SEPT PERSONNES c. SUEDE

APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 8811 /7 9 Seven individuals v/SWEDEN Sept personnes c/SUÃD E DECISION of 13 May 1982 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 mai 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Artlcle 8, peregraph I of the Convention : Respect for family life implies that parental rights and choices in the upbringing of children are paramount as against the State. The existerrce of legislation prohibiting all corporal punishment of childrert, but which does not provide for any sanctions in this respect . cannot be considered as an interference in the exercise of the parents' right to respect jor familv life . Neither does the jact that corporal punishment of a child by his parents may expose the latter to criminal prosecution for assault, by the same standards as assault of a person outside the jamily . constitute an interference with the exercise of this right . Arllcle 25 of the Conventlon : The mere existence of enforced legislation may justify an individual is claiming to be a victim of a breach of the Convention kv this legislation when he has shown that this legislation continuously and directlv affects him . Article 2 of the Fint Protocol : The mere fact that the prohibition of corporal punishment ojchildren by their parents is mentionned on instructions of the authorities, by the teachers in school, cannot be considered as an attempt at indoctrination contra ry to Article 2, second sentence of the Protocol (Reference to judgment in the case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen) .
Article 8, paragraphe I, de la Conventlon : Le respect de la vie familiale implique que les droits et les choir des parents quant Ã la maniÃ¨re d'Ã©lever leurs enjartts sont opposables Ã lEtat .
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L'existence d'une lÃ©gislation proscrivant tout ch8timent corporel des enfants . mais ne prÃ©voyant Ã cet Ã©gard aucune sanction, ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e cornme une ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice par les paren[s du droit au respect de leur vie familiale. Ne constitue pas non plus une ingÃ©rence dans !'exercice de ce droit le jait que le chÃ¢timent corporel d'un enfant par ses parents puisse exposer ceux-ci Ã des poursuites pÃ©nales pour voies de fait au mÃ©me titre que des voies de fait exercÃ©es sur un adulte Ã©tranger Ã la fanri!!e .
Artlcle 25 de la Conventlon : La seule existence d'une disposition lÃ©gale en vigueur permet Ã un individu de se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de la Converuion du fait de cette disposition lÃ©gale . s'il montre que celle-ci l'affecte de maniÃ¨re directe et continue. Artlcle 2 du Pro tocole addltlonnel : Le seu! fait que l'interdiction du chÃ¢timent corporel des enfants par leurs parents soit, sur instructions des autoritÃ©s . Ã©voquÃ©e par les enseignants dans les Ã©coles ne peut Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© comme une tentative d'endoctrinement contraire Ã !'article 2. deuxiÃ¨me phrase du Protocole (RÃ©jÃ©rence Ã l'arr@t Kjeldsen . Busk Madsen et Pedersen) .
THE FACTS
(franÃ§ais : voir p . l17)
The l'acts as submitted by the applicants may be summarised as follow s The applicants * , three couples and one divorcee, are all resident in Sweden and have children aged between 20 months and 12 years . They all belong to a Protestant free church congregation in Stockholm . As such the applicants believe in "traditional" nteans of bringing up their children and in pa rt icular, as an aspect of their religious doctrine, they believe in the necessity of physical punishment of their children, which they justify by reference to Biblical texts ( e .g . Proverbs 13 :12, Hebrews 12 :6) and doctri nal works such as Luther's Large Catechism and Summa Theologiae Moralis ( Mekkelbach) . The applicants complain at the rest rictions which are imposed by Swedish law on the corporal punishment of children, which are as follows : Under the Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 3, Sections 5 and 6 (Brottsbalken) the offences of assault and aggravated assault are respectively defined . Section 5 provides : "A person who inflicts bodily injury, illness or pain on another person, or renders him unconscious or otherwise sintilarly helpless, shall be sentenced for assault to imprisonment for at most two years or in cases where the offences is a pettv one, to pay a fine . " â¢ l'heapplicantswe rc reprecentedbeforctheConiniissionbyMrsAnne-Ma ri eAndreassonBiÃ¼rkinnn . Slockholm .
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Section 6 provides : If the offence mentioned in Section 5 is considered grave, the sentence shall be for aggravated assault to imprisonment for at least one and at most ten vears" . Theâ¢applicants contend that the scope of the application of the criminal offence of assault to cases of parental chastisement of their children was uncertain until January 1979 but that it was widely considered and the applicants believe that parents had a degree of immunity in this respect, which excluded chastisement such as boxing a child's ears, from the scope of the offence . Hence thev refer to the decision of a municipal court which in 1975 acquitted a father who had been accused of maltreating his three year old daughter on the grounds that he had not been proved to exceed "the right of corporal chastisement that a guardian has towards a child in his custody . " On 1 Januarv 1979, however, the Swedish Parliament adopted a new second paragraph to Chapter 6, Section 3, of the Code of Parenthood (FÃ¼raldrabalken) as a result ot' which Section 3 now reads : "A custodian shall exercise the necessa ry supervision over the child with due regard to the child's age and other circumstances . The child shall not be subjected to corporal punishment or any other form of humiliating treatment" . Although the Code of Parenthood is not part of the Penal Code and its obligations are incomplete, in that no sanction a ttaches to their breach, the applicants contend that their rights and freedoms under the Convention have been and continue to be prejudiced both bv the express terms and effect of the addition to Chapter 6, Section 3, of the Code of Parenthood and also by the effect which it has had on the interpretation of the c ri minal law and in particular of Chapter 3 . Section 5, of the Penal Code . The new legislation was described by the Swedish Standing Commi tt ee on Law Procedure in its offi cial commentary (LU 1978/79, p . 5) as removing the unce rt ain ty that existed (as a re sult of an amendment to the law in 1966) as to the extent to which mild corporal rebukes of children by their guardians are punishable . As a result of this legislation, the applicants contend that the legal position under the c ri minal law has now been made clear, that acts of chastisement directed at children by their parents are illegal to the same extent that such acts would be if exercised against an adult . The applicants set out the following analysis of the legal consequences of corporal chastisement of children by their parents :
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Manhandling to rescue : These are acts such as pulling a child away from a fire which are, in the words of the Swedish Standing Committee on Law Procedure (1978/9 :11, p . 5) "necessary if the parents are to fulfil their obligation to supervise the child" . The intention of such acts is never to punish and they have no consequences under criminal law or the Code of Parenthood . 2 . Slight forms of' chastisement : These are acts which are covered by the general prohibition in the Code of Parenthood but do not amount to petty assault under the Penal Code . The applicants describe these as utterly lenient physical expressions of disapproval . Ordinary chastisement : These are acts such as blows, beatings, boxing the ears which the applicants contend must now be regarded as assault contrary to the Penal Code by virtue of its reinterpretation arising from the amendment to the Code of Parenthood .
Maltreatment of children : This category has always been punishable under criminal law and is exemplitied by ordinary chastisement which unintentionally causes injury and has exceeded its natural limits . The applicants maintain that ordinary chastisement has now become included within the scope of 'assault' as a criminal offence in Sweden and that parents no longer have a greater immunity from criminal sanction in imposing such ordinary chastisement on their children than thev have if the same acts were committed on a stranger . They also maintain that slight forms of chastisement, although not criminally punishable, are breaches of the Code of Parenthood which might lead the applicants to lose custody of their children . The introduction of the 1979 legislation was accompanied by a considerable amount ot' publicity about its ideological justification and, in particular, the Central Social Board of Stockholm, to whom the legislation was subntitted for consideration, maintained that "special efforts of information" should be mounted in respect of "extreme religious groups which have argued for so-called loving chastisement as a systentatic part of the upbringing of children" . . The applicants also anticipate that they will be faced with a dilemma in the education of their children, who will be taught at school to regard their parents' values as antisocial and criminal . None of the applicants has been prosecuted under the present state of Swedish criminal law nor have any of them lost the custody of their children .
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They contend that they are unable to take legal proceedings to challenge the state of the law in Sweden and that therefore they need do no more to comply with the requirements of Article 26 of the Convention .
COMPLAINTS The applicants complain that the state of Swedish law resulting from th e introduction of the 1979 legislation by the Swedish Government makes the corporal punishment and humiliating treatment of children by their parents a crintinal offence to the same extent as if such acts were committed against strangers . They maintain that this state of the law violates their rights to respect for family life, to freedom of religion and to respect for their ri ghts to ensure that their children's education and teaching is in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions . The applicants maintain that thev are victims of legislation and a state ot' the law which is incompatible with A rt icles8 and 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of the First Protocol even though they have not been prosecuted for assaulting their children . Thev submit that the terms of the legislation and the state of the law are sufficiently precise to re quire them to alter their conduct . Thus the applicants know that if they chastise children as their consciences and religious convictions dictate, they mav be liable to criminal prosecution for assault . Accordinglv they maintain that they are directly, immediately and individually affected by the mere state of the law . Fu rt herntore, the applicants point out that they are unable to challenge the 1979 legislation or the state of the criminal law, which are the law of the land and unimpeachable before the Swedish cou rt s . Consequently they are unable to seek domestic remedies . They also refer to the consequences which would follow if they were not regarded as victims under A rt icle 25 in that they would have to wait to be prosecuted under the present state of the law, which thev maintain is incompatible with the Convention, and they would ri sk not only the public ignominy associated with such proceedings, but also the risk of being declared unsatisfactorv guardians of their children and losing custody of thent for breaching the Code of Parenthood before being able to bring their application to the Commission . Thev accordinglv submit that thev are victims within the terms of A rticle 25, have no domestic remedies to exhaust and invoke A rt icles 8 and 9 and Art icle 2 of the First Protocol .
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THE LAW Artlcle 25 of the Conventlo n The applicants complain that under the Code of Parenthood they are forbidden from corporally punishing their children . They further complain that under Swedish criminal law the boundary of criminal assault is the same whether the act is committed against a stranger or by a parent in chastising its child . They maintain that their ideological disagreement with these provisions results in their being victims of a continuing violation of their rights under Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of the First Protocol . The respondent Government has raised the question whether the applicants are victims within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention, without submitting any specific arguments on this question . The Commission, like the Court, has consistently held in its case-law that the verv existence of legislation may justify an applicant in claiming to be a victim within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention of a violation of one of its norntative provisions where the legislation continuously and directly affects him . Hence in the Marckx case (Series A judgments and Decisions, Vol . 31, p . 13, para . 27) the Court held : "Article 25 of the Convention entitles individuals to contend that a law violates their rights bv itself in the absence of an individual measure of implementation if they run the risk of being directly affected by it" .
In the present case the applicants are all parents who have the custody of children . They are therefore all ipso jacto affected -by the provisions of the Code of Parenthood and, in the light of their firmreligious convictions as to the appropriateness of physical chastisement of children by their parents they are, in the Commission's view, clearly directly affectedby the provisions of the Code and the state of the criminal law in SwedÃ©n .which thev submit criminalises behaviour which they regard as necessary andâ¢proper : The Commission therefore concludes that the applicants have shown that they may claim to be victims of violations of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention . 2 . Artlcle 26 of the Commlealo n The applicants contend that their application concerns the state of Swedish criminal and parental law . They have not been subjected to proceedings implementing the law but equally . have . not instituted proceedings themselves to challenge it, since this is notpossible in Sweden . They contend that the requirement of Article 26 of the Convention as to the â¢ exhaustion of domestic remedies does not apply to them .
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The respondent Government have not disputed the applicants' contention and the Commission finds that, since the applicants were unable to challenge the state of Swedish law in Sweden, the requirement of Article 26 of the Convention as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies is therefore inapplicable . 3 . Article 8 of the Conventio n The applicants complain that the present state of Swedish criminal law and the amendment of the Code of Parenthood interfere with their right to respect for private and familv life as guaranteed by Article 8 which provides : I . Evervone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence . 2 . There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessarv in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the countrv, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others . " In the applicants' view the interference which they allege the criminalisation of the phvsical chastisement of their children constitutes with their rights under the tirst paragraph of this Article cannot be justified under the terms of the second paragraph . The respondent Government argue however that the present state of the criminal law of assault, like all other normal provisions of the criminal law, cannot be regarded as constituting an interference with the applicants' right to respect for their family and private lives as guaranteed by Article 8, paragraph I, of the Convention . Alternatively the respondent Government contend that anv interference which arises isjustifiable under the terms of its second paragraph . The applicants further contend that the 1979 amendment of the Code of Parenthood constituted a further interference with their rights under Article 8, paragraph I, which is equally unjustifiable under Article 8 . paragraph 2 . The Government contend that the amendment in question, which is an incomplete law, with no relevance to criminal law and no accompanying sanction, cannot be regarded as an interference with the applicants' rights, under this Article or can be justified under its second paragraph . The Commission will examine first the applicants' complaints relating to the Code of Parenthood and in pa rt icular to the second paragraph to Chapter 6, Section 3 of the Code . In the applicants' submission this provision makes even slight forms of corporal chastisement illegal . They maintain that the existence and operation of this law constitutes an interference with their ri ght to respect t'or familv life as guaranteed bv Article 8, paragraph I, of the Convention .
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The Commission recalls its analysis of the scope of the concept of interference in its Report on Application No . 7525/76, Dudgeon against the United Kingdont, where it found (para . 90) : "In accordance with the Court's case-law in the Klass case . . . an applicant may only complain of the actual effects of the law on him . If in realitv it does not affect him at all, he cannot complain . Or its effects mav be slight and not such as to interfere with his right to private life . When he complains of the existence of penal legislation, the question whether he runs any risk of prosecution will be relevant in assessing the existence, extent and nature of anv actual effects on him . On the other hand the ntere fact that a penal law has not been enforced by means of crintinal proceedings . or is unlikely to be so enforced, does not of itself negate the possibilitv that it has efl'ects amounting to interference with private life . A primary purpose of any such law is to prevent the conduct it proscribes, by persuasion or deterrence . It also stigmatises the conduct as unlawful and undesirable . These aspects must also be taken into consideration . " The Commission must examine the scope and operation of the Code of Parenthood on the basis of the parties' submissions in the light of these criteria . It notes first that the applicants do not contend that light corporal rebukes are breaches of the Swedish criminal law of assault (Chapter 3, Sections 5 and 6, of the Penal Code) . Nor have they established anv instance of such behaviour being regarded as "ntolestation" (Chapter 4, Section 7, ot' the Penal Code) . The present case does not therefore concern the operation of the criminal law . No question arises of a "risk of prosecution" as a result of the operation of the Code ol' Parenthood as it did in the Dudgeon case referred to above . 'fhe Commission must therefore consider (he effects of the Code on the applicant's abilitv to express and implement their own convictions in the upbringing of their children, in the light of the background and aims of the Code . The Commission notes first that Sweden is the only Member State of the Council of Europe which has introduced legislation prohibiting all corporal punishment of children by their parents including light corporal rebukes . The Commission's evaluation of the Code's effect must start from the preniise that parental rights and choices in the upbringing and education of their children are paramount as against the state . This is inherent in the terms of the guarantee ot'respect for family life contained in Article 8, paragraph 1, since the upbringing of children is a central aspect of familv life . The same principle is clearly reasserted in Article 2, First Protocol, the text and interpretation of which bv the organs of the Convention leaves the primacy of the parental role in no doubt . - IIl -
The applicants concede that the scope of permissible parental punishment of their children was uncertain before the amendment to the Code in question and the Government sought by this provision to discourage acts of violence against children bv the imposition of the Code's general prohibition of corporal punishment of all kinds . The applicants contend, however, that this prohibition is contrary to their convictions, which support the use of corporal punishment of their children where appropriate .
Thev have submitted that the amendment of the Code extended the boundary ot the criminal law and also increased the risk that parents who merelv used light corporal chastisement mav lose the custodv of their child but thev have not been able to subntit any details of reported, or unreported, cases before the Swedish courts to substantiate either claim and which relate directly to light corporal rebukes . The Government on the other hand have described the amendment to the Code as an incomplete law . Thev have stressed that it has no accompanving sanction and that it has neither directly, nor indirectly, affected the scope or interpretation of Swedish criminal law . For this reason they have not been able to provide the Comniission with anv concrete example ot' the operation of the Code or its interpretation and application by Swedish courts or authorities . The Governntent have submitted that it was only by complete prohibition of all corporal punishment that criminal acts of violence against children could be effectively discouraged, since these might arise where a parent exceeded the legitimate non-criminal sphere of light corporal rebukes unintentionally or othenvise . Although the legitimacv of non-criminal light corporal rebukes was not challenged in itself, the Government did not wish to encourage corporal punishment even in this sphere, for fear of such excesses . In recognition of the difference between what ntay properly be called violence and is prohibited by the criminal law and the legitimate non-criminal sphere, the prohibition imposed by the amendment to the Code of Parenthood is not accompanied bv any sanction or other legal implications for the family, which lends support to the Government's contention that the amendment was and is intended to encourage a reappraisal of the corporal punishment of children in order to discourage abuse . The Commission must therefore decide whether the effects of the amendment of the Code of Parenthood are such as to constitute an intert'erence which amounts to a lack of respect for the applicants' family life which includes respect for parental acts and convictions relating to the upbringing of their children .
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The exact practical effects of the provision about which the applicants complain remain obscure . The applicants have not been directly subjected to anv enforcement or other procedure a rising from their disagreement with the Code which might constitute an interference with their rights . Nor have they provided any examples of its interpretation or application by the Swedish authorities in other cases . They have further contended that the provisions of the Code may be relied upon in deciding questions as to the custody of children, but again they have not illustrated this submission and the Commission must therefore find from the facts before it that this has not actually occurred . Furthermore the information provided by the Swedish Government tends to confirm that this incomplete law is without any direct practical effect bevond that ot' attempting to encourage a reappraisal of the treatment of children . No concrete measures have ever been referred to by the Government to achieve this reappraisal, except for the mere existence of the amendment and the publicity which it has attracted . In the light of this, the Commission concludes that the actual effects of the law are to encourage a positive review of the punishment of children by their parents, to discourage abuse and prevent excesses which could properly be described as violence against children . In this respect the Commission must distinguish between the expression of differing opinions from those held by the applicants in the context of the public debate on the proposed amendment and the actual implententation and operation of the amendment once enacted . On the facts as presented by the applicants it does not appear to the Commission that their original fears as to the nature of the amendment were justified . The Commission does not regard the effects of the amendment which are the subject of this application as constituting an interference which amounts to a lack of respect for the applicants' family life . It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Convention . The applicants also allege that the scope of the criminal law of assault and molesting fails to respect their right to respect for private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 . The Commission recognises that, whilst the upbringing of children remains essentiallv a parental dutv, encapsulated within the concept of family life, it is inevitable that certain aspects of criminal law will affect the relationship between parents and children to a greater or lesser degree . Hence the assault of children by their parents is treated as criminal and although the applicants have drawn attention to the wider prohibition of all corporal punishment of children contained in the Code of Parenthood, they concede that it is not every corporal rebuke which would infringe the Penal Code . - 113 -
However the applicants have not shown that the provisions of Swedish law criminalising the assault of children are unusual or in anyway draconian . The fact that no distinction is made between the treatment of children by their parents and the same treatment applied to an adult stranger cannot, in the Commission's opinion, constitute 'an interference' with respect for the applicant's private and family lives since the consequences of an assault are equated in both cases . Nor does the mere fact that legislation, or the state of the law, intervenes to regulate something which pertains to family life constitute a breach of Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Convention unless the intervention in question violates the applicants' right to respect for their family life . The Commission finds that the scope of the Swedish law of assault and molestation is a normal measure for the control of violence and that its extension to apply to the ordinary phvsical chastisement of children by their parents is intended to protect potentially weak and vulnerable member of society . The Commission therefore concludes that the state of Swedish criminal law does not interfere with their right to respect for private and family life within the meaning of Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Convention . It follows that this aspect of their complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Convention . 4 . Artlcle 9 of the Conventio n The applicants further complain that the legal position in question fail s to respect their right to freedom of religion as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention, which provides : "1 . Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion ; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance . 2 . Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed bv law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of pubfic safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and f'reedoms of others . " The respondent Government contend that the state of the law complained of reveals no interference with the applicants' rights under this Article, or in the alternative, that such interference as is occasioned is justified under the terms of its second paragraph . The Commission considers that on the facts of the applicatiÃ´n before it the same reasoning applies, mutatis mutandis, to the applicants' complaint s
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under this Article as to those under Article 8 . It follows that there has been no interference with the applicants rights as guaranteed by Article 9 and that this aspect of the applicants' complaints is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Convention .
5 . Article 2 Flnt Ikotoco l The applicants further complain that the amendment of the Code of Parenthood is to be incorporated into the school curriculum in order, in their view, to spread the view as widely as possible and even amongst their own children . that the applicants' attitude to corporal punishment is outdated, wrong and reprehensible . Thev maintain that such an approach fails to respect the guarantee contained in the second sentence of Article 2 First Protocol, which provides : . . . In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions" . The respondent Government has contended tirst that this provision is inapplicable since the state of the law complained of by the applicants does not concern the exercise of any state functions in relation to education or teaching, such as the organisation of schools or similar institutions . In the alternative, the Government maintain that if this Article is applicable, the second sentence must be given a reasonable interpretation and may not be read to protect extraordinary or unusual elements of religious or philosophical doctrine which may conflict with the State's duties to protect children from harm . Nevertheless the applicants have referred to passages in ot7icial documents published in connection with the amendment of the Code of Parenthood which suggest that the amendment in question should be taken into account in educational establishments . The Commission finds therefore that Article 2 is applicable in the present case . As far as the respondent Government's second contention is concerned, the Commission was f'aced with a similar arguntent on behalf of the United Kingdom Government in Applications Nos . 7511/76 and 7743/76, concerning the use of corporal punishment in schools in the United Kingdom, where, at paragraph 97 of that Report, it concluded that, in the light of the unequivocal terms of Article I ot' the Convention and Articles 2 and 5 First Protocol , "it is preciselv in their capacity as individual parents that the applicants are entitled to claint the right to respect for their philosophical convictions and this irrespeMive of whether their claint ntay conflict with the standards generally accepted by other parents in respect of discipline" .
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It is true that those applications concerned the respect for philosophical convictions (para . 83, ibid .), but the Commission recognises that the same criteria must equally apply to religious convictions . However, as the European Court of Human Rights confirmed in its judgment in the Kjeldren, Busk Madsen and Pedersen Case (Series A : Judgments and Decisions, Vol . 23 . para . 53), the second sentence of Article 2, First Protocol does not prevent States from imparting through teaching or education information or knowledge of adirectlv or indirectly religious or philosophical kind . Nor does it permit parents to object to aspects of teaching on these grounds unless the information or knowledge in question is not conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner . Thus "the State is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents' religious and philosophical convictions . That is the limit that must not be exceeded" (ibid) . In the present case the applicants have not complained that their children have in fact been subjected to what they regard as indoctrination on the question of the propriety of corporal punishment . They have merely averted to references in official publications that account should be taken of the amendment to the Code of Parenthood in the educational sphere . The respondent Government have expressly referred to the underlying purpose of the amendment as an attempt to strengthen the rights of children and encourage respect for them as individuals and have stressed that this humanitarian objective is to be pursued by way of a general policy of education in its broadest sense . Furthermore the Comntission recalls that, in accordance with its constant case-law and that of the Court, Article 2, First Protocol must be read as a whole with the Convention and especially in the light of the guarantees contained in Articles 8, 9 and 10 . In the present case the Commission has found that no interference with either Article 8 or 9 arises and concludes that the applicants, who have not averted to more than policy statements of a general character, which could in no sense be described as an attempt by the respondent Government to implement a policy of indoctrination in Swedish schools, have failed to show that their right to respect for their religious convictions protected bv Article 2, First Protocol has been violated bv any concrete provision or practice . It follows that this aspect of their complaint is manifestlv ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Convention . For these reasons the Commissio n
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBL E
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(TRADUCTION) EN FAI T Les faits, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par les requÃ©rants, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comnte suit . Les requÃ©rants * , trois couples et un divorcÃ©, habitent tous en SuÃ¨de et ont des enfants Ã¢gÃ©s de 20 mois Ã 12 ans . Ils appa rt iennent tous Ã une congrÃ©gation protestante libre de Stockholm . En cette qualitÃ©, ils sont partisans d'une Ã©ducation . traditionnelle . de leurs enfants et croient notamment - c'est un aspect de leurs convictions religieuses - Ã la nÃ©cessitÃ© d'infliger des chÃ timents corporels aux enfants, qu'ils justifient par rÃ©fÃ©rence Ã des textes bibliques ( ex . Proverbes 13/12, HÃ©breux 12/6) et Ã des travaux de thÃ©ologiens tels que le Grand CathÃ©chisme de Luther et la Sumnia Theologiae Moralis de Mekkelbach . Les requÃ©rants se plaignent que le droit suÃ©dois leur impose, en matiÃ¨re de chÃ¢timents corporels des enfants, les restrictions suivantes . Aux termes du Code pÃ©nal suÃ©dois, chapitre 3, a rticles 5 et 6 ( Brottsbafken), les infractions de voies de fait simples et qualifiÃ©es sont respectivement dÃ©finies comme suit : Article 5- .Quiconque inflige des blessures corporelles, maladies ou souffrances Ã une autre personne ou lui fait perdre connaissance ou . de toute autre nianiÃ¨re, la rÃ©duit Ã l'impuissance se rend coupable de voies de fait punies de deux ans de prison maximunt ou d'une amende lorsque l'infraction est lÃ©gÃ¨re . -
Article 6-â¢Si l'infraction dÃ©cri te Ã l'article 5 est considÃ©rÃ©e comme grave, la peine infligÃ©e pour voies de fait qualifiÃ©es est d'un an de p rison au moins et de dix ans au plus . â¢ Les requÃ©rants soutiennent que jusqu'en janvier 1979, l'application des dispositions pÃ©nales concernant les voies de fait Ã des cas de punition corporelle des enfants par leurs parents Ã©tait incertaine niais que rÃ©gnait Ã cet Ã©gard une attitude libÃ©rale et les requÃ©rants estinient que les parents avaient alors une certaine immunitÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard qui excluait notamment du domaine de l'infraction la punition consistant par exemple Ã tirer les oreilles d'un enfant . Les requÃ©rants renvoient Ã la dÃ©cision d'un tribunal qui, en 1975 . a acquittÃ© un pÃ¨re accusÃ© d'avoir maltraitÃ© sa fille de trois ans parce qu'il n'Ã©tait pas prouvÃ© que l'intÃ©ressÃ© avait outrepassÃ© â¢ le droit de chÃ¢timents corporels que la personne investie de la garde exerce sur l'enfant . â¢ â¢ Les rcquÃ©runts Ã©taient reprÃ©senlÃ©s devant la Commission par Mme Anne-Marie AndreaxomBjÃ¼rkman . de Stockholm .
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Le lâ¢1 janvier 1979 cependant . le Parlentent suÃ©dois a votÃ© le texte d'un nouveau paragraphe 2 Ã l'article 3 du chapitre 6 du Code parental (FiirÃ¢ldrabalken), ainsi libellÃ© : â¢ Le gardien de l'enfant exercera la surveillance nÃ©cessaire sur l'enfant compte tenu de l'Ã¢ge de celui-ci et d'autres facteurs . L'enfant ne sera pas sountis Ã des chÃ¢timents corporels ni Ã aucune autre forme de traitentent humiliant . .
Bien que le Code parental ne fasse pas part ie du Code pÃ©nal et que ses dispositions aient le caractÃ©re de lex imperfecta, puisque leur violation n'est asso rt ie d'aucune sanction, les requÃ©rants soutiennent qu'ils ont subi et continuent Ã subir une entrave dans l'exercice des droits et libertÃ©s que leur garantit la Convention, du fait tant du libellÃ© que des effets de cet amendement et Ã©galement par suite de l'effet que ce texte a eu sur l'interprÃ©tation du droit pÃ©nal . notantment du chapitre 3, article 5 du Code pÃ©nal . Dans un commentaire officiel (LU 1978/79, p . 5), la Commission permanente suÃ©doise des lois a dÃ©crit la nouvelle lÃ©gislation comme levant l'incertitude qui subsistait, aprÃ¨s l'amendement de 1966, sur la punissabilitÃ© des corrections lÃ©gÃ¨res que les parents peuvent administrer Ã leurs enfants . Les requÃ©rants soutiennent qu'avec cette lÃ©gislation la situation est ntaintenant claire au regard du droit pÃ©nal puisque les chÃ¢timents corporels infligÃ©s aux enfants par leurs parents sont illÃ©gaux . de la mÃªme maniÃ¨re que s'ils Ã©taient exercÃ©s sur un adulte . Les requÃ©rants exposent comnte suit leur analyse des consÃ©quences juridiques des chÃ¢timents corporels infligÃ©s aux enfants par leurs parents 1 . Usage de la force dans un but de sauvetage : Il s'agit d'actes consistant par exemple Ã Ã©loigner d'un incendie et qui, selon les termes de la Contmission permanente des lois (1978/79 : 11, p . 5), sont - nÃ©cessaires pour que les parents s'acquittent de leur obligation de su rveiller l'enfant Â» . Ces actes n'ont jantais pour intention de punir et n'ont aucune cÃ´nsÃ©quence au regard du droit pÃ©nal ou du Code parental . 2 . Corrections lÃ©gÃ¨res Il s'agit d'actes couverts par l'interdiction gÃ©nÃ©rale du Code parental mais qui ne constituent pas une agression mineure au regard du Code pÃ©nal . Les requÃ©rants les qualifient de maniÃ¨re trÃ¨s indulgente d'exp ri mer physiquentent sa dÃ©sapprobation . 3 . Corrections ordinaire s Il s'agit d'actes tels que coups . bastonnades, tirements d'oreilles qui, selon les requÃ©rants, doivent maintenant Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©s comme des voies de fait contraires au Code pÃ©nal, tel que rÃ©interprÃ©tÃ© par l'amendement au Code parental . - 118 -
SÃ©vices sur les enfants Cette catÃ©gorie a toujours Ã©tÃ© punissables au regard du droit pÃ©nal . Un exemple en est la correction ordinaire qui provoque des blessures non intentionnelles et dÃ©passe ses lintites normales . Les requÃ©rants soutiennent qu'en SuÃ¨de la correction ordinaire relÃ¨ve maintenant du doniaine d'application de l'infraction pÃ©nale de la =voie de fait - et que les parents ne sont pas plus protÃ©gÃ©s contre une sanction pÃ©nale lorsqu'ils infligent cette correction ordinaire Ã leurs enfants que s'ils contmettaient les mÃ©mes actes sur un Ã©tranger . lls soulignent Ã©galement que des formes lÃ©gÃ¨res de correction, tout en n'Ã©tant pas pÃ©nalement punissables, constituent nÃ©anntoins des violations du Code parental, susceptibles d'amener les requÃ©rants Ã se voir retirer la garde de leurs enfants . L'introduction de la lÃ©gislation de 1979 s'est accompagnÃ©e d'une publicitÃ© considÃ©rable quant Ã sa justification idÃ©ologique et le Bureau social central de Stockholm notamment, consultÃ© Ã propos du texte, a dÃ©clarÃ© que â¢des efforts particuliers d'inforntation - s'imposaient Ã l'encontre de - groupes religieux extrÃ©ntistes soutenant que le prÃ©tendu 'qui aime bien chÃ¢tie bien' fait partie intÃ©grante de l'Ã©ducation des enfants â¢ . Les requÃ©rants prÃ©voient Ã©galement qu'ils se trouveront confronlÃ©s Ã u n dilenime dans l'Ã©ducation de leurs enfants, Ã qui l'Ã©cole enseignera Ã considÃ©rer les valeurs prdnÃ©es par leurs parents conime antisociales et criminelles . Il est Ã noter qu'aucun des requÃ©rants n'a fait l'objet de poursuites en application du droit pÃ©nal suÃ©dois actuel et qu'aucun d'eux ne s'est vu retirer la garde de ses enfants . Les intÃ©ressÃ©s soutiennent que, ne pouvant engager aucune action en justice pour contester l'Ã©tat de la lÃ©gislation en SuÃ¨de, ils n'ont aucune dÃ©marche Ã faire pour satisfaire aux exigences de l'article 26 de la Convention . GRIEF S Les requÃ©rants se plaignent qu'aprÃ¨s l'introduction de la lÃ©gislation de 1979 par le Gouvernement suÃ©dois, le droit suÃ©dois ait fait du chÃ¢timent corporel et du traitement humiliant des enfants par leurs parents des infractions pÃ©nales au mÃªme titre que si ces actes concernaient des Ã©trangers Ã la famille . lls soutiennent que cet Ã©tat de la lÃ©gislation est contraire au respect de leur vie familiale, Ã la libertÃ© de religion et au respect de leur droit d'assurer Ã leurs enfants une Ã©ducation et un enseignement conformes Ã leurs convictions religieuses et philosophiques . Les requÃ©rants se prÃ©tendent victimes d'une lÃ©gislation et d'un Ã©tat du droit incompatibles avec les articles 8 et 9 de la Convention et avec l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel, quand bien mÃªnte ils n'ont pas fait l'objet de poursuites pour voies de fait sur leurs enfants . Selon eux, les termes de la lo i
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et l'Ã©tat du droit sont suffisamment prÃ©cis pour les obliger Ã modifier leur comportement . Ils savent en consÃ©quence que s'ils chÃ¢tient leurs enfants comme leur conscience et leurs convictions religieuses le leur dictent, ils encourront des poursuites pÃ©nales pour voies de fait . Ils soutiennent en consÃ©quence Ã©lre directement, immÃ©diatement et individuellement affectÃ©s par le simple Ã©tat du droit . En outre, les requÃ©rants soulignent ne pas pouvoir attaquer la lÃ©gislation de 1979 ni l'Ã©tat prÃ©sent du droit pÃ©nal qui constituent l'ordre lÃ©gal et ne peuvent Ã©tre contestÃ©s devant les tribunaux suÃ©dois . Aussi n'ont-ils pas de recours internes Ã leur disposition . Ils soulignent Ã©galement les consÃ©quences Ã prÃ©voir s'ils ne devaient pas Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©s comme des victimes, au sens de l'arlicle 25 : il leur faudrait alors attendre de faire l'objet de poursuites en application de la loi actuelle, qui est selon eux incompatible avec la Convention, et encourir non seulement l'ignominie publique liÃ©e Ã ce genre de poursuites, mais aussi le risque de se voir retirer la garde de leurs enfants pour infraction au Code parental et ce, avant d'avoir pu saisir la Commission . Les requÃ©rants se prÃ©tendent donc victimes, au sens de l'article 25, puisqu'ils n'ont pas de recours interne Ã exercer, et invoquent les articles 8 et 9 de la Convention et l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel .
EN DROI T Sur l'article 25 de la Conventio n Les requÃ©rants se plaignent de ce que le Code parental leur interdit d'infliger des chÃ¢timents corporels Ã leurs enfants . Ils soutiennent que, n'Ã©tant pas d'accord sur le plan thÃ©ologique avec ces dispositions, ils sont victimes d'une violation perntanente des droits que leur reconnaissent les articles 8 et 9 de la Convention et l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel . Le Gouvernentent dÃ©fendeur a posÃ© la question de savoir si les requÃ©rants sont des Â«victimes~ au sens de l'article 25 de la Convention mais sans soumettre aucune argumentaiion prÃ©cise Ã cet Ã©gard . Comnte la Cour, la Comntission a toujours dÃ©clarÃ© dans sa jurisprudence que la seule existence d'une lÃ©gislation peut Ã juste titre amener le requÃ©rant Ã se prÃ©tendre victime, au sens de l'article 25 de la Convention, d'une violation des dispositions normatives de la Convention, lorsque la lÃ©gislation l'affecte de maniÃ¨re continue et directe . Aussi . dansl'affaire Marckx (SÃ©rie A, ArrÃªts et dÃ©cisions, vol . 31, p . 13, par . 27), la Cour a-t-elle dÃ©clarÃ© : .L'article 25 de la Convention habilite les particuliers Ã soutenir qu'une loi viole leurs droits par elle-mÃªme, en l'absence d'acte individuel d'exÃ©cution . s'ils risquent d'en subir directement les effets . .
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En l'espÃ¨ce . les requÃ©rants sont tous des parents ayant la garde de leurs enfants . Ils sont donc tous, ipso facto, affectÃ©s par les dispositions du Code parental et . vu leurs convictions religieuses affirmÃ©es sur l'opportunitÃ© de chÃ¢tier corporellentent les enfants, ils sont manifestement, estime la Commission . directentent affectÃ©s par les dispositions du Code et par l'Ã©tat du droit pÃ©nal en SuÃ¨de, qui criminalisent un comportement qu'eux-mÃªmes jugent au contraire nÃ©cessaire et appropriÃ© . La Commission estime en consÃ©quence que les requÃ©rants ont ntontrÃ© qu'ils pouvaient se prÃ©tendre victimes, au sens de l'article 25 de la Convention, de violations des droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention .
2 . Sur l'article 26 de la Conventio n Les requÃ©rants soutiennent que leur requÃªte concerne l'Ã©tat du droit pÃ©nal et parental de SuÃ¨de . S'ils n'ont pas fait l'objet de poursuites en application de la lÃ©gislation . ils n'ont pas non plus exercÃ© de recours pour contester la loi puisque la chose n'est pas possible en SuÃ¨de . Selon eux, l'exigence de l'article 26 de la Convention relative Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes ne leur est donc pas applicable . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur n'a pas rÃ©futÃ© la thÃ¨se des requÃ©rants . Puisque ceux-ci ne sont pas en mesure de contester l'Ã©tat de la lÃ©gislation en SuÃ¨de, la Commission estime que la condition posÃ©e Ã l'article 26 de la Convention quant Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes ne leur est pas applicable .
3 . Sur l'article 8 de la Convention Les requÃ©rants se plaignent que l'Ã©tat actuel de la lÃ©gislation pÃ©nale en SuÃ¨de et f'amendement au Code parental portent atteinte Ã leur droit au respect de la vie privÃ©e et familiale tel que le leur garantit l'article 8, ainsi libellÃ© : â¢(I) Toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie privÃ©e et familiale, de son domicile et de sa correspondance . (2) II ne peut y avoir ingÃ©rence d'une autoritÃ© publique dans l'exercice de ce droit que pour autant que cette ingÃ©rence est prÃ©vue par la loi et qu'elle constitue une mesure qui, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, est nÃ©cessaire Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale, Ã la sÃ»retÃ© publique, au bien-Ãªtre Ã©conomique du pays, Ã la dÃ©fense de l'ordre et Ã la prÃ©vention des infractions pÃ©nales, Ã la protection de la santÃ© ou de la morale, ou Ã la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui . â¢ Selon les requÃ©rants, l'ingÃ©rence que la criminalisation du chÃ¢timent corporel de leurs enfants constitue dans l'exercice des droits protÃ©gÃ©s par le premier paragraphe de cet article ne saurait se justifier au regard du second paragraphe . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur fait valoir en revanche que l'Ã©ta t - 121 -
actuel de la lÃ©gislation pÃ©nale sur les voies de fait, Ã l'instar de toute autre disposition pÃ©nale du droit commun, ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme portant atteinte au droit des requÃ©rants au respect de leur vie privÃ©e et familiale, tel que garanti par l'article 8 . paragraphe l, de la Convention . A titre subsidiaire, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que toute ingÃ©rence de ce genre peut se justifier au regard du deuxiÃ¨me paragraphe de ce texte . Les requÃ©rants prÃ©tendent en outre que l'amendement de 1979 au Code parental a constituÃ© . dans l'exercice des droits prÃ©vus par l'article 8, para . graphe 1 . une ingÃ©rence tout aussi injustifiable au regard de l'article 8, paragraphe 2 . Le Gouvernement estime, quant Ã lui, que l'amendement en question . lex imperfecta, n'ayant rien Ã voir avec le droit pÃ©nal et non assortie de sanctions, ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme une atteinte aux droits des requÃ©rants protÃ©gÃ©s par cet article ou, Ã titre subsidiaire, pouvait se justifier au regard du second paragraphe . La Commission examinera tout d'abord les griefs des requÃ©rants contre le Code parental et notamment l'article 3 . paragraphe 2, du Chapitre 6 . Selon les requÃ©rants, cette disposition rend illÃ©gale mÃªme les formes les plus douces de chÃ¢timents corporels . lls soutiennent que l'existence et l'application de ce texte constituent une ingÃ©rence dans le droit au respect de la vie familiale, tel que garanti par l'article 8 . paragraphe l, de la Convention . La Commission rappelle l'analyse qu'elle a faite de la notion dans son rapport sur la requÃªte NÂ° 7525/76 Dudgeon contre Royaume-Uni, oÃ¹ elle a constatÃ© (par . 90) : Â« ConformÃ©ment Ã la jurisprudence de la Cour dans l'affaire Klass . . . un requÃ©rant individuel ne peut se plaindre que des consÃ©quences que la loi a effectivement eues pour lui . Si en rÃ©alitÃ© il n'a eu Ã subir aucun effet, il ne peut formuler de griefs . Il peut s'agir aussi d'effets mineurs qui ne sont pas susceptibles de porter atteinte Ã son droit au respect de sa vie privÃ©e . Lorsqu'il se plaint de l'existence d'une lÃ©gislation pÃ©nale, la question de savoir s'il court le moindre risque d'Ãªtre poursuivi devrait @tre prise en compte pour Ã©tablir l'existence, la portÃ©e et la nature de toute consÃ©quence effective pour l'intÃ©ressÃ© . Par ailleurs, le simple fait que l'existence d'une loi n'a pas Ã©tÃ© suivie d'exÃ©cution dans le cadre de poursuites pÃ©nales ou a peu de chances de l'@tre, ne suffit pas Ã supprimer la possibilitÃ© qu'elle ait des effets Ã©quivalant Ã une ingÃ©rence dans la vie privÃ©e . L'un des objectifs principaux d'une loi de ce type est d'empÃªcher, par la persuasion ou la dissuasion, le comportement qu'elle interdit . Elle stigmatise, de plus, le comportement en question comme illÃ©gal et indÃ©sirable . Ces aspects doivent Ã©galement Ãªtre pris en considÃ©ration . â¢ La Commission doit examiner, en fonction de ces critÃ¨res et sur la base de l'argumentation des parties, le domaine d'application et la mise en o_uvr e
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du Code parental . Elle relÃ¨ve en premier lieu que les requÃ©rants ne prÃ©tendent pas que les corrections lÃ©gÃ¨res soient des infractions Ã la lÃ©gislation pÃ©nale suÃ©doise sur les voies de fait (chapitre 3, arlicles 5 et 6 du Code pÃ©nal) . lis n'ont pas non plus fourni d'exemples du comportement qu'ils qualifient de â¢ molestation - (chapitre 4, article 7, Code pÃ©nal) . La prÃ©sente affaire ne concerne donc pas la mise en Åuvre d'une lÃ©gislation pÃ©nale . 11 n'est pas question d'un â¢risque d'Ãªtre poursuiviâ¢ aprÃ¨s l'entrÃ©e en vigueur du Code parental, comnie c'Ã©tait le cas dans l'affaire Dudgeon prÃ©citÃ©e . La Commission doit donc examiner les effets du Code sur l'aptitude des requÃ©rants Ã exprinter et Ã appliquer leurs convictions Ã l'Ã©ducation de leurs enfants, compte tenu de la genÃ¨se et des objectifs du Code . La Commission relÃ¨ve en prentier lieu que la SuÃ¨de est le seul Etat mentbre du Conseil de l'Europe Ã avoir introduil une lÃ©gislation interdisant tout chÃ titnent corporel des enfants par leurs parents, y compris les corrections lÃ©gÃ¨res . Pour apprÃ©cier l'effet du Code, la Comntission doit partir de ces prÃ©misses que les droits et les choix parentaux dans l'Ã©ducation de leurs enfants priment ceux de l'Etal . Cette idÃ©e est inhÃ©rente au libellÃ© de la garantie du respect de la vie familiale figurant Ã l'article 8, paragraphe I, puisque l'Ã©ducation des enfants est un aspect essentiel de la vie faniiliale . Ce mÃªme principe est clairement rÃ©affirmÃ© Ã l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel dont le texte et son interprÃ©tation par les organes de la Convention ne laissent aucun doute sur la primautÃ© du rÃ´le des parents .
Les requÃ©rants reconnaissent que les liniites du chÃ¢timent tolÃ©rable que les parents pouvaient administrer Ã leurs enfants Ã©taient incertaines avant l'amendement en question et le Gouvernement a certainement voulu, par cette disposition, dÃ©crÃ©tant une interdiction gÃ©nÃ©rale des chÃ¢tintents corporels de tous genres, dÃ©courager les actes de violence comntis contre des enfants . Les requÃ©rants soutiennent cependant que cette interdiction est contraire Ã leurs convictions, puisqu'eux-mÃªmes prÃ©conisent de recourir le cas Ã©chÃ©ant au chÃ¢timent corporel de leurs enfants . Ils ont fait valoir que l'amendement au Code a accru le domaine du droit pÃ©nal . ainsi que le risque pour des parents ne recourant qu'Ã des corrections lÃ©gÃ¨res de se voir retirer la garde de leur enfant . Cependant, ils n'ont pas pu, pour Ã©tayer l'un ou l'autre grief, fournir de dÃ©tails sur des cas, signalÃ©s ou non, portÃ©s devant les tribunaux suÃ©dois et concernant directement des corrections lÃ©gÃ¨res . De son cÃ´tÃ©, le Gouvernement a qualifiÃ© l'aniendement au Code de lex intperfecta, soulignant qu'il n'est assorti d'aucune sanction et n'a aucun effet, ni direct ni indirect, sur le domaine d'application ou l'interprÃ©tation de la lo i
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pÃ©nale suÃ©doise . Aussi n'a-t-il pas pu fournir Ã la Commission d'exemple concret de mise en o:uvre du Code ou de son interprÃ©tation et application par les instances suÃ©doises . Selon le Gouvernement, c'est seulement par l'interdiction gÃ©nÃ©rale de tout chÃ¢timent corporel que les actes de violence criminelle perpÃ©trÃ©s contre des enfants seront effectivement dÃ©couragÃ©s car ils se produisent prÃ©cisÃ©ment lorsqu'un parent dÃ©passe, intentionnellement ou non, la limite lÃ©gitime non pÃ©nale des corrections lÃ©gÃ¨res . Tout en ne contestant pas la lÃ©gitimitÃ© des corrections lÃ©gÃ¨res ne relevant pas du pÃ©nal, le Gouvernement craint des excÃ¨s et ne souhaite donc pas encourager les punitions corporelles dans ce domaine . Afin de marquer la diffÃ©rence entre ce que l'on peut Ã juste titre appeler la violence, interdite par le droit pÃ©nal, et la punition lÃ©gitime sans caractÃ¨re pÃ©nal, l'interdiction posÃ©e par l'amendement au Code parental n'entraÃ®ne aucune sanction ni autre consÃ©quence lÃ©gale pour la famille . Cette constatation Ã©taie la thÃ¨se du Gouvernement selon laquelle l'amendement vise Ã susciter une remise en question du chÃ¢timent corporel infligÃ© aux enfants, afin d'en dÃ©courager l'abus . La Commission doit donc dÃ©cider si les effets de l'amendement au Code parental sont de nature Ã constituer une ingÃ©rence Ã©quivalant Ã manquer au respect de la vie familiale des requÃ©rants et notamment au respect des actes et convictions des parents en matiÃ¨re d'Ã©ducation de leurs enfants . Les effets pratique exacts de la disposition contestÃ©e n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© mis en lumiÃ¨re . MalgrÃ© leur dÃ©saccord avec le Code, les requÃ©rants n'ont Ã©tÃ© directement soumis Ã aucune contrainte ni procÃ©dure pouvant constituer une atteinte Ã leurs droits . lls n'ont pas non plus fourni d'exemples de l'interprÃ©tation ou de l'application du Code par les autoritÃ©s suÃ©doises dans d'autres affaires . Ils ont soutenu en outre que les dispositions du Code pouvaient Ãªtre invoquÃ©es pour se prononcer sur des questions comme la garde des enfants mais, lÃ encore, sans illustrer leur thÃ¨se, si bien que la Commission ne peut qu'admettre . Ã partir des faits qui lui sont soumis, que la situation ne s'est pas effectivement prÃ©sentÃ©e . De plus, les informations fournies par le Gouvernement tendent Ã confirmer que cette loi est dÃ©pourvue d'effets pratiques directs autre que celui d'inciter Ã remettre en cause la maniÃ¨re de traiter les enfants . Pour arriver Ã cette remise en cause, le Gouvernement n'a signalÃ© aucune autre mesure concrÃ¨te que l'existence de l'amendement et la publicitÃ© qui lui a Ã©tÃ© donnÃ©e . Ceci Ã©tant, la Commission estime que les effets rÃ©els de la loi sont d'encourager Ã un rÃ©examen positif du chÃ¢timent des enfants par leurs parents, de dÃ©courager les abus et de prÃ©venir les excÃ¨s pouvant Ã juste titre Ãªtre dÃ©crits comme des violences commises sur les enfants . A cet Ã©gard . la
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Commission doit faire la distinction entre l'expression d'opinions diffÃ©rentes de celles des requÃ©rants dans le contexte du dÃ©bat public sur la proposition d'amendement et la rÃ©elle mise en o.uvre de l'amendement une fois votÃ© . Compte tenu des faits exposÃ©s par les requÃ©rants, il n'apparait pas Ã la Commission que les craintes que ceux-ci ont Ã©prouvÃ©es au dÃ©but quant Ã la nature de l'amendement soient fondÃ©es . La Commission ne considÃ¨re pas les effets de l'amendement qui font l'objet de la prÃ©sente requÃªte comme conslituant une ingÃ©rence Ã©quivalant Ã un nianquement au respect de la vie familiale des requÃ©rants . Il s'ensuit que ce grief est manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Les requÃ©rants allÃ¨guent Ã©galement que, vu son champ d'application, la lÃ©gislation pÃ©nale sur les voies de fait contrevient Ã leur droit au respect de la vie privÃ©e et Familiale protÃ©gÃ© par l'article 8 . La Comntission reconnaÃ®t que . si l'Ã©ducation des enfants demeure pour l'essentiel une obligation parentale relevant de la notion de vie familiale, il est cependant inÃ©vitable que certains aspects de la lÃ©gislation pÃ©nale affectent plus ou moins les rapports entre parents et enfants . Par exemple, les voies de fait commises par les parents sur leurs enfants sont traitÃ©es comme ayant un caractÃ¨re pÃ©nal et si les requÃ©rants ont attirÃ© l'attention sur l'interdiction plus gÃ©nÃ©rale de tout chÃ¢timent corporel infligÃ© aux enfants contenue dans le Code parental, ils reconnaissent nÃ©anmoins que toute correction n'emporte pas violation du Code pÃ©nal .
Cependant, les requÃ©rants n'ont pas dÃ©montrÃ© le caractÃ¨re inhabituel ou autrement draconien des dispositions de la lÃ©gislation suÃ©doise Ã©rigeant en infraction les voies de fait sur les enfants . Le fait qu'aucune distinction n'y est faite entre le traitement des enfants par leurs parents et le mÃªme traitement appliquÃ© Ã un adulte Ã©tranger Ã la famille ne saurait, aux yeux de la Commission, constituer â¢une atteinte . au respect de la vie privÃ©e et familiale des requÃ©rants, puisque les consÃ©quences d'une voie de fait sont mises Ã Ã©galitÃ© dans les deux cas . De ntÃ©nte, le simple fait que la lÃ©gislation, ou l'Ã©tat du droit, intervient pour rÃ©glementer une question touchant Ã la vie familiale ne constitue pas une violation de l'article 8, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, tant que cette intervention n'emporte pas violation du droit des requÃ©rants au respect de leur fantiliale . La Cotnntission estime que la lÃ©gislation suÃ©doise sur les voies de fait et les molestations est, dans ce domaine, une mesure normale de lutte contre la violence et que son extension au chÃ¢timent physique ordinaire des enfants par leurs parents vise Ã protÃ©ger des Ã©lÃ©ments rÃ©putÃ©s faibles et vulnÃ©rables dans la sociÃ©tÃ© .
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La Commission estime en consÃ©quence que l'Ã©tat du droit pÃ©nal en SuÃ¨de ne porte pas atteinte aux droits des requÃ©rants au respect de leur vie privÃ©e et familiale, au sens de l'article 8, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Il s'ensuit que cet aspect de leur grief est manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . 4 . Sur l'a rt icle 9 de la Conventio n Les requÃ©rants se plaignent en outre de ce que la situation juridique en question ne respecte pas leur droit Ã la libertÃ© de religion, tel qu'il est protÃ©gÃ© par l'article 9 de la Convention, ainsi libellÃ© :
.1 . Toute personne a droit Ã la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience et de religion ; ce droit implique la libertÃ© de changer de religion ou de conviction, ainsi que la libertÃ© de manifester sa religion ou sa conviction individuellement ou collectivement, en public ou en privÃ©, par le culte, l'enseignement, les pratiques et l'accomplissement des rites . 2 . La libertÃ© de manifester sa religion ou ses convictions ne peut faire l'objet d'autres restrictions que celles qui, prÃ©vues par la loi, constituent des mesures nÃ©cessaires, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© publique, Ã la protection de l'ordre, de la santÃ© ou de la morale publique, ou Ã la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui . . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que l'Ã©tat de la lÃ©gislation contestÃ©e ne comporte aucune ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice des droits garantis aux requÃ©rants par cet article ou, Ã titre subsidiaire, que cette Ã©ventuelle ingÃ©rence se justifierait au regard du second paragraphe . La Commission estime, au vu des faits qui lui sont soumis, que le mÃªme raisonnement s'applique, mutatis mutandis, aux griefs tirÃ©s par lesrequÃ©rants de cet article qu'Ã ceux tirÃ©s de l'article 8 . ll s'ensuitqu'il n'y a pas atteinte aux droits garantis aux requÃ©rants par l'article 9 et que cet aspect de leur requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . 5 . Sur l'article 2 du P rotocole additionne l Les requÃ©rants se plaignent en outre de ce que l'amendement au Code des parents doive Ãªtre incorporÃ© dans le programme scolaire de faÃ§on, selon eux, Ã diffuser aussi largement que possible, et mÃªme parmi leurs propres enfants, l'idÃ©e que leur attitude vis-Ã -vis des chÃ¢timents corporels est pÃ©rimÃ©e, fausse et rÃ©prÃ©hensible . lls soutiennent que cette maniÃ¨re de faire est contraire Ã la garantie figurant Ã la deuxiÃ¨me phrase de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel, ainsi libellÃ©e : â¢ L'Etat, dans l'exercice des fonctions qu'il assumera .dans le domaine d e l'Ã©ducation et de l'enseignement, respectera le droit des parents d'assurer cette Ã©ducation et cet enseignement conformÃ©mÃ©nt Ã leurs conviciions religieuses et philosophiques . .
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Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a soutenu en premier lieu que cette disposition est inapplicable en f'espÃ¨ce, puisque l'Ã©tat de la lÃ©gislation incriminÃ©e par les requÃ©rants ne concerne pas l'exercice d'une fonction de l'Etat liÃ©e Ã l'enseignement, par exemple l'organisation des Ã©tablissements scolaires . A titre subsidiaire, le Gouvemement affirnie que si cet article Ã©tait applicable, il faudrait donner Ã la deuxiÃ¨me phrase une interprÃ©tation raisonnable et non la lire comme protÃ©geant les partisans d'Ã©lÃ©ments extraordinaires ou inhabituels d'une doctrine religieuse ou philosophique pouvant entrer en conflit avec l'obligation faite Ã l'Etat de protÃ©ger les enfants contre ce qui peut leur nuire . NÃ©anmoins, comme les requÃ©rants ont mentionnÃ© certains extraits de documents officiels concernant l'amendement au Code des parents et indiquant que ce texte serait pris en considÃ©ration dans les Ã©tablissements scolaires, la Commission estime que l'article 2 s'applique bien au cas d'espÃ¨ce . Quant au second argument du Gouvernement, la Commission s'est trouvÃ©e confrontÃ©e Ã un raisonnement analogue prÃ©sentÃ© par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni Ã propos des requÃªtes NÂ° 7511/76 et 7743/76 relatives Ã l'adntinistration de chÃ¢timents corporels dans les Ã©coles du Royaume-Uni . Elle a estintÃ©, au paragraphe 97 de son rapport, qu'Ã la lumiÃ¨re des dispositions non Ã©quivoques de l'article 1Â° 1 de la Convention et des articles 2 et 5 du Protocole additionnel . â¢C'est prÃ©cisÃ©ment en qualitÃ© de parents individuels que les requÃ©rants sont fondÃ©s Ã revendiquer le droit au respect de leurs convictions philosophiques, et ce indÃ©pendamment de la question de savoir si leur revendication peut entrer en conflit avec les normes communÃ©ment admises par d'autres parents en matiÃ¨re de discipline . â¢ Certes, ces requÃªtes concernaient le respect de convictions philosophiques (par . 83, ibid .) mais la Commission admet que les mÃªmes critÃ¨res doivent s'appliquer aux convictions religieuses . Cependant, contme la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme l'a confirmÃ© dans l'arrÃªt rendu dans l'affaire Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen et Pedersen (SÃ©rie A . arrÃªts et dÃ©cisions, Vol . 23 . par . 53), la seconde phrase de l'article 2 du Protocole n'entpÃ©che pas les Etats de rÃ©pandre par l'enseignement ou l'Ã©ducation des informations ou connaissances ayant, directement ou non, un caractÃ¨re religieux ou philosophique . Elle n'autorise pas mÃªme les parents Ã s'opposer pour ces raisons Ã certains aspects de l'enseignement, Ã moins que les informations ou connaissances en question ne soient pas diffusÃ©es de nianiÃ¨re objective, critique et pluraliste . Ainsi, la seconde phrase de l'article 2 â¢interdit Ã l'Etat de poursuivre un but d'endoctrinement qui puisse Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme ne respectant pas les convictions religieuses et philosophiques des parents . LÃ se place la limite Ã ne pas dÃ©passer . (ibid .) . En l'espÃ¨ce, les requÃ©rants ne se sont pas plaints de ce que leurs enfants aient Ã©tÃ© en fait soumis Ã ce qui est Ã leurs yeux un endoctrinement sur l a
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question de l'opportunitÃ© du chÃ¢timent corporel . Ils ont simplement indiquÃ© . en se rÃ©fÃ©rant Ã des publications officielles, que l'enseignement tiendrait compte dorÃ©navant de l'amendement au Code parental . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a expressÃ©ment mentionnÃ© l'idÃ©e sousjacente Ã cet amendement, Ã savoir affermir les droits des enfants et inciter au respect de la personne de l'enfant . Il a soulignÃ© qu'il poursuivait cet objectif huntanitaire grÃ ce Ã une politique gÃ©nÃ©rale d'Ã©ducation au sens le plus large .
En outre, la Commission rappelle que, conformÃ©ment Ã sa jurisprudence constante et Ã celle de la Cour, l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel doit Ãªtre lu dans le contexte de la Convention formant un tout et nbtamment Ã la lumiÃ¨re des garanties figurant aux articles 8 . 9 et 10 . En l'espÃ¨ce . la Commission, ayant constatÃ© qu'il n'y a eu atteinte ni Ã l'arlicle 8 ni Ã l'article 9, estime que les requÃ©rants, qui se sont bornÃ©s Ã signaler des dÃ©clarations de principe Ã caractÃ¨re gÃ©nÃ©ral ne pouvant absolument pas Ãªtre qualifiÃ©es de tentatives faites par le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur pour mettre en auvre une politique d'endoctrinement dans les Ã©coles suÃ©doises, n'ont pas montrÃ© que l'une ou l'autre disposition ou pratique ait enfreint le droit au respect de leurs convictions religieuses, protÃ©gÃ© par l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DECLARE LA REQUÃTEIRRECEVABLE .
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APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 8990/80 Manuel GUINCHO v/PORTUGA L Manuel GUINCHO c/PORTUGA L DECISION of 6 July 1982 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 6 juillet 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragmph I of the Convention : Civil pmceedings pending at first instance for three years and 7 rnortths . Cornp(aint declared admissible . The question of the rnethods bv which the applicant could have accelerated the proceedings concerns the rnerits of the application . Article 26 of the Convention : In respect of the lenght of civil proceedings, the question of the methods bv which the upplicant could have accelerated the proceedings is not one which corrcerns the prob(ent of exhaustion of domestic remedies . When the proceedings are stiil pertding. a remedy can only be considered effectice if it can be brought rupidlv, while these proceedings are stilJ pendirtg.
Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : ProcÃ©dure civile pendante en prerniÃ¨re instance depuis 3 ans et 7 rnois . Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable . La question des mot'ens que le requÃ©runt aurait pu utiliser pour accÃ©lÃ©rer la procÃ©dure relÃ¨ve du bien-fondÃ© de (u requÃ©te . Article 26 de la Convention : S'agissant de la durÃ©e d'une procÃ©dure civile . la question des rnol'ens que le requÃ©rant aurait pu utiliser pour accÃ©lÃ©rer la procÃ©dure ne relÃ¨ve pas du problÃ¨me de !'Ã©puisement des voies de recours irnernes.
Si la prncÃ©dure est encore pendunCe, un recours ne peut Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© comnie efficace que s'il peut Ã©tre intentÃ© rapidemenl. en cours d'inslance .
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EN FAIT
( English : see p . 135)
Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©s par les pa rties peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant, Manuel Guincho, est un ressortissant portugais nÃ© en 1949, Ã©lectricien et domiciliÃ© Ã Lisbonne . Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par Maitre J .A . Pires de Lima, avocat au barreau de Cascais . Le 18 aoGt 1976, le vÃ©hicule Ã moteur dans lequel se trouvait le requÃ©rant avec Domingos Lopes ( conducteur) et JosÃ© Neves Lopes ( passager) fut heu rtÃ© par un autre vÃ©hicule, prop riÃ©tÃ© de la SociÃ©tÃ© Canalux, et conduit par Antonio Dinis . L'accident eut .lieu Ã Alverca, Ã quelques kilomÃ¨tres de Lisbonne . Le requÃ©rant, blessÃ©, fut hospitalisÃ© . La police locale informa de l'accident le parquet prÃ¨s le tribunal de Vila Franca de Xira' . Par la suite, le parquet engagea une procÃ©dure c ri minelle contre les conducteurs des deux vÃ©hicules, pour dommages corporels involontaires . Dans cette procÃ©dure pÃ©nale le requÃ©rant ne se constitua pas pa rtie civile . En octobre 1976, le DÃ©cret-Loi NÂ° 758/76 (a rt . 2-b) entra en vigueur, prÃ©voyant l'amnistie des infractions qui faisaient l'Ã´bjet de l'action pÃ©nale . Le 20 janvier 1977le requÃ©rant fut informÃ© que son a ffaire avait Ã©tÃ© classÃ©e . Le 7 dÃ©cembre 1978 le requÃ©rant et le conducteur du vÃ©hicule dont il Ã©tait passager, Domingos Lopes, introduisirent une action civile devant le t ri bunal de Vila Franca de Xira contre le conducteur et le prop ri Ã©taire du vÃ©hicule qui selon aux avait causÃ© l'accident, ainsi que contre la compagnie d'assurances Â« Tranquilidade . . Le requÃ©rant demanda une indemnitÃ© de 350 000 escudos . En outre, il demanda Ã bÃ©nÃ©ficier de l'assistance judiciaire . Le 9 dÃ©cembre 1978 le juge de la deuxiÃ¨me chambre du t ribunal de Vila Franca de Xira accorda l'assistance judiciaire au requÃ©rant et ordonna la citation des parties dÃ©fenderesses . Celles-ci Ã©tant domiciliÃ©es Ã Lisbonne, une commission rogatoire ( =carla precatoria . ) fut adressÃ©e Ã cet effet . Les 30 janvier, 28 fÃ©vrier, 2 av ri l, 4 mai et 11 juin 1979, le juge du tribunal de Vila Franca de Xira insista pour que la commission rogatoire soit exÃ©cutÃ©e par la ju ridiction commise . Le 18 juin 1979 les parties dÃ©fenderesses, Antonio Dinis, la SociÃ©tÃ© Canalux et la compagnie d'assurances Â« Tranquilidadeâ¢ re Ã§ urent notification de la citation . Un dÃ©lai de 10 jours leur fut fixÃ© pour contester la demande introductive d'instance . * Larticlc 7 du dÃ©cret-loi 35007 du 13 ociobre 1945 prÃ©voit que les autoritÃ©s de police sonl tenucs d'informer le MinistÃ¨re l'ublic de toutes les infractions dont elles ont pris connais,ancc .
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Par des conclusions ( .contestaÃ§Ã¢oâ¢) datÃ©es du 27 juin 1979, la partie dÃ©fenderesse, la compagnie d'assurances â¢Tranquilidade ., contesta les moyens prÃ©sentÃ©s par le requÃ©rant et forma une demande incidente d'intervention ( . intervenÃ§Ã«o principal â¢) d'une tierce personne, JosÃ© Neves Lopes, qui se trouvait Ã©galement dans la voiture avec le requÃ©rant au moment de l'accident . Le 2 juillet 1979 les dÃ©fendeurs Antonio Dinis et la SociÃ©tÃ© Canalux envoyÃ¨rent Ã©galement leurs conclusions . Le 28 janvier 1981 le juge du tribunal de Vila Franca de Xira ordonna la transmission des conclusions des parties dÃ©fenderesses au requÃ©rant et invita ce dernier Ã se prononcer, dans un dÃ©lai de 5 jours, sur la demande incidente susmentionnÃ©e . Le 9 fÃ©vrier 1981 le requÃ©rant contesta Ã son tour les conclusions des parties dÃ©fenderesses et fit valoir que la demande incidente d'intervention principale constituait une mano:uvre dilatoire, Ã©tant donnÃ© que la tierce personne en question . JosÃ© Neves Lopes, Ã©tait le frÃ¨re de la partie demanderesse Domingos Lopes, qu'il n'avait subi aucun dommage et renonÃ§ait expressÃ©ment Ã toute indemnitÃ© . Le 10 fÃ©vrier 1981 le juge du tribunal de Vila Franca de Xira dÃ©clara recevable la demande incidente et ordonna la citation de JosÃ© Neves Lopes . Celui-ci habitant Ã Loures, une commission rogatoire fut envoyÃ©e Ã cet effet le mÃªme jour au ressort de Loures et exÃ©cutÃ©e le 26 fÃ©vrier 1981 . Le 27 mars 1981 le magistrat prÃ©citÃ©, informÃ© tardivement de l'opposition du requÃ©rant Ã la demande incidente, dÃ©cida de la maintenir . Il rendit, en outre, une dÃ©cision prÃ©paratoire ( .despacho saneadorâ¢) dans laquelle il dressa une liste des faits prouvÃ©s dans les conclusions des parties (â¢especificaÃ§Ã¢oâ¢) et une liste des faits Ã Ã©claircir Ã l'audience ( . questionÃ rio .) . Cette dÃ©cision fut notifiÃ©e aux parties qui n'ont formÃ© aucun recours . Le 29 avril 1981, la partie dÃ©fenderesse, la compagnie d'assurances â¢Tranquilidade . dÃ©posa au greffe du tribunal la liste des tÃ©moins qu'elle dÃ©sirait faire entendre . Le 30 avril 1981, le requÃ©rant fit de mÃªme . Vu que l'un de ses tÃ©moins, Maria Silva, habitait une ville du ressort d'une autre juridiction (Almada), il demanda qu'une contmission rogatoire fÃ»t envoyÃ©e . Le 5 mai 1981 les parties dÃ©fenderesses Antonio Dinis et la SociÃ©tÃ© Canalux dÃ©posÃ¨rent leur liste de tÃ©moins . Le 18 inai 1981 une commission rogatoire fut envoyÃ©e au tribunal de Almada afin qu'il y soit procÃ©dÃ© Ã l'audition du tÃ©moin Maria Silva . nommÃ© par le requÃ©rant .
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Le 8 juin 1981 le juge du tribunal de Almada fixa au 9 juillet 1981 Ia date de l'audition du tÃ©moin . Le 17 juin 1981, il envoya toutefois au tribunal de Seixal une commission rogatoire pour l'audition de ce tÃ©moin, considÃ©rant que c'Ã©tait cette juridiction qui Ã©tait compÃ©tente . Le 26 juin 1981 le juge de cetle juridiction fixa l'audition au 12 octobre . Le 9 octobre 1981 l'avocat de la partie dÃ©fenderesse, la compagnie d'assurances â¢TranquilidadeÂ», envoya un tÃ©lÃ©gramme faisant savoir qu'il ne pouvait pas Ãªtre prÃ©sent Ã l'audience, pour motif de maladie . Le 12 octobre 1981, le tÃ©moin ne comparut pas . Le mÃªme jour . le juge du tribunal de Seixal condamna le tÃ©moin Ã une antende et fixa son audition au 17 novembre 1981 . par un autre tÃ©lÃ©gramme, le mÃªme avocat inform a .Le17novmbr98 le juge qu'il ne pouvait pas comparaitre . Le mÃªme jour, le juge du t ri bunal de Seixal ajourna l'audition au 10 fÃ©vrier 1982 . Le tribunal de Vila Franca de Xira n'a pas encore rendu son jugement dans la cause du requÃ©rant .
GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant se plaint que l'action civile qu'il a introduite le 7 dÃ©cembre 1978 soit toujours pendante devant le tribunal de Vila Franca de Xira . 11 fait valoir que pendant un certain laps de temps cette juridiction ne disposait pas de niagistrat en fonction et considÃ¨re que le Gouvernement portugais est le seul responsable du retard subi par la procÃ©dure . II allÃ¨gue Ã cet Ã©gard la violation dc l'article 6 . paragraphe 1 . de la Convention . II deniande de ce fait que le Gouvernement portugais soit condamnÃ© Ã lui payer une indemnitÃ© .
EN DROIT 1 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue la violation de l'article 6, paragraphe I . de la Convention, dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'action civile qu'il a introduite le 7 dÃ©cembre 1978 devant le tribunal de Vila Franca de Xira n'a pas encore Ã©tÃ© jugÃ©e . Il demande de ce fait que le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soit condamnÃ© Ã lui verser une indemnitÃ© en dommages-intÃ©rÃªts . 2 . L'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention prÃ©voit notamment que toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable par un tribunal qui dÃ©cidera des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil . - 132 -
3 . La Commission prend acte de ce que les parties s'accordent Ã dire que la premiÃ¨re procÃ©dure . de nature criminelle, dont le requÃ©rant a fait l'objet, qui a dÃ©butÃ© en aoÃ»t 1976 et s'est terminÃ©e en octobre de la mÃªme annÃ©e Ã la suite d'une amnistie, n'est pas soumise Ã son examen . Elle se limitera par consÃ©quent Ã examiner si l'action civile introduite par le requÃ©rant le 7 dÃ©cembre 1978 a ou n'a pas Ã©tÃ© entendue dans un .dÃ©lai raisonnable ., au sens de la disposition prÃ©citÃ©e de la Convention . 4 . Dans sa requÃªte Ã la Commission le requÃ©rant demande que le Gouvernentent dÃ©fendeur soit condamnÃ© Ã lui verser des dommages-intÃ©rÃªts en raison de la durÃ©e excessive de la procÃ©dure . Toutefois, aux termes de la Convention, la Commission n'est pas compÃ©tente pour accorder Ã un requÃ©rant prÃ©tendument lÃ©sÃ© une satisfaction Ã©quitable . Il n'y a donc pas lieu de se prononcer ici sur cet aspect de la requÃªte . (a) Quant Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes S . Le Gouvernentent dÃ©fendeur a soulignÃ© qu'il Ã©tait loisible au requÃ©ran t de s'adresser directement au juge saisi de son affaire ou . de prÃ©fÃ©rence, au Conseil supÃ©rieur de la Magistrature . afin que des mesures soient prises pour activer la procÃ©dure . Toutefois, ainsi que le Gouvernement l'admet lui-mÃªnte, pareilles dÃ©marches ne constituaient pas des recours proprement dits . Elles ne pourront Ãªtre prises en considÃ©ration par la Contmission que pour apprÃ©cier le comportenient du requÃ©rant en vue de juger du bien-fondÃ© de la requÃ©te, c'est-Ã -dire du point de savoir si la durÃ©e du procÃ¨s a dÃ©passÃ© un dÃ©lai raisonnable (v . requÃªte NÂ° 8961/80 . dÃ©cision du 8 dÃ©cembre 1981 . D .R . 26, p . 200) . 6 . D'autre part, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur affirme que le requÃ©rant aurait pu introduire une action en responsabilitÃ© civile contre l'Etat en invoquant la violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, qui est directement applicable dans l'ordre juridique portugais . Le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, il aurait obtenu un jugenient reconnaissant la violation de la Convention et aurait pu demander une rÃ©paration sous la forme d'une indemnisation . Il n'Ã©tait pas nÃ©cessaire pour cela qu'il prouve une faute de la part du ntagistrat chargÃ© de son affaire et devait seulement dÃ©montrer que la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure avait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©raisonnable, contrairement Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Outre cette disposition . il pouvait invoquer Ã©galement les articles 18 et 21 de la Constitution portugaise . ainsi que les dispositions pertinentes du DÃ©cret-Loi 48051 du 21 novembre 1967 . 7 . Le requÃ©rant conteste la thÃ¨se du Gouvernentent et soutient qu'aucun recours efficace n'est Ã sa disposition en droit portugais en vue d'obtenir une indemnisation pour la durÃ©e excessive de la procÃ©dure qui est toujours pendante devant le tribunal de Vila Franca de Xira . Selon lui, pour les situations d'engorgement du rÃ´le des tribunaux - comme dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce - il n'y aurait responsabilitÃ© de l'Etat ni pour acte illicite ni pour acte licite .
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8 . En l'espÃ¨ce, la procÃ©dure dont se plaint le requÃ©rant est pendante . Ce qui est donc dÃ©terminant, aux yeux de la Commission, c'est de savoir si le requÃ©rant avait la possibilitÃ©, mÃªme en cours d'instance, de se plaindre devant les juridictions nationales de la longueur de la procÃ©dure, en demandant de ce fait une rÃ©paration concrÃ¨te, en d'autres termes, de savoir si un recours pouvait porter remÃ¨de Ã ses grief en assurant une protection directe et rapide, et non seulement dÃ©tournÃ©e, des droits garantis Ã l'article 6 de la Convention (v . Cour eur . D .H ., Affaire Deweer, ArrÃªt du 27 fÃ©vrier 1980, paragraphe 29) . 9 . L'article 21 de la Constitution portugaise, mentionnÃ© par le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, dispose dans son paragraphe 1Â« que : .L'Etat et les autres personnes morales publiques sont civilement responsables . conjointement avec les titulaires de leurs organes, leurs fonctionnaires ou leurs agents . des actions ou omissions contmises dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, dont dÃ©coulerait une violation des droits, libertÃ©s et garanties ou un prÃ©judice pour autruiÂ» . D'autre part, le DÃ©cret-Loi 48051 du 21 novembre 1967, qui rÃ¨glemente la responsabilitÃ© civile extra-contractuelle de l'Etat . prÃ©voit dans son article 2, paragraphe1 . que : . L'Etat et les autres personnes morales publiques sont civilemen t responsables devant les tiers des atteintes Ã leurs droits ou aux dispositions lÃ©gales destinÃ©es Ã protÃ©ger leurs intÃ©rÃªts, si elles rÃ©sultent d'actes de faute pratiquÃ©s par leurs organismes ou agents administratifs dans l'exercice de leurs fonetions Ã©t suite Ã cet exerciceÂ» . -Toutefois, il ne ressort pas clairement de l'argumentation du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur si, en l'espÃ¨ce, et Ã quel moment pouvait Ãªtre intentÃ©e telle action civilÃ¨ : en particulier si elle pouvait l'Ãªtre au cours de l'instance ou seulement aprÃ¨s le prononcÃ© d'un jugement passÃ© en force de chose jugÃ©e . si elle avait des chances de succÃ¨s et si elle pouvait apporter un redressement rapide de la situation dont se plaint le requÃ©rant . Dans ces circonstances, . la Commission arrive Ã la conclusion que le Gouvernement n'a pas montrÃ© que les actions civiles mentionnÃ©es par lui constituaient en l'occurrence un recours efficace et suffisant pour le requÃ©rant . La requÃªte ne saurait donc Ãªtre rejetÃ©e pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . 6, paragraphe 1, de la Conventio n '(b)Surlatice 10 . Le point de dÃ©part de la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration par la Commission se situe au 7 dÃ©cembre 1978, date Ã laquelle le requÃ©rant a intentÃ© une action civile en dommages-intÃ©rÃªts devant le tribunal de Vila Franca de Xira . Cette pÃ©riode continue Ã courir, Ã©tant donnÃ© que le tribunal n'a pas encore rendu son jugement . La procÃ©dure dure donc depuis plus de 3 ans et 7 mois .
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I1 . Le caractÃ¨re raisonnable de la durÃ©e d'une procÃ©dure relevant de l'article 6, paragraphe I . de la Convention doit s'apprÃ©cier dans chaque cas d'espÃ¨ce, selon les circonstances de la cause . En matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale, la Commission et la Cour ont pris en considÃ©ration Ã cet Ã©gard notamment la complexitÃ© de l'affaire, le comportement du requÃ©rant et celui des autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes (voir, par exemple . Cour eur . D .H ., Affaire Ringeisen, arrÃªt du 16 juillet 1971, paragraphe 110, Affaire Buchholz, arrÃªt du 6 mai 1981, paragraphe 49) . Elles ont tenu compte des mÃªmes critÃ¨res, ainsi que de l'attitude du dÃ©fendeur et de l'enjeu du litige pour le demandeur, lÃ oÃ¹ il s'agissait d'instances relatives Ã des droits de caractÃ¨re civil (Cour eur . D .H ., Affaire KÃ¼nig . arrÃªt du 28 juin 1978 . paragraphes 99, 102-105 et 107-111) . En particulier pour ces derniÃ¨res, le droit d'Ãªtre entendu dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable est tributaire, selon la jurisprudence de la Commission, du comportement de l'intÃ©ressÃ©, qui doit faire preuve de la diligence nÃ©cessaire (v . Rapport de la Commission du 9 mars 1982, requÃªte NÂ° 8737/79, Zimmermann et Steiner c/Suisse, par. 37) . 12 . Au regard de ces critÃ¨res et prenant en considÃ©ration les circonstances propres Ã la prÃ©sente affaire, la Comniission, aprÃ¨s avoir examinÃ© l'arguntentalion prÃ©sentÃ©e par les parties, estime que le grief tirÃ© par le requÃ©rant de l'article 6, paragraphe I de la Convention ne peut pas Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme Ã©tant ntanifestement mal fondÃ© car il soulÃ¨ve des problÃ¨mes suffisamment complexes pour que leur solution doive relever d'un examen du bien-fondÃ© de l'affaire . Il sera donc dÃ©clarÃ© recevable .
Par ces ntotifs, la Comniission , DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE RECEVABLE, tous moyens de fond rÃ©servÃ©s .
(TJL4 NSJ.ATJOM THE FACT S The following is a summary of the facts as submitted by the parties The applicant, Manuel Guincho, is a Portuguese citizen, born in 1949 and residing in Lisbon where he works as an electrician . He was represented before the Commission bv Mr J .A . Pires de Lima, a lawyer practising at the Cascais Bar .
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On 18 August 1976, the vehicle in which the applicant was travelling with Domingos Lopes ( the d river) and JosÃ© Neves Lopes ( a co-passenger) was hit by another vehicle, owned bv the Canalux Company and d ri ven by Antonio Dinis . The accident took place at Alverca , a few kilometres from Lisbon . The applicant was inju red and admi tt ed to hospital . The local police authori ties informed the Public Prosecutor's depa rt ment at the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Cou rt of the accident' . The Public Prosecutor's depart ment then instituted cri minal proceedings against the d ri vers of both vehicles for causing unintentional bodily harm . The applicant did not claim damages in those criminal proceedings .
In October 1976 , legislative Decree No . 758/76 (Article 2 .b) came into force and granted an amnestv covering the offences on which the criminal proceedings were based . On 20 Janua ry 1977 the applicant was informed that the criminal proceedings had been terminated . On 7 December 1978 the applicant and Domingos Lopes, the driver of the vehicle in which he was a passenger, instituted civil proceedings in the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Cou rt against the driver and owner of the vehicle which thev alleged had caused the accident and against the "Tranquilidade" insurance company . The applicant claimed damages of 350 000 escudos and also applied for legal aid . On 9 December 1978 the judge of the second chamber of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Cou rt granted the applicant legal aid and ordered se rvice of the summons of the defendants . As the la tt er were resident in Lisbon, a request for se rv ice in that jurisdiction ("carta precat6ria") was issued . On 30 January . 28 February . 2 April, 4 Mav and 11 June 1979 the judge of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court requested that service of the summons be effected bv the designated court . On 18 June 1979 notice of the summons was served on the defendants, Antonio Dinis, the Canalux Company and the "Tranquilidade" insurance companv . They were allowed ten days to reply to the statement of claim . In its detence ("contestacÃ ti') dated 27 June 1979 . the defendant insurance companv, the "Tranquilidade", challenged the grounds of the applicant's claim and applied to have a third party, JosÃ© Neves Lopes, joined to the proceedings ("intervencao principal") as he was also a co-passenger of the applicant's at the time of the accident .
â¢ Under Article 7 of lÃ©gislalive decree No . 35007 of 13 October 1945 . the police authorities are required lo inforrn the Public Prosecutor's department of all offences that hnve conie to their nolice .
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On 2 July 1979 Antonio Dinis and the Canalux Company, defendants, also tiled their defence . On 28 January 1981 the judge of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court directed that the defence pleadings be communicated to the applicant and invited him to reply to the above-mentioned application within five days . On 9 February 1981 the applicant replied to the defence pleadings and claimed that the application to have a third party joined to the proceedings was a delaving tactic, as Jos6 Neves Lopes (the third party) was the brother of the plaintiff Dontingos Lopes, has suffered no damage and had expressly waived his right to claim damages . On 10 February 1981 the judge of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court declared that application admissible and directed that a summons be served on JosÃ© Neves Lopes . As the latter lived in Loures, a request for service in that jurisdiction was issued and service was effected on 26 February 1981 . On 27 March 1981 the above-mentioned judge, having received late notice of the applicant's objection to the application, decided not to alter his decision . Furthermore, in a prelimary decision ("despacho saneador") he drew up a list of the facts that had been established on the basis of the pleadings ("especiticaÂ¢Ã¢o") and the facts that had to be clariried at the hearing ("QuestionÃ rio") .
The parties were notitied of this decision and did not appeal against it . On 29 April 1981, the defendant insurance company, the "Tranquilidade" . tiled in the registrv of'the Court a list of the witnesses it intended to call . On 30 April 1981, the applicant did likewise . As one ot' his witnesses, Maria Silva, resided in a town in another jurisdiction (Almada) . he requested the issue of letters rogatorv . On 5 Mav 1981 Antonio Dinis and the Canalux Company, defendants, tiled their list of witnesses . On 18 May 1981 the Almada Regional Court was requested to execute the letters rogatorv in respect of the witness called by the appticant . Maria Silva . On 8 June 1981 the judge of this Court directed that the witness should be heard on 9 July 1981 . On 17 June 1981 however, he requested the Seixal Regional Court to take the evidence of this witness on the basis that that Court had jurisdiction in the matter . On 26 June 1981 the judge of that Court directed that the witness should be heard on 12 October . On 9 October the lawyer representing the defendant insurance contpanv, the "TranquilidadÃ©', sent a telegrant informing the Court that he was unable to appear because ot' illness .
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On 12 October 1981 the witness failed to appear . On the same day, the judge in the Seixal Regional Court fined the witness and directed that she should be heard on 17 November 1981 . . In another telegram on 17 November 1981, the same lawyer informed the judge that he was unable to appear . On the same day the Seixal Court adjourned the hearing to 10 February 1982 . The Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court has not vet delivered judgment in the applicant's case .
COMPLAINT S The applicant complains that the civil action he brought on 7 December 1978 is still pending bet'ore the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court . He claims that for a certain period this Court was without a judge and that the Portuguese Government is solely responsible for the delay in the proceedings . In this respect he claints a violation of Article 6, paragraph I . of the Convention and claims compensation from the Portuguese Government .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant alleges a violation of Article 6, paragraph 1 . of the Convention insofar as the civil action he brought on 7 December 1978 in the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Cou rt has not yet been heard . He therefore requests that the Government be ordered to pay him damages . 2 . Art icle 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention provides inter alia that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, everyone is entitled to a hearing within a reasonable time by a tribunal . 3 . The Commission notes that the pa rt ies ag re e that the first proceedings (criminal) involving the applicant, which were instituted in August 1976 and terminated in October of that vear following an amnes ty , are not before it for consideration . It will therefo re only consider the question whether the civil action brought by the applicant on 7 December 1978 was or was not heard within a"reasonable time" within the meaning of the above-mentioned provision of the Convention . 4 . In his application to the Commission, the applicant requests that the respondent Government pay him damages because of the excessive length of the proceedings . However, under the Convention, the Commission is not competent to grant just satisfaction to an applicant alleging damage . This aspect of the application does not therefore have to be decided here .
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a) 71te exhaustion of domestic remedlee 5 . The respondent Government underlines that the applicant could have approached directlv the judge dealing with his case or, preferably, the Superior Council of the Judiciary so that measures could have been taken to speed up the proceedings . However, as the Government itself concedes, such steps do not strictly speaking constitute remedies . They can only be taken into consideration by the Commission for the purpose of assessing the applicant's conduct in order to decide the merits of the application . i .e . whether the length of the proceedings exceeded Ã¢ reasonable time (see Application No . 8961/80, decision of 8 December 1981, D .R . 26, p . 200) . 6 . The respondent Government states that the applicant could have brought an action alleging the civil liability of the State on the basis of a violation of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention, which is directly applicable in the Portuguese legal system . If necessarv, he could have obtained a declaratory judgment recognising a violation of the Convention and could have applied for reparation in the form of compensation . It was not necessary for him to establish that the judge dealing with his case had committed an error but simply that the length of the proceedings had been excessive, contrary to Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention . In addition to that provision, he could also relied on Articles 18 and 21 of the Portuguese Constitution and on the relevant provisions of Legislative Decree No . 48051 of 21 November 1967 . 7 . The applicant challenges the Government's line of reasonirig and claims that he had no eflÃ¨ctive remedv under Portuguese law in order to obtain compensation for the excessive length of the proceedings, which are still pending before the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court . Where there is a backlog of cases, as in this instance, the State is liable neither for an illegal nor a legal act .
8 . In this case the proceedings complained of are still pending . The decisive question in the eves of the Commission is whether the applicant could have complained of the proceedings before domestic courts by claiming specific reparation even before those proceedings are terminated . In other words did a remedy exist that could have answered his complaints by providing him with a direct and speedy, and not merely indirect, protection of the rights guaranteed in Article 6 of the Convention (see Eur . Court, H .R ., Deweer case, judgment of 27 February 1980, para . 29) ? 9 . Article 21 of the Portuguese Constitution, cited by the respondent Government, provides in paragraph I that : "The State and other public bodies shall be jointly and severally liabl e under civil law with the members of their organs, their officials or their statf members, for actions or omissions in the exercise of their functions . or caused bv such exercise which result in violations of rights, freedoms or safeguards or in dantage to another party . "
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Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Legislative Decree No . 48051 of 21 November 1967, which regulates the extra-contractual civil liability of the State, provides that : "The State and other public b(dies shall be liable in civil law vis-Ã -vis third parties for infringements of their rights or of statutory provisions intended to protect their interests, where they are caused by wrongs committed by their organs or administrative agents in the exercise of their functions or subsequent to such exercise . "
However it is not clear from the submissions presented by the respondent Governntent whether in this case, and at which stage such a civil action could have been brought, and in particular whether it could have been brought during the proceedings or only after the judgment had become final, whether it had a chance of succeeding and whether it could have rectified speedily the situation complained of by the applicant . Under these circumstances, the Commission concludes that the Government has not shown that the civil actions it has mentioned constituted in this case an effective and adequate remedy for the applicant . The application cannot therefore be rejected on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies . b) Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Conventlo n 10 . The period to be taken into consideration by the Commission runs from 7 December 1978, when the applicant brought a civil action for damages in the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court . This period is still running, as the court has not vet delivered judgment . The proceedings have consequentlv lasted three vears and seven months . 11 . The reasonableness ot'the length of proceedings coming within the scope of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention must be assessed in each case according to the particular circumstances . In respect of criminal matters, the Comntission and the Court have for this purpose had regard, inter alia, to the complexity of the case and to the conduct of both the applicant and the competent authorities (see, for example, Eur . Court . H .R ., Ringeisen case, judgment of 16 July 1971, para . 110, Buchholz case, judgment of 6 May 1981, para . 49) . Thev have also taken account of the same criteria, as well as the defendant's behaviour and what is at stake in the litigation for the plaintiff, in proceedings concerning civil rights (Eur . Court, H .R ., Ktinig case, judgment of 28 June 1978, paras . 99, 102-105 and 107-111) . The right to be heard within a reasonable time, particularly in civil cases, depends, in accordance with the case-law of the Commission, on the behaviour of the person concerned, who must act with the requireddiligence (see Report of the Commission of 9 March 1982, Application No . 8737/79, Zimmermann and Steiner v . Switzerland, para . 3 7) . - 140 -
12 . In the light of these criteria and the particular circumstances of this case, the Commission, having examined the submissions of the parties, considers that the applicant's complaint based on Article 6, paragraph I, of the Convention cannot be regarded manifestly ill-founded because it raises problems of such complexity that their determination should depend upon an examination of the merits . It will therefore be declared admissible . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging in any way the merits of the case .
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