision d'expropriation conforme Ã la loi . La sociÃ©tÃ© refusait de reconnaÃ®tre un accord signÃ© en dÃ©cembre 1964 par l'un de ses commanditaires, Ã l'insu et sans le consentement de son directeur . La validitÃ© de cet accord fit par la suite l'objet d'un procÃ¨s intentÃ© par la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante contre la Province de Haute-Autriche et le tribunal rÃ©gional de Linz confirma, dans une dÃ©cision du 4 avril 1968, que l'existence d'un accord n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© Ã©tablie . 3 . Le Gouvernement provincial dÃ©cida alors d'engager une nouvelle procÃ©dure d'expropriation afin de rÃ©gulariser la situation . Entre temps la route avait Ã©tÃ© construite et la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante ne contestait donc pas la nÃ©cessitÃ© de l'expropriation en soi . Elle n'Ã©tait cependant pas d'accord avec le Gouvernement provincial sur le montant de l'indemnitÃ© . Lors de la procÃ©dure administrative d'expropriation la sociÃ©tÃ© rÃ©clama, outre la valeur agricole du terrain, une indemnitÃ© pour la perte du gisement d'argile et pour la moins-value de certains investissements qu'elle avait effectuÃ©s en vue de la future exploitation de ce gisement . Bien que l'argile n'ait pas Ã©tÃ© effectivement exploitÃ©, le Gouvernement provincial acceptait que l'indemnitÃ© soit, en principe, fixAe en fonction non pas de l'usage du terrain au moment de l'expropriation mais de la possibilitÃ©, qui existait dÃ©jÃ Ã l'Ã©poque, de l'utiliser Ã d'autres fins . Le Gouvernement provincial chargea donc un expert en briqueterie de dÃ©terminer la valeur du gisement d'argile . D'aprÃ©s le rapport d'expertise, soumis le 12 fÃ©vrier 1969, le dommage rÃ©sultant de la perte du gisement d'argile Ã©tait estimÃ©e au total Ã environ 83 000 Sch (schillings autrichiens) . Selon l'expert, il n'y avait pas lieu de verser une indemnitÃ© pour certaines installations dont la sociÃ©tÃ© prÃ©tendait qu'elles avaient perdu toute utilitÃ© aprÃ¨s l'expropriation . Ce rapport fut examinÃ© le 20 fÃ©vrier 1969, lors d'une audience, au cours de laquelle la municipalitÃ© d'A ., partie Ã la procÃ©dure d'expropriation, fit valoir qu'une voie publique traversant le terrain en question, l'exploitation de la totalitÃ© du gisement argileux Ã©tait, en tout cas, impossible . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante objecta que le droit de passage sur cette voie Ã©tait Ã©teint par la prescription, mais l'autoritÃ© compÃ©tente en matiÃ©re d'expropriation demanda Ã l'expert de complÃ©ter son rapport en tenant compte de l'existence de ladite voie publique . L'expert rÃ©duisait alors son estimation du dommage Ã 58 000 Sch . Dans sa dÃ©cision d'exproprier du 2 octobre 1969, le Gouvernement provincial ne fixait pourtant le montant de l'indemnisation qu'Ã 11 205 Sch ., soit la valeur agricole de la parcelle . Une demande de la sociÃ©tÃ© en vue d'obtenir une indemnisation sÃ©parÃ©e pour le gisement d'argile fut rejetÃ©e pour le motif que ladite voie publique sÃ©parait la partie expropriÃ©e de la parcelle des terrains exploitÃ©s par la sociÃ©tÃ©, laquelle ne possÃ©dait pas, n'avait jamais possÃ©dÃ© et ne pouvait espÃ©rer obtenir un permis d'exploitation pour l'argile situÃ© au-del Ã
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de cette voie publique' . L'autoritÃ© compÃ©tente considÃ©rait par consÃ©quent que la production de tuiles de la sociÃ©tÃ© n'Ã©tait aucunement affectÃ©e par l'expropriation et qu'en rÃ©alitÃ© c'Ã©tait pour d'autres raisons qu'elle avait Ã©tÃ© arrÃªtÃ©e . 4 . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante, non satisfaite par cette dÃ©cision administrative, forma le 2 dÃ©cembre 1969 un recours auprÃ©s du tribunal compÃ©tent, le tribunal du district de R . pour fixer l'indemnitÃ© selon la procÃ©dure prÃ©vue par la loi sur l'expropriation en matiÃ©re de chemins de fer (BGBI . NÂ° 71/19541, applicable en vertu de la loi provinciale de Haute-Autriche sur l'administration des routes (Amtliche Linzer Zeitung NÂ° 1/1947) . Ce recours avait pour effet de mettre Ã nÃ©ant la dÃ©cision administrative, la fixation de l'indemnitÃ© devenant de la compÃ©tence exclusive des tribunaux, statuant selon les rÃ©gles de la juridiction gracieuse . Au cours de cette procÃ©dure judiciaire, la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante fonda sa demande d'indemnisation, dont elle estimait alors le montant Ã 30 millions Sch ., sur le manque 9 gagner rÃ©sultant de l'arrÃªt de sa production qu'elle prÃ©tendait exclusivement imputable Ã la construction de la nouvelle route . La sociÃ©tÃ© prÃ©tendait qu'elle avait provisoirement cessÃ© sa production de tuiles en 1964 parce que les services compÃ©tents n'Ã©taient pas disposÃ©s Ã lui indiquer les mesures de sÃ©curitÃ© qu'elle devait prendre pour continuer d'exploiter l'argile sans occasionner de dommages Ã la nouvelle route . II s'avÃ©ra par la suite que le gisement exploitable, Ã l'origine de 65 000 m3, se trouvait rÃ©duit Ã 15 000 m3, ce qui obligea la sociÃ©tÃ© Ã cesser dÃ©finitivement une production dont la poursuite ne paraissait plus Ã©conomiquement rentable . A l'appui de sa revendication la sociÃ©tÃ© produisit l'avis d'un expert privÃ©, un professeur de l'Ecole des Mines de Leoben . 5 . II semble qu'au cours de la premiÃ©re phase de la procÃ©dure judiciaire, l'existence prÃ©tendue d'une voie publique traversant la propriÃ©tÃ© en question continua de jouer un certain rÃ´le . La municipalitÃ© d'A . introduisit action devant le tribunal du district de R . pour affirmer ses droits sur cette voie publique . Cette demande fut nÃ©anmoins retirÃ©e par la suite et le tribunal du district de R . reconnut que le caractÃ©re de voie publique avait Ã©tÃ© perdu par prescription acquisitive . Le 5 dÃ©cembre 1972, la propriÃ©tÃ© de la voie fut attribuÃ©e Ã la sociÃ©tÃ© avec le consentement de la Cour d'appel de Linz . 6 . Dans l'affaire d'expropriation, le tribunal dÃ©cida de consulter plusieurs experts : - Deux experts, spÃ©cialistes des indemnitÃ©s d'expropriation et rÃ©sidant respectivement Ã Vienne et VillaÃ h furent dÃ©signÃ©s le 5 mai 1970 . NÃ©anmoins , ' En fah, la sociÃ©tÃ© avait demandÃ© ce permis d'eaploiiation en mars 1969, mais ia prÃ©fectwe du district IBezirkshauptmannschaftl, qui Ã©tait comoÃ©tente, avait dACidÃ© le 22 mai 1989 de surseoir Ã l'exemen de la demande Ãusqu'A ce que solent rÃ©glÃ©es cenaines questions de dioil relatives 8 la voie oublique .
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le tribunal ne formula ses questions aux experts que le 10 avril 1976 . Le rapport d'expertise qu'ils prÃ©sentÃ©rent le 26 avril 1976 concernait uniquement la valeur agricole des terres expropriÃ©es . Lorsque les deux experts rÃ©clamÃ¨rent leurs honoraires (environ 21 000 et 19 000 Sch respectivement), la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante forma opposition, faisant valoir que pour un avis sur la valeur agricole, on aurait pu tout aussi bien consulter des experts rÃ©sidant sur le territoire du ressort du tribunal d'arrondissement, et que les frais de dÃ©placement de ces experts et les importants retards dont ils Ã©taient la cause n'Ã©taient pas justifiÃ©s . Le Gouvernement provincial dÃ©clara Ã©galement dans une note du 18 mai 1976, qu'Ã son avis, on aurait pu Ã©viter de consulter lesdits experts . - Un expert gÃ©ologue fut invitÃ© Ã estimer la valeur du gisement d'argile Ã l'aide de sondages . Les parties acceptÃ©rent le principe de cette expertise lors d'une audience en date du 6 novembre 1970 . Le tribunal dÃ©signa l'expert le 8 janvier 1971 . Celui-ci procÃ©da aux investigations in situ le 20 dÃ©cembre 1971 en prÃ©sence des parties et prÃ©senta son rapport le 18 juin 1973 . II fallut annuler une premiÃ©re audience fixÃ©e le 22 novembre 1974, le gÃ©ologue n'ayant pu Ãªtre prÃ©venu et les deux autres experts Ã©tant Ã©galement empÃªchÃ©s . Le tribunal fixa une nouvelle audience au 23 janvier 1975 ; une autre eut lieu le 12 mars 1976 et le 23 juin 1976 le tribunal demanda Ã l'expert-gÃ©ologue un complÃ©ment d'expertise . Les rÃ©ponses de l'expert aux questions complÃ©mentaires furent prÃ©sentÃ©es le 28 juillet 1976 . Le principal problÃ©me posÃ© par cette expertise fut celui de savoir qui devrait en avancer les frais . DÃ©jÃ dans sa dÃ©cision nommant l'expert, le tribunal avait ordonnÃ© Ã la Province de Haute-Autriche de verser un acompte provisionnel de 30000 Sch . Cette dÃ©cision se fondait sur l'article 44 de la loi sur l'expropriation en matiÃ©re de chemins de fer, qui stipule que les frais affÃ©rents Ã l'Ã©valuation de l'indemnitÃ© sont Ã la charge de l'entreprise de chemins de fer (l'expropriant), sauf s'ils sont occasionnÃ©es par une intervention injustifiÃ©e de la partie expropriÃ©e . Le Gouvernement provincial recourut contre cette dÃ©cision, allÃ©guant que l'intervention de la sociÃ©tÃ© Ã©tait injustifiÃ©e . Mais ce recours fut rejetÃ© par le tribunal rÃ©gional de R . le 1â¢â¢ mars 1971 . Le 21 juillet 1972, le tribunal de district ordonna Ã la Province de rÃ©gler certains autres frais, y compris ceux des sondages, s'Ã©levant Ã environ 131 000 Sch . Le Gouvernement provincial introduisit un nouveau recours, allÃ©guant que le point de savoir si l'intervention de la sociÃ©tÃ© Ã©tait ou non justifiÃ©e ne pourrait Ãªtre Ã©clairci qu'Ã l'issue du procÃ©s et que, par ailleurs, la loi ne prÃ©voyait aucun acompte provisionnel pour ces frais . Le tribunal rÃ©gional lui donna en partie raison en dÃ©cidant, le 5 septembre 1972, que les frais seraient provisoirement rÃ©glÃ©s par le greffe du tribunal . Le 6 novembre 1972, le Greffe adressa une sommation aux deux parties afin de se faire rembourser . Les deux parties formÃ©rent opposition contre ces sommations, la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante arguant qu'elle n'Ã©tait nullement obligÃ©e de supporter ces frais, le Gouvernement provincial invoquant Ã nouveau l'attitude prÃ©tenduement injustifiÃ©e de la sociÃ©tÃ© et la non-obligatio n
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de payer un acompte provisionnel . Par une dÃ©cision du 16 janvier 1973, le PrÃ©sident du tribunal rÃ©gional jugea fondÃ©es les objections de la sociÃ©tÃ© et dÃ©bouta le Gouvernement provincial . Celui-ci n'eut pas plus de succÃ©s avec un autre recours introduit auprÃ©s du tribunal administratif qui, le 18 octobre 1973, dÃ©cida que les frais en question devaient Ã©tre supportÃ©s par la Province, Ã titre non seulement provisoire mais dÃ©finitif . Pour ce tribunal, la question de savoir si l'intervention de la partie expropriÃ©e Ã©tait justifiÃ©e ou non, ne dÃ©pendait pas de l'issue du procÃ©s et rien n'indiquait, en l'espÃ¨ce, que cette intervention avait Ã©tÃ© injustifiÃ© e - Un autre expert fut chargÃ© d'examiner la mÃ©thode de production de sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante . Cet expert fut dÃ©signÃ© le 23 juin 1976 sur proposition de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante, qui forma nÃ©anmoins opposition quant Ã la personne choisie . Le Gouvernement provincial contesta Ã©galement la dÃ©cision de procÃ©der Ã cette expertise, n'ayant pas Ã©tÃ© consultÃ© au prÃ©alable et n'ayant Ã©tÃ© informÃ© de la dÃ©signation dudit expert qu'au moment oÃ¹ le rapport d'expertise, en date du 1â¢ 1 juillet 1976, lui fut communiquÃ©, le 3 aoÃ»t 1976 . Le recours du Gouvernement provincial au tribunal rÃ©gional, puis un pourvoi devant la Cour suprÃ©me furent toutefois rejetÃ©s IdÃ©cision du 13 janvier 1977) . 7 . Se fondant sur les rapports des experts susmentionnÃ©s , le tribunal du district de R . dÃ©cida, le 6 octobre 1977, de n'accorder qu'une indemnitÃ© de 16 979,70 Sch et rejeta la demande de la sociÃ©tÃ© pour une indemnitÃ© supplÃ©mentaire de 29 983 920 .30 Sch . Le tribunal constata que les parcelles expropriÃ©es Ã©taient en partie cultivÃ©s et en partie recouvertes de forÃªts . Elles contenaient de l'argile d'une qualitÃ© particuliÃ©rement appropriÃ©e Ã la production de tuiles . La superficie totale des terrains Ã©tait de 9 000 m2 et la superficie exploitable avait Ã©tÃ© rÃ©duite Ã 6 800 m2 par la construction de cette route . Il restait, aprÃ©s la construction de cette route, 30 400 m3 d'argile exploitable et 17 800 m3 ld'une valeur de 67 640 Sch) avaient Ã©tÃ© perdus . Avant 1935, la sociÃ©tÃ© avait exploitÃ© le gisement d'argile en direction de la nouvelle route mais par la suite, elle ne l'avait plus exploitÃ© qu'en profondeur . L'argile encore disponible aprÃ¨s la construction de la route aurait permis de poursuivre la production de tuiles pendant 10 ans Ã raison de 1,5 millions de tuiles par an, ou pendant 7 1/2 ans, Ã raison de 2 millions de tuiles par an . Mais l'argile dont la construction de la route interdisait l'exploitation aurait pu Ãªtre stockÃ© pour usage ultÃ©rieur . Dans ce cas, la production aurait pu se poursuivre pendant 12 ans . Sa situation financiÃ©re n'ayant cessÃ© de se dÃ©grader depuis 1965, la sociÃ©tÃ© avait Ã©tÃ© finalement contrainte de vendre la tuilerie en 1972 . Avant 1969, la sociÃ©tÃ© n'avait jamais sÃ©rieusement essayÃ© d'obtenir un permis d'exploitation de l'argile dans le pÃ©rimÃ©tre concernÃ© . Ce n'est qu'en mars 1969 qu'elle fit une demande de permis au service compÃ©tent du district . Ce faisant, elle avait expressÃ©ment mentionnÃ© le lien qui existait avec l'affaire d'expropriation . Au cours de la procÃ©dure, la sociÃ©tÃ© fut avertie qu'elle devai t -
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remplir certaines conditions pour obtenir le permis . Ces conditions n'ayant pas Ã©tÃ© remplies, aucune dÃ©cision ne fut prise . La sociÃ©tÃ© ne sollicita pas non plus de dÃ©cision de l'instance supÃ©rieure en application de l'article 73 du Code gÃ©nÃ©ral de procÃ©dure administrative . Le tribunal estima que la demande d'indemnitÃ© de la sociÃ©tÃ© se fondait sur la perte des gains qu'elle aurait pu rÃ©aliser au cas oÃ¹ elle aurait encore disposÃ© de la totaGtÃ© du gisement Mais ces gains n'auraient pu Ãªtre rAaFsÃ©s qu'Ã long terme, sur une pÃ©riode dÃ©passant considÃ©rablement la date de l'expropriation . Or, la sociÃ©tÃ© ayant vendu sa tuilerie en 1972, elle n'aurait, en tout cas, pas pu utiliser l'argile qui restait au moment de la vente aprÃ©s la construction de la route . Par contre, elle aurait pu, avant que la route ne soit construite, extraire la totalitÃ© de l'argile pour le stocker . La sociÃ©tÃ© aurait ainsi (comme elle en avait l'obligation juridiquel limitÃ© les pertes et utilisÃ© la totalitÃ© de l'argile . Le fait que la sociÃ©tÃ© n'avait pas demandÃ© le permis d'exploitation avant 1969 prouvait qu'elle n'avait pas vraiment, antÃ©rieurement, l'intention d'exploiter le dÃ©pBt d'argile en quesiion pour sa production . Manifestement, la sociÃ©tÃ© n'avait demandÃ© ce permis que pour pouvoir rÃ©clamer une indemnitÃ© plus forte . Par consÃ©quent, la demande d'indemnitÃ© pour le gisement d'argile perdu en raison de l'expropriation n'Ã©tait pas fondÃ©e et l'indemnitÃ© devait Ã©tre uniquement fixÃ©e sur la base de la valeur agricole et sylvicole des terres .
8 . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante interjeta appel de cette dÃ©cision du tribunal de district devant le tribunal rÃ©gional de R ., qui la dÃ©bouta le 24 janvier 1978 . Le tribunal rÃ©gional estima que, lors de l'apprÃ©ciation de la valeur d'un terrain, l'on ne pouvait tenir compte de sa future affectation Ã une fin prÃ©cise que si cette affectation Ã©tait non seulement juridiquement possible mais Ã©galement probable dans un proche avenir . Or, les faits de la cause montraient que la baisse de la production de tuiles de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante Ã©tait due non pas Ã la construction de la route mais Ã des difficultÃ©s Ã©conomiques de caractÃ©re gÃ©nÃ©ral . Outre les constatations du tribunal de district, il apparaissait que dÃ©s 1964 la sociÃ©tÃ© n'avait plus l'intention de poursuivre l'extraction de l'argile dans la direction de la nouvelle route . S'il n'existait pas de possibilitÃ© rÃ©elle d'exploiter le gisement d'argile perdu en raison de la construction de la route, la demande d'indemnitÃ© pour la perle de cet argile n'Ã©tait donc pas fondÃ©e . Certes, au moment de l'expropriation, il n'Ã©tait pas exclu que l'on ait un jour besoin d'argile ; mais dÃ©jÃ Ã cette Ã©poque, on pouvait prÃ©voir qu'il serait impossible de tirer profit du gisement dans un proche avenir. Le fait qu'en 1972, la sociÃ©tÃ© ait vendu sa fabrique sans vendre en mÃªme temps les parcelles touchÃ©es par l'expropriation confirmait cette hypothÃ©se . Il Ã©tait clair que l'argile contenu dans ces parcelles ne prÃ©sentait pas un intÃ©rÃ©t particulier pour l'acheteur et que son exclusion du contrat n'avait pas eu de rÃ©percussions sur le prix de vente . Le tribunal rÃ©gional en dÃ©duisit que la sociÃ©tÃ© n'avait souffert aucun manque Ã gagne r
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du fait de l'expropriation et qu'elle n'avait donc pas droit Ã une indemnitÃ© Ã ce titre . C'Ã©tait donc Ã juste titre que le tribunal de district avait fixÃ© le montant de l'indemnitÃ© d'aprÃ©s la seule valeur agricole et sylvicole des terres expropriÃ©es . 9 . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante introduisit un pourvoi devant la Cour suprÃªme qui, le 1 - juin 1978, le rejeta comme irrecevable . La Cour suprÃªme dÃ©clara qu'elle ne pouvait Ã©tre saisie d'un pourvoi contre un arrÃ©t d'appel confirmant le jugement d'un tribunal de premiÃ¨re instance qu'en cas de violation manifeste de la loi . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante avait invoquÃ© Ã l'appui de son pourvoi que le refus d'une indemnitÃ© pour le gisement d'argile constituait une violation manifeste de l'article 4, paragraphe 1 de la loi sur l'expropriation en matiÃ©re de chemins de fer, lequel prÃ©voit l'indemnisation de tous les dommages causÃ©s aux biens de l'expropriÃ© . La Cour suprÃªme estima cependant que le libellÃ© de cette disposition n'Ã©tait pas si clair qu'il excluait le moindre doute quant Ã l'intention du lÃ©gislateur . L'interprÃ©tation de cette disposition par le tribunal rÃ©gional, selon laquelle une indemnitÃ© pour richesse miniÃ©re contenue dans les terrains expropriÃ©s ne doit Ã©tre accordÃ©e que si l'exploitation de cette richesse est non seulement possible mais probable dans un avenir proche ne constituait pas une violation manifeste de la loi . Griefs 1 . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante allÃ©gue une violation des anicles 6 et 13 de la Convention, de l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel et de l'article 14 de la Convention combinÃ© Ã l'article 1 du Protocole . 2 . Se fondant sur l'article 6 de la Convention, la sociÃ©tÃ© se plaint de la longueur de la procÃ©dure dans la prÃ©sente affaire . A cet Ã©gard, elle dÃ©clare avoir Ã©tÃ© en fait expropriÃ©e le 7 mars 1966 lorsque le Gouvernement provincial ordonna, sans titre valable, de commencer la construction de la route dans le pÃ©rimÃ©tre concernÃ© . La dÃ©cision d'exproprier ne fut prise que le 2 octobre 1969 et le 2 dÃ©cembre de la mÃªme annÃ©e la sociÃ©tÃ© demandait au tribunal de fixer le montant de l'indemnitÃ© . Le tribunal de premiÃ¨re instance n'a pourtant statuÃ© que le 6 octobre 1977, date Ã laquelle la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante avait dÃ©jÃ dÃ©posÃ© la prÃ©sente requÃªte devant la Commission . Dans une lettre du 6 fÃ©vrier 1978, la Chancellerie fÃ©dÃ©rale reconnaissait que Â« la procÃ©dure Ã©tant pendante depuis 1969, il est difficile de parler de 'dÃ©lai raisonnable' Â» (dass "angesichts des seit 1969 anhÃ©ngigen Verfahrens . . . von einer 'angemessenen Frist' schwerlich gesprochen werden" kann) . Selon la sociÃ©tÃ©, la longueur excessive de la procÃ©dure ne saurait se justifier ni par le fait que le juge du tribunal de district a changÃ© cinq fois avant le jugement, ni par la difficultÃ© de fixer pour les audiences des dates qui conviennent Ã tous les experts . Deux de ces experts se sont dÃ©clarÃ©s compÃ©tents uniquement pour estimer la valeur agricole des terres, et les retards qu'ils ont occasionnÃ©s auraient facilement pu Ãªtre Ã©vitÃ©s si le tribunal avait dÃ©signÃ© un expert agricol e
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rÃ©sidant sur le territoire du ressort du tribunal rÃ©gional compÃ©tent . Le dÃ©lai nÃ©cessaire Ã l'Ã©laboration du rapport de l'expert-gÃ©ologue (2 1/2 ans, soit du 8 janvier 1971 au 18 juin 19731 et celui qui s'est Ã©coulÃ© avant qu'il ne trouve le temps d'exposer son avis au tribunal (pour la premiÃ©re fois le 23 janvier 1976) nÃ© sont pas non plus justifiÃ©s . En outre, le rapport d'expertise Ã©tait incomplet et a nÃ©cessitÃ© plusieurs additifs . Le tribunal a mÃªme renoncÃ© Ã l'examen contradictoire du dernier complÃ©ment d'expertise, estimÃ¢nt Â« qu'autrement il lui aurait sans doute fallu demander encore de nouveaux Ã©claircissements . rr La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante considÃ¨re enfin comme absolument inutiles les divers dÃ©lais provoquÃ©s par l'imputation des frais au gouvernement provincial et les recours de ce dernier contre les sommations de payer .
3 . Toujours en se fondant sur l'anicle 6 de la Convention, la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaint Ã©galement que la procÃ©dure, en cette affaire, n'a pas Ã©tÃ© Ã©quitable . A cet Ã©gard, elle invoque en particulier le fait que le tribunal de district a renoncÃ© Ã l'examen contradictoire du dernier complÃ©ment d'expertise de l'expert-gÃ©ologue, en se fondant sur une jurisprudence de la Cour suprÃªme, selon laquelle il n'est pas nÃ©cessaire de porter le rÃ©sultat de toutes les investigations Ã la connaissance des parties . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante estime nÃ©anmoins que cette procÃ©dure est incompatible avec le principe du procÃ©s Ã©quitable . Elle se plaint aussi, d'une maniÃ¨re gÃ©nÃ©rale, que l'administration des preuves ait Ã©tÃ© conduite de maniÃ¨re unilatÃ©rale dans la prÃ©sente affaire . Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle, il y a violation des principes d'Ã©galitÃ© et du procÃ¨s Ã©quitable lorsque, dans une situation donnÃ©e, un tribunal ne considÃ©re qu'une seule sÃ©rie de circonstances, sans examiner en mÃªme temps les raisons incitant Ã une interprÃ©tation diffÃ©rente . Dans cet ordre d'idÃ©es, la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante prÃ©tend, entre autres, que le tribunal a utilisÃ© en la dÃ©formant, une dÃ©claration du directeur de la sociÃ©tÃ© . M . H . avait reconnu que, d'une maniÃ©re gÃ©nÃ©rale, le marchÃ© des tuiles Ã©tait en rÃ©gression en 1964/65 mais il avait ajoutÃ©, qu'Ã son avis, les perspectives de vente des tuiles restaient bonnes pour les travaux de rÃ©paration . Cette opinion a Ã©tÃ© contirmÃ© par l'Ã©volution ultÃ©rieure du marchÃ©, mais le tribunal a complÃ©tement nÃ©gligÃ© cette derniÃ©re partie de la dÃ©claration de M . H . Il n'est pas non plus Ã©quitable, selon la sociÃ©tÃ©, que le tribunal ait insinuÃ© qu'elle n'avait pas rÃ©ellement l'intention de poursuivre sa production . En rÃ©alitÃ©, la sociÃ©tÃ© a investi, dans la limite de ses moyens, jusqu'en 1974 et n'a cessÃ© ces investissements qu'Ã© cause de la construction de la route, les autoritÃ©s ayant refusÃ© de lui indiquer les mesures de sÃ©curitÃ© Ã prendre et la menaÃ§ant de la tenir responsable de tout dommage causÃ© Ã la nouvelle route . Le tribunal a tirÃ© des conclusions absurdes de la demande dÃ©posÃ©e par la sociÃ©tÃ© le 6 mars 1969 en vue d'obtenir le permis d'exploiter l'argile dans l e
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pÃ©rimÃ©tre concernÃ© et du fait qu'elle n'avait pas insistÃ© pour avoir satisfactions . A ce propos, le tribunal a dÃ©clarÃ© que la sociÃ©tÃ© n'avait pas rempli les conditions requises par l'autoritÃ© administrative mais a omis de citer une condition essentielle, Ã savoir que soient rÃ©glÃ©s les problÃ©mes juridiques relatifs Ã l'existence d'une voie publique sur la propriÃ©tÃ© en question . Or, cette question n'a Ã©tÃ© rÃ©glÃ© qu'en 1972, Ã©poque Ã laquelle la sociÃ©tÃ© ne pouvait dÃ©jA plus continuer la production puisqu'elle avait vendu sa fabrique . La sociÃ©tÃ© estime en outre inÃ©quitable de la part du tribunal d'avoir considÃ©rÃ© cette vente comme un acte dÃ©libÃ©rÃ© de la sociÃ©tÃ© et non comme une consÃ©quence de la procÃ©dure d'expropriation . En fait, l'administration fiscale, elle, a reconnu que la vente Ã©tait la consÃ©quence de l'expropriation et a consenti Ã la sociÃ©tÃ© un dÃ©grÃ©vement de l'impÃ´t sur le revenu . Le tribunal n'a pas non plus tenu compte de ce qu'aurait co0tÃ© le stockage de l'argile perdu ni de la dÃ©tÃ©rioration de la qualitÃ© de l'argile que ce stockage aurait entrainÃ©e . L'apprÃ©ciation ne pouvait Ã¨tre faite que par l'expert en briqueterie et non par l'expert-gÃ©ologue, qui a d'ailleurs Ã©mis des doutes Ã ce sujet . Sont Ã©galements inÃ©quitables, selon la sociÃ©tÃ©, les conclusions tirÃ©es par le tribunal du fait que le terrain frappÃ© d'expropriation a Ã©tÃ© exclu de la vente de la tuilerie, et son affirmation que l'argile contenu dans ce terrain ne pouvait Ãªtre utilisÃ© que par la tuilerie en question . La sociÃ©tÃ© peut, en fait citer une entreprise qui s'intÃ©ressait Ã l'achat de l'argile et elle n'a exclu le terrain du contrat de vente que pour prÃ©server ses droits dans la procÃ©dure d'expropriation . 4 . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante, invoquant l'article 13 de la Convention, se plaint de ne pas avoir disposÃ© d'un recours effectif, son pourvoi devant la Cour suprÃªme ayant Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© irrecevable . La Cour suprÃªme n'aurait dÃ©clarÃ© le pourvoi recevable qu'en cas de violation de dispositions claires et expresses de la loi, mais elle n'a eu aucun doute quant au caractÃ©re unilatÃ©ral de l'administration des preuves dans la prÃ©sente affaire . Selon les rÃ¨gles de la juridiction gracieuse, les tribunaux ne sont nullement limitÃ©s dans leur apprÃ©ciation des moyens de preuve, ce qui a d'ailleurs Ã©tÃ© criGquÃ© par la doctrine . D'une maniÃ©re gÃ©nÃ©rale, les rÃ©gles de la juridiction gracieuse sont mal adaptÃ©es aux situations litigieuses, comme en l'espÃ©ce . 5 Au sujet de la prÃ©tendue violation des droits de propriÃ©tÃ© de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante larticle 1 du Protocole additionnel), le premier grief de la sociÃ©tÃ© est que l'indemnitÃ© Ã laquelle elle dit avoir droit lui a Ã©tÃ© refusÃ©e en raison du non-respect par la Cour du principe du procÃ©s Ã©quitable ou du droit Ã ce que la cause soit Ã©quitablement entendue (voir chapitre 3 ci-dessus) . Ainsi, une indemnitÃ© lui a Ã©tÃ© refusÃ©e non seulement pour le manque Ã gagner mais aussi pour la valeur nette du gisement d'argile, bien que les tribunaux reconnaissent le principe d'un calcul de l'indemnitÃ© sur la base du manque Ã gagner et qu'ils l'aient appliquÃ© dans des affaires analogues (voir chapitre 6 ci-aprÃ©sl . - 57 -
La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaint en outre de son impossibilitÃ© d'obtenir une revalorisation de l'indemnitÃ© depuis la date de l'expropriation . La chose est d'autant plus grave que la procÃ©dure a Ã©tÃ© particuliÃ¨rement longue et le taux d'inflation trÃ©s Ã©levÃ© (70 96) pendant la pÃ©riode considÃ©rÃ©e . Dans les procÃ©dures d'expropriation la date retenue pour fixer le montant de l'indemnitÃ© est celle de la dÃ©cision d'exproprier, alors que dans les procÃ©dures contentieuses des intÃ©r@ts sont toujours dus Ã partir de la date d'introduction de l'instance . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaint enfin d'avoir eu Ã supporter les frais de sa reprÃ©sentation en justice et des rapports d'expertise, soit environ 2,5 millions Sch . 6 . A propos de la prÃ©tendue violation de l'article 14 de la Convention (en combinaison avec l'article 1 du Protocole) la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante dÃ©clare que dans des cas similaires, les tribunaux ont accordÃ© une indemnitÃ© pour la perte de gisement d'argile, consÃ©cutive Ã une procÃ©dure d'expropriation . Le montant des indemnitÃ©s Ã ce titre s'est Ã©levÃ© Ã 1,4 million Sch . dans un cas (Y . Ziegelwerk GmbH), Ã 4,5 millions Sch . dans un autre (Ziegelei Z .), bien que dans ces deux affaires la valeur de l'argile ait Ã©tÃ© moindre et sa qualitÃ© impropre Ã la fabrication de tuiles . Dans une autre affaire, tranchÃ©e par le tribunal administratif parce que la restriction des droits de propriÃ©tÃ© Ã©tait fondÃ©e sur la loi sur les Eaux, ce tribunal a Ã©galement reconnu le droit Ã une indemnisation pour manque Ã gagner et pour la valeur du gisement d'argile concernÃ© . La sociÃ©tÃ© estime que la diffÃ©rence de traitement dans son cas Ã©quivaut Ã une discrimination au sens de l'article 14 de la Convention .
EN DROIT 1 . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaint du dÃ©roulement de la procÃ©dure judiciaire visant la fixation d'une indemnitÃ© d'expropriation . Elle allÃ©gue tout d'abord une violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, le tribunal n'ayant pas rendu son jugement dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . Elle allÃ©gue en outre une violation du principe du procÃ©s Ã©quitable . L'article 6, paragraphe 1 stipule entre autres que toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement, publiquement et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial qui dÃ©cidera des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractÃ©re civil . a . La Commission relÃ©ve tout d'abord que si l'expropriation peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e en soi comme une question administrative hors du champ d'application de la disposition susmentionnÃ©e de la Convention, la fixation du montant de l'indemnitÃ© Ã laquelle donne lieu cette expropriation est un problÃ¨me qui concerne la dÃ©termination des droits et obligations de caractÃ©r e -
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civil de l'expropriÃ© . Il s'ensuit que l'article 6, paragraphe 1 est Ã cet Ã©gard applicable, et que les griefs de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante fondÃ©s sur cette disposition ne peuvent Ãªtre rejetÃ©s comme Ã©tant incompatibles ratione materiae avec les dispositions de la Convention . b . La procÃ©dure visant Ã fixer l'indemnitÃ© d'expropriation en la prÃ©sente affaire s'est dÃ©roulÃ©e en deux Ã©tapes : selon les dispositions de la loi sur l'expropriation en matiÃ©re de chemins de fer, applicables en vertu des dispositions de la loi provinciale de Haute-Autriche sur l'administration des routes, une procÃ©dure administrative a tout d'abord Ã©tÃ© engagÃ©e devant le gouvernement provincial, puis une procÃ©dure judiciaire rÃ©gie par les rÃ¨gles de la juridiction gracieuse s'est dÃ©roulÃ©e devant les tribunaux ordinaires, en trois degrÃ©s de juridiction (tribunal de district, tribunal rÃ©gional, Court suprÃªme) . La Commission est convaincue que ces juridictions sont des tribunaux indÃ©pendants et . impartiaux, Ã©tablis par la loi, comme l'exige l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention . Le fait que leurs dÃ©cisions aient Ã©tÃ© prÃ©cÃ©dÃ©es d'une dÃ©cision administrative du gouvernement provincial ne donne en soi aucun motif de douter du respect des garanties institutionnelles d'une procÃ©dure judiciaire Ã©noncÃ©es Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1, puisque l'introduction d'une action devant le tribunal de district a eu pour effet de mettre Ã nÃ©ant la dÃ©cision administrative et que la procÃ©dure judiciaire ultÃ©rieure n'a Ã©tÃ© aucunement liÃ©e par ladite dÃ©cision ni autrement limitÃ©e en ce qui concerne la fixation dumontant de l'indemnitÃ© . Toutefois, le fait que la procÃ©dure judiciaire ait suivi une procÃ©dure administrative a une incidence sur le point de savoir s'il a Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© sur la contestation portant sur des droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil en cause dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, comme le veut l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . c . Au sujet de la plainte de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante quant Ã la longueur de la procÃ©dure, la Cbmmission fait tout d'abord observer que la sociÃ©tÃ© doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme ayant rempli la condition de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes stipulÃ©e Ã l'article 26 de la Convention, puisqu'en droit autrichien elle n'avait aucun recours effectif pour faire valoir son droit Ã une dÃ©cision judiciaire dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . Comme l'a constatÃ© la Commission dans sa dÃ©cision du 5 dÃ©cembre 1978 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 7464/76 (D .R . 14, p . 51), le seul recours disponible, qui est le recours hiÃ©rarchique prÃ©vu Ã l'article 78 de la loi sur l'organisation judiciaire, ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme suffisant . La Commission rappelle en outre sa jurisprudence constante selon laquelle un grief portant sur la longueur d'une procÃ©dure peut :Ã©tre formulÃ© avant mÃªme l'aboutissement de la procÃ©dure en question . La Commission est donc appelÃ©e Ã examiner le bien-fondÃ© de ce grief . d . La Commission note qu'en l'espÃ©ce l'expropriation a, en fait, eu lieu en 1965, lorsque1e gouvernement provincial a dÃ©cidÃ© de construire une route traversant la propriÃ©tÃ© de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante . Bien que cette expropriatio n
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ait eu un titre juridique, Ã savoir un accord conclu entre le gouvernement provincial et le commanditaire de la sociÃ©tÃ©, il s'avÃ©ra par la suite que ce titre Ã©tait entachÃ© d'un vice et c'est seulement en 1969 que fut entamÃ©e la procÃ©dure d'expropriation . Il ne semble pas que la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaigne de la longueur de la procÃ©dure judiciaire antÃ©rieure Ã l'ouverture de la procÃ©dure d'expropriation, et elle ne serait d'ailleurs pas fondÃ©e Ã le faire plusieurs annÃ©es aprÃ©s la conclusion de cette procÃ©dure (voir la rÃ©gle des six mois Ã©noncÃ©e Ã l'article 26 de la Convention) . La Commission considÃ©re, par consÃ©quent, qu'en l'occurrence le Â« dÃ©lai raisonnable Â» envisagÃ© par l'article 6, paragraphe 1 ne commence Ã courir qu'Ã© partir du moment oÃ¹ les droits et obligations de caractÃ©re civil de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante en matiÃ©re d'indemnitÃ© d'expropriation ont Ã©tÃ© pour la premiÃ©re fois examinÃ©s dans le contexte de la procÃ©dure d'expropriation lÃ distinguer de la procÃ©dure antÃ©rieure concernant la validitÃ© de l'accord de vente de dÃ©cembre 19641 . La date Ã retenir se situe donc entre juillet 1968 et fÃ©vrier 1969 .
Le caractÃ©re raisonnable de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure doit cependant Ãªtre apprÃ©ciÃ© 8 la lumiÃ©re des circonstances propres Ã l'affaire . A la suite de la procÃ©dure administrative devant le gouvernement provincial de Haute-Autriche, le tribunal de district de R . a Ã©tÃ© saisi de l'affaire le 2 dÃ©cembre 1969 mais il ne rendit son jugement que le 6 octobre 1977, plusieurs mois aprÃ©s le dÃ©pBt de la prÃ©sente requÃªte auprÃ¨s de la Commission et prÃ©s de huit ans aprÃ©s le dÃ©but de la procÃ©dure . L'appel de ce jugement, interjetÃ© par la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante auprÃ¨s du tribunal rÃ©gional, a Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ© le 24 janvier 1978 et un pourvoi introduit devant la Cour suprÃªme a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© irrecevable le 1â¢r juin 1978 . La procÃ©dure s'Ã©tant poursuivie au total pendant plus de huit ans, l a Commission est appelÃ©e Ã examiner s'il a Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable sur les droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante, au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . A cet effet, elle doit prendre en considÃ©ration la complexitÃ© de l'affaire, la maniÃ©re dont elle a Ã©tÃ© conduite par les autoritÃ©s administratives et judiciaires nationales ainsi que le comportement de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante (voir la jurisprudence de la Commission et de la Cour, par exemple l'arrÃªt du 28 juin 1978 dans l'affaire K6nig, paragraphe 99) .
Eu Ã©gard Ã tous ces facteurs et Ã la position prise par le Gouvernement aussi bien dans la lettre adressÃ©e au directeur de la sociÃ©tÃ© par la Chancellerie fÃ©dÃ©rale, le 6 fÃ©vrier 1978, que dans ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te, oÃ¹ il s'abstient de contester le grief de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante quant Ã la longueur de la procÃ©dure - la Commission en arrive Ã la conclusion que ce grief ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . La Commission n'ayant Ã©tabli aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© de cette partie de la requÃªte, celle-ci doit donc Ãªtre retenue pour examen au fond . -60-
e . La Commission examinera ensuite la recevabilitÃ© d'un second grief de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante au titre de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, Ã savoir qu'elle n'a pas bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un procÃ©s Ã©quitable . A cet Ã©gard, elle considÃ©rera en premier lieu l'objection du Gouvernement selon lequel le grief est irrecevable pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes conformÃ©ment aux exigences de l'article 26 de la Convention, la requÃªte ayant Ã©tÃ© dÃ©posÃ©e avant mÃªme que la dÃ©cision de premiÃ©re instance ait Ã©tÃ© rendue . La Commission note toutefois que dans sa requÃ©te introductive du 12 mai 1977, la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante, se fondant sur l'article 6, paragraphe 1 se plaignait essentiellement de la longueur de la procÃ©dure . Le grief concernant le procÃ©s Ã©quitable n'a Ã©tÃ© formulÃ© que le 26 juillet 1978, c'est-Ã©-dire aprÃ©s que la dÃ©cision du 1 -1 juin 1978 de la Cour suprÃ©me ait mis fin Ã la procÃ©dure interne . Le fait que la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante ait dÃ©jÃ prÃ©sentÃ© une requÃªte concernant la longueur de la procÃ©dure ne peut la priver de son droit, au titre de l'article 25, de formuler un autre grief touchant le cractÃ©re Ã©quitable du procÃ©s, une fois les voies de recours internes dÃ»ment Ã©puisÃ©es, et rien dans la Convention n'interdit Ã la Commission d'examiner ces deux griefs au cours de la mÃªme procÃ©dure . Il apparait Ã©galement que, pour l'essentiel, les griefs du requÃ©rant touchant au caractÃ©re Ã©quitable du procÃ©s ont dÃ©j9 Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s lors de la procÃ©dure interne d'appel . Ce grief ne peut donc Ãªtre rejetÃ© pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours interne . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaint des dÃ©cisions judiciaires rendues en son affaire, la Commission rappelle qu'elle a pour seule tÃ¢che, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 19 de la Convention, d'assurer le respect des engagements rÃ©sultant de la Convention pour les Parties contractantes . En particulier, elle n'est pas compÃ©tente pour examiner une requÃ©te relative Ã des erreurs de fait ou de droit prÃ©tendument commises par une juridiction interne, sauf si et dans la mesure oÃ¹ ces erreurs lui semblent susceptibles d'avoir entrainÃ© une atteinte aux droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention . La Commission se rÃ©fÃ©re sur ce point Ã sa jurisprudence constante (cf . par exemple les dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃ©tes NÂ° 458/59, Annuaire 3, pp . 223, 233 et NÂ° 1140/61, Recueil de dÃ©cisions 8, pp . 57, 62) . Certes, en l'espÃ©ce, la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaint aussi que l'administration des preuves a Ã©tÃ© conduite de maniÃ¨re unilatÃ©rale et, notamment, que le tribunal a renoncÃ© Ã l'examen contradictoire du dernier rapport complÃ©mentaire de l'expert-gÃ©ologue . La Commission est nÃ©anmoins convaincue que l'administration des preuves n'a Ã©tÃ© ni partiale ni incomplÃ©te et, pour cette raison, inÃ©quitable . La seule critique qui, de l'avis de la Commission, pourrait Ã¨tre formulÃ©e quant au caractÃ©re Ã©quitable de l'administration des preuves est qu'en fin de compte les rapports, trÃ¨s coÃ»teux en temps et en argent, de l'expert-gÃ©ologue se sont en grande partie avÃ©rÃ©s inutiles . Il est dÃ©jÃ tenu compte de cette circonstance dans l'opinion ci-dessus exprimÃ©e par la Commission que le grief de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante quant Ã© la longueur de l a
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procÃ©dure n'Ã©tait pas manifestement dÃ©nuÃ© de fondement . La Commission considÃ©re donc qu'il n'existe, pour le mÃªme motif, aucune apparence de violation supplÃ©mentaire de la rÃ©gle du procÃ©s Ã©quitable . Ce dont paraÃ®t rÃ©ellement se plaindre la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante est moins le mode d'administration des preuves que l'apprÃ©ciation de celles-ci . Or, c'est lÃ© un point qui relÃ©ve nÃ©cessairement du pouvoir d'apprÃ©ciation de tribunaux indÃ©pendants et impartiaux et ne peut Ã©tre examinÃ© par la Commission, sauf s'il y avait lieu de croire que le juge ait tirÃ© des conclusions decaractÃ©re arbitraire ou d'une injustice flagrante des faits qui lui ont Ã©tÃ©'sournis . Il n'apparait pas que ce soit le cas en l'espÃ¨ce . Se fondant sur le volumineux dossier de preuves dont il disposait le tribunal en est arrivÃ© Ã conclure que la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante n'avait pas rÃ©ellement l'intention d'utiliser dans un avenir proche l'argile contenu dans le terrain expropriÃ©, condition exigÃ©e par la loi pour lui donner droit Ã une indemnitÃ© au titre du gisement d'argile . Le tribunal a en outre conclu que les dÃ©cisions de la sociÃ©tÃ©, d'une part de cesser sa production en 1965, d'autre part de vendre sa tuilerie en 1972, tout en ayant peut-Ãªtre Ã©tÃ© subjectivement motivÃ©es par l'expropriation, ne pouvaient objectivement se justifier pour cette raison . Il a donc refusÃ© l'indemnisation rÃ©clamÃ©e pour la perte allÃ©guÃ©e de gain . Les constatations de fait du tribunal de district ont Ã©tÃ© confirmÃ©es par le tribunal rÃ©gional, et la Cour suprÃªme n'a pas constatÃ© d'erreur manifeste dans l'application de la loi par les juridictions infÃ©rieures . Les raisons qui ont motivÃ© les dÃ©cisions judiciaires susmentionnÃ©es sont, de l'avis de la Commission, suffisantes pour exclure l'hypothÃ¨se d'une apprÃ©ciation arbitraire des moyens de preuve . La Commission conclut que les allÃ©gations d'une violation des principes du procÃ©s Ã©quitable dans l'administration et l'apprÃ©ciation des preuves en la prÃ©sente affaire sont manifestement mal fondÃ©es, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . 2 . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante allÃ©gue Ã©galement une violation du droit, que lui garantit l'article 13 de la Convention, Ã urj recours effectif devant une instance nationale concernant les griefs susmentionnÃ©s, au titre de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention . Ces griefs se situant effectivement dans le champ d'application de cette disposition, l'article 13 est applicable en principe . a . Pour autant que la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaint de l'absence d'un recours interne effectif par lequel elle aurait pu faire valoir son droit Ã une dÃ©cision judiciaire dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, la Commission a dÃ©jÃ trouvÃ© qu'il n'existe pas de recours de ce genre en droit autrichien . Ce grief n'est donc pas manifestement dÃ©nuÃ© de fondement et doit Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ© recevable . b . Pour autant que la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaint de l'absence d'un recours interne effectif par lequel elle aurait pu faire valoir son droit Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable, la Commission a dÃ©jÃ© trouvÃ© que les procÃ©dures de recours internes devait Ã©tre Ã©puisÃ©e aux tins de l'article 26 de la Convention avan t
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qu'elle puisse Ãªtre saisie d'une requÃªte fondÃ©e sur l'obligation, dÃ©coulant de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, d'assurer un procÃ©s Ã©quitable . La Commission estime que ces procÃ©dures de recours constituent un recours effectif devant une instance nationale, au sens de l'article 13 de la Convention . Cette partie de la requÃªte est donc manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . 3 . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaint en outre de ce que le refus d'une indemnitÃ© d'expropriation au titre du gisement d'argile contenu dans le terrain expropriÃ© et de la perte de gain prÃ©tendument causÃ©e par l'expropriation constitue une violation du droit au respect de ses biens, que lui garantit l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel Ã la Convention . Il est stipulÃ© au premier alinÃ©a de cet article que nul ne peut Ãªtre privÃ© de sa propriÃ©tÃ© que pour cause d'utilitÃ© publique et dans les conditions prÃ©vues par la loi et les principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit international . La Commission relÃ©ve que la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante a Ã©tÃ©, en fait, privÃ©e de ses biens par l'expropriation . Il n'est pas contestÃ© que cette expropriation ait eu lieu pour cause d'utilitÃ© publique . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante Ã©tant en droit autrichien, une personne morale ayant son siÃ©ge en Autriche, aucun problÃ©me ne se pose quant Ã l'application des principes du droit international . La seule question est donc de savoir si la privation de la propriÃ©tÃ© a Ã©tÃ© effectuÃ©e Â« dans les conditions prÃ©vues par la loi Â» . L'une des conditions essentielles de la lÃ©galitÃ© d'une expropriation en Autriche est l'octroi d'une indemnitÃ© appropriÃ©e (angemessene Schadloshaltung, art . 365 du Code civil) . En l'espÃ©ce le montant de cette indemnitÃ© a Ã©tÃ© tixÃ© par les tribunaux, dans le cadre de la procÃ©dure prÃ©vue par la loi sur l'expropriation en matiÃ©re de chemins de fer, applicable en vertu de la loi provinciale de Haute-Autriche sur l'administration des routes . ConformÃ©ment aux principes dÃ©veloppÃ©s dans la jurisprudence des tribunaux, la richesse miniÃ©re contenue dans un terrain n'est prise en compte que si son exploitation est envisagÃ©e dans un avenir prÃ©visible . Ce principe a Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ© dans la prÃ©sente affaire et les tribunaux ayant constatÃ© que la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante n'avait pas l'intention d'exploiter dans un avenir prÃ©visible le gisement d'argile du terrain expropriÃ© lui ont donc refusÃ© une indemnisation Ã ce titre . Les tribunaux ont en outre appliquÃ© un autre principe selon lequel le manque Ã gagner ne peut donner lieu Ã indemnitÃ© que s'il a pour cause directe l'expropriation en question . Les tribunaux ont estimÃ© qu'en l'espÃ©ce ce n'Ã©tait pas le cas . La Commission, ayant constatÃ© que rien ne permet de mettre en doute le caractÃ©re Ã©quitable de la procÃ©dure visÃ©e, doit admettre que la dÃ©cision Ã laquelle les tribunaux ont abouti correspond Ã la situation juridique en Autriche . Aucun doute n'est donc possible quant Ã lÃ©galitÃ© de l'expropriation en droit interne .
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Le seul point restant Ã Ã©claircir est donc de savoir si la loi nationale, en particulier lorsqu'elle exclut l'indemnisation au titre d'une richesse miniÃ©re dÃ©s lors que l'expropriÃ© n'envisage pas de l'exploiter dans l'avenir prÃ©visible, est, en soi, conforme Ã la Convention et au Protocole, et notamment aux principes gÃ©nÃ©raux qui y sont explicitement ou implicitement contenus (voir Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, arrÃªt du 24 octobre 1979 dans l'Affaire Winterwerp, par . 45) . MÃªme si l'on admet que le paragraphe 1 de l'article 1 du Protocole reconnait en principe un droit Ã une indemnitÃ© d'expropriation, on ne saurait en dÃ©duire qu'il reconnaÃ®t un droit Ã une indemnitÃ© d'un montant dÃ©terminÃ© . Certes, dans certains cas, une rÃ©duction substantielle du montant de l'indemnitÃ© pourrait-elle Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme affectant la substance mÃªme du droit Ã© une indemnisation ivoir mutatis murandis le rapport de la Commission sur la requÃªte NÂ° 5 849/72, MÃ¼ller contre Autriche, DÃ©cisions et Rapports 3, pp . 33, 40, 411 . Toutefois, la Commission estime que l'exclusion de l'indemnisation lorsque l'exploitation de la richesse miniÃ¨re n'est pas envisagÃ©e dans un avenir prÃ©visible et le versement d'une indemnitÃ© calculÃ©e sur la seule base de la valeur agricole du terrain, n'affecte pas la substance du droit Ã une indemnisation . La mÃªme remarque s'applique Ã l'exclusion d'une indemnisation pour un manque Ã gagner qui n'est pas la consÃ©quence de l'expropriation . Il n'y a donc pas apparence de violation de l'article 1, paragraphe 1 du Protocole additionnel et le grief de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante sur ce point est manifestement mal fondÃ© . 4 . La sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante se plaint enfin d'une discrimination quant Ã ses droits de propriÃ©tÃ©, du fait qu'une indemnisation au titre du gisement d'argile et de la perte de gain lui a Ã©tÃ© refusÃ©e alors qu'elle a Ã©tÃ© accordÃ©e dans des circonstances similaires Ã d'autres briqueterie expropriÃ©es . La sociÃ©tÃ© invoque Ã cet Ã©gard l'article 14 de la Convention, combinÃ© Ã l'article 1 du Protocole . L'article 14 garantit Ã toute personne la jouissance des droits et libertÃ©s reconnus dans la Convention, sans distinction aucune . La Commission constate qu'en l'espÃ©ce le traitement diffÃ©rent appliquÃ© Ã la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante et 9 d'autres briqueteries rÃ©sulte non de l'application de la loi par les divers tribunaux eu Ã©gard Ã la situation respective des expropriÃ©s, mais de la distinction, Ã©tablie par la loi elle-mÃ¨me, entre les biens qui donnent lieu Ã une indemnisation complÃ©te (y compris pour richesse miniÃ©re et manque Ã gagner) et ceux qui ne donnent lieu qu'Ã une indemnisation partielle, calculÃ©e sur la base de la seule valeur agricole du terrain . Cette distinction lÃ©gale parait fondÃ©e sur l'idÃ©e que l'indemnitÃ© doit Ãªtre proportionnÃ©e au dommage rÃ©el causÃ© par l'expropriation ; une indemnitÃ© pour une destination particuliÃ©re du terrain expropriÃ© sera, dÃ©s lors, considÃ©rÃ©e comme Â« inappropriÃ©e Â» lorsque cette destination n'est pas envisagÃ©e dans un avenir prÃ©visible, ou, s'agissant du manque Ã gagner, lorsque celui-c i
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n'est pas le rÃ©sultat direct de l'expropriation . La Commission considÃ©re que ces raisons constituent une justification raisonnable de cette distinction lÃ©gale et qu'il n'y a donc pas apparence de discrimination Ã cet Ã©gard, au sens de l'article 14 de la Convention . Ce grief doit donc Ãªtre Ã©galement rejetÃ© comme manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . Par ces motifs . la Commissio n - DECLARE RECEVABLE et retient pour un examen au fond le grief de la sociÃ©tÃ© requÃ©rante fondÃ© sur l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention et portant sur la longueur de la procÃ©dure ainsi que le grief connexe, tirÃ© de l'article 13 de la Convention portant sur l'absence de recours effectif Ã cet Ã©gard devant une instance nationale';
- DECLARE LA REQUETE IRRECEVABLE pour le surplu s
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| SOCIETE X. c. AUTRICHE

Synthèse

Analyses

Parties

Origine de la décision

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