Mme X. et Mlle X. c. ROYAUME-UNI

APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 9471/8 1 Mrs X . and Miss X . v/the UNITED KINGDO M MT0 X . et MÂ°e X . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 13 March 1984 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 mars 1984 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 3 of the Conven[ion : Corporal punishment inflicted on teenage girl by school headmaster for breach of school discipline (Complaint of degrading treatment declared admissible) . Article 13 of the Convention in coqJunction with Article 3 of the Convention and A rticle 2 of the First Protocol : Question whether there exist effective remedies in English law for complaints concerning corporal punishment in schools (Complaint declared admissible) . Article 26 of the Convention : Non-exhaustion rule inapplicabte where there is a state practice . Article 2 of the First Protocol : Question whether the refusal of school authorities to give assurances that corporal punishment would not be inJlicted on one of their children fails to recognise parents' philosophical convictions (Complaint declared admissible) .
Article 3 de la Conventlon : ChÃ¢timent corporel pour indiscipline scolaire, infligÃ© Ã une adolescente par le directeur de l'Ã©cole. Traitement dÃ©gradant ? (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) . Artfcle 13 de la Convention, combinÃ© avec l'srtic/e 3 de la Convention et l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel : Existe-t-il au Royaume-Uni un recours effectif penmenant de se plaindre d'un chBtiment corporel infligÃ© Ã l'Ã©cole ? (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) . Article 26 de la Convention : La rÃ¨gle de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours inremes ne s'applique pas en prÃ©sence d'une pratique administrative.
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Article 2 du Protocole additionnel : Refus des autoritÃ©s scolaires de donner Ã des parents l'assurance qu'un de leurs enfants ne sera pas soumis Ã des chÃ riments corporels . MÃ©connaissance de leurs convictions philosophiques? (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) .
(fsanÃ§ais : voir p . 63 )
THE FACTS
The facts of the case which appear not to be in dispute between the parties may be summarised as follows : The applicants, mother and daughter, are United Kingdom citizens . The first applicant, born in 1944, is a social worker residing in London ; she is living apart from her husband and her four children . The second applicant is the first applicant's eldest child ; from 1975 until 27 June 1980 she attended a school in H . ("the school") . Both applicants are represented before the Commission by Messrs Wilford McBain, Solicitors, of London . who have instructed Mr A . Lester, Q .C . and Mr D . Pannick of Counsel . The first applicant has another daughter, L ., born in 1965, and a son ("the son"), bom in 1969 . Until June 1981 L . attended the school . The son, who lived and lives with his grandmother in H . attends a school in London . On the moming of 5 June 1980 the second applicant went to the school to sit one of her Certificate of Secondary Education examinations . She had been attending school since Whitsun 1980 solely for the purpose of taking these examinations . After the examination had ended, between 11 .30 a .m . and mid-day . she left the school premises to walk the short distance to her grandmother's house . She and two other 16-year-old girls, M . and l ., were seen smoking cigarettes in the street outside the school by the headmaster, who happened to be looking out of his study window at the time . He sent a subordinate teacher to apprehend the three girls and bring them back to the school- to his study . Only the second applicant and her friend retumed to the school, however, the third girl having walked on some distance by the time the teacher arrived in the street . When the two girls reached his study, the headmaster told them they were to be caned for smoking . He asked the deputy headmaster to witness the canings, and the deputy headmaster agreed to do so . The headmaster took from a cupboard a cane approximately 10 millimetres in diameter and 800 millimetres in length and ordered the second applicant to put out her hand . Having put out her left hand, she received one stroke of the cane on this hand .
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M . witnessed this caning of the second applicant, who was then obliged to witness the caning of her friend, M ., who was similarly beaten on the hand . M . became visibly very much distressed upon being caned ; she attempted to run from the room, saying that she wished to fetch her mother, but the deputy headmaster prevented her from doing so . The caning of the two girls was possibly witnessed by the son, who was on holiday with his grandmother at the time . He had come to the school to meet his sister that moming, and had returned to the school with her when she was apprehended for smoking . The caning broke blood vessels in the second applicant's palm, causing two large blood blisters . She stated later* that the pain experienced was such that the caned hand felt as if it had been chopped off ; that the hand was so painful, after the beating, that she could not clench her fist ; and that the muscles in her arm were also painful, having been affected because the violence of the blow forced the caned hand sharply downward . She was unable to use her hand for four days after the beating, and traces of the caning were still discemable on her palm after approximately two months . A doctor who prepared a medical report to the applicants' solicitors on 24 December 1980 stated that he saw the second applicant on 13 June 1980, i .e . eight days after the caning . "She had a resolving bruise across the palm of her hand approximately I" long, about 1/2" wide, with a few small bruised areas in line with the stroke of the cane . There was no deep injury, no treatment was necessary and I anticipated that she would have a full and uncomplicated recovery from the injury that had been sustained . " On the afternoon of 14 June 1980, the second applicant and her grandmother visited the local police headquarters in H . intending to complain that the second applicant had been assaulted by the caning inflicted upon her*â¢ . Two plain-clothes officers, one male and one female, took particulars of the incident . The male officer informed the second applicant that in his view English schools generally ought to ntake a more liberal use of corporal punishment ; his colleague expressed the opinion that her treatment at the hands of the headmaster would have been unexceptionable even if it had been applied to a girl aged 18 . The officers told the second applicant that the local police would not prosecute the headteacher without first consulting the Director of Public Prosecutions, whose policy it currently was to advise the police to leave any such criminal proceedings to a private prosecution at the expense of the injured party . The police, however, interviewed the headmaster on 15 July 1980, but finally considered that the nature of the injury did not justify prosecution .
â¢ In evidence to the H . Couniy Coun in rhe acaion for assault decided on I Ap ri l 1981 ( see below) . â¢ A phoiograph of the second applicanrs hard . uken at the police headquarters on that accasiun, has been submiimd -5I-
On 12 June 1980 and 16 June 1980, the first applicant wrote to the County Education Officer for H . and W ., complaining about thetreatment of the second applicant . On 26 June 1980 the first applicant wrote to the Chairman of the H . and W . County Council (by which local authority the school is maintained) . On 3 July 1 980 the Chairman replied to the first applicant, rejecting her complaints about the treatmentof the second applicant, and refusing to give an assurance that the first applicant's other daughter, L ., would not be subjected to corporal punishment while she was a pupil at a school maintained by the H . and W . Local Authority . He observed that, in the second applicant's case, the headmaster had prefered punishment by cane to suspension . On 2 July, 4 July and 8 July 1980, the first applicant wrote to the Department of Education and Science, complaining about the treatment of the second applicant . The letter of 8 July 1980 contained the first applicant's comments on the above letter from the Chairman of the H . and W . County Council of 26 June 1980 . On 18 July 1980 the Department replied to the applicant . It was stated that the Education Committee of H . and W . had not laid down formal rules about punishment, so the maintenance of discipline in school rested primarily with the headmaster and the Govemors . The use of corporal punishment was not a matter in which the Secretary of State could intervene, unless there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the Governors or the local education authority had acted "unreasonably" for the purpose of Section 68 of the Education Act 1944 . On the basis of the information available to it, the Department of Education and Science did not consider that there were grounds on which the Secretary of State could intervene in the matter of the second applicant . Nor did the Depanment have power to overrule the local education authority in its refusal to give an assurance with regard to the future treatment of the first applicant's other daughter, L . The First applicant applied for legal aid to finance the costs of a civil action in the H . County Court for dirnages for assault occasioned by the corporal punishment of the second applicant . However, by a letter dated 29 September 1980, the Law Society Legal Aid Local Committee informed her that the application had been refused for the following reasons : The potential benefit to the applicant is insufficient to justify the proceeding s
(and the effect of the statutory charge on what would be recovered or preserved in the proceedings) . " The first applicant's appeal against that decision was dismissed by the La w Society Legal Aid Area Committee which, in a letter dated 24 October 1980, gave thÃ© following ground : "Unlikely to succeed and doubtful benefit anyway . "
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Despite the refusal of legal aid the first applicant brought a civil action on behalf of the second applicant in the H . County Court against the headmaster and the County Council of H . and W ., claiming damages for assault occasioned by the beating of the second applicant . This action was dismissed on I April 1981 on the ground that the punishment was not "improper, inappropriate or disproportionate" . The judge found that the second applicant had breached a school rule ; he did not accept her submission that she considered herself entitled to smoke because she had come to the end of her school days . The judge observed that, at the time of the caning . "there was some distance away, outside the window of the headmaster's study, the small I 1-year-old brother of the Plaintiff, who had come to the school to meet his sister, and had entered into the school grounds, presumably to look for her . Whether he in fact witnessed anything of what was happening inside the headmaster's study, I have no idea . 1 am satisfied that the headmaster did not at the time see him, nor was he aware of his presence . " With regard to the headmaster's defence of "lawful correction by corporal punishment" the judge observed :"The corporal punishment of children in general and of girls in particular, and even more particularly corporal punishment of girls over the age of puberty-especially by a male teacher rather than a female-is a matter which has provoked public consideration and some controversy . It is not for this Coun to decide whether corporal punishment is desirable or not . . . It is not for this Court to seek to change the common law nor, in my judgment, for this Court to purport to test the decisions and suggest that principles of law written down by authorities which are binding on me should be modified because of changing public morals or attitudes . To do that would . . . be for me to ignore the cases ; and that I cannot do . If the common law is needing change in its essential principles, then it seems to me that only the House of Lords is entitled to do so . Standards, of course, change from time to time . As I indicated in argument, we would not now, I think, tolerate floggings in schools which, we are at least led to believe, happened in the middle of the last century . I am entitled to take account of changing views in deciding how the law should be applied to a particular case, but I have to accept the essential principles of the law ; and the essential principle of the law in this case is that a parent has the right to chastise by physical punishment any child in his custody or care . When a child is sent to school, either voluntarily or compulsorily, that parental right passes to the schoolmaster, save insofar as it is limited especially by the parent or by the school regulations, which are within the knowledge of the parent, but no such suggestions have been expressed in this case, by the evidence or otherwise . There was no limitation on the right and authority of the schoolmaster, in an appropriate case, to use the appropriate corporal punishment . The only doubt for me to decide is whether the punishment inflicted in this case was appropriate within the bounds of English common law ."
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The judge referred to a number of authorities as to what is "appropriate and lawful physical correction" and stated that it must be "moderate", "reasonable in nature and degree", "usual in the school" and "such as to be expected by the parent" . The headmaster must exercise his discretion "as would a conscientious and competent headmaster . But within that framework, the choice of appropriate punishment is his . I do not sit here as a court of appeal over his judgment or to decide that 1, or other teachers, would have come to a different choice of punishment ." In the second applicant's case the headmaster had not sought to exercise his discretion capriciously . "It was not a case . . . of a man inflicting corporal punishment for his own gratification . I am satisfied that he was over-wrought and indignant at what had happened, and that he became somewhat emotional because he was reluctant to use the cane upon girls, that being something which he had not done in the previous seven years (a matter, in his mind, of some pride) . I am however, satisfied that he did not sustain a loss of self-control, or reach his decision through ill-temper or overhastiness ." The headmaster had properly exercised his discretion when he had excluded the alternative punishments of detention after school hours (since the second applicant was no longer attending the school full-time) and suspension or expulsion (which would have prevented her from completing her examination) and decided that corporal chastisement was the appropriate form of punishment . The judge did not accept the plaintiffs argument that the punishment'applied was unusual . Heconsidered that "usual" means "an accepted category of punishment, one that was of an ordinarily contemplated category in the school, notwithstanding that it was only used as a last resort and that it had not been found necessary in the past seven years . ThÃ© evidence is, in my judgment, that it was within the contemplated sphere of punishment . There had been a conscious policy decision-taken by the headmaster and the three deputy heads (two men and one woman)-that corporal punishment for girls should be retained as an appropriate form of punishment ; and that being so, it seems to me that it was-within the meaning of the test-a usual punishment in that school . 'Unusual' means a punishment going outside that contemplated type of correction . If somebody tied a child up- and made him stand in a corner, bound- for an hour, that would make it unusual . The mere fact that the punishment is not used did not make it unusual . " The judge also did not accept the plaintiff s argument that the corporal punishment inflicted on the second applicant was not such as to be expected by the parent . He considered that this was an objective test and that it would be unreasonable to infer from the evidence of such a diversion of views between schools, authorities and those having to deal with children that all parents are of one mind . "It seems to me that, if parents make no enquiry as to the range of punishment and impose no limitation on the punishment, they must be assumed to have knowledge of the common law which permits physical punishment ; and I do not think . . . that that test should be read as meaning what ought a parent to expect would be the likely punishmen t
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for the individual offence . It is what the parent should expect might happen if a child had committed some form of misdemeanour which in the judgment of a schoolmaster or even schoolmistress could call for that course of punishment . " The judge finally did not find that, as submitted by the plaintiff, her caning was, in its effect and in view of her age, her sex and the fact that she received the stroke from a man "improper, inappropriate and disproportionate" . The second applicant has sustained a minor injury-a blood blister and some bruising . "The medical evidence is that there was no deep injury ; it was merely superficial, though some bruises do last some time" . The plaintiff's submission was not bome out by the evidence of a witness, who was called on her behalf : "He accepted that there are certainly two opinions in the matter . . . The informed, enlightened opinion is that such punishment is inappropriate and disproportionate . On the other hand, . . . in the majority of shools-something like seventy to eighty per cent-the right to use corporal punishment is retained even for girls over the age of sixteen and even when inflicted by a male teacher : and . . . in the twenty or thirty per cent of schools which by and large oppose corporal punishment only in some is there an express prohibition of it-whilst nevertheless leaving it to their discretion . In these circumstances, it seems to me that I cannot say that by modern standards this was improper, inappropriate or disproportionate . " On 19 May 1981 the applicants were advised in writing by the Counsel that there were no arguable grounds of appeal against the above judgments, which were likely to succeed as a matter of English law ; a decision of this kind was only appealable if the judge had mis-stated or mis-applied the law and not simply because his appraisal of the facts was contra ry to what others might have found . Counsel obse rv ed that the Court of Appeal, "like the rest of our cou rt s, consists almost entirely of judges whose education involved the liberal use of corporal punishment and who have no aversion to it, which makes an argument that the mere occurrence of physical injury proves an excess of force a difficult one to make attractive . "
COMPLAINTS The first applicant claims to be the victim of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No . I . and the second applicant claims that she is the victim of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention . Both invoke Article 13 of the Convention . The essential nature of the applicants' claim is that the corporal punishment inflicted on the second applicant on 5 June 1980 constituted degrading treatment or punishment, and that the H . and W . Local Education Authority and the United Kingdom Government have refused to respect the first applicant's philosophical convictions that her daughter, L ., should not be subjected to corporal punishment while she remained at the school .
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Article 3 As to the meaning of the term "degrading treatment or punishment" in Article 3, the applicants refer to the Commission's Report in the ( First) Gieek Case (Yearbook 12, 186), thejudgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Ireland v . the United Kingdom ( paras . 162 . 163 and 167) and in the Tyrer Case (paras . 30-33 and 35) and to the Commission's Report in the Case of Campbell and Cosans (para . 124) and its decision admitting Application No . 79077/77 (Mrs X v . the United Kingdom, DR 14, p . 205 [211]) . The applicants submit that A rt icle 3 applies to the infliction of corporal punishment by a school teacher on a pupil . Even if "punishment" is confined to the imposition of criminal penalties on convicted offenders, "treatment" is a concept wide enough to embrace corporal punishment . This conclusion is not merely suggested by a linguistic precedent and policy . The Commission's Decisions on the admissibility in the East African Asians Case (Yearbook 13, 928, 994) and the Greek Case, and the Cou rt 's judgment in Ireland v . the United Kingdom, suggest that A rt icle 3 is not confined in its operation to the protection of convicted prisoners . As a matter of policy, there is no reason to afford school children lesser protection against degrading treatment or punishment than is afforded to hardened criminals . It would be anomalous if school children could be beaten without A rt icle 3 being relevant, while the similar beating of convicted offenders would raise an A rticle 3 issue . Article 3 is therefore applicable to the treatment or punishment of the second applicant . This treatment or punishment was "degrading" within the meaning of A rt icle 3 . The second applicant suffered not only physical pain and shock, but also a substantial degree of humiliation and distress, by virtue of the manner and the circumstances of the beating . Despite the fact that she was a young woman of marriageable age . she was beaten by a male in the presence of another male ; the beating occurred in the presence of another girl waiting to be caned : and in such circumstances that her eleven year old brother could see into the room where it happened ; and she was obliged to witness a similar beating of her fried, and her friend's consequent distress . as-Hercanigws"uh to arouse in ( her) feelings offear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing (her) ." The pre sence of other persons ensures that the second applicant was not merely "humiliated in (her) own eyes", but also in the eyes of others, including a close member of her family and a close friend . The degrading nature of the punishment or treatment was enhanced by its administration without any safeguard : there was no detailed regulation by the Local Education Authority of the nature of a caning . The relatively trivial nature of the offence for which the second applicant was caned (i .e . smoking outside the school premises) added to the degradation inflicted on her . The caning of the han d
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constitutes a fu rt her degrading element of the treatment or punishment . The hand is a pa rt of the body which is fully visible for others to see, and, therefore, the fact of the caning could not be concealed by the second applicant from those with whom she entered into social intercourse . Moreover, the degradation resulting from this caning was increased by the fact that the second applicant was, at the time the caning was administered, in the course of taking her CSE (public) examinations . For the same reason the pain and anxiety caused by the caning was of more than usual significance . The caning of the hand is also degrading because of the degree of pain such treatment or punishment inflicts . " Neither can it be excluded that the punishment may have had adverse psychological effects" . In the Tyrer Case ( para . 31 of the judgment), the Cou rt had also taken into account "the developments and commonly accepted standards . . . of the member States of the Council of Europe in this field", few, if any, of which allow corporal punishment of school children in any, and cenainly not in these, circumstances . In the course of giving evidence before the H . County Court in the action for assault decided on I April 1981, the second applicant had affirmed, during cross-examination, that she had indeed felt she had been degraded by the beating . The applicants contend that, in all the circumstances of the case, " although the (second) applicant did not suffer any severe or long-lasting physical effects . (her) punishment-whereby ( she) was treated as an object in the power of the authorities-constituted an assault on precisely that which it is one of the main purposes of A rt icle 3 to protect, namely a person's dignity and physical integrity" . By way of comparison the applicants observe that, even in 1939, in institutions dealing with juvenile delinquents, the Home Office totally prohibited the infliction of corporal punishment on girls in remand homes . In approved schools, the Home Office required- inter a(ia, that corporal punishment of girls be inflicted only by a female, that it should not be inflicted on a girl aged fifteen years or more, and that (except for "minor offences") it should not be inflicted in the presence of other girls . Moreover, in 1977 two-thirds of local authorities stating administrative regulations on corporal punishment in maintained schools prohibited the beating or caning of a girl pupil by a male teacher . Article 2 or the Fi rst Protocol In their submissions under A rt icle 2 of the First Protocol the applicants quote the Commission's Repo rt in the Case of Campbell and Cosans ( paras . 82, 78, 94, 88- 89, 92 and 93) . the judgment of the Court in the Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen ( para . 50) and the Commission's Decision admitting Application No . 7907/77 . As to the religious and philosophical convictions of the first applicant, reference is made to her letter of 16 June 1980 to the County Education Officer in which she emphasised her "fundamental objections, on moral and ethical grounds, to an y
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physical punishment of my children whatsoever . I have never beaten my children myself and I have every possible objection to their being so treated by others . . . (my religious and philosophical) convictions include a belief that any form of physical punishment of children is morally indefensible ." These statements were repeated in her letter of 26 June 1980 to the Chairman of the County Council . As further evidence of her philosophical conviction that her children should not be subjected to corporal punishment, the first applicant's letters to the Department of Education and Science are mentioned . The first applicant submits that her views on the use of corporal punishment are ideas based on human knowledge and reasoning concerning the world, life and society, which she adopts and professes according to the dictates of her conscience . Her opposition to corporal punishment is an aspect of her outlook on life and a manifestation of her concept of human behaviour in society . Her views on the use or threatened use of corporal punishment as a means of disciplining school children, therefore, constitute philosophical convictions, which the United Kingdom Govemment has a duty to respect, by virtue of the second sentence of Anicle 2 . They are views of a clear moral order conceming human behaviour in respect of children at school and in society at large . The refusal of the United Kingdom Government to respect these philosophical convictions thus constitutes a breach of Article 2 . Article 1 3 In their submissions under Article 13, read together with Anicle 3 of the Convention and Article 2 of the First Protocol, the applicants quote the Court's judgment in the Klass Case (para . 64) and argue that there is no effective remedy before a national authority within the United Kingdom for their claims under Articles 3 and 2 . Accordingly, the United Kingdom has violated the applicant's rights under Article 13, by failing to provide such a remedy, and there has been, and continues to be . a practice by the United Kingdom of failing, in violation of Article 13, to provide such a remedy . The applicants emphasise that their claim under Article 13 is not a purely formal or technical claim . The denial of an effective remedy before a national authority for the claim that the second applicant has suffered degrading treatment or punishment, and for the claim that the United Kingdom Govemment denied the first applicant's right to ensure that her children are educated and taught in conformity with her religious and philosophical convictions, have compelled the applicants to seek the only redress available to them, namely recourse to proceedings under the Convention .
Statement as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies (Article 26 of the Convention ) The applicants submit that the existence of a State practice makes Article 26 inapplicable ; if Article 26 were held to apply, none of the three potential remedies is both available and sufficient, and that, to the extent that the civil action for assault is a domestic remedy, it has been exhausted in the present case .
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The applicants consider that with regard to corporal punishment there exists a repetition of acts, contrary to the Convention and the First Protocol, and an officia) tolerance of such acts, thereby establishing a practice in violation of the Convention . They submit, therefore, that Article 26 of the Convention is inapplicable . The applicants further submit that, even if Article 26 were held to apply, there are no domestic remedies within the United Kingdom for their claims . On the contrary, the scope of the three potentials remedies in English law against the infliction of corporal punishment establishes that English law authorises violations of Article 3 of the Convemion and of Article 2 of the First Protocol . These three remedies are : - a criminal prosecution of the headmaster for assault under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (as amended), or under other statutory provisions ; - a civil action against the headmaster (or against the H . and W . Local Education Authority (which is vicariously liable for his acts done in the course of employment) for damages for assault and battery : and - a complaint under Section 68 supported, if necessary, by prerogative order proceedings, to require the Secretary of State to comply with Section 76 of the Education Act 1944 . In the applicants' view none of the above three remedies is "both available and sufficient in respect of the violation alleged" in the sense of the test applied by the Court in the Deweer Case (para . 29 of the judgment) . With regard to the possible claim of civil or criminal assault, the general principle of English law is that teachers are in loco parenris . Corporal punishment is unlawful only if "it be administered for the gratification of passion or of rage, or if it be immoderate and excessive in its nature or degree, or if it be protracted beyond the child's powers of endurance, or with an instmment unfitted for the purpose and calculated to produce danger to life and limb" (R v . Hopley (1860) F 202, at 206 per Cockbum CJ) . The Commission found in the cases of Campbell and Cosans (Decisions on the admissibility, DR 12, pp . 59 and 149), "that it is not in dispute that moderate corporal punishment by school teachers is accepted in domestic law and is not as such justiciable in the courts ." Similarly, when admitting Application No . 7907/77 (DR 14, pp . 205, 210), the Commission noted that, "it is not in dispute that the use of moderate corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure in schools is accepted in English law and is not as such justiciable in the courts . A teacher would only incur legal liability for beating a pupil in unreasonable circumstances . The applicants point out that it is not a criminal offence in English law to degrade a pupil, nor is degradation relevant to the issue of whether a crirninal assault has been committed . Similarly, degradation does not give rise to civil liability, no r
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is degradation relevant to whether a civil assault has been occasioned . The factors relevant to degradation in this context (for example : whether the caning was administered by a person of the same sex as the victim ; whether the caning was administered in the presence of witnesses ; whether there was a doctor present ; the nature of the offence for which the victim was corporally punished) are not factors considered by English courts in deterrnining civil or criminal liability for assault by corporal punishment . Degradation is relevant, in English law, only to the measure of civil damages or to the sentence imposed on the offender once civil or criminal liability has been established . The applicants observe that corporal punishment administered by a school teacher on a pupil may be perfectly reasonable by the criteria of . English civil and criminal law (and hence give rise to neither civil nor criminal liability), and yet be degrading to the victim . Moreover, the corporal punishment may be wholly unreasonable by the standards of English law (and hence give rise to civil and criminal liability) and yet not be degrading to the pupil in the peculiar circumstances of an individual case . The tests of "reasonableness" in English law and "degradation" under Article 3 of the Convention are distinct . Hence English law authorises violations of Article 3 of the Convention . As to the possibility of a remedy under Section 68 of the 1944 Act, the House of Lords held in Secretary of State for Education and Science v . Metropolitan Borough of Tameside (1977) AC 1014, that "unreasonable" in Section 68 has the very restricted meaning assigned to it by English administrative law, "in a way in which no sensible authority acting with the appreciation of its responsibility would have decided to act ." That judgment makes it plain that the courts will strike down the exercise by the Secretary of State of Section 68 powers where he has simply imposed his views upon a local authority which holds an opposing view . It is not seriously arguable as a matter of English law that no sensible local education authority could decide to maintain corporal punishment in schools . By virtue of this judicial interpretation of the scope of the powers under Section 68, the applicants submit that English law authorises the denial to parents of the right to educate their children in accordance with their religious and philosophical convictions, as guaranteed by Article 2 of the First Protocol . ThÃ©y note that Section 76 of the 1944 Act does not entitle parents to have their children educated in accordance with their parents' wishes (See Watt v . Kesteven County Council (1955) 1AII ER 473 ; Wood v . London Borough of Ealing (1966) 3 ALL ER 514) ; nor does a breach of Section 76 give rise to a civil action for damages (ibid .) . (See also Cummings v . Birkenhead Corporation (1972) I, Chapter 12) . The applicants finally submit, with regard to a civil acrion for assÃ¢ult, that it does not give a remedy for degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, but only " an indirect means of redress", in the sense of the Court's judgment ( para . 29) in the Deweer Case and that, to the extent that it isa remedy, it has been exhausted in the present case .
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Statement concerning the six months' rute (Article 26 of the Convention ) The applicants submit that the six months' rule in Article 26 is inapplicable to the claim of violations of Anicle 3 of the Convention and of Article 2 of the First Protocol . These violations constitute a "continuing situation", within the meaning of the Commission's case-law (cf . Comm . Report in the De Becker Case, Yearbook 5 . 320) and, consequently, the six months' period could begin to mn only from the time when the State practice terminates . In any event, the claims of violations were first brought to the attention of the Commission by a telex dated 3 December 1980 (that is, within six months of the beating of the second applicant) from the applicants' solicitors ; the Commission acknowledged receipt of the telex by a letter dated 5 December 1980 . Moreover, if the civil action is a domestic remedy, it has been exhausted, and this application is brought within six months of the judgment of the County Court on I April 1981 .
THE LA W The applicants' complaints concern the corporal punishment applied to the second applicant by her headmaster and the refusal by the authorities to guarantee that similar punishment would not be applied to the first applicant's other daughter, L . The second applicant maintains that this treatment was contrary to Article 3 of the Convention . The first applicant complains that the refusal by the authorities to guarantee that her daughter, L ., would not be subjected to corporal punishment constitutes a violation of Article 2 of the First Protocol to the Convention . In addition, the applicants have complained that there is no effective remedy before a national authority in the United Kingdom for their claims under Article 3 of the Convention and Article 2 of the First Protocol . They, therefore, allege a violation of Article 13 .
As regards Article 3 of the Convention The Commission finds that it is not in dispute between the panies that the applicants have complied with the requirement of Article 26 of the Convention . The Commission, therefore, does not consider it necessary to go into the question whether Article 26 is inapplicable in the present case because of the existence of a State practice . In respect of the caning of the second applicant, the applicants have invoked Article 3 of the Convention which provides : "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ."
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The respondent Government have submitted, inrer alia, that the punishment applied to the second applicant did not pass the threshold of humiliation necessary to constitute a breach of Article 3 of the Convention . The Government, therefore, submit that the applicants' claim under Article 3 of the Convention should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded . The Commission has made a preliminary examination of the parties' submissions on this matter in the light of, in particular, the judgment of the Court in the Tyrer Case (Eur . Court H .R . judgment of 25 .4 .78) . It finds that this aspect of the applicants' complaints, as outlined above, raises complicated issues of law and fact under the Convention, which can only be determined by an examination of the merits of the case, and cannot be declared manifestly ill-founded . This pan of the application is, therefore, admissible, no other ground for declaring it inadmissible having been established .
As regards Article 3 read in conjunction with Article 1 3 The applicants have complained, for their claims under Anicle 3, that they did not have an effective remedy in the United Kingdom, in accordance with Anicle 13 of the Convention, which provides : "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capaciry . " The respondent Govemment have submitted that a civil action for assault constituted an available and sufficient remedy for the applicants' grievances under Article 3 . The Government, therefore, submit that the applicants' complaints under Article 13, read in conjunction with Article 3, should be rejected as manifestly illfounded . The Commission, however, having had regard to the criteria developed by the Court in the Tyrer Case, finds that the applicants' complaints about the absence of an effective remedy, in the sense of Article 13, also raise difficult questions of fact and law, which can only be determined by an examinatiÃ´n of the merits of the case, and cannotbe declared manifestly ill-founded . This pan of the application is, therefore, admissible, no other ground of inadmissibility having been established . As regards Article 2 of the First Protocol alone, and read in conjunction with Article 1 3 In respect of the refusal of the local Education Authority to give an assurance that L . would not be physically punished, the first applicant has invoked Article 2 of the First Protocol, which provides : "No person shall be denied the right to education . In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to leaching, the State shal l
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respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions . " The Commission notes that the respondent Govemment have not contested that the refusal by the local education authority to give the first applicant the assurance she asked for conceming L . gave rise to an issue under Article 2 of the First Protocol . In view of the parties' submissions, the Commission finds that the first applicant's complaints under Article 2 of the First Protocol raise important issues under the Convention, which should be detertnined in an examination of the merits of the case . No other grounds for inadmissibility having been established, this part of the application must, therefore, be declared admissible .
For these reasons, the Commission , without in any way prejudging the merits , DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
(TRADUCTlON)
EN FAI T Les faits de la cause, qui ne semblent pas controversÃ©s entre les parties, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Les requÃ©rantes, mi!re et fi lle, sont ressortissantes du Royaume-Uni . La premiÃ¨re, nÃ©e en 1944, est assistante sociale et habite Londres ; elle est sÃ©parÃ©e de son mari et de ses quatre enfants . La deuxiÃ¨me, fille atnÃ©e de la premiÃ¨re, a frÃ©quentÃ© l'Ã©cole Ã H . . . . (Â«l'Ã©coleâ¢) de 1975 jusqu'au 27 juin 1980 . Les deux requÃ©rantes sont reprÃ©sentÃ©es devant la Commission par le cabinet Wilford McBain, solicitors Ã Londres, qui a mandatÃ© comme conseils Me A . Lester QC et Me D . Pannick . La premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante a une autre fille, L ., nÃ©e en 1965 et un fils (Â« le fils nÃ© en 1969 . Jusqu'en juin 1981 , L . a frÃ©quentÃ© l'Ã©cole . Le fils qui vivait et vit toujours avec sa grand-mÃ¨re Ã H . frÃ©quente une Ã©cole Ã Londres .
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Le matin du 5 juin 1980, la deuxiÃ¨me requyÃ©rante s'est rendue Ã l'Ã©cole pour passer une Ã©preuve du certificat d'Ã©tudes secondaires . Depuis PentecÃ´te 1980, elle ne frÃ©quentait l'Ã©cole que pour passer ces examens . A l'issue de l'Ã©preuve, soit entre 11 h 30 et midi, elle quitta l'Ã©tablissement et parcourut Ã pied la courte distance sÃ©parant l'Ã©cole de la maison de sa grand-mÃ¨re . Il arriva que le directeur de l'Ã©cole, qui regardait justement par sa fenÃ©tre Ã ce moment-lÃ , l'aperÃ§ut en compagnie de deux autres jeunes filles de 16 ans, M . et J ., qui fumaient des cigarettes dans la nie, en-dehors de l'Ã©tablissement . Il envoya un enseignant pour ramener les trois jeunes filles Ã l'Ã©cole, dans son bureau . Seules, la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante et son amie revinrent Ã l'Ã©cole car la troisiÃ¨me s'Ã©tait Ã©loignÃ©e au moment oÃ¹ l'enseignant arriva dans la rue . Lorsque les deux jeunes Fil es arrivÃ rent Ã son bureau, le directeur leur dÃ©clar a qu'elles seraient battues pour avoir fumÃ© . Il pria le directeur-adjoint d'assister comme tÃ©moin Ã la sÃ©ance, ce que l'adjoint accepta de faire . Le directeur prit alors dans un placard un stick d'environ 1 cm de diamÃ¨tre et 80 cm de long et ordonna Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante de tendre la main . La jeune fille tendit la gauche et reÃ§ut un coup de stick . M . fut tÃ©moin du coup donnÃ© Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante qui, Ã son tour, fut obligÃ©e d'assister Ã la sÃ©ance pour son amie M ., laquelle reÃ§ut aussi un coup sur la main . M . fut visiblement trÃ¨s affectÃ©e d'avoir Ã©tÃ© frappÃ©e . Elle essaya de fuir la piÃ¨ce, disant qu'elle voulait aller chercher sa mÃ¨re mais le directeur-adjoint l'en empÃªcha . Peut-Ãªtre la sÃ©ance de stick fut-elle aperÃ§ue Ã©galement par le fils qui, en vacances alors chez sa grand-mÃ©re, s'Ã©tait rendu Ã l'Ã©cole ce matin-lÃ pour rencontrer sa so_ur et y Ã©tait revenu avec elle lorsqu'elle y fut ramenÃ©e pour avoir fumÃ© dans la rue . Le coup de stick fit Ã©clater des vaisseaux sanguins dans la paume de la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante, y provoquant de gros hÃ©matomes . L'intÃ©ressÃ©e dÃ©clara par la suiteâ¢ que la douleur Ã©prouvÃ©e Ã©tait telle que la main frappÃ©e lui paraissait avoir Ã©tÃ© tranchÃ©e ; que la douleur Ã©tait si pÃ©nible qu'aprÃ¨s la sÃ©ance elle ne pouvait pas fermer le poing et que les muscles du bras Ã©taient Ã©galement douloureux, la violence du coup ayant fait chuter brutalement la main . La jeune fille fut incapable de se servir de sa main pendant les quatre jours qui suivirent et deux mois plus tard, on voyait encore les traces du coup . Un mÃ©decin, qui Ã©tablit un rapport mÃ©dical pour les conseils des requÃ©rantes le 24 dÃ©cembre 1980, dÃ©clara avoir examinÃ© la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante le 13 juin 1980, soit huit jours aprÃ¨s le coup de stick . â¢ Elle prÃ©sentait en travers de la paume de la main . sur environ deux cm et demi de long et un demi cm de large, un hÃ©matom e â¢ En tÃ©moignant lors des poursuites pour coups ei blessures devant le rribunal de comtÃ© de H . qui stetua le Iâ¢' avril 19 8 1 (voir infra) .
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en voie de guÃ©rison ainsi que des zones comportant quelques hÃ©matomes plus petits Ã l'endroit oÃ¹ le stick avait frappÃ© . Je n'ai constatÃ© aucune blessure profonde . Aucun traitentent n'Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire, j'ai pronostiquÃ© une guÃ©rison totale et sans complication de la blessure reÃ§ue . â¢ L'aprÃ¨s-midi du 14 juin 1980, la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante et sa grand-mÃ¨re se rendirent au commissariat de police de H . pour se plaindre des coups et blessures infligÃ©s Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante par le coup de stickâ¢ . Deux agents en civil, un homme et une femme, prirent note des dÃ©tails de l'incident . L'agent masculin dÃ©clara Ã l'intÃ©ressÃ©e qu'Ã son avis, les Ã©coles anglaises en gÃ©nÃ©ral devraient user plus largement des chÃ¢timents corporels ; sa collÃ¨gue exprima l'opinion que le comportement du directeur aurait Ã©tÃ© inattaquable, mÃªme s'il s'Ã©tait agi d'une jeune fille majeure . Les policiers indiquÃ¨rent aussi Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante que la police locale n'engageait pas de poursuites contre un directeur d'Ã©tablissement sans consulter auparavant le parquet, dont la politique Ã©tait alors de conseiller Ã la police de laisser les victimes intenter ces poursuites pÃ©nales Ã leur frais et Ã titre privÃ© . La police interrogea cependant le directeur de l'Ã©cole le 15 juillet 1980, mais estima finalement que la nature de la blessure ne justifiait pas l'ouverture de poursuites . Les 12 et 16 juin 1980, la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante Ã©crivit Ã l'inspecteur rÃ©gional de l'enseignement pour H . et W . afin de se plaindre du traitement infligÃ© Ã sa fille . Le 26 juin 1980 . elle Ã©crivit aussi au prÃ©sident du conseil rÃ©gional pour H . et W ., organe de tutelle financiÃ¨re de l'Ã©cole . Le 3 juillet 1980, le prÃ©sident rÃ©pondit Ã la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante en rejetant les griefs relatifs au traitement de sa fille et refusa de donner Ã la mÃ©re l'assurance que son autre fille, L ., ne serait pas soumise Ã un chÃ timent corporel tant qu'elle serait Ã©lÃ¨ve de l'Ã©cole dÃ©pendant de la collectivitÃ© locale de H . et W . 11 fit remarquer qu'en l'espÃ¨ce le directeur de l'Ã©tablissement avait prÃ©fÃ©rÃ© ce chÃ¢timent Ã une exclusion temporaire . Les 2, 4 et 8 juillet 1980, la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante Ã©crivit au ministÃ¨re de l'Education et la Science pour se plaindre du traitement infligÃ© Ã sa fille . Dans la lettre du 8 juillet, elle joignait la rÃ©ponse reÃ§ue du prÃ©sident du conseil rÃ©gional de H . et W ., en date du 26 juin 1980 . Le 18 juillet 1980, le ministÃ¨re rÃ©pondit Ã la requÃ©rante que la commission de l'Ã©ducation de H . et W . n'avait pas Ã©tabli de rÃ¨gle formelle en matiÃ¨re de chÃ¢timents, de sorte que le maintien de la discipline dans l'Ã©tablissement relevait essentiellement du directeur et du conseil d'Ã©tablissement . S'agissant de chÃ timents corporels, le Ministre ne peut intervenir que s'il y a des preuves suffisantes que le conseil d'Ã©tablissement ou la commission locale de l'Ã©ducation ont agi de maniÃ¨re dÃ©raisonnable aux fins de l'article 68 de la loi de 1944 sur l'Ã©ducation . Sur la foi des renseignements dont il disposait, le Ministre de l'Education et de la Science n'a pas estimÃ© qu'il Ã©tait fondÃ© Ã intervenir dans l'affaire . Le Ministre n'avait pas non plus le pouvoir de passer outre â¢ La photographie de la main de la deuaidme requÃ©rante . prise Ã cette occasion au rommissenat de pulice . a Ã©tÃ© produite devant la Commission .
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au refus de la commission locale de l'Ã©ducation de donner Ã la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante des assurances quant au traitement futurde son autre fille, L . La premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante sollicita l'aide judiciaire pour faire face, devant le tribunal de comtÃ© de H ., aux frais d'une action civile en responsabilitÃ© pour coups et blessures rÃ©sultant du chÃ timent corporel in0igÃ© Ã la deuxiÃ©me requÃ©rante . Cependant, par lettre du 29 septembre 1980, la commission locale d'aidejudiciaire infortna l'intÃ©ressÃ©e que sa demande Ã©tait rejetÃ©e pour la raison suivante : -BÃ©nÃ©ftce Ã©ventuel pour la requÃ©rante jugÃ© insuffisant pour justifier la procÃ©dure (de mÃªme que l'effet de l'accusation en vertu de la loi sur ce que la procÃ©dure permettrait de recouvrer ou de protÃ©ger) . . Le recours formÃ© par la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante contre cette dÃ©cision fut rejetÃ© par la commission rÃ©gionale d'aide judiciaire qui, dans une lettre du 24 octobre 1980, en donna la raison suivante : â¢Faibles chances de succÃ©s et bÃ©nÃ©fice douteux au demeurant .MalgrÃ© le refus d'aide judiciaire, la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante engagea au nom de la deuxiÃ¨me, devant le tribunal de comtÃ© de H . et de W ., une action en responsabilitÃ© contre le directeur de l'Ã©cole et rÃ©clama des dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts pour les blessures infligÃ©es Ã safille du fait du coup de stick . Cette action fut rejetÃ©e le 1Â°' avril 1981 au motif que le chÃ¢timent n'Ã©tait pas â¢ impropre, inadaptÃ© ou disproportionnÃ© . . Le juge estima que la deuxiÃ©me requÃ©rante avait enfreint une rÃ¨gle scolaire et rejeta l'argument selon lequel elle s'estimait en droit de fumer parce qu'elle arrivait en fin de scolaritÃ© . Le juge fit remarquer qu'au moment du coup de stick, â¢ se tenait Ã quelque distance de lÃ , loin de la fenÃ©tre du bureau du directeur, le petit frÃ¨re de la plaignante, Ã gÃ© de 11 ans, venu Ã l'Ã©cole pour rencontrer sa so_ur et entrÃ© dans la cour, sans doute pour l'y chercher . Je ne sais s'il a ou non assistÃ© Ã ce qui s'est passÃ© Ã l'intÃ©rieur du bureau du directeur, je n'en ai pas la moindre idÃ©e, mais j'admets que le directeur ne l'a pas vu Ã ce moment et n'a pas Ã©tÃ© conscient de sa prÃ©sence- . S'agissant du moyen de dÃ©fense invoquÃ© par le directeur concemant Â« la correction lÃ©gale par chÃ¢timent corporel â¢, le juge fit remarquer que â¢ le chÃ¢timent corporel des enfants en gÃ©nÃ©ral et des ftlles en particulier, notamment celui des filles pubÃ¨res - et surtout lorsqu'il est pratiquÃ© par un enseignant - est une question qui_ a suscitÃ© un dÃ©bat public et certaines controverses . Il n'appartient pas Ã ce tribunal de dÃ©cider si les chÃ¢timents corporels sont ehose souhaitable ou non . . . Ce n'est pas Ã ce tribunal de chercher Ã modifier la common law ni, Ã mon sens, d'analyser la jurispmdence pour suggÃ©rer qu'il faudrait modifier, parce que la morale publique ou les attitudes du public ont changÃ©, des principes de droit Ã©tablis par des autoritÃ©s auxquelles je dois me soumettre . Le faire reviendrait pour moi Ã mÃ©connaitre la jurisprudence, ce
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qui m'est impossible . S'il faut modifier la common law dans ses principes fondamentaux . il me semble alors que seule la Chambre des Lords est habilitÃ©e Ã le faire . Bien sÃ»r, les normes se modifient avec le temps . Comme je l'ai indiquÃ© dans mon raisonnemem, je pense que nous ne tolÃ©rerions pas aujourd'hui dans nos Ã©coles lessÃ©ances de fouet qui se dÃ©roulaient au milieu du siÃ¨cle dernier, du moins telles qu'on nous les a dÃ©crites . Je puis tenir compte de l'Ã©volution des points de vue pour dÃ©cider comment appliquer le droit dans un cas prÃ©cis, mais il me faut nÃ©anmoins accepter les principes fondamentaux de ce droit ; or, en l'espÃ¨ce, le principe fondamental du droit est qu'un parent a le droit de chÃ¢tier physiquement un enfant confiÃ© Ã sa garde . Lorsque l'enfant est envoyÃ© Ã l'Ã©cole, qu'il s'agisse d'enseignement facultatif ou obligatoire, ce droit parental passe au maitre d'Ã©cole sauf si le parent ou la rÃ©glementation de l'Ã©tablissement, connue du parent, lui ont fixÃ© des limites . En l'espÃ¨ce, cependant, aucune indication de ce genre n'a Ã©tÃ© formulÃ©e, ni par les tÃ©moignages ni autrement . Rien ne limitait le droit et la facultÃ© du maÃ®tre d'Ã©cole de recourir, le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, au chÃ¢timent corporel . Le seul Ã©lÃ©ment sur lequel je doive me prononcer est celui de savoir si, en l'espÃ¨ce, le chÃ timent infligÃ© Ã©tait autorisÃ© dans les limites de la common law anglaiseâ¢ . Le juge s'est rÃ©fÃ©rÃ© Ã un certain nombre de sources juridiques sur ce qu'est â¢ une correction physique appropriÃ©e et liciteÂ» et a prÃ©cisÃ© qu'elle doit Ãªtre â¢ modÃ©rÃ©eâ¢, â¢d'un caractÃ©re et d'un degrÃ© raisonnables ., â¢de caractÃ¨re habituel dans l'Ã©coleâ¢ et â¢de nature telle que le parent s'y attende- . Le directeur de l'Ã©cole doit faire usage de son pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire â¢ comme le ferait un directeur consciencieux et compÃ©tent â¢ . Dans ce cadre, cependant- le choix du chÃ timent lui appartient . Je ne siÃ¨ge pas ici comme un organe d'appel de son jugement ni pour dÃ©cider que moi-mÃ©me ou d'autres enseignants aurions choisi une autre punition â¢ . S'agissant de la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante, le directeur d'Ã©tablissement n'a pas cherchÃ© Ã exercer son pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire Ã la lÃ©gÃ¨re . â¢ II ne s'agissait pas . . . d'un homme infligeant un chÃ timent corporel pour son propre plaisir . J'ai la conviction qu'il Ã©tait tourmentÃ© et indignÃ© de ce qui s'Ã©tait passÃ© et qu'il a Ã©prouvÃ© un certain Ã©moi parce qu'il rÃ©pugnait Ã utiliser le stick sur des jeunes filles . ce qu'il n'avait pas fait depuis sept ans (et dont il tirait quelque fiertÃ©) . J'ai cependant la conviction qu'il n'a pas perdu son sang-froid ni pris cette dÃ©cision sous l'effet de la colÃ©re ou de la prÃ©cipitation . Â» Le directeur avait donc convenablement exercÃ© son pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire en Ã©cartant les autres punitions de retenue aprÃ¨s l'Ã©cole (puisque la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante ne frÃ©quentait plus l'Ã©tablissement Ã plein temps) et d'exclusion temporaire ou dÃ©finitive (ce qui aurait empÃ©chÃ© la jeune ftlle de passer ses examens) et en dÃ©cidant que le chÃ¢timent corporel Ã©tait la punition appropriÃ©e . Le juge rejeta l'argument de la plaignante selon lequel le chÃ¢timent appliquÃ© avait un caractÃ©re inhabituel . Il estima que par . habituel â¢ on entend â¢ une catÃ©gorie de punitions autorisÃ©es, de celles qui sont gÃ©nÃ©ratement envisagÃ©es Ã l'Ã©cole, bien que celle-ci n'ait Ã©tÃ© utilisÃ©e qu'en derniÃ¨re ressource et qu'il n'eut pas Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© nÃ©cessaire de l'utiliser depuis sept ans . Il m'apparait Ã©vident que la punition utitisÃ©e
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rentrait bien dans ce domaine des punitions envisagÃ©es . C'Ã©tait une politique dÃ©libÃ©rÃ©e - dÃ©cidÃ©e par le directeur de l'Ã©cole et ses trois adjoints (deux hommes et une femme) - de maintenir le chÃ¢timent corporel comme forme appropriÃ©e de punition pour les filles . Cela Ã©tant, il me semble qu'il s'agissait bien - au sens de ce critÃ¨re - d'un chÃ timent habituel dans cette Ã©cole . Serait 'inhabituelle' une punition sortant du type de correction envisagÃ©e . Si par exemple on attachait un enfant debout dans un coin pendant une heure, cela serait un chÃ¢timent inhabituel . Le simple fait que la punition n'est pas rÃ©guliÃ¨rement uti(isÃ©e ne lui confÃ¨re pas un caractÃ¨re inhabituelâ¢ . â¢ . . Le juge rejeta Ã©galement l'argument de la plaignante selon lequel le chÃ timen t corporel infligÃ© Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante n'Ã©tait pas l'un de ceux auxquels la mÃ¨re pouvait s'attendre . Il estima .qu'il s'agissait lÃ d'un critÃ¨re objectif et qu'il serait dÃ©raisonnable de conclure que tous les parents sont d'un seul avis parce qu'il existe Ã l'Ã©vidence une telle divergence de points de vue entre Ã©tablissements scolaires, autoritÃ©s d'enseignement et Ã©ducateurs . â¢II me semble que si les parents ne posent aucune question sur l'Ã©ventail des punitions et n'imposent aucune restriction en ce domaine, il faut alors supposer qu'ils connaissent la common law qui autorise le chÃ timent corporel et je ne crois pas . . . qu'il faille interprÃ©ter ce critÃ¨re comme signifiant que ce que devrait escompter le parent serait la punition probable pour l'infraction en question . C'est plutÃ´t ce que le parent pourrair escompter si un enfant se comportait mal qui, de l'avis du maÃ®tre ou mÃ©me de la maitresse d'Ã©cole, appellerait ce type de punition . Â» Enfin, le juge n'a pas estimÃ© que, comme le soutenait la plaignante, le fait pour sa fille d'Ã©tre frappÃ©e Ã coups de stick soit de caractÃ¨re -impropre, inadaptÃ© et disproportionnÃ© â¢, tant dans ses effets que compte tenu de l'Ã ge et du sexe de l'intÃ©ressÃ©e et du fait qu'elle avait reÃ§u les coups d'un homme . La deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante a subi une petite blessure - un hÃ©matome et une IÃ©gÃ©re meurtrissure . â¢ Selon le mÃ©decin, il n'y a pas eu blessure profonde mais simple blessure superficielle, mÃ¨me si certains bleus ont subsistÃ© un certain temps . - La thÃ©se de la requÃ©rante n'a pas Ã©tÃ© Ã©tayÃ©e par les Ã©lÃ©ments fournis par le tÃ©moin qu'elle avait fait citer : â¢ Il a reconnu que deux avis sont assurÃ©ment en prÃ©sence . . . l'avis Ã©clairÃ© et autorisÃ© est que cette forme de punition est impropre et disproportionnÃ©e . D'un autre cÃ´tÃ© . . . dans la majoritÃ© des Ã©coles - 70 Ã 80 % - le droit de recourir aux chÃ¢timents corporels subsiste, mÃ©me pour lesfilles de plus de 16 ans et mÃ©me infligÃ©s par un enseignant . . . Dans les 20 ou 30 % des Ã©coles gÃ©nÃ©ralement opposÃ©es aux chÃ¢timents corporels, seules quelques-unes l'interdisent expressÃ©ment, tout en laissant subsister nÃ©anmoins un certain pouvoir d'apprÃ©ciation . Dans ces conditions, il me semble impossible d'affirmer que, selon les normes contemporaines, il s'agissait lÃ d'une punition impropre ou disproportionnÃ©e . â¢ Le 19 mai 1981, l'avocat indiqua par Ã©crit aux requÃ©rantes qu'Ã son avis il n'y avait'pas,contre ces dÃ©cisions judiciaires, de moyens d'appel valables prÃ©sentant
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quelque chance de succÃ¨s en droit anglais . En effet, une dÃ©cision de ce genre n'est susceptible d'appel que si le juge a mal interprÃ©tÃ© ou mal appliquÃ© la loi et non parce que son apprÃ©ciation des faits serait contraire Ã ce que d'autres auraient pu estimer . L'avocat fit observer que la Court of Appeal â¢comme le reste denos juridictions, se compose presque exclusivement de magistrats dont l'Ã©ducation a comportÃ© force chÃ¢timents corporels, auxquels ils ne sont pas hostiles . Aussi ne seront-ils guÃ¨re sensibles Ã l'argument selon lequel la simple survenance d'une blessure physique est l'indice d'une violence excessive- .
GRIEF S La premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante se prÃ©tend victime d'une violation de l'articte 2 du Protocole additionnel et la deuxiÃ¨me d'une violation de l'article 3 de la Convention . L'une et l'autre invoquent aussi l'article 13 . L'essentiel des griefs des requÃ©rantes est que a . le chÃ¢timent corporel infligÃ© Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante le 5 juin 1980 constituait un traitement ou un chÃ¢timent dÃ©gradant et que b . la commission rÃ©gionale de l'enseignement de H . et W . et le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ont refusÃ© de respecter les convictions philosophiques de la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante selon lesquelles sa fille L . ne devrait pas Ãªtre exposÃ©e aux punitions corporelles pendant son sÃ©jour Ã l'Ã©cole . Sur l'article 3 Sur la signi fi cation de l'expression -peine ou traitement dÃ©gradant- figurant Ã l'article 3, les requÃ©rantes renvoient au rapport Ã© tabli par la Commission sur la premiÃ¨re affaire grecque (Annuaire 12, p . 186) aux arrÃ©ts rendus par la Cour dans l'affaire Irlande c/Royaume-Uni ( par . 162, 163 et 167) et dans l'affaire Tyrer (par . 30-33 et 35), ainsi qu'au rappo rt de la Commission dans les affaires Campbell et Cosans ( par . 124) et Ã la dÃ©cision de la Commission dÃ©clarant recevable la requÃªte nÂ° 7907/77 ( MmO X . c/Royaume-Uni, D .R . 14, p . 205 [211]) . Les requÃ©rantes soutiennent que l'article 3 s'applique au cas d'une punition corporelle infligÃ© Ã un Ã©lÃ¨ve par un enseignant . A supposer mÃ©me que le mot . peine se limite Ã l'infliction de sanctions pÃ©nales Ã des dÃ©linquants condamnÃ©s, le â¢traitementÂ» recouvre une notion suffisamment vaste pour embrasser la punition corporelle . Cette conclusion ne provient pas seulement d'un prÃ©cÃ©dent et d'une pratique linguistiques . Les dÃ©cisions de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© de l'affaire des Asiatiques d'Afrique orientale (Annuaire 13, p . 928, 994) et de l'affaire grecque, ainsi que l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour dans l'affaire Irlande c / Royaume-Uni donnent Ã penser que l'article 3 ne se borne pas Ã protÃ©ger les dÃ©tenus condamnÃ©s . D'une maniÃ¨re gÃ©nÃ©rale, d'ailleurs, il n'y a pas de raison d'assurer aux Ã©coliers une protection moindre contre un traitement ou un chÃ¢timent dÃ©gradant que celle dont bÃ©nÃ©ficient les criminels endurcis . Il serait anormal que les Ã©coliers puissent Ãªtre battus sans pouvoi r
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faire entrer en jeu l'article 3, alors que le mÃªme traitemerit infligÃ© Ã des dÃ©linquants condamnÃ©s poserait un problÃ©me au regard de l'article 3 . Cette disposition s'applique dÃ¨s lorsau traitement"oit chÃ timent infligÃ© Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante : . Ce traitement ou chÃ¢timent Ã©tait Â«dÃ©gradantÂ» au sens de l'article 3 :l'intÃ©ressÃ©e en a subi non seulement une douleur et un choc physiques mais aussi un degrÃ© important d'humiliation el d'angoisse en raison du dÃ©roulement dÃ© la sÃ©ancede stick : bien que d'Ã¢ge nubile,la jeune fille a Ã©tÃ© frappÃ©e par un homme enprÃ©sence d'un autrÃ© homme et la'sÃ©ance a eu lied devant une autre jeune fille attendant son tour ; par ailleurs, le petit frÃ¨re de 11 ans pouvait voir dans la piÃ¨ce ce qui se passait ; l'intÃ©ressÃ©e a de .plus Ã©tÃ© obligÃ©e d'assister Ã une sÃ©ance analogue sur son amie et a Ã©tÃ© tÃ©moin de l'angoisse qui en est rÃ©sultÃ©e pour elle . Les coups reÃ§us Ã©taient Â«tels qu'ils pouvaient susciterchezelledes sentiment s de crainte, d'angoisse et d'infÃ©rioritÃ© susceptibles d'entraÃ®ner humiliation et avilissementÂ» . La prÃ©sence de tierces personnes a fait que la deuxiÃ¨me reqitÃ©rante a Ã©tÃ© non seulement Â«humiliÃ©e Ã ses propres yeuxÂ», inais Ã ceux d'autrui ; dont un membre de sa familleproche etune-amie intime . â¢ ' .
LecaractÃ¨re dÃ©gradant dÃ» chÃ¢timent ou du traitement s'est trouvÃ© renforcÃ© par le fait quelapunition a Ã©tÃ© administrÃ©e sans aucune garantie : aucun examen mÃ©dical ne l'a prÃ©cÃ©dÃ©e, aucun mÃ©decimn'assistait Ã la sÃ©ancb et la commission rÃ©gionale de l'enseignemÃ©nt n'a prÃ©vu aucune rÃ¨glementation dÃ©taillÃ©e quant Ã la nature des coups de stick . Le caractÃ¨re relativement mineur de l'infraction qui Ã¨st Ã l'originÃ© de la punition de la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante (fumer en dehors des locaux scolaires) a ajoutÃ© au caractÃ¨re dÃ©gradant de lasÃ©ance . Le fait d'avoir frappÃ© la main conslitue un Ã©lÃ©ment dÃ©gradant supplÃ©mentaire du traitement ou du chÃ timÃ©nt car la,main Ã©tant une partie du corps parfailement visible pour autrui, l'intÃ©ressÃ©e ne pouvait pasdissimuler Ã ses relations le fait qu'elle avait Ã©tÃ© frappÃ©e . " _ . . . En outre l'aspect dÃ©gradanl de cetle sÃ©ance a Ã©tÃ© accrÃ» par le fait que la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante Ã©tait, Ã l'Ã©poque, en train de passer un examen d'Etat (certificat d'Ã©tudes secondaires) . VoilÃ pourquoi douleur et anxiÃ©tÃ© provoquÃ©es par les coups de stick ont Ã©tÃ© aussi d'une importance supÃ©rieure Ã la normale . Donner des coups sur la main est Ã©galement dÃ©gradant en raison du degrÃ© de souffrance qu'entraÃ®ne ce traitement ou chÃ timent . -On ne peut exclure non plus quÃ© la pirnition ait pu avoir des effets psÃ¿chologiques nuisibles .Â» Dans l'affaire Tyrer (par . 31 de l'arrÃ©t), la Cour a Ã©galement tenu compte Â«de l'Ã©volution et desnormes communÃ©inent acceptÃ©es . . . dans ce domaine par les Etats membres du Conseil de l'EuropeÂ», dont rares; s'il en est, sont .ceux qui'autorisent le chÃ¢timent corporel d'Ã©coliers dans quelques circonstances que ce soit, et certainement pas dans celles-ci .- Lorsqu'elle a Ã©tÃ© entendue par le tribunal de comtÃ© de H . qui a statuÃ© le 1Â° avril 1981sur l'action pour cotips et' blessures : la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante a confirmÃ© pendant sÃ´nÃ§ontreimerrogatoire qu'elle s'Ã©tait vraiment sentie humiliÃ©e par la fustigation . -70
Les requÃ©rantes soutiennent que, cela Ã©tant, Â« bien que la (seconde) requÃ©rante n'ait pas subi de consÃ©quences physiques graves ou durables, la punition - par laquelle (elle) a Ã©tÃ© traitÃ©e comme un objet soumis au pouvoir des autoritÃ©s - a const ituÃ© une voie de fait Ã l'Ã©gard de ce que, prÃ©cisÃ©ment, l'article 3 vise surtout Ã protÃ©ger, Ã savoir la dignitÃ© et l'intÃ©gritÃ© physique d'un individuâ¢ . A titre de comparaison, les requÃ©rantes font observer que, dÃ¨s 1939, dans les Ã©tablissements accueillant des jeunes dÃ©linquants, le ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur interdisait absolument les chÃ timents corporels sur les filles pensionnaires dans les maisons d'Ã©ducation surveillÃ©e . Dans les Ã©coles agrÃ©Ã©es, le ministÃ¨re exigeait notamment que le chÃ timent corporel des filles ne soit infligÃ© que par une enseignante, qu'il ne le soit sur une fille de plus de quinze ans et, (sauf pour . infraction mineure - ), jamais en prÃ©sence d'autres filles . En outre, en 1977, les deux tiers des collectivitÃ©s locales Ã©dictant des rÃ©glements administratifs sur les chÃ timents corporels dans les Ã©coles subventionnÃ©es interdisaient Ã un enseignant de battre ou de fouetter une Ã©lÃ¨ve .
Article 2 du Protocole additionnel Dans leur argumentation tirÃ©e de l'a rt icle 2 du Protocole additionnel, les requÃ©rantes citent le rappo rt Ã© tabli par la Commission dans l'affaire Campbell et Cosans (par . 82, 78, 94, 88, 89, 92 et 93), l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour dans l'affaire Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen et Petersen ( par . 50) et la dÃ©cision de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte nÂ° 7907/77 . S'agissant des convictions religieuses et philosophiques de la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante, celle-ci fait rÃ©fÃ©rence Ã la lettre qu'elle adressa le 16 juin 1980 Ã l'inspecteur rÃ©gional de l'enseignement . Elle y soulignait son â¢opposition fonciÃ¨re, pour des raisons Ã©thiques et morales, Ã toute punition physique infligÃ©e Ã mes enfants sous quelque forme que ce soit . Je n'ai moi-mÃªme jamais battu mes enfants et suis tout Ã fait opposÃ©e Ã ce qu'autrui le fasse . . . Mes convictions (religieuses et philosophiques) comportent notamment l'idÃ©e que toute forme de chÃ¢timent physique des enfants est moralement indÃ©fendable . â¢Elle rÃ©itÃ©ra ces affirmations dans sa lettre du 26juin 1980 adressÃ©e au prÃ©sident du conseil de comtÃ© . Pour preuve supplÃ©mentaire de sa conviction philosophique que ses enfants ne doivent pas subir de chÃ¢timents corporels, la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante mentionne ses lettres au ministÃ¨re de l'Education et de la Science . La premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante fait valoir que ses idÃ©es en la matiÃ¨re sont fondÃ©es sur une connaissance de l'homme et un raisonnement concernant le monde, la vie et la sociÃ©tÃ© qu'elle adopte et professe selon les impÃ©ratifs de sa conscience . Son opposition aux chÃ timents corporels est un aspect de sa conception de la vie en gÃ©nÃ©ral et une manifestation de ses idÃ©es sur le comportement de l'homme en sociÃ©tÃ© . Ses idÃ©es sur l'usage ou la menace de l'usage du chÃ¢timent corporel pour discipliner des Ã©coliers constituent dÃ¨s lors une conviction philosophique que le Gouvernement d u -71-
Royaume-Uni est tenu de respecter aux termes de la deuxiÃ¨me phrase de l'article 2 . Il s'agit de points de vue d'ordre manifestement moral concernant le componement humain vis-Ã -vis des enfants Ã l'Ã©cole et dans la sociÃ©tÃ© en gÃ©nÃ©ral . Le refus du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de respecter ces convictionsphilosophiques constitue dÃ¨s lors une violation de l'article 2 .
,
.Article13
Dans leur argumentation tirÃ©e de l'article 13 lu en liaison avec les articles 3 et 2, les requÃ©rantes citÃ©nt l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour dans l'affaire Klass (par : 64) et soutiennent qu'elles n'ont Ã leur disposition au Royaume-Uni aucun recours effectif devant une instance nationale pour faire valoir des griefs qu'elles tirent des articles 3 et 2 du Protocole additionnel . Le Royaume-Uni a donc mÃ©connu les droits garantis aux requÃ©rantes par l'article 13 en ne fournissant pas ce recours . De plus, il existe, il a existÃ© et il continuÃ© d'exister aÃ¹ Royaume-Uni une pratique consistant Ã ne pas foumir un tel recours, ce qui est contraire Ã l'article 13 . Les requÃ©rantes soulignent que le grief qu'elles tirent de l'article 13 n'est pas d'ordre purement formel ou technique . Se voyant refuser un recours effectif devant une instance nationale pour faire valoir leurs griefs (que la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante a subi un traitement ou un chÃ¢timent dÃ©gradant, et que le Gouvemement du Royaume-Uni a refusÃ© Ã la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante le droit d'assurer Ã ses enfants une Ã©ducation et un enseignement conformes Ã ses convictions religieuses et philosophiques), les requÃ©rantes ont Ã©tÃ© obligÃ©es de rechercher le seul moyen de redressement Ã leur disposition, Ã savoir recourir Ã la procÃ©dure prÃ©vue par la Convention .
Quant Ã l'Ã©puisement des recou rs internes (Article 26 de la Convention ) Les requÃ©rantes font vatoir que l'existÃ©nce d'une pratique Ã© tatique rend inapplicable l'articlÃ¨ 26 ; que si l'article 26 devait nÃ©anmoins s'appliquer, aucun des trois recours potentiels n'Ã©tait disponible ni suffisant et que, dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'action civile pour coups et blessures est un recours inteme, il a bien Ã©tÃ© Ã©puisÃ© en l'espÃ¨ce . Les requÃ©rantes estiment que, s'agissant de chÃ timents corporels, il existe au Royaume-Uni une rÃ©pÃ©tition d'actes contraires Ã la Convention et au Protocole additionnel, jointe Ã une tolÃ©rance officielle de ces actes, qui Ã©tablissent dÃ¨s lors une pratique contraire Ã la Convention . Aussi font-elles valoir que l'article 26 de la Convention est inapplicable en l'espÃ©ce . Les requÃ©rantes soutiennent en outre que, mÃªme si l'article 26 devait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme applicable, il n'existe au Royaume-Uni aucun recours interne leur .permettant de faire valoir leurs griefs . Au contraire, le domaine d'application des trois recours potentiellement disponibles en droit anglais pour se plaindre de l'infliction
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de chÃ timents corporels Ã©tablit que le droit anglais autori se des violations de l'anicle 3 de la Convention et de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel . Ces trois recours sont les suivants : - des poursuites pÃ©nales contre le directeur d'Ã©tablissement pour coups et blessures, au titre de la loi de 1861 sur les atteintes Ã la personne (version amendÃ©e) ou au titre d'autres dispositions lÃ©gales . - une action civile contre le directeur d'Ã©tablissement (ou contre la commission rÃ©gionale de l'enseignement de H . et W . civilement responsable des actes commis par ses prÃ©posÃ©s) pour rÃ©clamer des dommages-intÃ©rÃªts pour voies de fait ; et - une plainte, dÃ©posÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 68 et appuy6e le cas Ã©chÃ©ant par une demande d'ordonnance comminatoire afin d'obliger le Ministre Ã respecter l'article 76 de la loi de 1944 sur l'Education . De l'avis des requÃ©rantes, aucun des trois recours susdits n'est Â«disponible et suffisant en ce qui concerne la violation allÃ©guÃ©eâ¢ au sens du critÃ¨re appliquÃ© par la Cour dans l'affaire Deweer (par . 29 de l'arrÃªt) . S'agissant de l'ouverture Ã©ventuelle d'une action civile ou de poursuites pÃ©nales pour voies de fait, le principe gÃ©nÃ©ral en droit anglais est que les enseignants se substituent aux parents : le chÃ timent corporel n'est contraire Ã la loi que s'il est administrÃ© pour assouvir une passion ou une colÃ©re, s'il a un caractÃ¨re excessif, s'il se prolonge au-delÃ des possibilitÃ©s d'endurance de l'enfant ou encore s'il est appliquÃ© avec un instrument impropre Ã ce but et s'il est calculÃ© de faÃ§on Ã mettre la vie de l'enfant en danger. (R . v/Hopley (1860) F 202, p . 206 per Cockburn CJ) . La Commission a estimÃ© dans les affaires Campbell et Cosans (dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ©, D .R . 12 . pp . 70 et 161) (â¢qu'il n'est pas contestÃ© qu'un chÃ timent corporel modÃ©rÃ© infligÃ© par les enseignants est admis en droit interne et n'est pas en tant que tel passible d'une procÃ©dure judiciaire . â¢) De mÃªme, en dÃ©clarant recevable la requÃ©te n- 7907/77 (D .R . 14, pp . 211, 216), la Commission a relevÃ© que â¢ l'usage modÃ©rÃ© de chÃ timents corporels est admis comme mesure disciplinaire dans les Ã©tablissements scolaires et qu'il ne peut Ãªtre, en tant que tel, sousmis aux tribunaux . Un maitre ne sera juridiquement responsable que s'il a battu un Ã©lÃ¨ve dans des circonstances dÃ©raisonnables . â¢ Les requÃ©rantes soulignent qu'en droit anglais, ce n'est pas une infraction pÃ©nale que d'avilir un Ã©lÃ©ve et l'avilissement n'est pas un Ã©lÃ©ment Ã prendre en compte pour rechercher s'il y a eu voie de fait . De mÃ©me, l'avilissement ne met pas en jeu la responsabilitÃ© civile et n'est pas Ã prendre en considÃ©ration pour savoir s'il y a eu voie de fait . Les Ã©lÃ©ments affÃ©rant Ã l'avilissement dans ce contexte (par exemple le point de savoir si les coups de stick ont Ã©tÃ© administrÃ©s par une personne du mÃ©me sexe que la victime, celui de savoir si la sÃ©ance a eu lieu en prÃ©sence de tÃ©moins, si un mÃ©decin Ã©tait prÃ©sent, quelle Ã©tait la nature de l'infraction pou r
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laquelle la victime a Ã©tÃ© corporellement chÃ¢tiÃ©e) ne sont pas des Ã©lÃ©ments que les tribunaux anglais prennent en compte pour dÃ©terminer la responsabilitÃ© civile ou pÃ©nale encourue suite Ã des voies de fait rÃ©sultant de chÃ timents corporels . L'avilissement n'est un facteur pertinent en droit anglais que pour mesurer les dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts ou pour dÃ©terminer la peine Ã infliger Ã l'auteur de l'infraction une fois Ã©tablie la responsabilitÃ© civile ou pÃ©nale . Les requÃ©rantes font observer que les chÃ timents corpÃ´rels administrÃ©s par un maitre Ã un Ã©lÃ¨ve peuvent parfaitement avoir un caractÃ¨re raisonnable selon les critÃ¨res du droit civil et pÃ©nal anglais (et donc n'entraine aucune responsabilitÃ© civile ni pÃ©nale) et avoir nÃ©anmoins un caractÃ¨re avilissant pour la victime . En revanche, les chÃ¢timents corporels peuvent avoir dans un cas prÃ©cis un caractÃ¨re parfaitement dÃ©raisonnable selon les normes anglaises (et ouvrir droit Ã responsabilitÃ© civile et pÃ©nale) et n'avoir cependant rien d'avilissant pour l'Ã©lÃ¨ve . Les critÃ¨res de Â« caractÃ¨re raisonnable- en droit anglais et de Â«caractÃ¨re dÃ©gradant- selon l'article 3 de la Convention sont trÃ¨s diffÃ©rents . Aussi le droit anglais autorise-t-il des violations de l'article 3 de la Convention . Sur la possibilitÃ© d'un recours au titre de l'article 68 de la loi de 1944, la Chambre des Lords a dÃ©clarÃ© dans l'affaire Secretary of State for Education and Science v/ Metropolitan Borrough of Timeside (1977) AC 1014 que le mot Â«dÃ©raisonnable â¢ figurant Ã l'article 68 a le sens trÃ¨s restreint qui lui est attribuÃ© en droit administratif anglais : Â«d'une maniÃ¨re dont aucune autoritÃ© sensÃ©e, agissant en pleine connaissance de ses responsabilitÃ©s, n'aurait dÃ©cidÃ© d'agirÂ» . Cejugement indique clairement que les tribunaux annuleraient l'Ã©xercice par le Ministre des pouvoirs que lui confere l'article 681orsqÃ»'il aurait simplement imposÃ© son point de vue contre une collectivitÃ© locale professant un point de vue opposÃ© . On ne peut sÃ©rieusement soutenir qu'en droit anglais - une autoritÃ© locale sensÃ©e en matiÃ¨re d'Ã©ducation dÃ©ciderait de maintÃ©nir les chÃ timents corporels Ã l'Ã©cole . Etant donnÃ© cette interprÃ©tation judiciaire de la portÃ©e des pouvoirs confÃ©rÃ©spar l'article 68, les requÃ©rants soutiennent que le droit anglais autorise de refuser aux parents le droit d'Ã©duquer leurs enfants conformÃ©ment Ã leurs convictions religieuses et philosophiques, tel quÃ© le garantit l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel . Elles relÃ¨vent que l'article 76 de la loi de 1944 n'autorise pas les parents Ã faire Ã©duquer leurs enfants conformÃ©ment Ã leurs vues : voir les affaires Watt v'/Kesteven County Council (1955) 1 AII ER 473 ; Wood v/London Borough of Ealing (1966 3 AII ER 514 ; et qu'une mÃ©connaissance de l'article 76 n'ouvre pas droit Ã une action civile en dommages-intÃ©rÃªts (ibid) . Voir Ã©galement Cummings v/Birkenhead Corporation (1972) 1, Chapitre 12 . Enfin, les requÃ©rants font valoir, en ce qui concerne l'action civile pour voies de fair, que cette action ne fournit pas un recours pour se plaindre d'un traitement ou d'un chÃ timent dÃ©gradant contraire Ã l'a rticle 3 de la Convention, mais seulement â¢un moyen dÃ©tournÃ© de redressement Â» au sens oÃ¹ la Cour l'a indiquÃ© dans l'arrÃªt (par . 29) rendu dans l'affaire Deweer et que, dans la mesure oÃ¹ il s'agirait bien d'un recours, il a Ã©tÃ© Ã©puisÃ© en l'espÃ¨ce .
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Concernant la rÃ©gie des six moi s Les requÃ©rantes soutiennent que la rÃ¨gle des six mois figurant Ã l'article 26 ne s'applique pas lorsqu'il s'agit d'allÃ©gations de violations de l'article 3 de la Convention et de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel . Ces violations constituent en effet une â¢ situation continue . au sens de lajurisprudence de la Commission (cf . Rapport dans l'affaire De Becker, Annuaire 5, p . 320) et le dÃ©lai de six mois ne pourrait dÃ¨s lors commencer Ã courir qu'Ã partir du moment oÃ¹ prend fin la pratique Ã©tatique . Au demeurant, les violations allÃ©guÃ©es ont d'abord Ã©tÃ© signalÃ©es Ã la Commission par un tÃ©lex des solicitors des requÃ©rantes en date du 3 dÃ©cembre 1980 (donc envoyÃ© dans les six mois qui ont suivi les coups infligÃ©s Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante) . La Commission en a accusÃ© rÃ©ception par lettre du 5 dÃ©cembre 1980 . En outre, si l'action civile constitue un recours interne, il a effectivement Ã©tÃ© Ã©puisÃ© et la prÃ©sente requÃ©te a bien Ã©tÃ© introduite dans les six mois suivant le jugement rendu par le tribunal de comtÃ© le I" avril 1981 .
EN DROI T Les griefs des requÃ©rantes po rt ent sur le chÃ¢timent corporel infligÃ© Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante par son directeur d'Ã©cole et sur le refus des autoritÃ©s de donner Ã la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante l'assurance que semblable chÃ¢timent ne serait pas appliquÃ© Ã son autre fille, L . La deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante soutient que ce traitement Ã©tait contraire Ã l'article 3 de la Convention . La premiÃ¨re dÃ©clare que le refus des autoritÃ©s de lui donner l'assurance que sa fille L . ne serait pas soumise Ã des chÃ¢timents corporels constitue une violation de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel Ã la Convention . De plus, les requÃ©rantes se plaignent de ne disposer au Royaume-Uni d'aucun recours effectif devant une instance nationale pour se plaindre des violations de l'article 3 de la Convention et de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel . Elles allÃ¨guent en consÃ©quence une violation de l'article 13 .
Sur l'article 3 de la Conventio n La Commission estime qu'il n'est pas contestÃ© entre les parties que les requÃ©rantes satisfont Ã la condition posÃ©e par l'a rt icle 26 de la Convention . Elle n'estime dÃ¨s lors pas nÃ©cessaire d'approfondir la question de savoir si l'anicle 26 serait inapplicable en l'espÃ¨ce en raison de l'existence d'une pratique administrative .
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S'agissant des coups de stick infligÃ©s Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante, les requÃ©rantes : ont invoquÃ© l'article 3 de la Convention, qui stipule : â¢ Nul ne peut Ãªtre soumis Ã la torture ni Ã des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dÃ©gradants . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a soutenu notamment que la punition infligÃ©e Ã la deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rante n'a pas dÃ©passÃ© le seuil d'humiliation nÃ©cessaire pour constituer une violation de l'article 3, dela Convention . Il soutient dÃ¨s lors que le grief tirÃ© par les requÃ©rantes de l'article 3 de la Convention doit Ãªtre rejetÃ© pour dÃ©faut . . manifeste de fondement . . , La Commission a procÃ©dÃ© Ã un premier examen de l'argumentation des parties sur ce point, Ã la lumiÃ¨re notamment de l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour dans l'affaire Tyrer (arrÃ©t du 25 avril 1978, sÃ©rie A, nÂ° 26) . Elle estime que cet aspect des griefs des requÃ©rantes, qui vient d'Ãªtre rÃ©sumÃ©, soulÃ¨ve au regard de la Convention des questions de fait et de droit dont la complexitÃ© appelle un examen du bien-fondÃ© de l'affaire et qu'il ne saurait donc Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ© manifestement mal fondÃ© . Cette partie de la requÃ©te est dÃ¨s lors recevable, aucun motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli .
Sur l'article 3 lu en liaison avec l'article 1 3 Les requÃ©rantes se sont .plaintes de ne pas disposer au Royaume-Uni d'un recours effectif pour faire valoir les griefs qu'elles tirent de l'article 3, ce qui serait contraire Ã l'anicle 13 de la Convention, ainsi libellÃ© : Â« Toute personne dont les droits et libertÃ©s reconnus dans la prÃ©sente Convention ont Ã©tÃ© violÃ©s, a droit Ã l'octroi d'un recours effectif devant une instance nationale, alors mÃªme que la violation aurait Ã©tÃ© commise par des personnes agissant dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions officielles . . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient qu'une action civile pour voies de fai t constituait un recours disponible et suffisant quant au grief contenu dans la requ@te au titre de l'article 3 . 11 soutientdÃ¨s lors que les griefs tirÃ©s par les requÃ©rantes de l'article 13 . lu en liaison avec l'article 3 . doivent Ãªtre rejetÃ©s comme manifestement dÃ©pourvus de fondement . Cependant la Commission, eu Ã©gard aux critÃ¨res dÃ©gagÃ©s par la Cour dans l'affaire Tyrer (SÃ©rie A, n" 26) estime que les griefs des requÃ©rantes sur l'absence d'un recours effectif au sens de l'article 13 posent eux aussi de difficiles questions de fait et de droit qui nÃ©cessitent un examen au fond de l'affaire et ne peuvent 2tre dÃ©clarÃ©s manifestement mal fondÃ©s . La requÃ©te est donc sur ce point recevable, aucun motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli .
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Sur l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel considÃ©rÃ© isolÃ©ment et lu en liaison avec l'article 1 3 S'agissant du refus de la commission rÃ©gionale de l'enseignement de donner l'assurance que L . ne serait pas soumise Ã des punitions corporelles, la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante a invoquÃ© l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel, ainsi libellÃ© : â¢ Nul ne peut se voir refuser le droit Ã l'instruction . L'Etat, dans l'exercice des fonctions qu'iI assumera dans le domaine de l'Ã©ducation et de l'enseignement, respectera le droit des parents d'assurer cette Ã©ducation et cet enseignement conformÃ©ment Ã leurs convictions religieuses et philosophiquesÂ» . La Commission constate que le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur ne conteste pas que le refus de la commission rÃ©gionale de l'enseignement de donner Ã la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante l'assurance qu'elle recherchait concernant L . pose un problÃ¨me sur le terrain de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel . Vu les observations des panies, la Commission estime que le grief tirÃ© par la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel pose d'importantes questions au regard de la Convention qui appellent, pour en dÃ©cider, un examen du bien fondÃ© de l'affaire . Aucun motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli, la requÃªte doit dÃ¨s lors Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable sur ce point .
Par ces motifs, la Commission Tous moyens de fond rÃ©servÃ©s , DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE RECEVABLE .
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| Mme X. et Mlle X. c. ROYAUME-UNI

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