CHRISTIANS AGAINST RACISM AND FASCISM c. ROYAUME-UNI

APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 8440/7 8 CHRISTIANS AGAINST RACISM AND FASCISM v/the UNITED KINGDOM CHRISTIANS AGAINST RACISM AND FASCISM c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 16 July 1980 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 16 juillet 1980 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Artlcle 10 of the Conventlon : !n the case of a demonstration by way of procession, the right to freedom of expression is subsidiary to that of /'reedom of assembly and does not require a separate examination . Article 11, prâ¢rrâ¢graph l, of the Conventlon : Freedom of peaceful assembly includes processions . It is a freedom capable of being exercised by those who intend to organise a peaceful assembly, and cannot be lost by virtue of the mere fact that a third party plans a violent counter-demonstration . Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Convention : ( a) General temporary bar on demonstration in the form of a public procession . justiJied by the protection of order. (b) A restriction of the freedom of peaceful assembly is necessa ry . in a democratic society. if the disadvantages which it brings about . are outweighed by the security reasons which justified it and if there are no other less far reaching measures to avoid that risk . /n this respect, exantination of the circunistances in the case in point . Article 14 of the Convention In coNunctlon with Article 11 of the Convention Difference in treatment justified between customa ry processions and occasional demonstrations in the form of a procession . Basing the ban on the objective risk of public disorder rather than on the intent of the organisers is not discriminato ry .
Article 26 of the Conventlon : Where a general regidntion is applicable without any further domestic decâ¢ision and where no dotnesnc rernedy is available to challenge the measure . the 6 month time-(imit runs from the date on which the applicant was actrmBy affected by that measure .
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Article 10 de la Convention : S'agissant d'une mani(eslation sous fornle de dÃ©filÃ© . la libertÃ© d'ex-pression s'e((ace derriÃ¨re la libertÃ© de rÃ©union paci%ique et ne nÃ©cessite pas un examen distinct . Arlicle 11, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : La libertÃ© de rÃ©union pacifique inclut les dÃ©filÃ©s. Elle apparlient Ã tous ceux qui ont l'intention d'organiser une rÃ©union pacifique et ne se perd pas du fail que des /iers projettent une contre-manifestation violenle . Article 11, paragraphe 2, de la Conventlon : (a) /nlerdic7ion gÃ©nÃ©rale et temporaire de manifester sous forme de dÃ©filÃ©, justifiÃ©e pur la dÃ©fetlse de l'ordre. (h) Une restriction de la libertÃ© de rÃ©union paciJique est nÃ©ressaire . dans une snriÃ©tÃ© dÃ©rnocrutique, si les dÃ©savantages qu'elle enrraine som moindres que ly dangrr qui la justife et s'il ruexiste pas de rnqrens p61s limilÃ©s dÃ©riler re danger . A ret Ã©gard. exumerl des cirronstances du ras d'espÃ¨ee .
Article 14 de la Convention, combinÃ© avec l'article II de la Convention : Dillrrenre ele traitemem justifiÃ©e entre les dÃ©filÃ©s traditiounels et les mmiiijestatiuns orrasioenlclles snus forme de dÃ©filÃ©s . Jl n'esl pas disrrinlimuoire de se jonder. pour interdire des manifestations . sur le risque ohiecti(de dÃ©sordres publics plut8l que sur les iutemions des orgunisalenrs . Article 26 de la Convenllon : Lorsqu'mle mesure de caractÃ¨re gÃ©nÃ©ral s'upplique sarus quune dÃ©rision partiruliÃ¨re soit nÃ©cessaire et qu'il uesl pas question de rerours internes li exercer, le dÃ©lai de six nlois roun Ã partir du enornem nÃ¹ le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© aJ/ertÃ© par la mesure visÃ©e .
(/Urumais : voir p . 153)
THE fACTS
The facls of the case as they have been presented by Ihe applican i a,socialiem Ihrnugh Iheir lawyers . Mrs Hilary Kilchin, solicitor ofIhe Legal Deparnmeni ol' Ihe Nalional Cmincil for Civil Liberties, and Prof . Jan Brownlie . mar hr suninlarised as follnws : I . 'fhc applicanl a .ssociaiiun . called "Chrislians against Racism and Fascism" (CARAF) i% an organisalion which was fornially conslilmed at a conference in Lomdmn om 28 lanuarv 1978 . al the inilialive of several church organisations includinR Ihe Cnmmunily and Race Relations Unit of Ihe British Council of Chmches . the Caiholic Cuniniission for Racial Justice, and ihe Friends Social Respunsihiliip Council alter a period of informal co-operation on mailers of racc relaiioms since June 1977 . '
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The declared ainis of CRAF are . Tn unite in the love nt God and our neiehbours in face of racist an d :"i fascisl ideoloev . ii . Tn act as a broad ecunienical voice froni the Christian Church o n issues of racism and fascisni . Ã¼i . To prn m nte an awareness anwng Christians of' the dangers of fascisin and ihe Ihreals presented bv fascist organisations . ir . Tn aexist ihe developnienl of local Christian initiatives ainied at reducine Ihe efTectiveness nf faseist propaganda . Tn encnurage church leaders lo oppose at national level, the divisive policies and aclivilies of nrganisalions such as the National Front and Ihc Nalin n al Parly . To cu-nperale with.vi nlher initiatives ainied al promoting racial juslic c and nppusing laÃ§civn . Â°
2 . Thc principal organs of Ihe association are the Annual Assentbly and an F.seculive Conimitree to which is en tr usted Ihe overall direction ol' the activities 44 CARAF . II is the Executive Coninritlee which has decided to file the presenl applicalinn wilh the Conimission when a procession which the Annual As .enihlv had decided lo hold was prohibited because it cante under an order which had hcrn made by the Commissioner of ihe Metropolitan Police under Scclitm .1 (3) ol ihe Public Order Act 1936 .1 . The decision lo hold a p rocession which would pass froni St . Paul' s Calhcdral in Ihe City of Londnn, to Westniinster Cathedral in the City of Westminster on 22 April 1978, was made by the First Annual Assembly of CARAF on 28 January 1978 . The procession was planned to draw the attention , d Ihc public In CARAF and so prnninte Ihe ainis of the organisation . II was phuined rn puhlici .se the procession with a leaflet explaining ihe aints of CARAF . II was also proposed lo head the procession with a large banner .iving Ilie (ull nanrc of ihe organisation . This would have been ihe onlv hanner . cnncenlraring atlenlion on the Christian unily of those parlicipaling in ihe prncecsion . 'rhe procession would have been seen by a large section ol' the puhlic adong irs rnule . and in addilion . in advance publicily and in reports on ihe dvcnl would hace reachÃ©d many ntore people . In Ihis way it was inlended , uforn, ihe public nf the new organisalion, and of the imporlance being Placrd on cÂ¢â¢live nppnsilion lo raci .sni and fascism by Christian organisalinns . lllis inl'nrmalion was considered to be c . : particular importance at a time when naiciiv hy eroups with racisl and fascist views was receiving wide publicity . 4 . Although il was nnt a legal requiremenl to inform the police of Ihe plans Ynr Ihe procession . CARAF nevertheless informed the City Ã´f London police . i .a . I o allnw lim arraneements to be niade concerning road traflic and to avoid dillicuhieS uith ihe police on ihe day of the denwnstration . A nieelinÂ¢ of th e
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Chairman ot the CARAF Executive Cmm n tittee . Rev . Robert Nind . with the p,dice w ;rc planned l'nr 22 February 1978, but it was referred lu 27 Februarv npparendv lo allow for the additional presence of represenlatives of ihe Mcl ro Podium Police . This rearranged nieeting . however, was eventuallv cancclled brcause in Ihe meanlime Ihe Cnmmissioner of the Metropolitan Police had urdered a ban un all public processions in the London Metropnlilan Police ;u'e ;i 11n' a Perind ol Iw'n mm n lhs . 5 . The order was worded as follows :
"PUBLIC ORDER ACT . 1936 Whereas 1, David Blackstock McNee, Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, am of the opinion that, by reason of particular circumstances existing in my police area, the powers conferred on me by sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Public Order Act, 1936, will not be sufficient to enable me to prevent serious public disorder being occasioned by the holding of public processions in the Metropolitan Police District . Now I, David Blackstock McNee, Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, with the consent of the Secretary of State, in pursuance of the powers conferred on me by sub-section (3) of section 3 of the said Act hereby by this order prohibit for the period of 2 months from 6 a .m . on Friday- 24th February, 1978 the holding of the following class of public processions, that is to say all public processions other than those of a religious, educational, festive or ceremonial character customarily held within the Metropolitan Police District . (signed) DAVID McNF.F. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Dated this 22nd day of February 1978 New Scotland Yard, London . SWIH OB G I hereby certify that the above Order has been made by the Commissioner of Police with my consent . (signed) MERLYN REES Secretary of State for the Hom e Department " 6 . The ban was apparently imposed to have the immediate effect of banning a procession in the London Borough of Ilford, organised by the National Front on 25 February 1978 . However, as it ended only on 24 April 1978 it had the effect of also prohibiting the applicant association's procession proposed for 22 April 1978 . - 141 -
Some attempt were made by Rev . Nind to have this procession recognised as being of a religious nature, and for this purpose it was proposed that the procession should follow a more limited route between the Abbey and Cathedral in Westminster, with a service to be held in both Abbey and Cathedral and the journey between being made in quiet and peaceable fashion led by choirs in robes . On about 28 February 1978 this proposal was communicated to the Metropolitan Police, but the reply by the police was that the procession would still be prevented by the Commissioner's ban as it was not an event customarily held . In view of the limited time available to make alternative arrangements for 22 April 1978, further negotiation to find an alternative form of procession not covered by the ban was abandoned . Instead, CARAF sought and obtained permission to hold a public meeting in Hyde Park without any procession . There were also restrictions placed on the Hyde Park meeting, Rev . Nind being informed by the Department of the Environment that the distribution of hymn sheets was not allowed . It is submitted that the public impact of the demonstration was considerably reduced by the fact that no procession could be held as originally envisaged . 7 . The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police made the banning order of 22 February 1978 under powers given to him by virtue of the Public Order Act 1936 . section 3 of which reads as follows : "Powere for the prexnatlons of publlc order on the occaslon of proceuione . (1) If the chief officer of police, having regard to the time or place at which and the circumstance in which any public procession is taking place or is intended to take place and to the route taken or proposed to be taken by the procession, has reasonable ground for apprehending that the procession niay occasion serious public disorder, he may give direction imposing upon the persons organising or taking part in the procession such conditions as appear to hini necessary for the preservation of public order, including conditions prescribing the route to be taken by the procession and conditions prohibiting the procession from entering any public place specified in the directions : Provided that no conditions restricting the display of flags, banners or emblems shall be imposed under this subsection except such as are reasonably necessary to prevent risk of a breach of the peace .
(2) . . . (3) If at any time the Commissioner of the City of London police or the Comntissioner of the Metropolis is of opinion that, by reason of pa rt icular circumstances existing in his police area or in any pa rt thereof, the powers conferred on him by subsection ( 1) of this sect :on will not be sufficient to enable him to prevent serious public disorder being occasioned by the holding of public processions in that area or pa rt , he may, with the consent of the Secretary of State, make an order prohibiting for such period no t
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exceeding three months as may be specified in the order the holding of all public processions or of any class of public procession so specified either in the police area or in that part thereof, as the case may be . (4) Any person who knowingly fails to comply with any directions given or conditions imposed under this section, or organises or assists in organising any public procession held or intended to be held in contravention of an order niade under this section or incites any person to take part in such a procession . shall be guilty of an offence . " 8 . According to information provided by the Home Secretary on 10 March 1978 in reply to a written question put to him in Parliament by Ms Jo Richardson, MP for Barking, the same powers had been used earlier on the following occasions :
"Between June 1937 and the outbreak of the Second World War, ten successive orders were made under section 3 (3) of the Public Order Act 1936 prohibiting all public processions of a political character in the East End of London . The first two orders were of six weeks' duration . the remainder were for three months . An order was made in April 1948 prohibiting all public processions of a political character for three months in the East End and areas of Stoke Newington . Stamford Hill and Hackney . Between May 1948 and February 1949 three successive orders, each of three months' duration, were ntade prohibiting political processions throughout the Metropolitan Police District . Seven orders, in the same ternts and for the same duration, were made in March 1949, October 1949 and between February 1959 and February 1951 .
Orders were made in September 1960 prohibiting .all public processions other than of a solely religious character for three months in St Pancras ; in September 1961 prohibiting any public procession organised by the "Committee of 100" for 24 hours in Central London ; in August 1962 prohibiting all political processions for 48 hours in the Metropolitan Police District ; and in July 1963 prohibiting all political processions for 48 hours in the East End of London and neighbouring boroughs . " 9 . Subsequent to the issue of the banning order of 22 February 1978 there was a Parliantentary debate on 27 February in which the Home Secretary stated i .a . that the Public Order Act 1936 was under review, but that in the opinion of chief officers there were few changes that would be necessa ry . He them continued with particular reference to the banning order in question : "The essential point is that the decision must be taken by the Commissioner of Police in the Metropolis and by Chief Constables elsewhere . I have thought long and deep about this . The decision is made on th e - 143-
basis of law and order, and I do not believe that it should be made bv the Home Secretary . It is right that the Home Secretarv is involved in sonte way, but no Home Secretary should make the decision on the basis that he does not like the march or the marchers, or that he believes that they will cause trouble in an area . .What do such considerations ntean? The decision should be taken by policemen, I applaud the decision of the Commissioner last weekend and I agreed to it . " Subsequently in the same debate the Secretary of State stated : "The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis took that decision without any advice from me . " (Hansard, 27 February 1978, columns 61-64 ) 10 . The Commissioner's motives when issuing the Order were clarified in subsequent correspondence . In a letter of 13 March 1978 in which he replied to a written enquiry by Ms Jo Richardson, MP for BarkinÂ¢ and Chairperson of the Civil Liberties Group of the Parliamentary Labour Party, the Commissioner stated that the period of two months was intended to give a cooling off period following the prohibition of the National Front procession of 25 February 1978 . Home Office letters of 18 April 1978 to Ms Richardson, and of 14 June 1978 to Ms H . of the National Council for Civil Liberties try to justify the scope and duration of the ban notwithstanding its effect for other processions . In rhe letter to Ms H . it was stated i .a . "The present position is that all requests for bans on processions mus t originate from the local Chief Constable (or in London, the Commissioner) and he is required by law to make his decision solely on public order grounds . Chief officers are invariably reluctant to seek such orders unless they are clearly necessary to prevent serious public disorder-and the Home Secretary is equally concerned that there should be no unreasonable interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and public protest . You will, however, appreciate that, in the circumstances which led to recent orders being made, the chief officers concerned were anxious to ensure that the terms of the orders left no scope for the organisers of those processions likely to lead to serious public disorder to circumvent them by sonic - subterfuge such as representing their procession as being for a purpose not covered by the terms of the bans . To achieve this, the orders had to be drafted in broad terms, even though this had the effect of prohibiting a number of processions with which one would not normally wish to interfere in any way . Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1936 does not permit the banning of individual processions ; any order must prohibit all public processions or any class of public procession so specified, and the Home Secretary has no power to exempt individual processions from the terms of an order . "
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I I . The applicant association states that there is no provision for appeal againsi the order of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, nor for anv form of judicial review . A prohibitory order can be impugned only if it is perverse or singles out an individual procession . As the order concerned was made in accordance with the principles of the legislation which include a wide discretion of the Contmissioner of Police and Home Secretary, there were no grounds for a review in Ihe present case . Complaint and legal argumenb of the applicant raewclatlo n 1. The applicant association submits that it has no, alternatively no effeciive, domestic remedies of a legal character within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention . As regards the six months period, it should not be calculated from the date of the banning order (22 February 1978) but from the date of the actual resiriction of the applicant association's freedoms (22 April 1978) . The banning order created a state of affairs lasting for two months, but there was still a possibility of it being revoked until a date near the date of the planned procession . The association's complaint is directed against its continued operalion on 22 April 1978 . Moreover, while being an executive act at the basis of the applicant association's contplaint the banning order was not a final decision concerned with any domestic remedy taken by the applicant association .
The applicant association therefore submits that it must be considered as having complied with the conditions of Article 26 . 2 . The applicant association alleges breaches of Articles 5 (I), It), I I and 14 of the Convention and reserves its right to add fu rt her allegations of breach of ihe Convention . (a) As regards the alleged breach of Article 5 (1) of the Convention it is submitted that the right to liberty and security of person includes the liberty to exercise a right provided for under the Convention free from a prohibition backed by a power of arrest . The indivicual affected by the order has no appeal against the effect of the decision upon his actions, and none of the procedures prescribed by law are applicable to the operation of the powers under section 3 of the Public Order Act . (b) As regards the alleged breach of Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant association subniits that the planned public procession was a means tu express the views of (he organisation and its supporters and to inform the public about the concern felt by Christians at racist and fascist ideas and organisations . By the prohibition of the procession, the applicant association was prevented front expressing and communicating these views .
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It is subntitted that this interference was not justified in the absence of any threat of disorder emanating from the proposed procession . The proposed procession was of a peaceful and lawful nature, and as such, avoiding conflict and provocation, would have been a demonstration of normal political expression in a democratic society . Its prohibition therefore could not be justified as being in the interest of democratic society, of public safety or prevention of crime . If any threat of disorder was anticipated in connection with the applican t association's procession . it should be noted that this procession was separated by a lengthy period of time from the National Front demonstration of 25 February 1978 in relation to which such fears appeared to be justified . It is . submitted that in respect of any fears of disorder which might have existed, the ban was an unreasonable and disproportionate reaction in particular as regards the period of its application, and that it was therefore contrary to Article 10 .
(c) As regards the alleged breach of Article 11 of the Convention, it is subntitted that there was also an interference with thetxercise of the applicant association's right to freedont of peaceful assembly, and that this interference could not be justified for the same reasons as the interference with its freedom of expression . (d) The applicant association puts particular emphasis on the allegatio n that the measure complained of was also discriminatory and contrary to Article 14 of the Convention . In this respect it is submitted that the power given to chief police officers by section 3 of the Public Order Act 1936 is disproportionate to the needs of public order in that it is indiscriminate in effect and thereby discriminates against organisations which represent no threat to public order . The applicant association stresses that its proposed procession could not in any way be contpared to the National Front dentonstrations, and that it was in fact admitted by the authorities that it should not have been interfered with . In their opinion, non-discrimination in the sense of Article 14 implies Ihat, although similar organisations may be treated in a sintilar way, it is discrimi . natory to subject types or categories of activity or opinion which are essentially unlike one another, to the same conditions . The applicant association also objects to the distinction made between its oroposed procession, and processions "customarily held" which were excluded from the ban . It considers that this distinction bears no relation to the provisos nf Articles 10 and 11, and that the unreasonableness of the distinction is accentuated by the fact that, like customary processions, the proposed procession did not give rise to any speciil need lo prevent disorder .
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THE LA W 1 . The applicant association complains of the prohibition of all public processions other than those of a religious, educational, festive or ceremonial character customarily held which was ordered by the London police authorities under section 3 (3) of the Public Order Act 1936 for a period running from 24 February to 23 April 1978 . The applicant association considers that this nteasure . insofar as it affected its plans to organise a procession in London on 22 April 1978, unjustifiedly interfered with its rights to freedom of expression (Ariicle 10 of the Convention) and to peaceful assembly (Article Il of the Convention) . It is further alleged that the measure was discriminatory and contrary to Article 14 of the Convention in several respects, and finally that the sanctions to which a contravention of the prohibition would have given rise unjustifiedly interfered with the right to security of person guaranteed by Article S of the Convention . 2 . The Commission first observes that the measure complained of is a general regulation enacted by the police for a certain period of time in exercise of powers conferred on it under the relevant legislation . This regulation was binding for everyone, including the applicant association, who wished to organise a procession in London during the relevant time, and no further administrative decision was required in respect of the particular activities planned by the association, nor was a remedy available to the association to challenge the measure as such or its application to the planned procession on 22 April 1978 . The question as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies in accordance with Article 26 of the Convention thus did not arise for the applicant association and the only question under this article is accordingly whether the application has been brought in time, i .e . within the six months period envisaged by this provision . This period must normally be calculated from the final domestic decision, but where, as in the present case, no domestic decision is required for the application of a general measure to the particula- ~ase, the relevant date is the time when the applicant was actually affected by that measure . In the present case, this was the date of the procession planned by the applicant association, i .e . 22 April 1978 . As the application has been lodged with the Commission on 29 August 1978, that is less than six months after the date of the planned procession, it cannot be rejected for non-contpliance with the conditions of Article 26 of the Convention, and the Commission is therefore called upon to deal with the substance of the applicant association's complaints .
3 . The applicant association claims that the prohibition of its planned procession interfered with its right to freedom of expression which is guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention . The Commission will however confine the examination of the application to the aspects concerning Articles 11 and 14 of the Convention . As in the case of Application No . 8191/78 (Rassemble- 147 -
nient jurassien and UnitÃ© jurassienne v/Switzerland . decision on admissibilitv of 10 October 1979 . D .R . 17, p . 93), the allegations under Article 10 must be considered as subsidiary in relation to those concerning the right to peaceful assembly . The problem of freedom of expression cannot in this case be separated from that of freedom of assembly, as guaranteed by Article 11, and it is the latter freedoni which is primarily involved . In the circumstances of the present case, it is accordingly not necessary to consider Article 10 . 4 . Article I I of the Convention reads as follows :
"(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests . (2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic sociely in the interests of national security or public safety- for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others . This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the adntinistration of the State . " The applicant association claims that the prohibition of its planned procession interfered with its right to freedom of peaceful assembly as guaranteed bv this provision . The respondent Government, while not objecting to the application of the concept of freedom of assembly to a demonstration in the litrnt of a public procession, have nevertheless expressed doubts as to the applicability of Article II in this case because the applicant association's planned procession would in their view not have been a"peaceful" one having regard to the possible activities of opponents and extremists . The Comntission accepts that the freedom of peaceful assembly covers not only static meetings, but also public processions . It is moreover a freedom capable of being exercised not only by the individual participants of such denionstration, but also by those organising it . including a corporate body such as the applicant association . Under Article I1 (1) of the Convention, the right to freedom of peacefu l assembly is secured to everyone who has the intention of organising a peaceful demonstration . In the Commission's opinion the possibility of violent counterdemonstrations, or the possibility of extremists with violent intentions, not members of the organising association, joining the demonstration cannot as such take away that right . Even iP there is a real risk of a public procession resttlting in disorder by developments outside the control of those organising it . such procession does not for this reason alone fall outside the scope of Article II (1) of the Convention, but any restriction places on such a n -148-
assembly ntust be in conformity with the ternis of paragraph 2 of that provision . It follows Ihat the applicant association in this case can rightly claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convemion, of an interference with its right to freedom of assembly as guaranteed in Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and that this interference needs to be justilied under Article 11 (2) . 5 . This provision requires first, that any restriction of the freedom to peaceful assembly should be prescribed by law . In this respect, it has not been cuntested that the ban of all public processions in London during the relevant period was covered by section 3 (3) of the Public Order Act 1936 . The Contmission has no doubt that this measure was in fact prescribed by law as required by Article 11 (2) of the Convention . The above provision requires next that the restriction of the applicant association's freedom should pursue any of the legitimate purposes enumerated therc . The provision authorises irrtrr alia restrictions being imposed in the inierest of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others . These are the purposes invoked by the Governnienl in the present case . The Commission accepts that each of these purposes may be relevant and that in particular the nteasures concerned in the circumstances of this case were taken with a view to preventing disorder . This is borne out not only by the title and text of the applicable Iegislation, but also by the Government's unconlested description of the situation in which it was applied, as well as by the very terms of the ban of 22 February 1978 . In fact, reference was made there to the existence of particular circuntstances in which the imposition of conditions under section 3(1) of the Public Order Act was considered to be insufficient to prevent "serious public disorder" being occasioned by the holding of' public processions . The Commission therefore finds that the measure complained of pursued purposes authorised by Article 11 (2) of the Convention .
It is finally a requirement under the above provision of the Convention that any restrictions placed on the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly should be necessary in a democratic society . It is in this respect that the parties are in fundamental disagreement as to the justification of the measure complained of. The applicant association contests the necessity in a democratic society of the wide powers conferred upon the policy by the Public Order Act 1936, and the necessity of their use in relation to a peaceful demonstration such as the one which it proposed to hold on 22 April 1978 . The Government, on the other hand, invoking the margin of appreciation permitted to the High Contracting Parties by the above provision of the Convention, consider the nieasure taken as necessary . In their view, regard must be had to the tense atntosphere prevailing in London at the relevant time as described in their submissions, in particular the very real fear of public disorder being occasione d
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by National Front marches and demonstrations concerned with similar matters . The Government therefore submit that the extension of the ban into April 1978 and its application to the applicant association's planned procession, for fear of disorder being caused by opponents or extremists, was justified under Article 11 (2) . The Commission notes that the legislation adopted by the United Kingdom for the prevention of disorder in connection with public processions . while not excluding the possibility of imposing specific conditions for the holding of a particular demonstration, does not allow the prohibition of such demonstrations in a individual case . The Public Order Act 19 3 6 provides only for general measures such as a ban on all public processions, or on any class of public processions, in a certain area during a specified time . The Commission recognises that this legal situation is based on considerations designed to ensure an even application of the law in that it aims at the exclusion of any possibility for the taking of arbitrary measures against a particular demostration .
A general ban of demonstrations can only be justified if there is a real danger of their resulting in disorder which cannot be prevented by other less stringent measures . In this connection, the authority must also take into account the effect of a ban on processions which do not by themselves constitute a danger for the public order . Only if the disadvantage of such processions being caught by the ban is clearly outweighed by the security considerations justifying the issue of the ban, and if there is no possibility of avoiding such undesirable side effects of the ban by a narrow circumscription of its scope in ternts of territorial application and duration, can the ban be regarded as being necessary within the meaning of Article 11 (2) of the Convention . In the light of the above considerations, the Commission linds that the situation existing in England at the relevant time, as described by the Governmem and apparently not disputed by the applicant association, was characterised by a tense atmosphere resulting from a series of riots and disturbances, having been occasioned by public processions of the National Front and counter-demonstrations in connection therewith . Although very considerable police contingents had been deployed on each occasion, it had not been possible to prevent grave damage to persons and property . Similardemom strations were imminent in several districts of London where the most serious clashes had happened in connection with a National Front march about half a year earlier, in August 1977 . One march of the National Front had been announced for 25 February 1978 in the borough oÃ¯ Redbridge and more were to be expected in connection with Parliamentary by-elections in the borough of Lambeth on 20 April 1978 . A National Front meeting in the latter district on 15 April 1978 in fact necessitated the deployment of 2 400 police offtcers .
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The Contmission considers that in these circumstances it was noi unreasonable for the contpetent authorities to prohibit all public processionoi oiher than cusiomary ones during the relevant two nionths period, i .e . extending three days af'ter the by-election in Lambeth . Having regard to the previous experience in Manchester where the National Front had circumvented a local ban by marching in another district it was also not unreasonable to extend the ban to the whole of the London police areas . The effect on other demonstrations, including the march proposed by the applicant association to be held on 22 April 1978 was not so serious as to cast doubt on the necessity of the ban as such . Even taking into account that the Comntissioner of Police ot the Metropolis took his decision knowing of the applicant association's plans . he was not in Ihe Commission's opinion required to make special arrangements allowing for the realisation of these plans on the date envisaged . Whilst it was clear that the applicant association had wholly peaceful intentions it is nevertheless true that its statutory purposes were expressly directed against the National Front policies and it could therefore not be excluded that the proposed procession could also give rise to disorder . Moreover, it would have been possible for the applicant association to organise its procession only two days after the date originally envisaged . On that dale it could have held its procession anywhere outside the London police districts, and even within these districts it could and, in fact . did hold a meeting in another form than a public procession . The Commission considers that the applicant association could reasonably be expected to sustain the adverse etTects of the ban on its planned procession which were not disproportionate to the aim pursued by that ban . The Commission therefore concludes that the measure complained of, including its effect on the applicant association's planned procession, can be justified as being necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Arlicle 11 (2) of the Convention . It follows that the applicant association's contplaint in this respect is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . The applicant association has also complained that the ban of publi c .6 processions in London was discriminatory and contrary to Article 14 of the Convemion in several respects . This Article reads as follows : "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Conventio n shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language . religion, political or social origin, association with a national ntinority, property, birth or other status . " The Government have submitted that the applicant association's above coniplaint is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention insofar as it invoked Article 14 separately . The applicant association has however clarified that it did in fact mean to raise this complaint .in relation to the enjoyment o f -t51-
the rights under Article I I of the Convention, and it is on this basis that the Contmission will deal with it . a) The applicant association has first complained of the exception made i n the ban for processions of a religious, educational, festive or ceremonial character customarily held . It submits that the distinction made between these customary processions and all other public processions including the one proposed by itself lacked an objective and reasonable justification linked to thc criteria in Article 11 (2) of the Convention, as customary processions could also result in disorder . The Commission observes, however, that the general possibilitv of customary processions resulting in disorder is irrelevant . As the application of the measure taken in the present case was limited in place and time it must be assumed that the competent authorities were able to foresee that none of the customary processions in London during Ihe relevant lime were likely to cause trouble, while they could not-in the absence of any obligation to inform the authorities in advance of a planned demonstrationbe expected to know what other processions were going to take place . It was therefore not unreasonable for the authorities to assume that processions other than the custontary events known to them were more likely than those to result in disorder . The Commission thÃ¨refore considers that the distinction made did not arnuunl io discrimination, within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention . in relation to the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly (Art . 11) by ihc applicant association . This part of the application is therefore again nianitÃ¨stlv ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . b . The applicant association has further complained that the measure in question discriminated against organisations which represented no threat to public order because they were treated in the same way as organisations which did in fact represent such a threat . However, even assuming that indiscriminate treatment of essentially different matters may under certain circumstances give rise to a problem under Article 14 of the Convention, the Commission considers that in the present case it is not necessary to deal with this problem . It is not in dispute that the applicant association does not advocate violence . Its difference in this respect from other organisations is, however, not in issue . What is in issue is the likelihood of demonstrations to result in public disorder . and in this respect it was not unreasonable for the authorities to apply an objective criterion rather than a subjective test relating to the violent or peaceful intentions of the organisers of such demonstrations . At least insofar as the applicant association's procession is concerned it is clear that the authorities considered it as involving a risk of disorder, and they did not thereby deliberately or arbitrarily put it in a category of demonstrations with which it had nothing to do . The Ãommission therefore fails to see any element of discrimination in the authorities' attitude . It follows that the applicant association's complaint in this respect is again manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
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7 . The Commission has finally considered the applicant association's complaint that Ihe sanctions t'or notrcontpliance with the ban by which its planned procession was prohibited interfered with the right to security of person as guaranteed by Article 5(1) of Ihe Convention . However, the Commission finds thal this claint has nnt been substantiated in the proceedings, and it must accordingly be rejected as being ntanifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Arlicle 27 (2) of the Convention . Fnr Ihese reasons . the Commissio n DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE :
(TRAGUCT/ON) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause . tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©s par l'association requÃ©rante par l'intermÃ©diaire de ses avocats . Mme Hilary Kilchin . solicitor . du service juridique du Conseil National des LibertÃ©s civiques (National Council for Civil Liberties), et le Professeur Jan Brown)ie . peuvent se rÃ©smner conime suit :
1 . L'association requÃ©rante . dÃ©nonimÃ©e â¢ Christians against Raci : :n and Fascisnt â¢(ChrÃ©tiens contre le racisnte et le fascisme/CARAF) est une organisation qui a Ã©tÃ© formellement constituÃ©e lors d'une confÃ©rence qui eul lieu Ã Londres le 28 janvier 1978, Ã )'initiative de plusieurs organisations ecclÃ©siastiques parmi lesquelles le â¢ Comniunitv and Race Relations Unit .â¢ du Conseil britannique des Eglises . la - Catholic Commission for Racial Justice Â» et le - Friends Social Responsibility Council - aprÃ¨s une pÃ©riode de coopÃ©ration infornielle sur les questions concernant les relations entre les races depuis juin 1977 .
.
Les buts dÃ©clarÃ©s du CARAF SON Â« S'unir dans l'amour de Dieu et du prochain . face Ã l'idÃ©ologie racist e Ti et fasciste .
ii . Agir comme porte-parole iecumÃ©nique de l'Egiise chrÃ©tienne sur les questions de racisme et de fascisnte . iii . Faire prendre conscience aux chrÃ©tiens des dangers du fascisme et des nienaces que reprÃ©sentent les organisations fascistes .
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iv . Favoriser les initiatives chrÃ©tiennes locales . visant Ã rÃ©duire l'efficacitÃ© de la propagande fasciste . v . Encourager les dirigeants ecclÃ©siastiques Ã s'opposer au niveau national aux politiques et activitÃ©s . qui sÃ¨ment la discorde . d'organisations telles que le Front National et le Parti Natibnal . vi . CoopÃ©rer Ã d'autres initiatives destinÃ©es Ã prontouvoir une justice raciale et Ã s'opposer au fascisme . â¢ 2 . Les principaux organes de l'association sont l'AssemblÃ©e annuelle et un ComitÃ© exÃ©cutif chargÃ© de la direction gÃ©nÃ©rale des activitÃ©s du CARAF . C'est le comitÃ© qui a dÃ©cidÃ© d'introduire la prÃ©sente requÃªte auprÃ©s de la Commission lorsqu'un dÃ©filÃ© que l'AssemblÃ©e annuelle avait dÃ©cidÃ© de faire a Ã©tÃ© interdit parce qu'il tombait sous le coup d'une ordonnance rendue par le prÃ©fet de police niÃ©tropolitaine en vertu de l'article 3 . paragraphe 3 de la loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public . 3 . La dÃ©cision d'organiser un dÃ©filÃ© qui irait de la cathÃ©drale St . Paul . dans la City de Londres . Ã la cathÃ©drale de Westminster . dans la City de Westminster . le 22 avril 1978 . a Ã©tÃ© prise par la premiÃ¨re assentblÃ©e annuelle du CARAF le 28 janvier 1978 . Le dÃ©filÃ© devait attirer l'attention du public sur le CARAF et promouvoir ainsi les buts de l'organisation . Celle-ci envisageait d'annoncer le dÃ©filÃ© par un tract expliquant les buts du CARAF . Elle se proposait aussi de mettre en tÃ©te du dÃ©filÃ© une grande banniÃ¨re indiquant le titre entier de l'organisation et qui, Ã©tant la seule, aurait concentrÃ© l'attention sur l'unitÃ© chrÃ©tienne des participants au dÃ©filÃ© . Celui-ci aurait Ã©tÃ© vu par une grande fraction du public, le long de son itinÃ©raire et . en outre . la publicitÃ© prÃ©alable et les comptes rendus de l'Ã©vÃ©nement auraient atteint encore beaucoup plus de gens . On entendait ainsi informer le public sur cette nouvelle organisation et sur l'importance que des organisations chrÃ©tiennes attachent Ã une opposition active au racisme et au fascisme . Cette information Ã©tait considÃ©rÃ©e comme revÃªtant un intÃ©rÃªt particulier Ã une Ã©poque oÃ¹ les activitÃ©s de groupes racistes et fascistes jouissaient d'une large publicitÃ© . Bien que la loi n'exigeÃ¢t pas que les projets relatifs au dÃ©filÃ© lussen t .4 portÃ©s Ã la connaissance de la police, le CARAF n'en a pas moins informÃ© la police de la City de Londres, notamment afin que des dispositions soient prises pour la circulation routiÃ¨re et afin d'Ã©viter des difficultÃ©s avec la police le jour de la manifestation . Une rÃ©union du prÃ©sident du ComitÃ© exÃ©cutif du CARAF, le RÃ©vÃ©rend Robert Nind, avec la police Ã©tait prÃ©vue pour le 22 fÃ©vrier 1978 , mais elle a Ã©tÃ© reportÃ©e au 27 fÃ©vrier pour que, sentble-t-il . d'autres reprÃ©sentants de la police mÃ©tropolitaine puissent y assister . Toutefois . cette nouvelle rÃ©union fut finalement elle aussi annulÃ©e parce qu'entre temps le prÃ©fet de la police niÃ©tropolitaine avait interdit par ordonnance tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics pour une pÃ©riode de deux mois dans la circonscription de la police mÃ©tropolitaine de Londres .
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5 . L'ordonnance Ã©tait libellÃ©e ainsi : LOI DE 1936 SUR L'ORDRE PUBLI C ConsidÃ©rant que nous, David Blackstock McNec . PrÃ©fet de police de la mÃ©tropole . estimons que . vu les circonstances particuliÃ¨res prÃ©valant dans notre circonscription . Ies pouvoirs qui nous sont confÃ©rÃ©s par le paragraphe 1 de l'article 3 de la loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public ne nous suffiront pas Ã empÃ©cher que le dÃ©roulement de dÃ©filÃ©s publics dans le district de la police mÃ©tropolitaine ne provoque de graves troubles publics . Nous, David Blackstock McNee . PrÃ©fet de police de la ntÃ©tropole, avec l'agrÃ©ment du Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur et conformÃ©ment aux pouvoirs qui nous sont confÃ©rÃ©s par le paragraphe 3 de ladite loi, interdisons par la prÃ©sente ordonnance pour une durÃ©e de deux mois Ã compter du vendredi 24 fÃ©vrier 1978 Ã 6 h . l'organisation de la catÃ©gorie suivante de dÃ©filÃ©s publics . Ã savoir tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics aulres que ceux de caractÃ¨re religieux, Ã©ducatif . de fÃªte ou de cÃ©rÃ©monie se tenant traditionnellement dans le district de la police mÃ©tropolitaine . (SignÃ©) David McNEE PrÃ©fet de police de la mÃ©tropol e Fait le 22 fÃ©vrier 1978 New Scotland Yard Londres . SWIH OB G Je certifie par la prÃ©sente que l'ordonnance ci-dessus a Ã©tÃ© prise par le PrÃ©fet de police avec mon agrÃ©ment . (SignÃ©) Merlyn REE S Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur 6 . L'interdiction a apparemment Ã©tÃ© Ã©dictÃ©e dans le but immÃ©diat d'interdire un dÃ©filÃ© dans le bourg londonien de llford . organisÃ© par le Front National le 25 fÃ©vrier 1978 . Toutefois, comme cette interdiction ne prenait fin que le 24 avril 1978 . elle avait pour effet d'interdire Ã©galement le dÃ©filÃ© de l'association requÃ©rante . envisagÃ© pour le 22 avril 1978 . Le rÃ©vÃ©rend Nind fit quelques tentatives pour que ce dÃ©filÃ© fÃ»t reconnu comme Ã©tant de caractÃ¨re religieux et Ã cette fin il proposa que le dÃ©filÃ© suivit un itinÃ©raire plus limitÃ© entre l'Abbaye et la CathÃ©drale de Westminster, un service devant avoir lieu Ã la fois Ã l'Abbaye et Ã la CathÃ©drale et le trajet devant se dÃ©rouler d'une ntaniÃ¨re calme et paisible, des chreurs en surplus devront oiivrir la marche . Vers le 28 fÃ©vrier 1978 . cette proposition fut communiquÃ©e Ã la police mÃ©tropolitaine mais celle-ci rÃ©pondit que le dÃ©filÃ© continuait Ã @tre frappÃ© par l'interdiction du prÃ©fet puisqu'il ne s'agissait pas d'un Ã©vÃ©nement traditionnel . En raisdn du peu de temps qu'il restait avant l e
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22 avril 1978 pour prendre d'autres dispositions, il fut renoncÃ© Ã de nouvelles nÃ©gociations en vue de trouver tine aulre forme de dÃ©filÃ© Ã©chappant Ã l'interdiction . Le CARAF demanda et obtint Ã la place l'autorisation de tenir une rÃ©union publique Ã Hyde Park . sans dÃ©filÃ© . La rÃ©union de Hyde Park fit elle aussi l'ohjet de restrictions : le MinistÃ¨re de l'environnentent infornia le RÃ©vÃ©rend Nind que la distribution de feuilles de cantiques n'Ã©tait pas aut . L'association requÃ©rante fait valoir que l'effet de la ntanifestation sur le orisÃ©e public a Ã©tÃ© sensiblement amoindri, le dÃ©filÃ© n'ayant pas pu avoir Iieu comnie prÃ©vu initialenient .
7 . Le prÃ©fet de la police mÃ©tropolilaine prit l'ordonnance d'interdiction du 22 fÃ©vrier 1978 en vertu des pouvoirs que lui confÃ¨re l'article 3 de la loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public qui stipule que : â¢ Pouvoirs en vue de la sauvegarde de l'ordre public Ã l'occasion de dÃ©filÃ©.s 1 . Si le chef de la police . eu Ã©gard Ã l'Ã©poque, Ã l'endroit et aux conditions dans lesquelles un dÃ©filÃ© public a lieu ou doit avoir lieu et Ã l'itinÃ©raire choisi ou envisagÃ© . a des motifs raisonnables de craindre que le dÃ©filÃ© puisse provoquer de graves troubles publics . il peut imposer, par voie dc directives aux personnes qui l'organisent ou y prennent part . les conditions qui lui semblent nÃ©cessaires Ã la sauvegarde de l'ordre public . y compris des conditions prÃ©cisant l'itinÃ©raire Ã suivre et des couditions interdisant au dÃ©filÃ© de pÃ©nÃ©trer dans tel ou tel emplacement public prÃ©cisÃ© dans les directives : Ce sous rÃ©serve que des conditions restreignant le dÃ©ploiement de drapeaux . banniÃ©res ou entblÃ¨mes ne soient imposÃ©es en vertu de ces paragraphe que si elles sont raisonnablement nÃ©cessaires pour prÃ©venir le risque d'atteinte Ã la paix . 2. ... 3 . Si, Ã quelque moment que ce soit . le prÃ©fet de police de la City de Londres ou le prÃ©fet de police de la mÃ©tropole estime qu'en raison d'une situation particuliÃ¨re prÃ©valant dans sa circonscription ou dans une partie de celle-ci, les pouvoirs que luiconfÃ¨re le paragraphe 1 du prÃ©sent article ne lui suffiront pas Ã entp@cher que le dÃ©roulemenl de dÃ©filÃ©s publics ne provoque de graves troubles publics dans cette circonscription ou partie de circonscription, il peut . avec le consentement du Ministre de l'intÃ©rieur, prendre une ordonnance interdisant . pour une durÃ©e n'excÃ©dant pas trois mois et prÃ©cisÃ©e dans l'ordonnance, tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics ou toute catÃ©gorie spÃ©cifiÃ©e de dÃ©filÃ©s publics . dans la circonscription de police ou dans une partie de celle-ci . selon le cas . 4 . Toute personne qui omet sciemment de se conformer Ã l'une des directives ou conditions imposÃ©es en vertu du prÃ©sent article . ou organis e
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ou aide Ã organiser un dÃ©filÃ© public tenu ou devant se tenir en contra . vention Ã une ordonnance prise en vertu du prÃ©sent article ou incite une personne Ã prendre part Ã pareil dÃ©filÃ©, se rend coupable d'une infraction . â¢ 8 . Selon des renseignements fournis par le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur le 10 mars 1978, en rÃ©ponse Ã une question Ã©crite que lui avait posÃ©e au Parlement Mme Jo Richardson, dÃ©putÃ© dÃ© Barking, ces mÃªmes pouvoirs avaient Ã©tÃ© exercÃ©s prÃ©cÃ©demment, aux occasions suivantes : â¢ Entre juin 1937 et la dÃ©claration de la seconde guerre mondiale, dix ordonnances successives ont Ã©tÃ© prises en vertu de l'article 3, paragraphe 3 . de la loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public pour interdire tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics de caractÃ¨re politique dans l'Easr End de Londres . Les deux premiÃ¨res Ã©taient d'unedurÃ©e de 6 semaines, les autres de 3 mois . Une ordonnance a Ã©tÃ© prise en avril 1948 pour interdire tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics de caractÃ¨re politique pendant 3 mois dans l'Easr End et les quartiers de Stocke Newingnon . Stamford Hill et Hachney . Entre mai 1948 et fÃ©vrier 1949 ont Ã©tÃ© prises trois ordonnances successives . d'une durÃ©e de trois mois chacune, qui interdisaient les dÃ©filÃ©s politiques dans tout le district de la police mÃ©tropolitaine . Sept ordonnances, dans les mÃªmes termes et pour la mÃªme durÃ©e, ont Ã©tÃ© rendues en mars 1949, octobre 1949 et entre fÃ©vrier 1950 et fÃ©vrier 1951 . Des ordonnances ont Ã©tÃ© p rises en septembre 1960 pour interdire pour une pÃ©riode de 3 mois Ã St Pancras tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics autres que ceux revÃªtant un caractÃ¨re exclusivement religieux : en septembre 1961 . pour interdire pendant 24 heures tout dÃ©filÃ© public organisÃ© par le CumLJ des 100 dans le centre de Londres ; en aoÃ»t 1962, pour interdire pendant 48 heures tous les dÃ©filÃ©s politiques dans le district de la police mÃ© tropolitaine et en juillet 1963 pour interdire pendant 48 heures tous les dÃ©filÃ©s politiques dans l'East End de Londres et les quartiers avoisinants . Â» 9 . A la suite de l'ordonnance d'interdiction du 22 fÃ©vrier 1978 . il y eut au Parlement . le 27 fÃ©vrier, un dÃ©bat au cours duquel le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur a dÃ©clarÃ© notamment que la loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public Ã©tait en cours dc rÃ©vision mais que de l'avis des responsables de la police peu de changentents seraient nÃ©cessaires . Il ajouta alors, en se rÃ©fÃ©rant en particulier Ã l'ordonnance d'interdiction en cause : â¢ Le point essentiel est que la dÃ©cision doit Ãªtre prise par le prÃ©fet de police de la mÃ©tropole et . ailleurs, par les comntissaires de police . J'ai mOrement rÃ©flÃ©chi Ã cela . La dÃ©cision est prise au nont de l'ordre public et je ne pense pas qu'efle devrait Ãªtre rendue par le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur . Il est juste que celui-ci intervienne d'une certaine maniÃ¨re mai s -157-
aucun Ministre de l'intÃ©rieur ne devrait prendre une pareille dÃ©cision parce qu'il n'ainie pas le dÃ©filÃ© ou ceux qui y participent, ou parce qu'il pense qu'ils vont provoquer des troubles dans un quartier . Que signifient ces considÃ©rations ? La dÃ©cision doit Ãªtre prise par les officiers de police . J'applaudis Ã la dÃ©cision prise par le prÃ©fet le week-end dernier et je l'ai approuvÃ©e . Plus tard, au cours du mÃªme dÃ©bat . le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur a dÃ©clar Ã© â¢~ Le prÃ©fet de police de la mÃ©tropole a pris cette dÃ©cision sans aucun conseil de ma part . â¢
(Hansard . 27 fÃ©vrier 1978 . colonnes 61-64) . 10. Les ntotifs pour lesquels le prÃ©fet a rendu cette ordonnance ont Ã©tÃ© Ã©lucidÃ©s dans une correspondance ultÃ©rieure . Dans une lettre du 13 mars 1978 par laquelle il rÃ©pondait Ã une dentande Ã©crite de Mme Jo Richardson . dÃ©putÃ© de Barking et prÃ©sidente du groupe des libertÃ©s civiles du Parti parlententaire travailliste . le prÃ©fet indiqua que la durÃ©e de 2 mois devait constituer une pÃ©riode apaisante aprÃ¨s l'interdiction du dÃ©filÃ© du Front National du 25 fÃ©vrier 1978 . Les lettres du MinistÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur du 18 avril 1978 Ã Mme Richardson et du 14 juin 1978 Ã Mme H . . du Conseil National des libertÃ©s civiles . tentent de justifier l'Ã©tendue et la durÃ©e de l'interdiction nonobstant son effet sur d'autres dÃ©filÃ©s . Dans la lettre Ã Mme H . . il est dit notanintent : ~â¢ La situation se prÃ©sente ainsi : toutes les demandes d'interdiction de dÃ©filÃ©s doivent Ã©nianer du comntissaire local (ou Ã Londres du prÃ©fet de police) qui est tenu par la loi de prendre sa dÃ©cision pour des niotifs d'ordre public exclusivement . Les officiers de police sont toujours rÃ©ticents Ã demander ces ordonnances, sauf si elles sont manifestement nÃ©cessaires pour empÃªcher de graves troubles publics, et le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur veille lui aussi Ã ce qu'il n'y ait pas d'entrave dÃ©raisonnable aux droiis de rÃ©union pacifique et de contestation publique . Vous noterez toutefois que . dans les circonstances qui ont conduit Ã prendre les ordonnances rÃ©centes, les officiers de police intÃ©ressÃ©s ont cherchÃ© Ã ce que les lernies des ordonnances ne laissent pas aux organisateurs de dÃ©filÃ©s risquant d'entrainer de graves troubles publics la possibilitÃ© de les Ã©luder par quelque subterfuge comme celui de dire que leur dÃ©filÃ© avait un objectif non couvert par les terntes des interdictions . A cette fin, les ordonnances se devaient d'@tre rÃ©digÃ©es en terntes larges . mÃªme si elles avaient ainsi pour effet d'interdire plusieurs dÃ©filÃ©s dans lesquels on ne voudrait pas normalenient s'ingÃ©rer de quelque maniÃ¨re . L'article 3 de la loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public ne perniet pas d"interdire des dÃ©filÃ©s isolÃ©s : une ordonnance doit interdire tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics ou une catÃ©gorie prÃ©cise de dÃ©filÃ©s publics, et le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur n'a pas le pouvoir de relever tel ou tel dÃ©filÃ© des conditions d'une ordonnance â¢ . - 158 -
Il .
L'associalion requÃ©ranle dÃ©clare qu'il n'est prÃ©vu ni recours contre l'or-
donnance du prÃ©fel de police ntÃ©tropolitaine, ni contrÃ´le judiciaire . Une ordonnance d'interdiction ne peut Ã©tre altaquÃ©e que si elle est prise de mauvaise foi ou vise un dÃ©filÃ© dÃ©terminÃ© . Coninie l'ordonnance en cause a Ã©tÃ© prise conformÃ©ment aux principes de la lÃ©gislation qui reconnaissent un large pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire au prÃ©fet de police et au Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur, il n'y avait pas de niolif de recours en l'espÃ¨ce .
Grief et argumenls juridiques de l'associelion requÃ©ranl e 1 . L'association requÃ©rante soutient qu'elle ne dispose d'aucune voie de recours interne - Ã titre subsidiaire, d'aucune voie de recours efficace -, de caractÃ¨re juridique au sens de l'article 26 de la Convention . Pour ce qui est du dÃ©lai de 6 mois . il ne devrait pas Ãªtre calculÃ© Ã compter de la date de l'ordonnance d'interdiction (22 fÃ©vrier 1978) mais Ã compter de la date de la restriction effective des libertÃ©s de l'association requÃ©rante (22 avril 1978) . L'ordonnance d'interdiction a crÃ©Ã© une situation qui a durÃ© deux mois mais il y avait encore une possibilitÃ© que l'ordonnance soit rÃ©voquÃ©e jusqu'Ã une date proche de celle prÃ©vue pour le dÃ©filÃ© . Le grief de l'association vise le fait que cette interdiction demeurait en vigueur le 22 avril 1978 . En outre, bien que la plainte de l'association requÃ©rante porte sur un acte adminislratif, l'ordonnance d'interdiction n'Ã©tait nullement une dÃ©cision dÃ©Finitive liÃ©e Ã quelque recours interne exercÃ© par l'association requÃ©rante .
Selon l'association requÃ©rante, on doit donc considÃ©rer qu'elle s'est conformÃ©e aux conditions de l'article 26. 2 . L'association requÃ©rante allÃ¨gue des violations des articles 5, paragraphe 1, 10, 11 et 14 de la Convention et se rÃ©serve le droit d'ajouter d'autres allÃ©gations de violation de la Convention . a . Quant Ã la violation allÃ©guÃ©e de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 de la Convention . elle soutient que le droit Ã la libertÃ© et Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© de la personne comprend la libertÃ© d'exercer un droit reconnu par la Convention en Ã©tant Ã l'abri d'une interdiction doublÃ©e d'un pouvoir d'arrestation . L'individu affectÃ© par l'ordonnance ne dispose d'aucun recours contre l'effet de la dÃ©cision sur ses actes, et aucune des procÃ©dures prÃ©vues par la loi ne s'applique Ã l'exercice des pouvoirs confÃ©rÃ©s par l'article 3 de la loi sur l'ordre public . h . Quant Ã la violation allÃ©guÃ©e de l'article 10 de la Convention, l'association requÃ©rante soutient que le dÃ©filÃ© public envisagÃ© constituait un moyen d'exprimer les vues de l'organisation et de ses partisans et d'informer le public de la prÃ©occupation des chrÃ©tiens devant les idÃ©es et organisations racistes et fascistes . L'interdiction du dÃ©filÃ© a empÃªchÃ© l'association requÃ©rante d'exprimer et de communiquer ces vues : - 159 -
Elle soutient que cette ingÃ©rence ne se justifiait pas en l'absence d'une menace de troubles reprÃ©sentÃ©e par le dÃ©filÃ© envisagÃ© . Celui-ci Ã©tait pacifique et rÃ©gulier et en tant que tel . Ã©vitant les conflits et la provocation, aurait Ã©tÃ© la manifestation d'une expression politique normale dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©ntucratique . Son interdiction ne saurait donc se justifier comme Ã©tant nÃ©cessaire . dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©ntocratique . Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale ou Ã la prÃ©vention du crime . Si l'on redoutait des troubles Ã cause du dÃ©filÃ© de l'association requÃ©rante, il faut noter qu'un temps trÃ¨s long se serait Ã©coulÃ© depuis la nianifes . tation du Front National du 25 fÃ©vrier 1978 . Ã propos de laquelle de pareilles craintes paraissaient justifiÃ©es . La requÃ©rante estime, quant aux craintes de troubles Ã©ventuels, que l'interdiction constituait une rÃ©action dÃ©raisonnable et dÃ©mesurÃ©e, en particulier pour ce qui est de sa durÃ©e d'application, et qu'elle Ã©tait donc contraire Ã l'article 10 .
c . Quant Ã la violation allÃ©guÃ©e de l'article 11 de la Convention, l'asso. ciation requÃ©rante scnwtient qu'il y a eu aussi ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice de son droit Ã la libertÃ© de rÃ©union pacifique . et que cette ingÃ©rence ne saurait se justifier . pour les mÃªmes raisons que l'ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice de sa libertÃ© d'expression . d L'association requÃ©rante met un accent particulier sur l'allÃ©gation selon laquclle la ntesure incriminÃ©e Ã©tait aussi discriminatoire et contraire Ã l'article 14 de la Convention . Elle soutient Ã cet Ã©gard que les pouvoirs reconnus aux officiers de police par l'article 3 de la loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public sont disproportionnÃ©s aux nÃ©cessitÃ©s de l'ordre public en ce que leurs effets s'exercent sans discernentent et qu'il s'ensuit une discrintination contre les organisations qui ne reprÃ©sentent aucune menace pour l'ordre public . L'association requÃ©rante souligne que le dÃ©filÃ© envisagÃ© ne pouvait en aucune maniÃ¨re se comparer aux manifestations du Front National et que les autoritÃ©s ont en fait admis qu'il n'aurait pas dÃ» subir d'entrave . A son avis, la non-discrimination au sens de l'article 14 suppose que . si des organisations semblables peuvent Ãªtre traitÃ©es de maniÃ¨re semblable, il est discriminatoire de soumettre aux mÃªmes conditions des types ou des catÃ©gories d'activitÃ©s ou d'opinions fondamentalement dissemblables . L'association requÃ©rante s'Ã©lÃ¨ve Ã©galement contre la distinction faite entre le dÃ©filÃ© qu'elle envisageait et les dÃ©filÃ©s traditionnels qui Ã©taient exclus de l'interdiction . Elle estime que cette distinction est sans rapport avec les dispositions des articles 10 et 11 et que son caractÃ¨re dÃ©raisonnable est accentuÃ© par le fait que, comme les dÃ©filÃ©s traditionnels, le dÃ©filÃ© envisagÃ© ne fait ressortir aucune nÃ©cessitÃ© particuliÃ¨re de prÃ©venir des troubles .
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EN DROIT 1 . L'association requÃ©ratite se plaint de l'interdiction dÃ©cidÃ©e par les autoritÃ©s de police de Londres en vertu de l'article 3 . paragraphe 3 de la loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public, pour la pÃ©riode du 24 fÃ©vrier au 23 avril 1978 et qui frappait tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics autres que les dÃ©filÃ©s traditionnels de caractÃ¨re religieux, Ã©ducatif, de fÃªte ou de cÃ©rÃ©monie . L'association requÃ©rante considÃ¨re que cette mesure, pour autant qu'elle a affectÃ© son projet d'organisation un dÃ©filÃ© Ã Londres le 22 avril 1978, a portÃ© atteinte de maniÃ¨re injustifiÃ©e Ã ses droits Ã la libertÃ© d'expression (article 10 de la Convention) et Ã la libertÃ© de rÃ©union pacifique (article Il de la Convention) . Elle allÃ¨gue en outre que la mesure Ã©tait discriminatoire et contraire Ã l'article 14 de la Convention Ã plusieurs Ã©gards, et enfin que les sanctions auxquelles aurait donnÃ© lieu une contravention Ã l'interdiction ont portÃ© atteinte de nianiÃ¨re injustifiÃ©e au droit Ã la sÃ»retÃ© de la personne garanti par l'article 5 de la Convention . 2 . La Comniission fait d'abord observer que la mesure incriminÃ©e Ã©tait une disposition gÃ©nÃ©rale prise par la police pour une certaine pÃ©riode dans l'exercice des pouvoirs que lui confÃ¨re la lÃ©gislalion pertinente . Ces dispositions s'imposaient Ã quiconque - y compris l'association requÃ©rante - souhaitait urganiser tin dÃ©filÃ© Ã Londres au cours de la pÃ©riode en cause, niais aucune autre dÃ©cision administrative n'avait Ã @tre prise quant Ã l'action envisagÃ©e par l'association : celle-ci ne disposait pas non plus d'un recours pour contester la nicsure en tant que telle ou son application au dÃ©filÃ© projetÃ© pour le 22 avril 1978 . La question de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, selon l'article 26 de la Convention, ne se pose donc pas pour l'association requÃ©rante et . partant, la seule question Ã exantiner sous l'angle de cet article est celle de savoir si la requÃ©te a Ã©tÃ© introduite Ã temps . c'est-Ã -dire dans le dÃ©lai de six mnis qui y est prÃ©vu . Ce dÃ©lai court normalement Ã partir de la dÃ©cision iuterne dcfinitive niais lorsque, comme en l'espÃ¨ce . aucune dÃ©cision interne n'est nÃ©cessaire pour l'application d'une mesure gÃ©nÃ©rale au cas particulier, la date Ã retenir est celle Ã laquelle le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© effectivement affectÃ© par cette mesure . En l'occurrence, cetle date est celle Ã laquelle devait avoir lieu le dÃ©filÃ© projetÃ© par l'association requÃ©rante . c'est-Ã -dire le 22 avril 1978 . La requÃªte ayant Ã©tÃ© introduite devant la Contmission le 29 aoÃ»t 1978, soit moins de six mois aprÃ¨s la date du dÃ©filÃ© projetÃ©, elle ne peut @tre rejetÃ©e pour inobservation des conditions de l'article 26 de la Convention, et la Commission se trouve donc appelÃ©e Ã examiner les griefs de l'association requÃ©rante .
3 . L'association requÃ©rante prÃ©tend que l'interdiction du dÃ©filÃ© qu'elle envisageait a portÃ© atteinte Ã son droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression garanti par l'article 10 de la Convention . La Comntission bornera toutefois l'examen de la requ@te aux aspects relatifs aux articles Il et 14 de la Convention . Comme dans le cas de la requÃªte NÂ° 8191/78 (Rassemblement jurassien et UnitÃ© jurasienne contre la Suisse, dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© du 10 octobre 1979, D .R . 17 p . 93) . les allÃ©gations fondÃ©es sur l'article 10 doivent Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e s - 161 -
comme subsidiaires par rapport Ã celles se rapportant au droit de rÃ©union pacifique . Le problÃ¨nte de la libertÃ© d'expression ne peut . en l'espÃ¨ce . Ãªtre sÃ©parÃ© de celui de la libertÃ© de rÃ©union . tel que le garantit l'article 11, et c'est decette derniÃ¨re libertÃ© qu'il s'agit au premier chef . Dans les circonstances de la cause, il n'est donc pas nÃ©cessaire de s'arrÃªter Ã l'article 10 . Aux termes de l'article Il de la Convention : â¢ I . Toute personne a droit Ã la libertÃ© de rÃ©union pacifique et Ã la libertÃ© d'association, y compris le droit de fonder avec d'autres des syndicats et de s'affilier Ã des syndicats pour la dÃ©fense de ses intÃ©r@ts . 2 . L'exercice de ces droits ne peut faire l'objet d'autres restrictions que celles qui, prÃ©vues par la loi, constituent des mesures nÃ©cessaires, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale, Ã la sÃ»retÃ© publique, Ã la dÃ©fense de l'ordre et Ã la prÃ©vention du crime, Ã la protection de la santÃ© ou de la morale, ou Ã la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui . Le prÃ©sent article n'interdit pas que des restrictions lÃ©gitimes soient imposÃ©es Ã l'exercice de ces droits par les membres des forces armÃ©es . de la police ou de l'administration de l'Etat . â¢
L'association requÃ©rante prÃ©tend que l'interdiction du dÃ©filÃ© qu'elle envisageait a portÃ© atteinte Ã son droit Ã la libertÃ© de rÃ©union pacifique telle que le garantit cette disposition . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, tout en n'Ã©levant pas d'objection Ã l'application du concept de libertÃ© de rÃ©union Ã une manifestation sous forme de dÃ©filÃ© public, exprime des doules quant Ã l'applicabilitÃ© de l'article I I en l'espÃ¨ce parce que le dÃ©filÃ© projetÃ© par l'association requÃ©rante n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ©, Ã ses yeux . â¢ pacifique e . eu Ã©gard Ã la possibilitÃ© d'actions de la part d'opposants et extrÃ©mistes . La Commission admet que la libertÃ© de rÃ©union pacifique ne couvre pas seulement les rÃ©unions statiques mais aussi les dÃ©filÃ©s publics . C'est de plus une libertÃ© qui peut Ã©tre exercÃ©e non seulement par les individus participants Ã pareille manifestation mais aussi par les organisateurs . y compris un organe constituÃ© comme l'association requÃ©rante . En vertu de l'article 11, paragraphe 1 de la Convention, le droit Ã la libertÃ© de rÃ©union pacifique est garanti Ã quiconque a l'intention d'organiser une manifestation pacifique . De l'avis de la Commission, la possibilitÃ© de contre-nianifestations violentes, ou celle que des extrÃ©mistes aux intentions violentes non-membres de l'association organisatrice se joignent Ã la manifestation, ne peuvent . conime telles, supprimer ce droit . MÃªnie s'il existe un risque rÃ©el qu'un dÃ©filÃ© public soit Ã l'origine de troubles par suite d'Ã©vÃ©ne . ments Ã©chappant au contrÃ´le des organisateurs . ce riÃ©filÃ© ne sort pas pour cette seule raison du champ d'application de l'article 11, paragraphe I de la Convention, et toute restriction imposÃ©e Ã pareille rÃ©union doit Ãªtre conforme aux termes du paragraphe 2 de cette disposition . Il s'ensuit que l'associatio n
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requÃ©rante . en l'espÃ¨ce . peut Ã bon droit se prÃ©tendre victime . au sens de l'article 25 de la Cnnvention, d'une ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice de son droit Ã la libertÃ© de rÃ©union garanti par l'article 11, paragraphe I de la Convention, et que cette ingÃ©rence doit pouvoir se justifier aux ternies de l'article 11 . paragraphe 2 . 5 . Cette disposition exige d'abord que toute restriction Ã la libertÃ© de rÃ©union pacifique soit prÃ©sue par la loi . A cet Ã©gard . il n'est pas contestÃ© que l'interdiction-de tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics Ã Londres au cours de la pÃ©riode entrant en ligne de compte Ã©tait couverte par l'article 3, paragraphe 3 dÃ© la loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public . Il ne fait pas de doute pour la Comntission que cette ntesure Ã©tait rÃ©ellement prÃ©vue par la loi, comme l'exige l'article Il . paragraphe 2 de la Convention . La mÃªme disposition exige ensuite que la restriction de la libertÃ© de l'association requÃ©rante ait l'un des buts lÃ©gitimes qui y sont Ã©numÃ©rÃ©s . Elle autorise entre autres des restrictions imposÃ©es dans l'intÃ©rÃªt de la sÃ»retÃ© publique, de la dÃ©fense de l'ordre et de la prÃ©vention du crime, ou de la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui . Tels sont les buts invoquÃ©s par le Gouvernement en l'espÃ¨ce . La Commission admet que chacun de ces buts peut entrer en ligne de compte et qu'en particulier les mesures en cause dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce ont Ã©tÃ© prises en vue de la dÃ©fense de l'ordre, ce que confirment non seulement le titre et le texle de la lÃ©gislation applicable . mais aussi la description non contestÃ©e que le Gouvernement fait de la situation dans laquelle elle a Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©e, ainsi que les termes mÃªmes de l'interdiction du 22 fÃ©vrier 1978 . De fait, il y est fait rÃ©fÃ©rence Ã l'existence de circonstances particuliÃ¨res dans lesquelles l'imposition de conditions prÃ©vues Ã l'article 3 . paragraphe I de la loi sur l'ordre public Ã©tait considÃ©rÃ©e comme ne suffisant pas Ã empÃªcher que de â¢ graves troubles publics . soient provoquÃ©s par l'organisation de dÃ©filÃ©s publics . La Commission constate donc que la mesure incriminÃ©e avait pour but ceux autorisÃ©s par l'article 11, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . Enfin, la disposition susmentionnÃ©e de la Convention exige que tout e
restriction imposÃ©e Ã l'exercice de la libertÃ© de rÃ©union pacifique soit nÃ©cessaire, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique . C'est Ã cet Ã©gard que les parties sont en total dÃ©saccord quant Ã la justification de la mesure incriminÃ©e . L'association requÃ©rante conteste la nÃ©cessitÃ©, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocralique . des larges pouvoirs que la loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public confÃ¨re Ã la police, et la nÃ©cessitÃ© de les exercer Ã propos d'une manifestation pacifique comme celle qu'elle envisageait d'organiser le 22 avril 1978 . Le Gouvernement, en revanche, invoquant la ntarge d'apprÃ©ciation reconnue aux Hautes Parlies Contractantes par la disposition susmentionnÃ©e de la Convention, considÃ¨re la mesure prise comnie nÃ©cessaire . Selon lui, il faut tenir compte de l'atmosphÃ¨re tendue qui rÃ©gnait Ã Londres Ã l'Ã©poque des faits, telle qu'elle est dÃ©crite dans son ntÃ©ntoire . en particulier de la crainte IrÃ©s rÃ©elle que des troubles publics soien t
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provoquÃ©s par les dÃ©filÃ©s et manifestations du Front National Ã propos de questions analogues . Le Gouvernement soutient donc que l'extension de l'interdiction jusqu'en avril 1978 et son application au dÃ©filÃ© projetÃ© par l'association requÃ©rante, par crainte que des Iroubles soient provoquÃ©s par des . opposants ou desextrÃ©niistes, se justifiait au regard de l'article 11, paragraphe 2 . La Commission relÃ¨ve que la lÃ©gislation adoptÃ©e par leRoyaume=Uni pour la dÃ©fense de l'orclre Ã propos des dÃ©filÃ©s publics, tout en n'excluant pas la possibilitÃ© d'imposer des conditions particuliÃ©res au dÃ©roulement d'une manifestation dÃ©terminÃ©e,ne permet pas d'interdire pareilles manifestations dans un cas isolÃ© . La loi de 1936 sur l'ordre public ne prÃ©voit que des mesures gÃ©nÃ©rales telle l'interdiction de tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics ou d'une catÃ©gorie de dÃ©filÃ©s publics . dans un certain quartier, pendant une pÃ©riode dÃ©termiriÃ©e . La Comniission reconnait que cette situation juridique rÃ©sulte dÃ©considÃ©rations visant Ã garantir une application de la loi Ã©gale pour tous, en ce qu'elle tend Ã exclure toute possibilitÃ© de prendre des mesures arbitraires contre une manifestation particuliÃ¨re . Une interdiction gÃ©nÃ©rale des manifestations- nepeut se justifier que s'i l
existe un risque rÃ©el qu'elles aboutissent Ã des troubles qu'on ne peut empÃªcher par d'aulres niesures moins rigoureuses . A ce propos, l'autoritÃ© doit aussi tenir cotnpte de l'effet d'une interdiction sur les dÃ©filÃ©s qui ne font pas eux-m@mes courir de risques Ã l'ordre public . Ce n'est que si l'incon'vÃ©nient dÃ» au fait que de pareils dÃ©filÃ©s soient touchÃ©s par l'interdiction est manifestentent dÃ©passÃ© par les considÃ©rations de sÃ©curitÃ© justifiant cette interdiction, et que s'il n'existe aucune possibilitÃ© d'Ã©viter de tels effets secondaires indÃ©sirables de l'interdiction en circonscrivant Ã©troitement sa portÃ©e, du point de vue de son application territoriale et de sa durÃ©e, qÃ»e .l'interdiction peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme nÃ©cessaire au sens de l'article 11, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . Ceci posÃ©, la Commission constate que la situation qui prÃ©valait en Angleterre Ã l'Ã©poque des faits, telle qu'elle est dÃ©crite par le Gouvernement et apparemment non contestÃ©e par l'association requÃ©rante, secaractÃ©risait par une atmosphÃ¨re tendue Ã une sÃ©rie d'Ã©meutes et de troubles, occasionnÃ©s par des dÃ©filÃ©s publics du Front National et des contre-manifestations . Bien que des contingents de police tout Ã fait considÃ©rables aient Ã©tÃ© dÃ©ployÃ©s Ã chaque occasion . il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© possible d'empÃªcher que de graves dommages ne soient causÃ©s aux personnes et aux biens . De pareilles manifestations Ã©taient imminentes dans plusieurs quartiers de Londres oÃ¹ s'Ã©taient produits les affrontements les plus graves Ã l'occasion d'un dÃ©filÃ© du Front National Ã peu prÃ¨s six mois auparavant, en aoÃ»t 1977 . Un dÃ©filÃ© du Front National avait Ã©tÃ© annoncÃ© pour le 25 fÃ©vrier 1978 dans le bourg de Redbridge et l'on devait s'attendre Ã d'autres Ã propos d'Ã©lections parlementaires partielles dans le bourg d e
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Lambeth . le 20avril1978 . Une rÃ©uniondu Front National danscÃ© quartier le 15 avril 1978 avait en fait rendu nÃ©cÃ¨ssaire le dÃ©ploiement de 2400 agents de police . La Commission estinie que dans ces circonstances il n'Ã©tait pas dÃ©raisonnable que les autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes interdisent tous les dÃ©filÃ©s publics autres que les dÃ©filÃ©s traditionnels pendant la pÃ©riode de deux mois dont il s'agit, c'est-Ã -dire jusqu'Ã trois jours aprÃ¨s les Ã©lections partielles de Lambeth . Etant donnÃ©que prÃ©cÃ©demment, Ã Manchester, le Front National avait,Ã©ludÃ© une interdiction locale en dÃ©filant dans tin autre quartier, il n'Ã©tait pas non pluq dÃ©raisonnable d'Ã©tendre l'interdiction Ã toutes les circonscriptions de la police de Londres . L'effet sur d'autres manifestations, y compris le dÃ©filÃ© envisagÃ© par l'association requÃ©rante pour le 22 avril 1978, n'Ã©tait pas assez grave pour faire mettre en doute la nÃ©cessitÃ© de l'interdiction en tant que telle . M@me en tenant compte du fait que le prÃ©fet de police de la mÃ©tropole a pris sa dÃ©cision en connaissant les projets de l'association requÃ©rante, la Commission estime qu'il n'Ã©tait pas tenu de prendre des dispositions spÃ©Ã§iales autorisant la rÃ©alisation de ces projets Ã la date envisagÃ©e . S'il est constant que l'association requÃ©rante avait des intentions tout Ã fait pacifiques, il n'est pas moins vrai que ses buts statutaires Ã©taient expressÃ©ment dirigÃ©s contre la politique du Front National et l'on ne pouvait donc exclure que le dÃ©filÃ© envisagÃ© pÃ»t, lui aussi, entrainer des troubles . De plus, l'association requÃ©rante aurait pu organiser son dÃ©filÃ© deux jours seulement aprÃ¨s la date initialentent prÃ©vue . A cette date elle aurait pu organiser son dÃ©filÃ© ailleurs que dans les districts de la police de Londres . et elle pouvait mÃªme organiser et, en fait, elle a organisÃ© une rÃ©union Ã l'intÃ©rieur de ces districts sous une forme autre qu'un dÃ©filÃ© public . La Commission considÃ¨re que l'on pouvait raisonnablement s'attendre que l'association rÃ©quÃ©rante accepte les effets inopportuns de l'interdiction sur le dÃ©filÃ© qu'elle envisageait, effets qui n'Ã©taient pas disproportionnÃ©s au but poursuivi par l'interdiction .
La Conintission en conclut que la niesure incriminÃ©e, y contpris son effet sur le dÃ©filÃ© envisagÃ© par l'association requÃ©rante, se justifie comme Ã©tant nÃ©cessaire dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©ntocratique . au sens de l'article 11, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . Il s'ensuit que le grief de l'association requÃ©rante Ã cet Ã©gard est manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . ' L'association requÃ©rante se plaint aussi que l'interdiction de dÃ©filÃ© s 6. publics Ã Londres Ã©tait discriminatoire et contraire Ã l'article 14 de la Convention Ã plusieurs Ã©gards . Cet article se lit ainsi : - La jouissance des droits et libertÃ©s reconnus dans la prÃ©sente Convention doit Ãªtre assurÃ©e, sans distinction aucune, fondÃ©e notamment sur le sexe, la race, la couleur, la langue . la religion, les opinions politiques ou
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toutes autres opinions, l'origine nationale ou sociale, l'appartenance Ã une ntinoritÃ© nationale, la fortune, la naissance ou toute autre situation . â¢ Le Gouvernement soutient que le grief susmentionnÃ© de l'associatio n requÃ©rante est incompatible avec les dispositions de la Convention pour autant qu'il se fonde sur l'article 14 pris isolÃ©ment . L'association requÃ©rante prÃ©cise toutefois qu'elle entend, en rÃ©alitÃ©, formuler ce grief en relation avec la jouissance des droits prÃ©vus par l'article 11 de la Convention et c'est ainsi que la Commission l'exantinera .
a . L'association requÃ©rante se plaint d'abord de l'exception faite dans l'interdiction en faveur des dÃ©filÃ©s de caractÃ¨re religieux, Ã©ducatif, de fÃªte ou de cÃ©rÃ©monie qui ont lieu traditionnellement . Elle soutient que la distinction faite entre ces dÃ©filÃ©s et tous les autres dÃ©filÃ©s Publics, y compris celui qu'elle envisageait elle-mÃªme, manquait de justification objective et raisonnable, selon les critÃ¨res de l'article 11, paragraphe 2 de la . Convention, puisque les dÃ©filÃ©s traditionnels peuvent eux aussi donner lieu Ã des troubles . La Commission fait toutefois observer que la possibilitÃ©, en gÃ©nÃ©ral, que des dÃ©filÃ©s traditionnels entraÃ®nent des troubles est ici sans pertinence . Comme l'application de la mesure prise en l'espÃ¨ce Ã©tait limitÃ©e dans le ,temps et l'espace, on doit supposer que les autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes Ã©taient en mesure de prÃ©voir qu'aucun des dÃ©filÃ©s traditionnels de Londres au cours de la pÃ©riode en question ne risquait de provoquer des troubles, alors qu'on ne pouvait s'attendre qu'elles sachent - en l'absence de toute obligation de les informer Ã l'avance d'une manifestation envisagÃ©e - quels autres dÃ©filÃ©s allaient avoir lieu . 11 n'Ã©tait donc pas dÃ©raisonnable que les autoritÃ©s pensent que des dÃ©filÃ©s ne figurant pas parmi les Ã©vÃ©nements traditionnels connus d'elles risquaient davantage que ces derniers de provoquer des troubles . La Commission estime en consÃ©quence que la distinction faite ne constituait pas une discrimination, au sens de l'article 14 de la Convention, quant Ã l'exercice par l'association requÃ©rante de la libertÃ© de rÃ©union pacifique (article 11) . Cette partie de la requÃªte est donc elle aussi manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . b . L'association requÃ©rante se plaint aussi que la mesure incriminÃ©e ait entrainÃ© une discrimination Ã l'encontre des organisations qui ne prÃ©sentaient aucune menace pour l'ordre public . parce qu'elles ont Ã©tÃ© traitÃ©es de la mÃªme maniÃ¨re que des organisations qui, elles, en prÃ©sentaient une . Toutefois . Ã supposer mÃªme qu'un traitenient indiffÃ©renciÃ© de questions fondamentalement diffÃ©rentes puisse dans certaines circonstances poser un problÃ¨me sur le terrain de l'article 14 de la Convention, la Commission estime qu'en l'espÃ¨ce il n'est pas nÃ©cessaire d'aborder celui-ci . Il n'est pas contestÃ© que l'association requÃ©rante ne prÃ©conise pas le recours Ã la violence, niais il est ici sans importance qu'elle se distingue Ã cet Ã©gard d'autres organisations . Ce qui est dÃ©cisif, c'est la probabilitÃ© que des nianifestations provoquent des troubles publics et, Ã cet Ã©gard, il n'Ã©tait pas dÃ©raisonnable que les aulorilÃ©s appliquent un critÃ¨re objectif et non u n
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crilÃ¨re .subjectif reposant sur les intemions violenles ou pacifiqqes des organiSaleur5 de pareilles nianifestation .c . De ntoins pour ce qui concerne le dÃ©filÃ© envlsagÃ© par l'association requÃ©rante . il est clair que les autoritÃ©s l'ont considÃ©rÃ© contme coniportant un risque de troubles et elles ne l'ont donc pas rangÃ© dÃ©libÃ©rÃ©ment ou arbitrairement dans une catÃ©gorie de nianifestations avec lesquelles il n'avait pas de rapport . Partant, la Commission n'aperÃ§oit aucun Ã©lÃ©ntent de discrimination dans l'attitude des autoritÃ©s . Il s'ensuit que le grief de l'association requÃ©rante Ã cct Ã©gard est lui aussi manifestement mal fondÃ© et doit @tre rejetÃ© conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . 7 . La Comniission a enfin examinÃ© le grief de l'association requÃ©rante selon lequel les sanctions pour inobservation de l'interdiction qui a frappÃ© le dÃ©filÃ© qu'elle envisageait portaient atteinte au droil Ã la sGretÃ© de la personne garanti par l'article 5 . paragraphe 1 de la Convention . Toutefois, la Commission constate que ce grief n'a pas Ã©tÃ© dÃ©veloppÃ© au cours de la procÃ©dure et doit donc @tre rejetÃ© comme Ã©tant manifestement mal fondÃ© . au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 dc la Convcntion .
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REOU@TEIRRECEVÃBLE .
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| CHRISTIANS AGAINST RACISM AND FASCISM c. ROYAUME-UNI

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