N. c. ALLEMAGNE

RESOLUTlON DH (83) 6 (Adopted by the Ministers' Deputies on 24 March 1983 )
APPLICATION No . 9116/8 0 RELATING TO ALPARSLAN TEMELTASCH against SWITZERLAND
The Contmittee of Ministers . under the terms of Article 32 of the Converrtiau for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedorns (hereinafter refened to as"the Convention') , Havirrg regard to the repo rt drawn up by the European Commission of Hurnan Rights iu accordance with Article 3 1 of the Convention relating to tlre application lodged by Mr Alpars/an Terneltasch against Switzerlaud (No. 91 1 6/80) : Whereas on 19luly 1 982, the Commission transmitted the said report to the Committee of Ministers and whereas the period of three mouths provided Jo r in Article 31, paragraph 1 . of the Convention has elapsed without the case having been brought before the European Cou rt of Human Rights, in pursuarrce of Article 48 of the Conveution ; Whereas. in his application introduced on 16 September 1 980, the upplicaut. a Dutch national of Turkish origin, complained that he was to pay a part of the interpreters' fees in violation of Article 6 . paragraph 3 .e. of the Coaventian . underlining that the interpretative declaration of Switzerland concernirrg this provision could not be considered as a reservatiorr validly made . in the sense of Article 64 of the Convention : Whereas the Cornntissiou, after having declared the application adntissible on 12 Octuber 1 98 1 , expressed in its report the opirriou by nine votes to two and one abstention that the above-mentioned iuterpretative declaration of Switzerland produced the legal effects of a validly made reservation and that, therefore, there was not a violation of Article 6, paragraph 3.e . of the Convention ;
Agreeirtg with the opinion expressed by the Commission in accordance with Article 31 . paragraph 1 . of the Convention ; Voting in accordance with the provisions of Article 32, paragraph 1 . of the Conrention .
Decides that in this case there has not been violation of the Converuion for the Protection of Huniarr Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9132/80 N . v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY N . c/ RÃPUBLIQUE FÃDÃRALE D'ALLEMAGN E DECISION of 16 December 1982 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 16 dÃ©cembre 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Artlcle 5, pareg aph 1(a) end (c) of the Convention : The detention of a perswn convicted at first instance falls under Article 5, paragraph !(a)-and not under Article 5, paragraph !(c)-in spite of the fact that a) as a result of appeal proceeding.s this detention was considered as detention on remand according to domestic law and that b) the ftrst instance judgment has subsequently partly been quashed and the sentence reduced. Article 5, psragraph 3 of the Convention : Determination of the length oj detention on remand when in the course of the criminal proceedings the applicant was considered during a ce rt ain period of time as serving a sentence which in part had become ftnal . Article 6, paragraph I of the Conventlon : Reasonable time (criminal) : a) Determination of the beginning and of the end of the period to be taken into consideration when different criminal charges have been brought at different times and when they have been determined by different successive judgments . b) Examination of the question to what extent an applicant can claim to be a victim of the right to be tried within a reasonable time, when the national judge without admitting a breach of Article 6, paragraph ( has reduced the sentence in view of the length of the procedure. Article 25 of the Convention : Unsubstantiated allegation that theprisonauthortties had denied the applicant ce rt ain facilities to prepare observations requested by the Commission not verified . Article 26 of the Conventlon : !n a comples criminal case con.sisting in a first final conviction for a number of offences and a second final conviction for the remainder, the proceedings can no longer be examined to the extent that they have lead up to the frst conviction, if the application has been brought more than six months thereafter.
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Arllcle 5, partigraphe I, Iltl . (a) et (c), de la Conventlon : La dÃ©tention d'une personne condamnÃ©e en premiÃ¨re instance relÃ¨ve de l'article 5, paragraphe 1(a), - et non de l'article S. paragrpahe 1(c), - nonobstant le fait a) qu'en raison d'une procÃ©dure d'appel cette dÃ©tention Ã©tait considÃ©rÃ©e comme prÃ©ventive en droit national et b) que le jugement de premiÃ¨re instance a Ã©tÃ© ensuite partiellement rÃ©formÃ© et la peine rÃ©duite.
Artlcle 5, paragraphe 3, de la Conventlon : Calcul de la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive lorsqu'au cours de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© considÃ©rÃ©, pendant un certain temps, comme purgeant une peine rÃ©sultant d'un premier jugement partiellement passÃ© en force de chose jugÃ©e . Artlcle 6, paragraphe I, de la Conventlon : DÃ©lai raisonnable (pÃ©nal) . a) DÃ©termirtation du dÃ©but et de la ftn de la pÃ©riode ti prendre en considÃ©ration lorsque diverses accusations ont Ã©tÃ© portÃ©es Ã des Ã©poques diffÃ©rentes et qu'il a Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© sur leur bien fondÃ© par plusieurs jugemenrs successifs . b) Examen du point de savair dans quelle mesure un requÃ©rant peut se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation du droit Ã Ãªtre jugÃ© dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, lorsque le juge national, sans reconnaÃ®tre une violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, a nÃ©anmoins attÃ©nuÃ© la peine en raison de la longue du'rÃ©e de la procÃ©dure . Artlcle 25 de la Convention : AllÃ©gation non vÃ©rifiÃ©e selon laquelle les autoritÃ©s pÃ©nitentiaires auraient refusÃ© au requÃ©rant certaines facilitÃ©s pour prÃ©parer des observations demandÃ©es par la Commission. Arllcle 26 de la Conventlon : Dans une affaire pÃ©nale complexe comportant un premier jugement dÃ©finitif sur une part ie des accusations puis un second jugement dÃ©finitif sur le reste des accusations, la procÃ©dure ne peut plus Ãªtre examinÃ©e dans la ntesure oÃ¹ elle a abouri au premier jugement, lorsque la requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© introduite plus de six mois aprÃ¨s celui-ci .
(fFaucais : voir p. 174 )
THE FACTS
The fads of the case as they appear from the file may be summarised as follows : 1 . The applicant is a German citizen born in 1927 . At the time of filing the application he was detained in Cologne in connection with criminal proceedings relating to his bankruptcy . After having been free for some time he is now serving the remainder of his sentence at the prison of Remscheid .
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2 . An earlier application relating to the length of the bankruptcy proceedings (No . 8610/79) was rejected by the Commission on 10 October 1980 as being manifestly ill-founded . A further application concerning certain civil court proceedings taken by the applicant in connectidn with these bankruptcy proceedings (No . 9314/81) was rejected on 7 December 1982 . The present application is exclusively concerned with thecriminal proceedings taken against the applicant and with the detention imposed on him in connection with these criminal proceedings .
Development of the criminal p roceedings 3 . The applicant who owned a firm in Cologne had business relationships with a building firm engaged in supplying building mate ri al and sites on credit to financially weak clients, the Eckle company . According to his own state, ments the applicant gave loans to the Eckle firm in the total amount of 3 million DM . The means for this were provided to the applicant by his bank who in turn received mo rt gages on the real estate of his firm . The applicant on the other hand received securities from the Eckle firm in the form of bills of exchange drawn on that firm's building clients (total value 60 million DM) . A part of these bills of exchange (2,8 million DM) we re given by the applicant as secu rity to the firm BGE which had rented a part of his business premises and had paid the rent in advance for five years (475 .000 .- DM) . These rent proceeds, mo rt gage letters by which the applicant had encumbered another plot belonging to his firm (815 .000 .- DM), and finally half of the above bills of exchange ( representing a value of 30 million DM) were ceded by the applicant to a trust company in Liechtenstein (which the Government say was in fact controlled by the applicant himself) . 4 . In the year 1967, criminal proceedings were instituted against H . and M . Eckle on charges of criminal bankruptcy ( cf. application No . 8130/78) . In connection with these proceedings a search was carried out in the applicant's tirm on 20 Julv 1967 . Numerous documents including in pa rt icular a pa rt of the above bills of exchange were seized . The prosecution authori ties considered that the applicant was not entitled to keep these securities because they assumed that his loan had already been paid back to him in a clandestine transaction with his Liechtenstein business pa rt ners . The applicant who has consistently denied this did not get back these documents even after the Eckle criminal proceedings had been discontinued in 1977 . They were only returned to him at his release from prison on 25 March 1981 . The applicant's reimprisonment since I October 1981 is related to new criminal charges being raised against him in connection with his a tt empts to make use of these bills ol'exchange . A fu rt her search of the applicant's p rivate residence was carri ed out in January 1968 and the seizure of ce rtain bank accounts ordered in Februa ry -156-
1968 . According to the Government these acts were taken because the applicant was suspected to be an accomplice of Eckle . 5 . According to the applicant it was the above seizure of his securities which brought him into financial difficulties in 1968 . The Government, on the other hand . submit that these difficulties arose only because of the applicant's premeditated plan to transfer his inland property abroad to the detriment of his creditors . In any event it is clear that since summer of 1968 the applicant t'ailed to pay certain debts . In September he liquidated his firm . As he did not pay back the annuities for his bank loan the bank eventually requested the sale on auction of the business plot on which it had mortgages . This auction took place on 13 December 1968 and brought proceeds of only DM 3,2 million (although) the estimated value of the plot was allegedly much higher, probably around 5 million) . The consequence was that claims ranking after the bank could not be satistied . and that the applicant became definitely insolvent . The tax authorities requested the opening of bankruptcy proceedings in January 1969 . and these were still pending at the time of filling the present application (cf. application No . 8610/79) . They were discontinued on 5 October 1981 . 6 . The applicant was now himself suspected of criminal bankruptcy, tax evasion and certain other criminal offences . The proceedings against him were severed from the Eckle proceedings on 13 December 1968 . A further searching order was issued against him by the District Court of Cologne on 17 December 1968, and at the same time this court also ordered his arrest . He was detained on remand from 19 Decentber 1968 until 24 April 1970 when the Regional Court of Cologne pronounced the first judgment in this case . The trial had first been set for January 1970, but had been repeated in March and April 1970 after a change of the applicant's defence lawyer . 7 . The court convicted the applicant only of the crime of forgery of documents, namely making certain entries on blanco bills of exchange received from the Eckle tirm which he had forwarded without authorisation to the firm BGE (who had tried to use the securities given to them), and to his Liechtenstein business partners with whom he had made a plan to realise the claims underlying the bills of exchange by profiting of the abstract nature of these papers . For this, the applicant was given a prison sentence of 11 months which was considered as served by his detention on remand . 8 . The applicant was at that time acquitted of the further charges raised against him . These included allegations of fraud to the detriment of the firm BGE (the court considered it not established that the applicant had concluded the 5 year rent contract with them in bad faith, namely in knowledge of the imminent auction of his business premises), of theft or conceiling of stolen goods (the court found it unsubstantiated that the applicant had obtained the bills ot'exchange from the Eckle firm in this way) and criminal bankruptcy on two counts (the court found it not established that the applicant had failed t o - 157 -
pay his current debts to his business partners, therefore it did not feel prompted to investigate the prosecution's allegations that he had removed the property of his firm to Liechtenstein with the intent to harm his creditors ; as regards the allegation of criminal bankruptcy to the detriment of his private creditors, the court found that the claims of these creditors were disputed and that the acts of criminal bankruptcy alleged by the prosecution had not been established) . 9 . The proceedings concerning charges of tax evasion were adjourned pending the final outcome of the tax proceedings . 1 0 . Both the applicant and the prosecution appealed from the above judgment, and the Federal Court of Justice dealt with the case on 24 November 1971 . It rejected the applicant's appeal and his conviction for forgery of documents therefore became final . On the other hand the Federal Court allowed the prosecution's appeal against the applicant's acquittal from the charges of fraud and criminal bankruptcy . The proceedings on these issues were referred back to another Chamber of the Regional Court, with detailed legal arguments of the Federal Court to be taken into consideration . 11 . The prosecution had also appealed against the adjournment of the Regional Court's proceedings on tax evasion . This appeal was allowed by the Cologne Court of Appeal on 15 March 1972 . On 21 March 1973 the Chamber of the Regional Court dealing with this part of the proceedings referred the matter to the chamber dealing with the renewed proceedings on fraud and criminal bankruptcy . The latter chamber decided on 23 March 1975 to join the two sets of proceedings . 12 . The trial took place on 119 days between 2 September 1976 and 13 January 1978 . The applicant was rearrested during the trial on 28 July 1977 and remained in detention on remand until 25 March 1981 . 13 . On 13 .January 1978 the Regional Court of Cologne convicted the applicant of tax evasion on two counts and attempted tax evasion, fraud and criminal bankruptcy on three counts . It acquitted him of some other charges . The applicant was given a sentence of 7'/h years imprisonment . a) The Court found that the applicant had made incomplete tax declarations for the years 1963 and 1964 and had thereby completed two offences of tax evasion . His failure to declare certain speculative profits made in 1966 had not resulted in damage for the State because the tax had been fixed on the basis of the tax authorities' own investigations . This failure therefore constituted only an ofi'ence of attempted tax evasion . b) The court further found the applicant guilty of fraud to the detriment of the firm BGE because he had failed to inform this frm, when renewing their rent contract for five years, of the imminent auction of the premises . - 158 -
c) As regards the charges of bankruptcy, the court found that it had to judge the applicant's whole behaviour prior to his bankruptcy insofar as it constituted a natural unity, notwithstanding that the indictment did not cover all of the relevant facts . In view of the amendments of the applicable legal provisions on criminal bankruptcy it had to be established that both the requirements of the former law (para . 239 of the Bankruptcy Act) and of the new law (para . 283 of the Penal Code) were fulfllled . The court considered that this was the case insofar as the applicant had already since 1964 taken property out of his firm and transferred it to Liechtenstein in knowledge of the imminent insolvency of his firm in Cologne and with intent to cause damage to its creditors . As he had caused his firm's insolvency by his above actions, the court considered that he had thereby completed the offence of criminal bankruptcy under s . 283 (2) of the Penal Code . The transfers to Liechtenstein in 1968 of his current rent income, and of the lump sum received for the renewal of the rent contract from the firm BGE further constituted two offences under s . 283 (1) of the Penal Code (removal of property in knowledge of an imminent bankruptcy) . d) The applicant was however acquitted of criminal bankruptcy in respect ot' his private property . Although the court found that the applicant removed certain property to Liechtenstein in the year 1968, it assumed that he owned at least 2,8 million DM in Liechtenstein whereas his private debts were only 2 .2 million . He was therefore not insolvent, but only unwilling to pay his debts . This did not suffice for a conviction of criminal bankruptcy . Insofar as he had been charged with a further offence of criminal bankruptcy by the encumbrement of his property with mortgage letters which he had transferred to Liechtenstein the court found that these letters did not represent a real value which could have been realised by the receiver in the bankruptcy proceedings . 14 . The global sentence of 7 1h years was composed of the following individual sentences . - for criminal bankruptcy under s . 282 (2) of the Penal Code, caused by transfer of property to Liechtenstein in . the years 1964 and 1965 : 31/h years . The court observed that the penalty would have been near to the maximum penalty of 5 years if not so much time had elapsed since the commission of the offence ; - for criminal bankruptcy under s . 283 (1) of the Penal Code by the transfer of current rent proceeds to Liechtenstein : I year ; - for criminal bankruptcy under s . 283 (1) of the Penal Code by the transfer of the rent for five years from BGE : 2 years . 263 of the Penal code) : 3 years ; ;-foraudtheimnofBEG(s - for tax evasion (s . 370 of the revenue Act) : 3 years for continued evasion of income tax in the years 1963 and 1964, 6 months for evasion of trade tax in 1963, 11/2 years for attempted evasion of income tax in 1966 . - 159 -
Taking into account the penalties imposed on the applicant in cert ain other criminal proceedings (a fine of DM 1000 .- for defamation resulting from a conviction by the Regional Court of Cologne in 1973, and a prison sentence of 3 months for defamation, resulting from a conviction by the District Cou rt of Cologne in 1975) as well as ce rt ain aggravating ( amount of damage, criminal energy, criminal collaboration with the Eckle firm and ruthlessness against his pa rt ners) and mitigating circumstances (his querulatory complex, the legal possibilities provided by the law of Liechtenstein, and in pa rt icular the fact that the offences had been commi tt ed ten to fifteen years ago, and that two ve ry long and onerous trials were necessa ry to convict the applicant) the cou rt combined the above individual sentences of a total length of 13 years 3 months 2 weeks and 20 days to a global sentence of 71h years (the minimum would have been the heaviest individual penalty, i .e . 3'/~ years) . The detention spent by the applicant as a remand p ri soner ( exclsuive of the I I months se rv ed by him on account of the of the sentence of 24 April 1970 which had become tinal) was recognised as part of the sentence. The prosecution's request to order in addition the applicant's preventive detention as a security measure ( Sicherungsverwahrung) was rejected . 15 . As regards the length of procedure, the judgment contained the following statement in the general considerations relating to the mitigating circumstances : "It is a mitigating circumstance for the accused that two trials have taken place against him, the last one during 119 days of session . This is not only due to sho rtcomings in the administration of justice for which he cannot be held responsible, but also to the excessive use which the accused has made of his rights . It is true that the reproach to be made to the accused in this respect cannot be reflected in meting out his penalty . However, the unusually frequent and voluminous declarations, applications and interrogations of witnesses which were based on the free decision of the accused provide at least an explanation for the duration of the trial . . . " 16 . The applicant appealed from the above judgment, but in preparing his appeal (which he preferred to do himself rather than rely on his official defence counsel) he met certain difficulties to obtain a transcript of the trial and other documents . As he therefore failed to meet the time limit for completing his appeal he made an application to the Federal Court to reinstitute this time limit . The Federal Court however rejected this application as being out of time since it had not been made within 8 days from the removal of the obstacles . The Federal Court's decision to this effect of 13 February 1980 was challenged by a constitutional complaint, but a three judge committee of the Federal Constitutional Court rejected the latter on 24 April 1980 . 17 . The Federal Court also decided on 13 February 1980 to confirm the Regional Court's judgment on most issues, but it quashed the applicant' s
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conviction insofar as it was based on criminal bankruptcy under s . 283 (2) of the Penal Code (see para . 13 (c) above) . The proceedings in this respect were discontinued on the ground that the court had overstepped the indictment . The prosecution had in fact referred to the applicant's property transfers in 1964 and 1965 only in the context of the charges of tax evasion . The court however had examined these facts also in connection with the charges of criminal bankruptcy, assuming that they formed part of a natural unity of action . Although it was correct that the court had to take account of the natural unity of action of an accused, it could not be maintained that a natural unity of action of the applicant's property transfers in 1964 and 1965 with his later criminal bankruptcy acts had been established . Not only had a considerable time elapsed between these two sets of events, they also had been only loosely connected and could not theret'ore be considered as one continued behaviour . In view ot'the discontinuation of a part of the proceedings it was necessary to reconsider the sentence . The Federal Court therefore referred the case back to the Regional Court for the purpose of determining a new global sentence . 18 . The applicant then filed a constitutional complaint on the length of the criminal proceedings in his case . This complaint was however rejected by a committee of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court on 24 April 1980 . The Committee declined to accept the complaint for consideration because it did not in its view provide sufficient prospects of success . On the particular point of length of proceedings it stated that there were no indications of excessive delays in the proceedings, caused by lack of expediency, which could be challenged under the Constitution ("keine Anhaltspunkte fÃ¼r ein von Verfassungs wegen zu beanstandendes Ã¼berlanges Verfahren, das nicht hinreichend geftirdert wurde") . 1 9 . The Regional Court fixed a new global sentence following a hearing on 19, 20 and 23 June 1980 . The total length of the remaining individual sentences was 9 years 6 ntonths and 20 days . but the court could not impose a global sentence beyond 7'/2 years as fixed in the earlier judgment . The minimum penalty was threeyears . Within this legal frame the court considered a new global sentence of 6 years as adequate . In reaching this conclusion the court had regard to the same mitigating and aggravating circumstances as in the earlier sentence . In this connection it stated the following with regard to the length of proceedings : "In addition it could not be disregarded that the criminal proceedings against the accused have taken an extraordinary length of time . The unreasonably long interruption of the proceedings between the judgment of the Federal Court of Justice of 24 November 1971 and the beginning of the new trial on 2 September 1976 was exclusively caused by thejudicial administration (Die Ursache fÃ¼r die unverhÃ¯ltnismÃ¯ssig lange Verfahrensunterbrechung . . . lag dabei ausschliesslich im justizinternen Bereich) . But the State's right to impose penalties diminishes with the lapse of time since the commission of the criminal offences . . ." .
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20 . The applicant again appealed from this decision to the Federal Court of Justice, claiming inter alia that the length of the proceedings had not sufficiently been taken into account . The Federal Court however rejected the appeal as manifestly ill-founded by a decision of 13 May 1981 . It stated that the unusually long duration of the proceedings did not create a procedural obstacle . It had been rightly taken into account when meting out the sentence and the applicant's right under Article 6 of the Convention to speedy proceedings had thereby been respected . 21 . The applicant then lodged yet another constitutional complaint which inter alia again concerned the length of the proceedings . It was rejected bv a three judge committee of the Federal Constitutional Court on 24 July 1981 . The court considered that the complaint had no prospects of success since the length of proceedings had sufliciently been taken into account . Theappllcant'e detention 22 . As mentioned above (para . 6) the applicant had been detained on remand from 19 December 1968 until 24 April 1970 (= 16 months and 5 days) . The stated reasons for his detention were a danger of absconding and danger of obstructing the course of justice, in particular by collusion with persons abroad . In a decision of 27 December 1968 the Regional Court of Cologne confirmed these reasons and stated that even a bail of 500,000 .- DM could only remove the danger of absconding but not the danger of collusiÃ´n . On 13 January 1969 the District Court of Cologne expressed the opinion that a bail (100 .000 .- DM) would not even prevent the danger of absconding "as the applicant had transferred his whole property of about 3 million DM abroad" . By a further decision of January 1969 this court suspended the applicant's right to receive visits because a letter addressed to his Liechtenstein business partners had been found in his wife's handbag . This decision was confirmed by a decision of the Regional Court of 11 March 1969 by which a complaint against the applicant's continued detention was also rejected . The applicant's attempt to infinence witnesses was considered as an additional ground to justify his detention . The appiicant was eventually released on the date of the firstjudgment pronounced in his case as his detention on remand had lasted longer than the 11 months-sentence imposed in hint on that occasion . The applicant was rearrested during his second trial on 28 July 1977 . A .23 warrant of arrest had been issued against him by the Regional Court of Cologne on 18 July 1977 after he had not appeared at a hearing on this day and had sent the court a medical certificate by a Swiss general practitioner as excuse . The court considered that the applicant had in fact fled to Switzerland and had used the medical certificate only as a means to screen his escape . He had told a neighbour that he would spend his holiday in Bava ri a, but it was to be suspected that he in fact had left Cologne with an intention to influence witnesses in Liechtenstein . -162-
24 . The applicant's objections against the above detention order were rejected by the Regional Court on 25 July 1977 . The court had made enquiries in Switzerland about the applicant's true state of health (including statements of the above general practitioner made with the applicant's own consent) and had found that there could be no question of a danger to his life or of his being unable to travel . It had only been certified that he should not drive himself . The court drew the conclusion that it had in reality been the applicant's intention to make the continuation of the trial impossible, while preventing his arrest at his reentry into Germany . 25 . At the court hearing on 29 July 1977 the court considered further objections raised by the applicant against the detention order, which it however fully maintained . Applications to revoke the detention order were rejected by the Regional Court on 9 and 12 August 1977, and these decisions were confirmed by the Cologne Court of Appeal on 5 September 1977 . The applicant filed a constitutional complaint against the latter decision which was however rejected by a three-judge committee of the Federal Constitutional Court on 14 Deember 1977 . The committee considered that the constitutional complaint lacked sufficient prospects of success because it essentially raised only questions of the correct application of the ordinary law which could not be controlled by the Constitutional Court . A violation of specific provisions of constitutional law, including the constitutional right to be heard, was not apparent . 26 . During the appeal procedure after his second conviction the applicant again challenged thejustifcation of his continued detention on remand, invoking inter alia certain documents issued from Liechtenstein authorities . The Regional Court however found by a decision of 2 January 1980 that the reasons stated in the detention order of 18 July 1977 and in its decision of 25 Julv 1977 were still valid . This decision was confrmed by the Court of Appeal on 1I January 1980 . The applicant's constitutional appeal from this decision was rejected by a three-judge committee of the Federal Constitutional Court on 18 September 1980 . 27 . After the partial success of the applicant's appeal (Federal Court's decision of 13 February 1980, see para . 17 above) the Regional Court of Cologne had to examine ex officio whether his continued detention was still justified . In a decision of 26 March 1980 it stated that this was the case as the Federal Court had confirmed convictions entailing individual sentences totalling 9'h years . It could be expected that even after the quashing of the 3 117 year bankruptcy sentence under s . 283 (2) of the Penal Code the new global sentence would not be below the earlier global sentence of 7'h years . Even if the new global sentence would be shorter, and even assuming that the applicant could be released after serving two thirds of this sentence (which was doubtful in this case) there would be a remaining penalty to be served, and the applicant would therefore be tempted to flee although he had spent 3 year s
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and 2 months in detention on remand . The danger of absconding was also to be assumed because of the applicant's repeated statements that he would immediately travel to Liechtenstein in order to collect certain evidence . The court further stated that applicant's continued detention had not yet become disproportionate as less stringent measures were not sufficient, in view of his personality, to secure the aim of the criminal proceedings . 28 . The applicant's appeal from this decision was rejected by the Cologne Court of Appeal on 21 April 1980 . It found that the Regional Court had rightly assumed that the applicant had to expect a new global sentence which would exceed the length of the detention already served by far more than a third . It had also correctly assumed a danger of absconding and had not erred in confirming the continued proportionality of the detention, because there had been no avoidable delays in the proceedings concerning the final determination of the applicant's penalty . The Court of Appeal confirmed this decision on 2 and I I June 1980 despite various objections raised by the applicant . 29 . After the fixing of a new global sentence of 6 years, the Regional Court of Cologne again confirmed the continued necessity of the applicant's detention on remand by a decision of 5 August 1980 . The applicant's appeal from this decision was rejected by the CoÃ»rt of Appeal on 5 September 1980 . It was stated that the applicant's intention to flee was clear from various submissions which he had made to the court, and that the detention was still proportionate . The applicant's constitutional appeal from this decision was dealt with together with his earlier constitutional appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision of 11 January 1980 . It was rejected by a three-judge committee of the Federal Constitutional Court on 18 September 1980 . 30 . Further decisions confirming the continued justification of the applicant's detention on remand were taken by the Court of Appeal on 10 October, by the Regional Court on 3 November and again by the Court of Appeal on 28 November and 12 December 1980 . The applicant ftled a constitutional complaint against these decisions of 16 December 1980 . 31 . Towards the end of the year 1980 the applicant made very frequent complaints of his detention and some of these were not dealt with since the Presiding Judge of the Regional Court chamber considered them as abusive because of their insulting language . The Presiding Judge's decisions to this effect of 4 December 1980 were however quashed by the Court of Appeal on 9 January 1981 . 32 . The Regional Court had in the meantime confirmed the continued justification of the detention by decisions of 10, 17 and 29 December 1980 . On 23 January 1981 the Court of Appeal cnnfirmed these decisions . 33 . The applicant thereupon asked the Regional Court to reexamine his various complaints against the detention including the restrictions resultin g
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therefrom which he considered as unjustified in view of the legal presumption of innocence . The Regional Court dealt with these questions in a decision of 12 February 1981 . It stated that the applicant still had not served two thirds of the final sentence to be expected . The restrictions imposed on him were covered by law and in any event struck him less severely than would be the case if he was serving a final sentence . The preseumption of innocence could not be violated because his convictions, though not the sentence, had already become final . Although it was true that the impact of the restrictions on the applicant was increased due to the length of his detention on remand there was no reason to revoke the detention order . There were no new relevant factors which could justifiy the applicant's release from detention which in the court's view still had not become disproportionate . This was true even though the applicant would have completed two thirds of his sentence on 18 February 1981 because it was doubtful with regard to his personality whether he futfilled the legal conditions for a conditional release . It was to be feared that he would escape if not the serving of his remaining sentence at least the termination of the criminal procedure . It was the purpose of the detention on remand to secure the completion of the whole proceedings, including the trial and the enforcement proceedings . If the applicant's pending appeal to the Federal Court would be successful with the consequence that there would have to be a new trial it would be legally impossible to conduct that trial in his absence . The court therefore considered the applicant's continued detention as justified . On the applicant's objections the Regional Court confirmed its above decision on 23 and 25 February 1981 . 34 . The judge rapport eur of the Federal Constitutional Cou rt , acting on the basis of the applicant's constitutional appeal of 16 December 1980 (see para . 30 above) had in the meantime addressed a le tt er to the Minister of Justice of the Land No rt hrhine-Westphalia requesting him to comment on the proport ionali ty ot'the applicant's continued detention on remand after completing two thirds of his global sentence . Apparently in reaction to this request the Cou rt of Appeal decided on 25 March 1981 that the detention order could no longer be enforced against the applicant as a decision of the Federal Cou rt of Justice on his appeal from the sentence of 23 June 1980 was not foreseeable in the near future and as he had already se rved more than two thirds of the sentence . In these circumstances it was not warranted to assume a fu rt her danger of absconding . The applicant was released on the same day and left the Federal Republic shortly afterwards with the destination of Liechtenstein after certain of his seized documents had been returned to him by the bankruptcy receiver to whom they had been forwarded by the criminal court in 1978 .
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35 . The applicant returned to the Federal Republic of Germany on ] October 1981 to fetch from the public prosecutor's office in Cologne certain further documents seized in 1967/68 . He had a conversation with the public prosecutor on the civil proceedings which he had in the meantime instituted before the Regional Courts of Siegburg and' Cologne in order to realise certain claims resulting from bills of exchange which he had formerly received from Eckle . At the end of the conversation, he was arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest issued by the public prosecutor's office already on the preceding day . It ordered his arrest with a view to enforcing the remainder of his six year sentence . This was considered necessary because the realisation of the above claims was considered to constitute new criminal behaviour of the kind of which he had been convicted back in 1970, and because new criminal investigations had been instituted against him for this reason . This was explained in an application of the prosecution to the Regional Court of Duisburg being the court competent to supervise the execution of the sentence, by which they requested to refuse the applicant the privilege of conditional release after completion of two thirds of the sentence . He had completed these two thirds already before he had been released from remand custody . 36 . The Regional Court decided on 28 October 1981 to refuse the conditional release, as requested by the prosecution . It confirmed the prosecutor's opinion that the applicant's intention to realise the bills of exchange was new criminal behaviour, which the applicant, who was in no way willing to draw the consequences of his conviction wished to give a moral justification be pretending that he had been the victim of an error of justice . In these circumstances it was excluded that he could be conditionally released . 37 . The applicant himself had tried to appeal against his arrest, but was infornied by the Hamm Court of Appeal that a warrant of arrest ordering the enforcement of a final sentence was not subject to appeal . The applicant then requested the Regional Court to treat the appeal as an application to find that the enforcement of the remainder of the sentence was inadmissible . The Regional Court decided on 12 November 1981 to reject this request . It observed in particular that the revocation of the detention order of 1976 by the Cologne Court of Appeal (para . 34 above) concerned only the detention on remand but not the detention as a convicted prisoner . It therefore did not prevent the enforcement of the sentence . The reasons invoked by the applicant also did not show that the enforcement was inadmissible . It was true that the question of conditional release had to be examined after serving two thirds of the sentence, but this had been done in the court's decision of 28 October 1981 . The applicant had rightly been refused conditional release as he had gone to Liechtenstein and had instituted civil proceedings to realise claims resulting from bills of exchange, a behaviour which constituted a continuation of his criminal activities . The detention was not calculated to interfere with these civil proceedings which could in any event be conducted from the prison .
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38 . The applicant appealed against both the above decisions, the appeal against the decision of 28 October 1981 was however rejected by the Dusseldorf Court of Appeal on 4 January 1982, on the ground that it was inadmissible as being out of time . The appeal against the decision of 12 November 1981 was rejected on its merits, by a decision of 13 January 1982 . The Court of Appeal fully confirmed the decision of the Regional Court . stressing in particular that the applicant's release from his detention on remand was in no way equivalent to the grant of conditional release, and that the allegation of the prosecution authorities having acted out of improper motives was wholly unl'ounded . 39 . The applicant then filed a constitutional complaint, claiming inter alia violations of various provisions of the Convention (Articles 3 . 5 . 6(1), (2) and (3) (a), (b), (c) and (d) . The Federal Constitutional Court rejected this remedy by a decision of 3 February 1982 . 40 . The applicant was subsequently granted reinstitution of the appeal proceedings against the Regional Court decision of 28 October 1981, by a decision of the Dusseldorf Court of Appeal of 25 March 1982 . By the same decision, the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal as being unfounded . It stated that it could be left open whether the new investigation proceedings taken against the applicant could justify the refusal of conditional release . In any event this refusal was justified because the applicant was, according to the judgntent itself, a wholly unimpressionable criminal .
41 . The applicant again made a constitutional complaint . He also lodged a number of hierarchical appeals . However, all these remedies were of no avail . The constitutional complaint was rejected as inadmissible on 6 July 1982, on the ground that there was no appearance of violations of constitutional provisions . The interpretation and application of the criminal law was a matter reserved to the ordinary courts and escaped the review by the Federal Consitutional Court . 42 . The applicant had in the meantime requested an interruption of the enforcement of his sentence, in particular for the purpose of preparing his observations in reply to the Government's observations on the present application . However no decision was taken on this matter . On 24 August 1982 he was told that he would be transferred to Cologne for a psychiatric examination, however, after a telephone conversation with the psychiatric expert this measure was not carried out . The applicant then applied to be freed from his duties to work in prison, in order to have more time for the completion of his observations to the Commission . This was refused . On 27 August 1982 the chief public prosecutor informed the applicant that there was no reason to release him by an act of grace, as requested by him (the applicant denies that he had made such a request), and the enforcement of his sentence necessarily involved a restriction of his personal liberty which he had to accept eve n - 167 -
having regard to the present Convention proceedings . It was not apparent that only an interruption of the detention would enable him to prepare the observations requested by the Commission . Comptainta 1 . Theapplicant now complains first of. all of the length of the criminal proceedings in his case (14 years since 1967) which he considers to be contrary to Article 6(1) of the Convention . In this context he claims that the length of proceedings was not sufficiently taken into account in the global sentence imposed on him . He considers that the proceedings should have been discontinued in view of their excessive length . 2 . The applicant has also raised a number of complaints relating to the conduct of the criminal proceedings . These include allegations that the court unlawfully took into account certain evidence received from Liechtenstein authorities although these authorities had refused to grant legal assistance to the German courts . The applicant further complains that the public prosecutor dealing with the case was a person against whom the applicant had himself tried to institute criminal proceedings, and that the official defence counsel appointed for the applicant was a lawyer who also represented the interests of his children in an official liability action brought against the State on account of the seizure of the securities from his firm (in which the children apparently had a share) . The applicant further complains that the proceedings were unfair because many applications which he had ntade during the trial were only dealt with at the end of the trial, the earlier assumption having been that he might be unfit to plead . 836 applications were rejected on the 116th day of the trial after a psychological expert opinion had shown that he was in fact fit to plead . The applicant furthermore submits that the appeal proceedings have been unfair in that he was not initially provided with the necessary documentation to prepare the appeal himself, and that his subsequent request to reinstitute the time limit of the presentation of the appeal was rejected . In his submission this had the effect that the Federal Court in its decision of 13 February 1980 rejected the appeal on most of the issues . The applicant considers that his right to defend himself in person (Art . 6 (3) (c) of the Convention) has thereby been violated and that he was also deprived of his right to an effective remedy to a national authority (Art . 13) . 3 . As regards the detention on remand, the applicant complains that it was not justified in the first place, and that in any event its duration was excessive and contrary to Article 5(3) of the Convention . He claims that the court used the detention on remand as a means to enforce its sentence by all means although it had not yet become final . In his view the resultant disadvantages for him were out of proportion . He also claims compensation for unjustified
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detention under Article 5 (5) of the Convention . In this respect he has made an application for legal aid to the competent court which adjourned its decision pending the outcome of the appeal proceedings before the Federal Court of Justice and of the present Convention proceedings . 4 . In his observations on admissibility, the applicant introduced a nuntber of new complaints relating to his arrest and detention since 1 October 1981 . He submits that this detention is unjustified and contrary to Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, and that in the relevant proceedings Articles 5 (4) and 6(1), (2), (3) (a)-(d) have been violated . 5 . The applicant finally complains of an interference by the domestic authorities with his right of petition under Article 25 of the Convention because his documents were taken away from him at a time when he needed them to prepare this application, and because the court refused to give him copies of court decisions for which he had been asked by the Commission's Secretariat . Some of these decisions were subsequently sent to the Commission by the Presiding Judge of the court . The applicant submits that a further interference with his rights under Article 25 occurred after he had received the Government's observations on the present application, because he was neither released nor freed from his duty to work in prison, and because certain documents which he wished to consult were not made available to him in his cell . Instead the authorities even made an attempt to let him disappear in a psychiatric clinic .
THE LA W 1 . The present case concerns exclusively the applicant's complaints about the conduct of the criminal proceedings against him, and his related detention . The applicant has referred to various further proceedings (an official liability action, civil law suits against various persons, applications for the institution of criminal proceedings against various officials, applications for the retrial of his criminal case), but the Commission notes that he has not submitted any formal contplaints in this respect, and it therefore considers that it is not called upon to deal with these matters in the context of the present application . 2 . As regards the applicant's complaint that he has been wrongly convicted and sentenced, the Commission recalls, that in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties of the Convention . In particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention . The Commission refers, on this point, to its constan t
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jurisprudence (see e .g . decisions on the admissibility of applications No . 458/59, Yearbook 3, pp . 222, 236 and No . 1140/61, Collection of Decisions 8, pp . 57, 62) . 3 . It is true that in this case the applicant has also complained of a violation of the procedural guarantees of Article 6(I) of the Convention, and in this respect the Commission has competence to deal with the applicant's complaints . However, a distinction must be drawn between the complaints concerning the observance of the principles of a fair trial, and the further complaints relating to the lenglh of the proceedings . 4 . The complaints regarding fair trial must be considered separately for each of the principal stages of the proceedings . a) The applicant's first conviction of 1970, and the corresponding sentence, became final in 1971, and he should therefore have addressed the Commission at that time if he wished to complain of a violation of his Convention rights . Since he has not done so within the six months time limit provided for in Article 26, this part of the application must be rejected under Article 27 (3) of the Convention . b) As regards the subsequent proceedings which ended with the Federal Court's decision of 13 February 1980 by which the applicant's conviction for a number of further offences became final, the applicant has in fact filed a constitutional complaint and respected the six months time limit . However . with regard to his particular complaints he has nevertheless failed to exhaust the domestic remedies according to the generally recognised principles of international law which require that the time limits and formal conditions of the domestic law should be observed . The applicant's appeal concerning the alleged procedural defects of the (second) trial (involving in particular the allegation of insufficient clarification of the Liechtenstein facts) was filed out of time and was therefore disregarded by the Federal Court of Justice which found that the legal conditions for granting a reinstitution of the appeal proceedings were not fulfilled . In these circumstances, the applicant has not met the conditions of Article 26, and this part of his application must again be rejected under Article 27 (3) of the Convention . c) As regards finally the last stage of the proceedings by which the final sentence was determined, the Commission notes that the applicant has not challenged these proceedings as having been contrary to the principles of a fair trial . 5 . As regards the applicant's complaints concerning the length of procedure, the Commission first notes the Government's argument that in this respect, too, the examination should be carried out by stages . The Commission agrees with this argument only insofar as the length of the proceedings leading up to the first linal conviction and sentence pronounced against the applicant can no longer be examined as such due to the expiration of the six months time limi t - 170 -
in this respect . However, this does not mean that the same period cannot be taken into account as part of the time needed to determine the other charges raised against the applicant of which he was then acquitted but which were subsequently pursued because of the successful appeal of the prosecution . These charges must be traced back in each case until the moment when they first substantially affected the applicant's position . It may be true that the tax offences were not brought to light before 19 December 1968 when the applicant was arrested on the basis of a warrant related to them . However, the other charges were apparently taken over from the Eckle proceedings from which they had been severed on 13 December 1968 . In view of the poor docunientation of the first phase of the proceedings the Commission is not able at present to establish exactly how each of these charges was realted to the search ot' 20 July 1967 . As this search led to the seizure of the securities which the applicant had obtained from the Eckle firm, and as the question of the use of these securities in fact continued to form an essential background of the proceedings through all the subsequent stages, it is not unreasonable to assume that these proceedings in fact started on the date of the search . The Commission therefore cannot exclude that some of the charges of whose delayed determination the applicant complains go back to 20 July 1967 while some others indeed did not affect him before the date of the first arrest on 19 December 1968 . 6 . As regards the end of the period to be considered under Article 6(1) of the Convention, the Commission has to distinguish between those charges of which the applicant was acquitted on 13 July 1978 and those of which he was convicted on that date . Since the acquittals were not made the subject of appeal proceedings, the final date in relation to them is the 13 January 1978 . As regards the convictions, they were in fact challenged in the applicant's appeal and the proceedings in relation to them were not finally terminated before 13 May 198 1 , the date of the confirmation of the new aggregate sentence by the Federal Court of Justice (cf . para . 77 of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Eckle case) . The total length of the proceedings was therefore 13 years and 10 months between July 1967 and May 1981 . Some of the charges were in fact determined within a shorter period, but the minimunt length of time during which all charges together remained pending is still 9 years and one month between December 1968 and January 1978 . The Commission considers that in these circumstances the case clearly raises the question whether the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time has been respected . 7 . The Government have argued that the applicant can no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of this right because the excessive length of the proceedings was recognised by the German courts themselves and was compensated for by a reduction of the sentence . The Commission notes, however, the applicant's complaint that his sentence was not sufficientl y
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reduced . As this complaint is not as such outside the scope of Article 6 (1) (cf . the Commission's decision on the admissibility of application No . 8182/78) . it must be ascertained whether the applicant has in fact obtained adequate redress . Having regard to the principles developed by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 15 July 1982 concerning the Eckle case (cf . in particular paras . 69-70, 87 and 94 of that judgment) the Commission finds that there can at least be doubts in this respect . The courts in fact dealt with the question of the length of procedure without establishing a breach of Article 6(1) in explicit terms, and they invoked the principle of reduction of sentence without specifying how the various individual and global sentences were affected by this principle . It goes without saying that an effective redress requires more than a mere declaratory exercise . Only a real and measurable reduction of the sentence attributable specifically to the overlength of the proceedings can be taken into account as a ground for denying an applicants standing in the Convention proceedings . Since the position in the present case is not at all clear in this respect there is no basis for declaring the applicant's complaint incompatible with the provisions of the Convention, on the ground that he can no longer claim to be a victim .
8 . The Commission further finds that the applicant's complaint also cannot be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded . It has taken note of the Government's explanations as to the reasons which led to the extraordinary length of the proceedings in this case, and of the applicant's counter arguments . On balance, the Commission considers that it has not been estblished beyond doubt that the delays which have actually occurred can either be justified having regard to the criteria which the Commission has developed in its constant case law, or that they have actually been compensated for insofar as they cannot be so justified . The Commission therefore concludes that the determination of the applicant's complaint relating to the length of the criminal proceedings must depend on an examination as to its merits . 9 . The Commission now turns to the applicant's complaints relating to his detention . The applicant was detained during three periods, from December 1968 to April 1970, from July 1977 until March 1981, and since October 1981 . Each of these periods must be considered separately . 10 . As regards the first period, the Commission is not required to examine whether it might have involved a ciolation of the applicant's Convention rights, because the conditions of Article 26 of the Convention are not met in this respect . It is not clear whether the applicant has exhausted the domestic remedies at the relevant time, but in any event he failed to observe the sixmonths time lintit . This part of the application must therefore be rejected under Article 27 (3) of the Convention . 11 . As regards the second period of detention, the applicant has first complained under Article 5 (1) (c) that his arrest was not justified because i t - 172 -
was wrongly assumed that he had tried to flee . However, the Commission notes that the applicant has failed to submit the above complaint to the Commission within six months from the final domestic decision . i .e . the Federal Constitutional Court's decision of 14 December 1977 . The Commission is therefore foreclosed front examining the question whether this detention was in fact ordered in conformity with Article 5 (1) (c) and it must limit its examination to the question of the length of the detention in question . In this respect the six-months time limit has been clearly observed by the applicant . When determining the period to be considered under Article 5 (3) of the Convention, regard ntust be had not only to the time after the applicant's arrest on 28 July 1977, but also to the fact that the applicant had been detained on remand in connection with the same criminal proceÃ©dings already at an earlier time . Since the earlier detention had lasted about 16'h months while the 1970 sentence which was subsequently considered as served by this detention was only 11 months, there was a remainder of 5'/. months spent in detention on remand which still had to be taken into account in 1977 when judging the appropriateness of the applicant's renewed detention . By the time of the pronouncement of the judgment of first instance on 13 January 1978 the applicant's detention on remand had thus effectively lasted I I months . The Commission considers that this is the final date to be taken into account for the purposes of Article 5 (3) of the Convention . It is of the opinion that by that time the length of the applicant's detention on remand had not yet become disproportionate in view of the serious charges raised against him . The applicant's complaints in this respect must accordingly be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . 12 . After this date, the applicant continued to be considered as a remand prisoner under the domestic law, but for the purposes of the Convention his detention comes under Article 5(1) (a) which authorises the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court (cf . the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Wemhoff case, of 27 June 1968, Publications ol' the Court, Series A, No . 7, at p . 30) . The applicant had in 1'act been convicted and sentenced to 7'/a years prison on 13 January 1978 . The subsequent quashing of a part of the judgment, and the reduction of the sentence to six years did not alter this position . At least the conviction became tinal on 13 February 1980, and the fact that the sentence had not become final when the applicant had already spent two thirds of it in prison was in_ itself considered as a sufficient ground to release him on 25 March 1981 . The remainder of the sentence was only enforced as from October 1981 when the sentence had in fact become final . The Commission therefore considers that in these circumstances there is no appearance of a violation of the applicant's rights by his above detention, as it was fully covered by Article 5 (1) (a) of the
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Convention . This part of the application must therefore again be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded . 13 . The only remaining issue is the question whether the applicant's right under Article 25 (1) of the Convention to the effective exercise of his right to petition the Commission has been interfered with . In this connection, the Commission first notes that the applicant has withdrawn the allegations that he was hindered in his free communication with the Commission by certain measures taken against him in 1980 . The Commission therefore need not examine this matter any further . Insofar as the applicant has alleged (hat he has met certain obstacles during the preparation of his observations to the Commission in the summer of 1982, the Commission notes that the applicant has in fact subntitted very voluminous observations covering all aspects of his case . The Comntission therefore finds no appearance of an unjustitied interference with the effective exercise of the applicant's right of' petition . For these reasons the Commissio n DECLARES ADMISSIBLE and retains for an examination as to the merits the applicant's complaint under Article 6(I) of the Convention that the criminal charges raised against him have not been determined within a reasonable time ; DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the applicatio n FINDS that no action is required with regard to the applicant's allegation that he has been hindered in the effective exercise of his right of petition under Article 25 of the Convention .
(TRADUCTION ) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ressortent du dossier, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : 1 . Le reauÃ©rant est un resso rt issant allemand . nÃ© en 1927 . Au moment de l'introduction de la requÃªte, il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu Ã Cologne Ã la suite de poursuites pÃ©nales liÃ©es Ã sa mise en faillite . AprÃ¨s avoir Ã©tÃ© un temps en libertÃ©, il purge actuellement le reste de sa peine Ã la prison de Remscheid .
2 . La Commission a rejetÃ© le 10 octobre 1980, pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement, une prÃ©cÃ©dente requÃªte nÂ° 8610/79 concernant la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure de faillite . Une autre requÃªte n' 9314/81 concernant certaines actions engagÃ©es devant les tribunaux civils par le requÃ©rant en liaison avec cette procÃ©dure de faillite a Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©e le 7 dÃ©cembre 1982 . La prÃ©sente requÃªte concerne exclusivement les poursuites pÃ©nales engagÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant et la dÃ©tention qu'il a subie de ce chef . DÃ©roulement de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale 3 . Le requÃ©rant, propriÃ©taire d'une entreprise Ã Cologne, avait des relations d'affaires avec une autre entreprise qui fournissait Ã crÃ©dit Ã des clients Ã©conomiquement faibles des sites et des matÃ©riaux de construction, la sociÃ©tÃ© Eckle . Selon ses propres dÃ©clarations, le requÃ©rant a consenti des prÃªts Ã la sociÃ©tÃ© Eckle pour un montant total de 3 millions de DM . Les moyens lui en ont Ã©tÃ© fournis par sa banque, qui a son tour a reÃ§u des garanties hypothÃ©caires sur le patrimoine immobilier de la sociÃ©tÃ© du requÃ©rant . D'autre part, ce dernier reÃ§ut des garanties de la sociÃ©tÃ© Eckle sous forme de lettres de change tirÃ©es sur les acheteurs immobiliers de cette sociÃ©tÃ© (pour une valeur totale de 60 millions de DM) . Une partie de ces lettres de change (2,8 millions de DM) a Ã©tÃ© remise en garantie par le requÃ©rant Ã la sociÃ©tÃ© BGE, qui louait une partie de ses locaux commerciaux et en avait acquittÃ© le loyer d'avance pour cinq ans (475 .000 DM) . Ces revenus locatifs, les hypothÃ¨ques dont le requÃ©rant avait grevÃ© une autre parcelle appartenant Ã sa sociÃ©tÃ© (815 .000 DM) et enfin la moitiÃ© des lettres de change prÃ©citÃ©es (d'une valeur de 30 millions de DM) furent cÃ©dÃ©s par le requÃ©rant Ã une sociÃ©tÃ© fiduciaire implantÃ©e au Liechtenstein (qui serait en fait, d'aprÃ¨s le Gouvernement, sous le contrÃ´le du requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme) . 4 . En 1967, des poursuites pÃ©nales furent engagÃ©es contre H . et M . Eckle du chef de faillite frauduleuse (cf . requÃªte nÂ° 8130/78) . En liaison avec ces poursuites . l'entreprise du requÃ©rant fit l'objet le 20 juillet 1967 d'une perquisition au cours de laquelle furent saisis de nombreux documents, notamment une partie des lettres de change susdites . Le parquet estima que le requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait pas habilitÃ© Ã conserver ces garanties : il prÃ©sumait en effet que le prÃªt avait dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© remboursÃ© au requÃ©rant lors d'une transaction clandestine conclue avec ses associÃ©s au Liechtenstein . Le requÃ©rant, qui a toujours niÃ© ce remboursement, n'est pas rentrÃ© en possession desdits documents, mÃ©me aprÃ¨s l'arrÃªt des poursuites pÃ©nales contre les Eckle en 1977 . En effet, les documents ne lui ont Ã©tÃ© renvoyÃ©s qu'aprÃ¨s sa sortie de prison le 25 mars 1981 . Sa rÃ©incarcÃ©ration survenue le 1â¢' octobre 1981 est liÃ©e Ã de nouvelles accusations pÃ©nales portÃ©es contre lui Ã propos des tentatives faites pour utiliser ces lettres de change . Une nouvelle perquisition eut lieu en janvier 1968 et en fÃ©vrier fut ordonnÃ©e la saisie de certains de ses avoirs bancaires . Selon le Gouvernement - 175 -
ces mesures ont Ã©tÃ© prises parce que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait soupÃ§onnÃ© de complicitÃ© avec Eckle . 5 . Selon le requÃ©rant, c'est prÃ©cisÃ©ment la saisie de ses valeurs qui l'entraina dans des difficultÃ©s financiÃ¨res en 1968 . Le Gouvernement soutient quant Ã lui que ces difficultÃ©s ne sont survenues qu'en raison du projet, prÃ©mÃ©ditÃ© par le requÃ©rant, de transfÃ©rer ses avoirs Ã l'Ã©tranger au dÃ©triment de ses crÃ©anciers . Quoi qu'il en soit, il est clair que, depuis l'Ã©tÃ© 1968, le requÃ©rant n'a pas honorÃ© certaines de ses dettes et qu'en septembre, il a liquidÃ© sa sociÃ©tÃ© . Comme la banque n'avait pas perÃ§u les annuitÃ©s de son prÃªt, elle a finalement demandÃ© la vente aux enchÃ¨res de l'immeuble commercial sur lequel elle avait des hypothÃ¨ques . Cette vente eut lieu le 13 dÃ©cembre 1968 mais ne rapporta que 3,2 millions de DM (alors que l'ensemble Ã©tait estimÃ© Ã une valeur bien plus Ã©levÃ©e, sans doute aux environs de 5 millions) . La consÃ©quence fut que les crÃ©anciers venant immÃ©diatement aprÃ¨s la banque ne purent pas Ãªtre satisfaits et que le requÃ©rant fut dÃ©clarÃ© dÃ©finitivement insolvable . En janvier 1969, le fisc demanda l'ouverture d'une procÃ©dure de faillite qui au moment du dÃ©pÃ´t de la prÃ©sente requÃ©te Ã©tait toujours pendante (cf . requÃªte nÂ° 8610/68) . La procÃ©dure fut clÃ´turÃ©e le 5 octobre 1981 . 6 . Le requÃ©rant fut alors Ã son tour soupÃ§onnÃ© de faillite frauduleuse, de fraude fiscale et d'autres infractions pÃ©nales . La procÃ©dure le concernant fut disjointe de l'affaire Eckle le 13 dÃ©cembre 1968 . Un nouveau mandat de perquisition fut lancÃ© contre le requÃ©rant par le tribunal du district de Cologne le 17 dÃ©cembre 1968, ainsi qu'un mandat d'arrÃªt dÃ©cernÃ© par cette juridiction . L'intÃ©ressÃ© fut arrÃªtÃ© le 18 dÃ©cembre 1968 au 24 avril 1970, date du premier jugement rendu par le tribunal rÃ©gional de Cologne dans cette affaire . Le procÃ¨s, d'abord prÃ©vu pour janvier 1970, dut Ãªtre rÃ©pÃ©tÃ© en mars et avril 1970 aprÃ¨s changement de l'avocat de la dÃ©fense . 7 . Le tribunal ne reconnut le requÃ©rant coupable que du dÃ©lit de faux, Ã savoir de certaines inscriptions portÃ©es sur les lettres de change en blanc reÃ§ues de la sociÃ©tÃ© Eckle et qu'il adressa sans autorisation Ã la sociÃ©tÃ© BGE (laquelle tenta d'utiliser les titres ainsi remis) et Ã ses associÃ©s au Liechtenstein avec qui il envisageait de rÃ©aliser les crÃ©ances Ã l'origine des lettres de change en profitant du caractÃ¨re abstrait de ces effets . Le requÃ©rant se vit donc infliger de ce chef une peine de onze mois de prison, que le juge estima purgÃ©e par la pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . 8 . Le requÃ©rant fut en mÃªme temps acquittÃ© sur les autres chefs d'accusation, dont les accusations d'escroqueries au dÃ©triment de la sociÃ©tÃ© BGE (le tribunal n'estima pas Ã©tabli que le requÃ©rant avait agi de mauvaise foi dans la conclusion du bail de cinq ans, autrement dit qu'il Ã©tait au courant de la vente aux enchÃ¨res imminente de ses locaux commerciaux), les allÃ©gations de vol ou de recel (le tribunal n'estima pas prouvÃ© que le requÃ©rant s'Ã©tait procurÃ© de la sorte les lettres de change de la sociÃ©tÃ© Eckle) et de faillite frauduleuse su r
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deux chefs (le tribunal n'estima pas Ã©tabli que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas honorÃ© les dettes exigibles vis-Ã -vis de ses crÃ©anciers sociaux, aussi ne jugea-t-il pas nÃ©cessaire d'examiner les allÃ©gations de transfert par le requÃ©rant au Liechtenstein des avoirs de sa sociÃ©tÃ© dans l'intention de nuire Ã ses crÃ©anciers ; quant Ã l'accusation de faBlite frauduleuse au dÃ©triment des crÃ©anciers privÃ©s, le tribunal estima qu'il y avait litige sur les prÃ©tentions desdits crÃ©anciers et que l'accusation n'avait pas prouvÃ© l'existence d'actes de faillite frauduleuse) . 9 . La procÃ©dure concernant les accusations de fraude fiscale fut ajoumÃ©e en attendant l'issue de la procÃ©dure sur les impÃ´ts . 10 . Le requÃ©rant et l'accusation firent tous deux appel du jugement ci-dessus et la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice examina l'affaire le 24 novembre 1971 . La Cour dÃ©bouta le requÃ©rant, dont la condamnation pour faux devint donc dÃ©finitive . Par contre, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale fit droit Ã l'appel formÃ© par l'accusation contre l'acquittement du requÃ©rant sur les chefs d'escroquerie et de faillite frauduleuse . L'affaire fut renvoyÃ©e pour ces questions Ã une autre chambre du tribunal rÃ©gional, Ã charge pour elle de tenir compte de l'argumentation juridique dÃ©taillÃ©e fournie par la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale . 11 . L'accusation avait Ã©galement fait appel contre l'ajournement par le tribunal rÃ©gional des poursuites pour fraude fiscale . La Cour d'appel de Cologne fit droit Ã cet appel le 15 mars 1972 . Le 21 mars 1973, la chambre du tribunal rÃ©gional saisie de cette partie de l'affaire renvoya le dossier Ã la chambre traitant des poursuites renouvelÃ©es pour escroquerie et faillite frauduteuse . Cette derniÃ¨re instance dÃ©cida le 23 mars 1975 la jonction des deux volets de la procÃ©dure . 12 . Le procÃ¨s dura 119 jours, du 2 septembre 1976 au 13 janvier 1978 . Le requÃ©rant fut une nouvelle fois arrÃ©tÃ© pendant le procÃ¨s le 28 juillet 1977 et demeura en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive jusqu'au 25 mars 1981 . 13 . Le 13 janvier 1978, le tribunal rÃ©gional de Cologne dÃ©clara le requÃ©rant coupable de fraude fiscale sur deux chefs et de tentative de fraude fiscale, d'escroquerie et de faillite frauduleuse sur trois chefs . Il l'acquitta pour le reste . Le requÃ©rant se vit infliger une peine de sept ans et demi de prison . a . Le tribunal estima que le requÃ©rant avait fait au fisc des dÃ©clarations incomplÃ¨tes pour 1963 et 1964, commettant ainsi deux dÃ©lits de fraude fiscale . Par contre, le fait de n'avoir pas dÃ©clarÃ© certains bÃ©nÃ©fices dGs Ã la spÃ©culation en 1966 n'avait pas causÃ© de prÃ©judice Ã l'Etat, puisque l'impÃ´t avait Ã©tÃ© fixÃ© sur la base des enquÃªtes effectuÃ©es par le fisc lui-mÃªme . Cette omission ne constituait donc qu'une infraction de tentative de fraude fiscale . b . Le tribunal estima en outre le requÃ©rant coupable d'escroquerie au dÃ©triment de la sociÃ©tÃ© BGE, du fait qu'il avait omis, en renouvelant le bail de cinq ans, d'informer cette sociÃ©tÃ© de la vente aux enchÃ¨res imminente des locaux . - 177 -
c . Quant aux accusations de faillite frauduleuse, le tribunal estima devoir apprÃ©cier l'ensemble du comuortement du requÃ©rant avant sa faillite dans la mesure oÃ¹ cela constituait naturellement un tout, mÃªme si l'acte d'accusation n'englobait pas tous les Ã©lÃ©ments pertinents . Compte tenu des amendements apportÃ©s aux dispositions lÃ©gales sur la faillite frauduleuse, il fallait Ã©tablir que les conditions prÃ©vues par la loi antÃ©rieure (par. 239 de la loi sur la failGte) et celles de la lÃ©gislation nouvelle (par . 283 du Code pÃ©nal) Ã©taient rÃ©unies les unes et les autres . Le tribunal estima que tel Ã©tait le cas puisque, depuis 1964 dÃ©jÃ , le requÃ©rant avait sorti les valeurs de son entreprise pour les transfÃ©rer au Liechtenstein, sachant que sa sociÃ©tÃ© Ã Cologne allait prochainement Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e insolvable et avec l'intention de nuire Ã ses crÃ©anciers . Le requÃ©rant Ã©tant lui-mÃªme, par les actions susdites, Ã l'origine de l'insolvabilitÃ© de sa sociÃ©tÃ©, le tribunal estima que l'infraction de faillite frauduleuse Ã©tait donc constituÃ©e au regard de l'article 283, paragraphe 2 du Code pÃ©nal . Le tribunal estima Ã©galement que les transferts au Liechtenstein des revenus locatifs en 1968 et de la somme forfaitaire reÃ§ue de la sociÃ©tÃ© BGE pour le renouvellement du contrat de bail constituaient deux autres infractions au regard de l'article 283, paragraphe 1 du Code pÃ©nal (soustraction de biens avant mise en faillite imminente) . d . Le requÃ©rant fut cependant acquittÃ© du chef de faillite frauduleuse pour ce qui concerne ses biens personnels . Le tribunal constata certes qu'il avait transfÃ©rÃ© certains biens au Liechtenstein au cours de l'annÃ©e 1968, mais estima qu'il possÃ©dait au moins 2,8 miBions de DM au Liechtenstein alors que ses dettes privÃ©es n'atteignaient que 2,2 millions . Il n'Ã©tait donc pas insolvable, mais seulement peu enclin Ã payer ses dettes, ce qui Ã©tait insuffisant pour le reconnaitre coupable de faillite frauduleuse . Dans la mesure ou le requÃ©rant avait Ã©tÃ© inculpÃ© d'une infraction supplÃ©mentaire de banqueroute pour avoir grevÃ© ses biens d'hypothÃ¨ques qu'il avait transfÃ©rÃ©es au Liechtenstein, le tribunal estima que ces lettres hypothÃ©caires ne reprÃ©sentaient pas une valeur rÃ©elle que le syndic aurait pu rÃ©alisÃ©r dans la procÃ©dure de faillite . 14 . La peine globale de 7 ans et demi se composait des peines distinctes suivantes : - Trois ans et demi pour faillite frauduleuse selon l'article 283, paragraphe 2 du Code pÃ©nal, suite au transfert de valeurs au Liechtenstein dans les annÃ©es 1964 et 1965 . Le tribunal flit observer que la peine infligÃ©e aurait approchÃ© le maximum de cinq ans si le dÃ©lit n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© aussi ancien ; - Un an pour faillite frauduleuse au regard de l'article 283, du Code pÃ©nal en raison du transfert des revenus locatifs au Liechtenstein ; - Deux ans pour faillite frauduleuse selon l'article 283, paragraphe 1 du Code pÃ©nal en raison du transfert des cinq ans de loyer rÃ©clamÃ©s d'avance Ã la BGE : - 7X -
- Trois ans pour escroque rie au dÃ©t ri ment de la BGE (art . 263 du Code pÃ©nal) . - Pour fraude fiscale (art . 370 de la loi sur le fi sc) : trois ans pour fraude continue Ã l'impÃ´t sur les revenus des annÃ©es 1963 et 1964, six mois pour fraude Ã l'impÃ´t sur les sociÃ©tÃ©s en 1963, un an et demi pour tentative de fraide Ã l'impÃ´t sur les re venus en 1966 . Le tribunal a tenu compte des peines infligÃ©es au requÃ©rant dans d'autres affaires pÃ©nales (une amende de 1 000 DM pour diffamation, infligÃ©e par le tribunal rÃ©gional de Cologne en 1973, et une peine de trois mois de prison pour diffamation, aprÃ¨s condamnation prononcÃ©e par le tribunal de district de Cologne en 1975) ainsi que de certaines circonstances aggravantes d'une part (montant du prÃ©judice, acharnement dÃ©lictueux, collaboration dÃ©lictueuse avec la sociÃ©tÃ© Eckle et cruautÃ© Ã l'Ã©gard de ses associÃ©s) et attÃ©nuantes d'autre part (complexe de rÃ©crimination du requÃ©rant, faciGtÃ©s juridiques offertes par la lÃ©gislation du Liechtenstein, et notamment le fait que les infractions remontaient Ã 10 ou 15 ans plus tÃ´t et que deux trÃ¨s longs et trÃ¨s onÃ©reux procÃ¨s avaient Ã©tÃ© nÃ©cessaires pour Ã©tablir la culpabilitÃ© du requÃ©rant) . Le tribunal fusionna donc les peines distinctes susdites qui atteignaient au total treize ans, trois mois, deux semaines et vingt jours et pour les ramener Ã une peine globale de sept ans et demi (le minimum aurait Ã©tÃ© la peine distincte la plus lourde, soit trois ans et demi) . Le tribunal imputa sur la peine la pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention passÃ©e par le requÃ©rant comme prÃ©venu (Ã l'exclusion des I1 mois qu'il avait purgÃ©s comme partie de la peine prononcÃ©e le 24 avril 1970 et devenue dÃ©finitive) . Le tribunal rejeta une demande prÃ©sentÃ©e par l'accusation et tendant Ã prononcer en plus un internement Ã titre de mesure de sOretÃ© (Sicherungsverwahrung) . 15 . Sur la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure, le jugement contenait, Ã propos de considÃ©rations gÃ©nÃ©rales liÃ©es aux circonstances attÃ©nuantes, la dÃ©claration suivante : â¢ Le fait que l'accusÃ© ait dfi subir deux procÃ¨s, dont le dernier a durÃ© 119 jours, constitue pour lui une circonstance attÃ©nuante . Cette durÃ©e n'est pas imputable aux seules insuffisances de l'administration de l ajusticedonl'Ã©r ss auitenporsable,mi Ã©galement de l'exercice excessif que l'accusÃ© a fait de ses droits . Certes, le reproche a faire Ã l'accusÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard ne saurait se traduire dans le calcul de sa peine . Cependant, l'exceptionnel volume et la frÃ©quence des dÃ©clarations, demandes et interrogations des tÃ©moins suite Ã des dÃ©cisions librement prises par l'accusÃ© constituent pour le moins une explication de la durÃ©e du procÃ©s . . . . . 16 . Le requÃ©rant fit appel de ce jugement mais rencontra, en prÃ©parant son recours (ce qu'il prÃ©fÃ©ra faire lui-mÃªme au lieu de se fier Ã son dÃ©fenseur commis d'office) certaines difficultÃ©s pour se procurer les comptes rendu s - 179 -
d'audiences et d'aÃ¹tres documents . Comme il ne fit pas appel dans le dÃ©lai prescrit, il sollicita de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale une restitution de dÃ©lai . Cependant, la Cour rejeta sa demande pour tardivetÃ© puisqu'elle n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e dans les huit jours suivant la levÃ©e des obstacles . La dÃ©cision prise par la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale en ce sens le 13 fÃ©vrier 1980 fit l'objet d'un pourvoi constitutionnel, qu'un comitÃ© de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale rejeta le 24 avril 1980 . 17 . La Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale dÃ©cida Ã©galement le 13 fÃ©vrier 1980 de confirmer sur la plupart de ses points le jugement rendu par le tribunal rÃ©gional, mais annula cependant la condamnation du requÃ©rant dans la mesure oÃ¹ elle se fondait sur la faillite frauduleuse au regard de l'article 283, paragraphe 2 du Code pÃ©nal (voir paragraphe 13 (c) supra .) . A cet Ã©gard le non-lieu fut prononcÃ© au motif que le tribunal avait outrepassÃ© l'acte d'accusation . L'accusation n'avait de fait Ã©voquÃ© les transferts de biens du requÃ©rant en 1964 et 1965 qu'Ã propos des accusations de fraude fiscale . Or, le tribunal avait Ã©galement examinÃ© ces faits en liaison avec les accusations de faillite frauduleuse, en partant de l'idÃ©e que l'ensemble constituait naturellement un tout . Certes le tribunal devait tenir compte de l'unitÃ© d'action naturelle chez un accusÃ©, mais il n'Ã©tait pas possible de soutenir qu'en matiÃ¨re de transfert de biens par le requÃ©rant en 1964 et 1965 . l'unitÃ© naturelle avec ses postÃ©rieurs actes de faillite frauduleuse avait Ã©tÃ© Ã©tablie . En effet, non seulement un dÃ©lai considÃ©rable sÃ©parait ces deux Ã©vÃ©nements, mais ils n'Ã©taient que faiblement liÃ©s et ne pouvaient donc pas Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©s comme l'illustration d'un mÃ©me comportement . Vu l'abandon d'une partie de ces poursuites, il fallait donc rÃ©viser la peine . La Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale renvoya par consÃ©quent l'affaire au tribunal rÃ©gional pour que ce dernier fixe une nouvelle peine globale . 18 . Le requÃ©rant forma alors un pourvoi constitutionnel concernant la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Le pourvoi fut cependant rejetÃ© le 24 avril 1980 par un ComitÃ© de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale, qui se refuse Ã examiner le grief, estimant qu'il n'offrait pas suffisamment de chances d'aboutir. Sur la question prÃ©cise de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure, elle dÃ©clara que rien n'indiquait l'existence d'un dÃ©lai excessif imputable Ã une nÃ©gligence et contestable au regard de la Constitution (,,keine Anhaltspunkte fÃ¼r ein von Verfassungs wegen zu beanstandendes ilberlanges Verfahren, das nicht hinreichend gef6rdert wurde") . 19 . Le tribunal rÃ©gional dÃ©cida d'une nouvelle peine globale aprÃ¨s ses audiences des 19, 20 et 23 juin 1980 . La durÃ©e totale des peines restantes, prises sÃ©parÃ©ment, Ã©tait de neuf ans, six mois et 20jours, mais le tribunal ne pouvait pas infliger une peine globale excÃ©dant sept ans et demi telle qu'elle avait Ã©tÃ© fixÃ©e dans le prÃ©cÃ©dent jugement . La peine minimum Ã©tait de trois ans . Dans les limites fixÃ©es par la loi, le tribunal estima Ã six ans la durÃ©e convenable de la nouvelle peine globale . Pour parvenir Ã cette conclusion, il tient compte de s - 180 -
mÃªmes circonstances attÃ©nuantes et aggravantes que pour la prÃ©cÃ©dente peine . Il dÃ©clara Ã cet Ã©gard, pour ce qui concerne la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure : . En outre, il ne faut pas mÃ©connaitre le fait que la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale engagÃ©e contre l'accusÃ© a Ã©tÃ© anormalement longue . L'interruption trÃ¨s longue qu'a subie la procÃ©dure entre le jugement rendu par la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice le 24 novembre 1971 et l'ouverture du nouveau procÃ©s le 2 septembre 1976 est imputable exclusivement Ã l'administration judiciaire (Die Ursache fÃ¼r die unverhgltnismUssig lange Verfahrensunterbrechung . . . lag dabei ausschliesslich im justizinternen Bereich) . Cependant, le droit qu'a l'Etat d'infliger des sanctions dÃ©croit avec le temps qui s'Ã©coule depuis la commission des infractions pÃ©nales . . . . . 20 . Le requÃ©rant fit de nouveau appel Ã la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice, en prÃ©tendant notamment qu'il n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© suffisamment tenu compte de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure pour fixer la nouvelle peine globale . Par dÃ©cision du 13 mai 1981 . la Cour rejettera cependant l'appel pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . Elle dÃ©clara que la durÃ©e exceptionnellement longue de la procÃ©dure n'avait pas pour autant suscitÃ© d'obstacle processuel . Il en avait justement Ã©tÃ© tenu compte dans la fixation de la peine, en sorte que le droit Ã procÃ©dure rapide garantie au requÃ©rant par l'article 6 de la Convention avait Ã©tÃ© dÃ»ment respectÃ© . 21 . Le requÃ©rant forma alors un autre pourvoi constitutionnel portant notamment sur la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure . Ce pourvoi fut Ã©galement rejetÃ© le 24 juillet 1981 par un comitÃ© de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale . Celle-ci estima en effet que le pourvoi n'avait pas de chance d'aboutir puisqu'il avait suffisamment Ã©tÃ© tenu compte de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure pour fixer la peine .
La dÃ©tention du requÃ©ran t 22 . Comme indiquÃ© plus haut (par . 6), le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© placÃ© en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du 19 dÃ©cembre 1968 au 24 avril 1970, soit 16 mois et cinq jours . Les motifs indiquÃ©s en Ã©taient le risque de fuite du requÃ©rant et donc d'entraver au cours de la justice, notamment par collusion avec des tiers Ã l'Ã©tranger . Par dÃ©cision du 27 dÃ©cembre 1968, le tribunal rÃ©gional de Cologne confirma le bien-fondÃ© de ces motifs et prÃ©cisa que mÃªme une caution de 500 000 DM ne ferait que supprimer le risque de fuite, mais non celui de collusion . Le 13 janvier 1969, le tribunal du district de Cologne exprima l'avis qu'une caution (100 000 DM) ne prÃ©viendrait mÃªme pas le risque de fuite â¢ puisque le requÃ©rant avait transfÃ©rÃ© Ã l'Ã©tranger la totalitÃ© de ses biens, soit environ 3 millions de DM . . Par dÃ©cision complÃ©mentaire du 22 janvier 1969, le mÃªme tribunal suspendit le droit du requÃ©rant Ã recevoir des visites, une lettre adressÃ©e Ã ses partenaires commerciaux du Liechtenstein ayant Ã©tÃ© trouvÃ©e dans le sac Ã main de son Ã©pouse . Cette dÃ©cision fut confirmÃ©e par le tribunal rÃ©gional le 11 mars 1969, qui rejeta Ã©galement un grief concernant la dÃ©tentio n
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prolonguÃ©e du requÃ©rant . Le juge considÃ©ra les tentatives faites par le requÃ©rant pour influencer le tÃ©moin comme une raison de plus de maintenir l'intÃ©ressÃ© en dÃ©tention . Celui-ci fut finalement mis en libertÃ© Ã la date du premier jugement, la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive ayant durÃ© plus longtemps que la peine de onze mois prononcÃ©e par le tribunal . 23 . Le requÃ©rant fut arrÃªtÃ© une deuxiÃ©me fois, pendant son second procÃ©s, le 28 juillet 1977, le tribunal rÃ©gional de Cologne avait lancÃ© un mandat d'arrÃ©t contre lui le 18 juillet 1977, jour oÃ¹ au lieu de comparaÃ®tre Ã l'audience, le requÃ©rant avait adressÃ© pour excuser son absence un certificat d'un mÃ©decin gÃ©nÃ©raliste suisse . Le tribunal estima qu'en fait le requÃ©rant avait fui en Suisse et ne s'Ã©tait servi du certificat mÃ©dical que pour camoufler sa fuite . 11 avait indiquÃ© Ã un voisin qu'il passerait ses vacances en BaviÃ¨re mais tout portait Ã croire qu'il avait en rÃ©alitÃ© quittÃ© Cologne dans l'intention d'influencer des tÃ©moins au Liechtenstein . 24 . Le tribunal rÃ©gional rejeta le 25 juillet 1977 les objections formulÃ©es par le requÃ©rant contre le mandat de dÃ©pÃ´t susdit . Il avait fait procÃ©der en Suisse Ã une enquÃªte sur l'Ã©tat de santÃ© rÃ©el du requÃ©rant (notamment par des dÃ©clarations du gÃ©nÃ©raliste prÃ©citÃ©, faites avec le consentement du requÃ©rant) et constatÃ© qu'il n'Ã©tait absolument pas question qu'un voyage mette sa vie en danger ou soit impossible pour lui . Simplement, l'intÃ©ressÃ© ne devait pas conduire lui-mÃªme . Le tribunal en tira la conclusion qu'en rÃ©alitÃ© le requÃ©rant voulait empÃªcher la suite du procÃ¨s tout en Ã©vitant d'Ãªtre arrÃªtÃ© Ã son retour en Allemagne . 25 . A l'audience du 29 juillet 1977, le tribunal examina les nouvelles objections formulÃ©es par le requÃ©rant contre le mandat de dÃ©pÃ´t . qu'il confirma cependant pleinement . Les 9 et 12 aoÃ»t 1977, il rejeta les demandes d'annulation dudit mandat et la cour d'appel de Cologne confirma ces dÃ©cisions le S septembre 1977 . Le requÃ©rant forma contre cet arrÃªt un pourvoi constitutionnel qu'un comitÃ© de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale rejeta cependant le 14 dÃ©cembre 1977 . Le ComitÃ© estima que le pourvoi n'avait pas suffisamment de chance d'aboutir car il ne posait pour l'essentiel que des questions de bonne application du droit commun, que la Cour constitutionnelle ne pouvait pas vÃ©rifier . Il n'y avait pas apparence de violation des dispositions prÃ©cises du droit constitutionnel, notamment du droit d'Ãªtre entendu . 26 . Pendant la procÃ©dure d'appel qui suivit sa deuxiÃ¨me condamnation, le requÃ©rant contesta Ã nouveau le bien-fondÃ© de son maintien en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, en invoquant notamment certains documents Ã©mis par les autoritÃ©s du Liechtenstein . Le tribunal rÃ©gional estima cependant, par dÃ©cision du 2 janvier 1980 . que les motifs indiquÃ©s dans le mandat de dÃ©pÃ´t du 18 juillet 1977 et dans sa dÃ©cision du 25 juillet 1977 Ã©taient toujours valables . La cour d'appel confirma cette dÃ©cision le 11 janvier 1980 . Le pourvoi constitutionnel form Ã© - 182 -
par le requÃ©rant contre l'arrÃªt de la Cour fut rejetÃ© le 18 septembre 1980 par un comitÃ© de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale . 27 . AprÃ¨s le succÃ¨s partiel de l'appel formÃ© par le requÃ©rant (arrÃªt de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale en date du 13 fÃ©vrier 1980, cf . par . 17 supra), le tribunal rÃ©gional de Cologne dut examiner d'office si le maintien en dÃ©tention se justifiait encore . Par dÃ©cision du 26 mars 1980, il dÃ©clara que tel Ã©tait bien le cas puisque la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale avait confirmÃ© les condamnations emportant des peines pour un total de neuf ans et demi si on les prenait sÃ©parÃ©ment . On pouvait s'attendre Ã ce que, mÃªme aprÃ¨s l'annulation de la peine de trois ans et demi infligÃ©e pour faillite frauduleuse, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 283, par2graphe 2 du Code pÃ©nal, la nouvelle peine globale ne se situe pas en-deÃ§Ã de la premiÃ¨re pleine globale de sept ans et demi . MÃªme si la nouvelle peine globale devait Ãªtre plus courte et Ã supposer mÃªme que le requÃ©rant puisse Ãªtre libÃ©rÃ© aprÃ¨s en avoir purgÃ© les deux tiers (ce qui Ã©tait douteux en l'espÃ¨ce), il resterait une peine Ã purger et le requÃ©rant serait donc tentÃ© de fuir bien qu'il eÃ»t dÃ©jÃ passÃ© trois ans et deux mois en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . Le risque de fuite Ã©tait Ã©galement Ã prÃ©sumer en raison des dÃ©clarations rÃ©pÃ©tÃ©es du requÃ©rant qu'il se rendrait immÃ©diatement au Liechtenstein pour y rassembler certains Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve . Le tribunal dÃ©clara en outre que le maintien du requÃ©rant en dÃ©tention n'Ã©tait pas encore devenu disproportionnÃ© puisque, compte tenu de la personnalitÃ© du dÃ©tenu, des mesures moins rigoureuses ne suffisaient pas pour rÃ©pondre aux besoins des poursuites . 28 . La cour d'appel de Cologne rejeta le 21 avril 1980 l'appel formÃ© par le requÃ©rant contre cette dÃ©cision . Elle estima que le tribunal rÃ©gional avait justement prÃ©sumÃ© que le requÃ©rant devait s'attendre Ã une nouvelle peine globale dÃ©passant de plus d'un tiers la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention dÃ©jÃ purgÃ©e . Il Ã©tait juste aussi de prÃ©sumer le danger de fuite et de confirmer la permanence de la proportionnalitÃ© de la dÃ©tention, puisqu'aucun retard pouvant Ãªtre Ã©vitÃ© n'avait Ã©tÃ© enregistrÃ© dans la procÃ©dure de fixation dÃ©finitive de la peine . La cour d'appel confirma cette dÃ©cision les 2 et 11 juin 1980, en dÃ©pit de diverses objections soulevÃ©es par le requÃ©rant . 29 . AprÃ¨s avoir fixÃ© une nouvelle peine globale de six ans, le tribunal rÃ©gional de Cologne confirma, par jugement du 5 aoÃ»t 1980 . la nÃ©cessitÃ© de maintenir le requÃ©rant en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . Le 5 septembre 1982, la cour d'appel dÃ©bouta le requÃ©rant de son appel contre cette dÃ©cision . Elle dÃ©clara que l'intention de fuir ressortait clairement de diverses observations faites par le requÃ©rant au tribunal et que la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention Ã©tait toujours proportionnÃ©e . Le pourvoi constitutionnel formÃ© par le requÃ©rant contre cet arrÃªt fut examinÃ© en mÃªme temps que son prÃ©cÃ©dent pourvoi contre l'arrÃ©t rendu par la cour d'appel le 11 janvier 1980 . Un comitÃ© de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale rejeta le pourvoi le 18 septembre 1980 . 30 . D'autres dÃ©cisions confirmant le bien-fondÃ© du maintien du requÃ©rant en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive furent prises par la cour d'appel le 10 octobre, par l e
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tribunal rÃ©gional le 3 novembre et Ã nouveau par la cour d'appel les 28 novembre et 12 dÃ©cembre 1980 . Le requÃ©rant forma un pourvoi constitutionnel contre ces dÃ©cisions le 16 dÃ©cembre 1980 . 31 . Vers la fin de l'annÃ©e 1980 . le requÃ©rant formula trÃ¨s souvent . Ã propos de sa dÃ©tention, diverses plaintes dont certaines ne furent pas examinÃ©es, le magistrat prÃ©sidant la chambre du tribunal rÃ©gional les ayant estimÃ©es offensantes en raison de leur langage injurieux . Les dÃ©cisions prises en ce sens par le juge prÃ©sident le 4 dÃ©cembre 1980 furent cependant annulÃ©es par la cour d'appel le 9 janvier 1981 . 32 . Entre-temps . par ses dÃ©cisions des 10, 17 et 29 dÃ©cembre 1980, le tribunal rÃ©gional avait confirmÃ© le bien-fondÃ© du maintien en dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant . Le 23 janvier 1981 . la cour d'appel confirma ces dÃ©cisions . 33 . Le requÃ©rant demanda alors au tribunal rÃ©gional de rÃ©examiner ces diverses plaintes concernant sa dÃ©tention, notamment les restrictions qui en dÃ©coulaient et que, personnellement, il trouvait injustifiÃ©es, compte tenu de la prÃ©somption lÃ©gale d'innocence . Le tribunal rÃ©gional en traita dans une dÃ©cision du 12 fÃ©vrier 1981 et dÃ©clara que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas encore purgÃ© les deux tiers de la peine Ã escompter . Les restrictions imposÃ©es Ã©taient prÃ©vues par la loi et Ã©taient du reste moins Ã©prouvantes que s'il avait purgÃ© une peine dÃ©finitive . 11 n'Ã©tait pas question de mÃ©connaissance de la prÃ©somption d'innocence puisque les condamnations avaient dÃ©jÃ un caractÃ¨re dÃ©finitif, mÃªme si ce n'Ã©tait pas le cas de la peine. Si l'effet des restrictions imposÃ©es au requÃ©rant se trouvait certes augmentÃ© en raison de la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, il n'y avait pas lieu de rÃ©voquer pour autant le mandat de dÃ©pÃ´t . Aucun Ã©lÃ©ment nouveau pertinent ne venait justifier l'Ã©largissement du requÃ©rant dont, aux yeux de la cour, la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention n'Ã©tait pas encore disproportionnÃ©e . Cela aurait Ã©tÃ© le cas si le requÃ©rant avait purgÃ© les deux tiers de sa peine le 18 fÃ©vrier 1981, car il Ã©tait douteux, compte tenu de sa personnalitÃ©, qu'il remplit les conditions prÃ©vues par la loi pour une libÃ©ration conditionnelle . Il Ã©tait Ã redouter qu'il veuille Ã©chapper sinon au reste de peine Ã purger, du moins Ã la fin de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Or, c'est prÃ©cisÃ©ment le but de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive que de garantir l'achÃ¨vement de toute la procÃ©dure, y compris du procÃ¨s et de la procÃ©dure d'exÃ©cution de la peine . Si l'appel du requÃ©rant en instance devant la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale rÃ©ussissait et qu'il y ait en consÃ©quence un nouveau procÃ¨s, il serait juridiquement impossible de mener ce procÃ¨s en son absence . Aussi le tribunal estima-t-il justifiÃ© de maintenir le requÃ©rant en dÃ©tention . Le requÃ©rant ayant soulevÃ© des objections, le tribunal rÃ©gional confirma sa dÃ©cision les 23 et 25 fÃ©vrier 1981 . 34 . Le juge rapporteur de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale, se fondant sur le pou rvoi formÃ© par le requÃ©rant le 16 dÃ©cemb re 1981, voir par . 30 supra ) - 184 -
avait entre-temps adressÃ© une lettre au ministre de la Justice du Land de RhÃ©nanie du Nord-Westphalie pour lui demander s'il trouvait raisonnable de maintenir le requÃ©rant en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive alors qu'il avait purgÃ© les deux tiers de sa peine globale . En rÃ©action Ã cette demande, semble-t-il, la cour d'appel dÃ©cida le 25 mars 1981 qu'il n'Ã©tait plus possible de maintenir le mandat de dÃ©pÃ´t car la dÃ©cision de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice sur l'appel formÃ© contre la condamnation du 23 juin 1980 n'allait pas intervenir de sitÃ´t et l'intÃ©ressÃ© avait dÃ©jÃ purgÃ© plus des deux tien de sa peine . Dans ces conditions . il n'Ã©tait pas justifiÃ© de prÃ©sumer derechef un danger de fuite . Le requÃ©rant fut remis en libertÃ© le mÃ©me jour et quitta peu aprÃ¨s la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale en destination du Liechtenstein, aprÃ¨s avoir rÃ©cupÃ©rÃ© les documents saisis auprÃ¨s du syndic Ã qui la justification pÃ©nale les avait confiÃ©s en 1978 . 35 . Le requÃ©rant revint en RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne le 1 ` octobre 1981 pour chercher Ã u parquet de Cologne certains autres documents saisis en 1967 et 1968 . II eut avec le procureur une conversation sur l'action civile qÃ» il avait engagÃ©e entre-temps devant les tribunaux rÃ©gionaux de Siegburg et de Cologne afin de rÃ©aliser des crÃ©ances nÃ©es de lettres de change reÃ§ues autrefois de Eckle . A la fin de la conversation, il fut arrÃªtÃ© sur la base d'un mandat d'arrÃªt dÃ©cernÃ© par le parquet la veille dÃ©jÃ . Ce mandat d'arrÃªt avait pour but d'obliger le requÃ©rant Ã purger le reste de sa peine de six ans . Cette mesure avait Ã©tÃ© jugÃ©e nÃ©cessaire parce que la rÃ©alisation des crÃ©ances susdites constituait un nouveau comportement pÃ©nal, analogue Ã celui pour lequel l'intÃ©ressÃ© avait Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© en 1970 et parce qu'une nouvelle information pÃ©nale avait en consÃ©quence Ã©tÃ© ouverte contre lui . Telle fut l'explication donnÃ©e par le parquet dans une requÃªte adressÃ©e au tribunal rÃ©gional de Duisbourg, juridiction compÃ©tente pour l'exÃ©cution de la peine ; le parquet demandait de refuser au requÃ©rant le bÃ©nÃ©fice d'une libÃ©ration conditionnelle aprÃ¨s accomplissement des deux tiers de la peine, l'intÃ©ressÃ© ayant dÃ©jÃ purgÃ© ces deux tiers avant d'avoir Ã©tÃ© libÃ©rÃ© de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . 36 . Le tribunal rÃ©gional refusa, le 28 octobre 1981, comme le demandait le parquet, d'admettre le requÃ©rant au bÃ©nÃ©fice de la libÃ©ration conditionnelle . Il confirma l'opinion du parquet que l'intention du requÃ©rant de valider les lettres de change constituait un nouveau comportement pÃ©nal, auquel l'intÃ©ressÃ©, nullement dÃ©sireux de tirer les consÃ©quences de sa condamnation, voulait confÃ©rer une justification morale en prÃ©tendant avoir Ã©tÃ© victime d'une erreur judiciaire . Dans ces conditions, il Ã©tait exclu de pouvoir le libÃ©rer sous condition . Le requÃ©rant avait lui-mÃªme tentÃ© de recourir contre son arrestation , .37 mais il fut informÃ© par la cour d'appel de Hamm qu'un mandat d'arrÃªt ordonnant l'exÃ©cution d'une peine dÃ©finitive n'Ã©tait pas susceptible de recours . II demanda alors au tribunal rÃ©gional de considÃ©rer son recours comme une demande tendant Ã faire dÃ©clarer inacceptable l'exÃ©cution du reste de la pein e
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mais le tribunal rejeta la demande le 12 novembre 1981 . II fit notamment observer que la rÃ©vocation du mandat de dÃ©p6t de 1976 par la cour d'appel de Cologne (par . 34 ci-dessus) ne concemait que la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive et non la dÃ©tention aprÃ¨s condamnation et n'empÃªchait donc pas l'exÃ©cution de la peine . Les raisons invoquÃ©es par le requÃ©rant ne prouvent pas non plus le caractÃ¨re inacceptable de l'exÃ©cution de la peine . Il fallait certes, aprÃ©s accomplissement des deux tien de la peine, examiner la question de la libÃ©ration sous condition, mais cela avait dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© fait dans la dÃ©cision rendue par le tribunal le 28 octobre 1981 . Il Ã©tait justifiÃ© que le requÃ©rant se voie refuser la libÃ©ration sous condition puisqu'il Ã©tait allÃ© au Liechtenstein oÃ¹ il avait engagÃ© une action civi]e pour rÃ©aliser les crÃ©ances nÃ©es de lettres de change, comportement qui Ã©tait le prolongement de ses activitÃ©s dÃ©lictueuses . La dÃ©tention n'avait pas pour but de porter atteinte Ã cette action civile, qui pouvait du reste Ãªtre menÃ©e depuis la prison . 38 . Le requÃ©rant interjeta appel des deux jugements prÃ©cÃ©dents, mais l'appel concernant la dÃ©cision du 28 octobre 1981 fut rejetÃ© pour tardivitÃ© par la cour d'appel de Dusseldorf le 4 janvier 1982 . Celui formÃ© contre le jugement du 12 novembre 1981 fut rejetÃ© quant au fond par dÃ©cision du 13 janvier 1982 . La cour d'appel confirma dans son entier la dÃ©cision du tribunal rÃ©gional, relevant notamment que la mise en libertÃ© du requÃ©rant aprÃ¨s dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive n'Ã©quivalait nullement au bÃ©nÃ©fice d'une libÃ©ration sous condition et que l'accusation selon laquelle le parquet aurait agi pour des motifs fallacieux Ã©tait totalement dÃ©nuÃ©e de fondement . 39 . Le requÃ©rant forma alors un pourvoi constitutionnel en arguant notamment de violations de diverses dispositions de la Convention (articles 3, 5, 6 paragraphes 1, 2 et 3((a), (b), (c) et (d) . La Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale rejeta ce pourvoi par un arrÃªt du 3 fÃ©vrier 1982 . 40 . Le requÃ©rant se vit par la suite accorder une restitution de dÃ©lai dans la procÃ©dure d'appel contre le jugement rendu par le tribunal rÃ©gional le 28 octobre 1981, ceci par un arrÃªt de la cour d'appel de Dusseldorf en date du 25 mars 1982 . Par ce mÃªme arrÃªt, la cour d'appel rejetait l'appel pour dÃ©faut de fondement . Elle dÃ©clara ne pas pouvoir trancher la question de savoir si la nouvelle infortnation ouverte contre le requÃ©rant justifiait le refus de libÃ©ration conditionnelle . Ce refus Ã©tait par ailleurs justifiÃ©, le requÃ©rant Ã©tant, selon les termes mÃªmes du jugement, un dÃ©linquant qu'il Ã©tait totalement impossible d'impressionner . 41 . Le requÃ©rant forma derechef un pourvoi constitutionnel et introduisit aussi plusieurs recours hiÃ©rarchiques . Cependant, tous ces recours n'eurent aucun succÃ¨s : le pourvoi constitutionnel fut rejetÃ© pour irrecevabilitÃ© le 6 juillet 1982, au motif qu'il n'y avait pas apparence de violation d'une disposition de la Constitution . L'interprÃ©tation et l'application de la lÃ©gislation pÃ©nale relÃ¨vent exclusivement de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice . - 186 -
42 . Dans l'intervalle, le requÃ©rant avait demandÃ© l'interruption de l'exÃ©cution de sa peine, afin notamment de prÃ©parer sa rÃ©ponse aux observations du Gouvernement dans la prÃ©sente procÃ©dure . Cependant, aucune dÃ©cision ne fut prise Ã cet Ã©gard . Le 24 aoÃ»t 1982, le requÃ©rant fut informÃ© qu'il serait transfÃ©rÃ© Ã Cologne pour un examen psychiatrique mais, aprÃ¨s une conversation tÃ©lÃ©phonique avec le psychiatre, le transfert n'eut pas lieu . Le requÃ©rant demanda alors Ã Ãªtre dispensÃ© de l'obligation de travailler en prison afin de disposer de plus de temps pour achever la rÃ©daction de ses observations Ã la Commission, ce qui lui fut refusÃ© . Le 27 aoÃ»t 1982, le directeur du parquet informa le requÃ©rant qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de le libÃ©rer par voie de grÃ¢ce comme il l'avait demandÃ© (le requÃ©rant nie avoir formulÃ© une telle demande), et que l'exÃ©cution de sa peine emportait nÃ©cessairement une limitation Ã sa libertÃ© personnelle qu'il devait accepter mÃªme pour ce qui Ã©tait de la procÃ©dure devant la Commission . Il n'Ã©tait pas Ã©vident d'ailleurs que seule une interruption de la dÃ©tention lui aurait permis de prÃ©parer les observations demandÃ©e par la Commission .
Griefs 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint tout d'abord de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale le concernant (14 ans depuis 1967), durÃ©e qu'il estime contraire Ã l'article 6 . paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Il prÃ©tend Ã cet Ã©gard que la peine globale qui lui a Ã©tÃ© infligÃ©e n'a pas suffisamment tenu compte de cette durÃ©e . Selon lui, il aurait dÃ» y avoir abandon des poursuites en raison de la durÃ©e excessive de la procÃ©dure . 2 . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©galement formulÃ© plusieurs griefs relatifs au dÃ©roulement de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Notamment, le juge aurait irrÃ©guliÃ¨rement tenu compte de certains Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve reÃ§us des autoritÃ©s du Liechtenstein bien que ces mÃªmes autoritÃ©s aient refusÃ© l'entraide judiciaire aux tribunaux allemands . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en outre que le magistrat du parquet qui a traitÃ© l'affaire Ã©tait une personne contre qui le requÃ©rant avait lui-mÃªme tentÃ© d'engager des poursuites pÃ©nales et que l'avocat qu'on lui avait dÃ©signÃ© d'office dÃ©fendait par ailleurs les intÃ©rÃªts de ses enfants dans une action en responsabilitÃ© intentÃ©e contre l'Etat aprÃ¨s saisie des valeurs auprÃ¨s de sa sociÃ©tÃ© (dans laquelle les enfants semblaient avoir une participation) . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en outre du caractÃ¨re inÃ©quitable de la procÃ©dure, bien des demandes formulÃ©es pendant le procÃ¨s n'ayant Ã©tÃ© examinÃ©es qu'Ã la fin de celui-ci car le juge aurait d'abord pensÃ© que l'intÃ©ressÃ© ne serait peut-Ã©tre pas en mesure de plaider . Or, il a rejetÃ© 836 demandes le 116' jour du procÃ¨s, aprÃ¨s qu'une expertise psychiatrique eut montrÃ© qu'en rÃ©alitÃ© le requÃ©rant Ã©tait apte Ã dÃ©fendre sa cause . Le requÃ©rant soutient au surplus que la procÃ©dure d'appel n'a pas Ã©tÃ© Ã©quitable puisqu'il n'a pas disposÃ© d'emblÃ©e de la documentation nÃ©cessair e
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pour prÃ©parer l'appel et que sa demande ultÃ©rieure tendant Ã une restitution du dÃ©lai d'appel a Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©e . Selon lui, cela a eu pour effet d'amener la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale Ã rejeter l'appel sur la plupart des chefs dans son arrÃ©t du 13 fÃ©vrier 1980 . Selon le requÃ©rant, il y a donc eu mÃ©connaissance de son droit Ã se dÃ©fendre Iui-mÃªme (article 6, paragraphe 3 (c), de la Convention) et Ã©galement privation du droit Ã un recours effectif devant une instance nationale (article 13) . 3 . En ce qui conceme la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, le requÃ©rant se plaint d'abord qu'elle n'Ã©tait pas justifiÃ©e et qu'ensuite sa durÃ©e a Ã©tÃ© excessive et contraire Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 3 . de la Convention . fx tribunal aurait usÃ© de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive comme d'un moyen d'exÃ©cuter la peine coÃ»te que coÃ»te alors que cette derniÃ¨re n'avait pas encore acquis un caractÃ¨re dÃ©finitif . Selon le requÃ©rant les inconvÃ©nients qui en sont rÃ©sultÃ©s Ã©taient hors de proportion avec l'infraction sanctionnÃ©e . Il rÃ©clame une rÃ©paration pour dÃ©tention injustifiÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 5 . paragraphe 5, de la Convention . Il a Ã cet Ã©gard prÃ©sentÃ© une demande d'aide judiciaire au tribunal compÃ©tent qui a ajournÃ© sa dÃ©cision en attendant l'issue de la procÃ©dure d'appel devant la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice et celle de la prÃ©sente procÃ©dure devant la Commission . 4 . Dans ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ©, le requÃ©rant a formulÃ© divers griefs nouveaux relatifs Ã son arrestation et Ã sa dÃ©tention depuis le lef octobre 1981 . Selon lui, cette dÃ©tention serait injustifiÃ©e et contraire aux articles 3 et 5 de la Convention et la procÃ©dure y affÃ©rente aurait contrevenu Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 4, et Ã l'article 6, paragraphes 1, 2, 3 .a Ã d . 5 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint enfin d'une entrave de la part des autoritÃ©s nationales Ã l'exercice de son droit de recours individuel, que lui confÃ¨re l'article 25 de la Convention, ses documents lui ayant Ã©tÃ© enlevÃ©s Ã un moment oÃ¹ il en avait besoin pour prÃ©parer la prÃ©sente requÃªte et le tribunal ayant refusÃ© de lui remettre copies des jugements demandÃ©s par le SecrÃ©tariat de la Commission . Certaines de ces dÃ©cisions ont Ã©tÃ© ultÃ©rieurement adressÃ©es Ã la Commission par le prÃ©sident du tribunal . Le requÃ©rant soutient qu'une autre entrave Ã l'exercice des droits que lui garantit l'article 25 s'est produite aprÃ¨s qu'il eut reÃ§u les observations du Gouvernement sur la prÃ©sente requÃªte ; en effet, il n'a Ã©tÃ© ni mis en libertÃ© ni dispensÃ© de son obligation de travailler en prison et il n'a pas pu disposer dans sa cellule des documents qu'il souhaitait consulter . Au contraire, les autoritÃ©s ont mÃªme tentÃ© de le faire disparaitre dans un hÃ´pital psychiatrique .
EN DROIT 1 . La prÃ©sente affaire ne po rt e que sur les griefs formulÃ©s par le requÃ©rant au sujet du dÃ©roulement de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre lui et de l a
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dÃ©tention qui y est liÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©voquÃ© diverses autres procÃ©dures (action en responsabilitÃ© contre l'Etat . actions civiles contre diverses personnes, demandes de poursuites pÃ©nales contre divers fonctionnaires, demandes de rÃ©ouverture de son procÃ¨s pÃ©nal), mais la Commission relÃ¨ve qu'il n'a prÃ©sentÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard aucun grief formel et estime en consÃ©quence n'Ãªtre pas appelÃ©e Ã examiner ces questions dans le contexte de la prÃ©sente requÃªte . 2 . En ce qui concerne le grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel c'est Ã tort qu'il aurait Ã©tÃ© reconnu coupable et condamnÃ©, la Commission rappelle qu'elle a pour seule tÃ¢che, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 1 9 de la Convention, d'assurer le respect des engagements rÃ©sultant de la Convention pour les Parties contractantes . En particulier, elle n'est pas compÃ©tente pour examiner une requÃªte relative Ã des erreurs de fait ou de droit prÃ©tendÃ»ment commises par les juridictions internes, sauf si et dans la mesure oÃ¹ ces erreurs lui semblent susceptibles d'avoir entraÃ®nÃ© une atteinte aux droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention . La Commission renvoie sur ce point Ã sa jurisprudence constante (Cf . par exentple les dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃªtes nÂ° 458/59) Annuaire 111, pp . 223-233 et nÂ° 1140/61 . Recueil nÂ° 8, pp . 57, 62) . 3 . En l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant se plaint Ã©galement, il est vrai, d'une violation des garanties de procÃ©dure prÃ©vues Ã l'article 6 . paragraphe 1, de la Convention, et Ã cet Ã©gard, la Commission a compÃ©tence pour examiner les griefs du requÃ©rant . Cependant, il faut faire la distinction entre les griefs relatifs au respect des principes d'Ã©quitÃ© du procÃ¨s et les autres griefs qui concernent la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure . 4 . Les griefs relatifs Ã l'Ã©quitÃ© du procÃ¨s doivent Ã©tre examinÃ©s sÃ©parÃ©ment pour chacune des phases principales de la procÃ©dure . a . Les premiÃ¨re condamnation du requÃ©rant en 1970 et la peine correspondantes sont passÃ©es en force de chose jugÃ©e en 1971 ; l'intÃ©ressÃ© aurait donc dÃ» s'adresser Ã la Commission Ã cette Ã©poque s'il souhaitait se pleindre d'une violation de ses droits . Puisqu'il ne l'a pas fait dans le dÃ©lai de six mois prÃ©vu Ã l'article 26, le requÃªte soit, sur ce point, Ãªtre rejetÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . b . Pour la procÃ©dure ultÃ©rieure, qui a pris fin avec l'arrÃ©t rendu le 13 fÃ©vrier 1980 par la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale, par lequel la condamnation du requÃ©rant pour diverses entres infractions est passÃ©e en force de chose jugÃ©e, le requÃ©rant a dÃ©posÃ© un pourvoi constitutionnel et respectÃ© le dÃ©lai de six mois . Cependant, pour ce qui est de ses griefs particuliers, il a nÃ©anmoins omis d'Ã©puiser les recours internes selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus, qui exigent le respect des dÃ©lais et des conditions formelles prÃ©vues par le droit interne . En effet, l'appel interjetÃ© par le requÃ©rant contre les prÃ©tendus vices de forme du (second) procÃ¨s (comportant notamment l'allÃ©gation d'une clarification insuffisante des faits survenus au Liechtenstein) a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©posÃ© en dehors des dÃ©lais et donc ignorÃ© par la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de Justice, qui a constatÃ© que les conditions prÃ©vues par la loi pour accorder au requÃ©ran t
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une restitution de dÃ©lai n'Ã©taient pas rÃ©unies . Dans ces conditions, le requÃ©rant n'a pas obse rvÃ© les exigences de l'a rt icle 26 et la requÃªte doit, sur ce point encore, Ãªtre rejetÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . c . Pour ce qui est enfin de la derniÃ¨re phase de la procÃ©du re comportant fixation de la peine dÃ©finitive, la Commission relÃ¨ve que le requÃ©rant n'a pas fait valoir que cette procÃ©dure aurait Ã©tÃ© contraire aux p ri ncipes du procÃ¨s Ã©quitable . 5 . En ce qui conceme les g riefs du requÃ©rant portant sur la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure, la Commission relÃ¨ve en p re mier lieu l'argument du Gouveroement selon lequel il faut, Ã cet Ã©gard aussi, procÃ©der Ã l'examen sÃ©parÃ© de chaque phase de la procÃ©dure . La Commission ne sousc ri t Ã cet argument que dans la mesure oÃ¹, vu l'expiration du dÃ©lai de six mois, il n'est plus possible d'examiner en tant que telle la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure ayant abouti Ã la premiÃ¨re condamnation et Ã la premiÃ¨re peine prononcÃ©es dÃ©finitivement contre le requÃ©rant . Cependant, cela ne signifie pas que cette mÃªme pÃ© ri ode ne puisse pas Ãªtre prise en considÃ©ration comme une partie du temps qu'il a fallu pour statuer sur les autres chefs d'accusation dont le requÃ©rant fut alors acquittÃ© mais qui ont Ã©tÃ© rep ris en raison de l'issue favorable de l'appel fonnÃ© par le parquet . Il faut, pour chaque cas, remonter le fil de ces accusations jusqu'au moment oÃ¹ elles ont commencÃ© Ã affecter la situation du requÃ©rant . Il se peut que les infractions fiscales ne soient appames que le 19 dÃ©cembre 1968, date de l'arrestation du re quÃ©rant sur la base d'un mandat liÃ© Ã ces infractions . Cependant, les autres chefs d'accusation Ã© taient apparemment rep ri s des poursuites contre Eckle, dont ils ont Ã©tÃ© disjoints le 1 3 dÃ©cembre 1968 . Vu la minceur de la documentation fournie sur la premiÃ¨re phase de la procÃ©du re , la Commission ne peut pas dÃ©terminer avec prÃ©cision dans quelle mesure chacune de ces accusations est liÃ©e Ã la perquisition du 20 juillet 1967 . La perquisition ayant abouti Ã la saisie de titres que le requÃ©rant avait obtenus de la sociÃ©tÃ© Eckle et la question de l'utilisation de ces titres ayant toujours en fait constituÃ© une donnÃ©e p ri ncipale de la procÃ©dure tout au long des phases ultÃ© ri eures, il n'est pas dÃ©raisonnable d'admettre que ce tte procÃ©du re a en rÃ©alitÃ© commencÃ© le jour de la perquisition . La Commission ne saurait donc exclu re que certaines des accusations sur lesquelles le requÃ©rant se plaint qu'il ait Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© tardivement remontant au 20 juillet 1967 . alors que d'autres ne l'ont pas affectÃ© avant sa premiÃ¨ re arrestation le 19 dÃ©cembre 1968 .
6 . Pour ce qui concerne la fin de la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration au regard de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, la Commission doit distinguer entre les accusations dont le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© acquittÃ© le 13 janvier 1978 et celles pour lesquelles il a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© Ã cette mÃªme date . Comme les acquittements n'ont pas fait l'objet de la procÃ©dure d'appel, la date finale les concernant est le 13 janvier 1978 . Quant aux condamnations, elles ont en fait Ã©tÃ© contestÃ©es par le requÃ©rant en appel et la procÃ©dure y affÃ©rente n'a pris fin que le 1 3 mai 1981, date de la confirmation par la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice de la nouvelle peine globale (cf . paragraphe 77 de l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cou r
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europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire Eckle) . La durÃ©e totale de la procÃ©dure a donc Ã©tÃ© de 13 ans et 10 mois, de juillet 1967 Ã mai 1981 . En rÃ©alitÃ©, il a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ© du bien-fondÃ© de certaines accusations dans un dÃ©lai plus bref, mais le laps de temps minimum pendant lequel la totalitÃ© des accusations est demeurÃ©e pendante reste de neuf ans et un mois, de dÃ©cembre 1968 Ã janvier 1978 . La Commission estime que, dans ces conditions, se pose manifestement la question de savoir si le droit du requÃ©rant Ã faire entendre sa cause dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable a Ã©tÃ© respectÃ© . 7 . Le Gouvernement a fait valoir que le requÃ©rant ne peut plus se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de ce droit, puisque la durÃ©e excessive de la procÃ©dure a Ã©tÃ© admise par les tribunaux allemands eux-mÃªmes et compensÃ©e par une rÃ©duction de la peine . La Commission relÃ¨ve cependant le grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel la rÃ©duction de la peine a Ã©tÃ© insuffisante . Ce grief n'Ã©chappant pas en tant que tel Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1, (cf . la dÃ©cision de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© nÂ° 8182/78), il faut rechercher si le requÃ©rant a obtenu en rÃ©alitÃ© une rÃ©paration adÃ©quate . Eu Ã©gard aux principes fixÃ©s par la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'arrÃªt Eckle du 15 juillet 1982 (cf . notamment les paragraphes 69-70, 87 et 94), la Commission estime qu'il existe tout au moins certains doutes Ã cet Ã©gard . En effet, les tribunaux ont traitÃ© de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure sans Ã©tablir expressÃ©ment une violation de l'article 6, paragraphe l, et invoquÃ© le principe de la rÃ©duction de la peine sans en prÃ©ciser les ntodalitÃ©s d'application aux diverses peines, sÃ©parÃ©es et globale . II va sans dire qu'une rÃ©paration effective exige plus qu'une simple dÃ©claration . Seule, une rÃ©duction rÃ©elle et mesurable de la peine, imputable expressÃ©ment Ã la durÃ©e excessive de la procÃ©dure, peut servir de motif pour dÃ©nier au requÃ©rant l'intÃ©rÃªt Ã agir devant les organes de la Convention . En l'espÃ¨ce, la situation n'Ã©tant pas du tout claire Ã cet Ã©gard, rien ne pennet de dÃ©clarer le grief du requÃ©rant incompatible avec les dispositions de la Convention au motif que son auteur ne pourrait plus se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation .
8 . La Commission estime en outre que le grief du requÃ©rant ne saurait Ãªtre rejetÃ© non plus comme manifestement mal fondÃ© . Elle a pris acte d'une part des explications du Gouvernement quant aux raisons de la durÃ©e anormale de la procÃ©dure en l'espÃ¨ce et d'autre part des arguments du requÃ©rant pour les rÃ©futer . Tout bien pesÃ©, la Commission estime qu'il n'est pas indiscutablement Ã©tabli que les retards effectivement enregistrÃ©s se justifient, eu Ã©gard aux critÃ¨res qu'elle a fixÃ©s dans sa jurisprudence constante, ou ont Ã©tÃ© effectivement compensÃ©s lorsqu'ils ne se justifient pas . La Commission en conclut donc que, pour se prononcer sur le grief du requÃ©rant concernant la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, il faut procÃ©der Ã un examen au fond de l'affaire . 9 . La Commission en vient maintenant aux griefs formulÃ©s par le requÃ©rant Ã propos de sa dÃ©tention . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© incarcÃ©rÃ© Ã trois reprises : d e - 141 -
dÃ©cembre 1968 Ã avril 1970, de juillet 1977 Ã mars 1981 et depuis octobre 1981 . Il faut examiner sÃ©parÃ©ment chacune de ces pÃ©riodes . 10 . Pour la premiÃ¨re, la Commission n'est pas appelÃ©e Ã examiner si elle a pu emporter violation des droits garantis au requÃ©rant par la Convention, puisque les conditions prÃ©vues Ã l'article 26 de la Convention ne sont pas rÃ©unies . On ne sait pas clairement si le requÃ©rant a ou non Ã©puisÃ© les recours internes Ã l'Ã©poque mais, quoiqu'il en soit, il n'a pas respectÃ© le dÃ©lai de six mois . La requÃªte doit donc, sur ce point, Ã©tre rejetÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention .
l l . Pour la deuxiÃ¨me pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention, le requÃ©rant a d'abord invoquÃ© l'article 5, paragraphe 1(c), pour se plaindre que son arrestation n'Ã©tait pas justifiÃ©e, puisqu'elle se fondait sur l'hypothÃ¨se erronÃ©e qu'il avait essayÃ© de prendre la fuite . La Commission relÃ¨ve cependant que le requÃ©rant ne lui a pas prÃ©sentÃ© le grief susdit dans le dÃ©lai de six mois Ã dater de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive, c'est-Ã -dire de l'arrÃªt rendu le 14 dÃ©cembre 1977 par la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale . La Commission est donc incapable d'examiner le point de savoir si cette dÃ©tention a Ã©tÃ© ordonnÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article S . paragraphe 1(c), et elle doit se borner Ã examiner la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention litigieuse . Il est clair Ã cet Ã©gard que le requÃ©rant a respectÃ© le dÃ©lai de six mois . Pour dÃ©terminer la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration au regard de l'article 5 . paragraphe 3, de la Convention, il faut non seulement tenir compte du temps Ã©coulÃ© aprÃ¨s l'arrestation du requÃ©rant le 28 juillet 1977, mais aussi du fait que le requÃ©rant avait dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© placÃ© en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive Ã raison des mÃªmes poursuites pÃ©nales . Comme la prÃ©cÃ©dente dÃ©tention avait durÃ© quelque 1 6 mois et demi alors que la peine infligÃ©e en 1970 (que le juge estima purgÃ©e par cette pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention) n'Ã©tait que de 11 mois, il subsistait un reliquat de 5 mois 1/2 passÃ©s en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive et dont il fallait tenir compte en 1977 pour apprÃ©cier l'opportunitÃ© d'incarcÃ©rer Ã nouveau le requÃ©rant . Au moment du prononcÃ© du jugement de premiÃ¨re instance le 1 3 janvier 1978 . la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du requÃ©rant avait donc effectivement durÃ© onze mois . La Commission estime que c'est lÃ la date dÃ©finitive dont il faut tenir compte aux fins de l'article S . paragraphe 3, de la Convention . Elle est d'avis qu'Ã cette Ã©poque la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait pas encore devenue disproportionnÃ©e compte tenu des accusations graves portÃ©es contre lui . Les griefs du requÃ©rant Ã cet Ã©gard doivent donc Ãªtre rejetÃ©s comme manifestement mal fondÃ©s, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . 12 . AprÃ¨s cette date, le requÃ©rant a continuÃ© Ã Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© au regard du droit interne comme en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, mais aux fins de la Convention sa dÃ©tention relÃ¨ve de l'article 5, paragraphe 1(a), qui autorise la dÃ©tention rÃ©guliÃ¨re d'un individu aprÃ¨s condamnation par un tribunal compÃ©ten t - 192 -
(cf . l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de 1'Homme dans l'affaire Wemhoff le 27 juin 1968, Publications de la Cour, SÃ©rie A nÂ° 7, p . 23) . En effet, le requÃ©rant avait Ã©tÃ© reconnu coupable et condamnÃ© Ã 7 ans 1/2 de prison le 13 janvier 1978 . L'annulation ultÃ©rieure d'une partie de ce jugement et la rÃ©duction de la peine de six ans n'ont rien changÃ© Ã cette situation . Du moins la condamnation est-elle devenue dÃ©finitive le 1 3 fÃ©vrier 1980 et le fait que la peine n'avait pas un caractÃ¨re dÃ©finitif quand le requÃ©rant en avait dÃ©jÃ passÃ© les deux tiers en prison a Ã©tÃ© considÃ©rÃ© en soi comme un motif suffisant de le remettre en libertÃ© le 25 mars 1981 . II n'a donc purgÃ© le reste de la peine qu'Ã partir d'octobre 1981, lorsque cette peine a acquis un caractÃ¨re dÃ©finitif . La Commission estime en consÃ©quence que, dans ces conditions, il n'y a pas apparence de violation des droits du requÃ©rant du fait de cette dÃ©tention, pleinement couverte par l'article 5, paragraphe 1(a), de la Convention . La requÃªte doit donc, sur ce point aussi, Ãªtre rejetÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e . 13 . Le seul point litigieux restant Ã examiner est celui de savoir s'il y a eu entrave Ã l'exercice effectif par le requÃ©rant du droit de recours Ã la Commission que prÃ©voit l'article 25, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . A cet Ã©gard, la Commission relÃ¨ve tout d'abord que le requÃ©rant a retirÃ© les allÃ©gations selon lesquelles il aurait Ã©tÃ© empÃªchÃ© de communiquer librement avec elle suite Ã certaines mesures prises contre lui en 1980 . Elle n'a donc pas besoin d'approfondir la question . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant a allÃ©guÃ© avoir rencontrÃ© certains obstacles pour prÃ©parer, pendant l'Ã©tÃ© de 1982, les observations destinÃ©es Ã la Commission, ce11e-ci relÃ¨ve que l'intÃ©ressÃ© a cependant soumis des observations trÃ¨s volumineuses portant sur tous les aspects de 1'affaire .Elencostaduneprcd'atinjusfÃ©eÃ lxrci effectif du droit de recours du requÃ©rant .
1
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n - DECLARE RECEVABLE et retient pour examen du . .fond le grief tirÃ© par le requÃ©rant de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention , selon lequel il n'a pas Ã© tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ© dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable du bien -fondÃ©esacutipnlesd rigÃ©es contre lui ;
- DECLARE LA REQUÃTE IRRECEVABLE pour le surplus - DECIDE qu'il n'y a pas lieu de donner suite aux allÃ©gations du requÃ©rant relatives Ã de prÃ©tendues entraves Ã l'exercice efficace du droit de recours que lui reconnait l'article 25 de la Convention .
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| N. c. ALLEMAGNE

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